THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
FRANK  J.  KLINGBERG 


TOWARDS  AN 
ENDURING  PEACE 


A  SYMPOSIUM   OF  PEACE 

PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 

1914-1916 


COMPILED  BY 

RANDOLPH  S.  BOURNE 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

FRANKLIN  H.  GIDDINGS 


AMERICAN     ASSOCIATION     FOR 

INTERNATIONAL  CONCILIATION 

NEW  YORK 


VAIL-BALLOU     COMPANY 
BINQHAMTON  AND  NEW  YORK 


CO!t«C« 

Library 

JX 


CONTENTS 

PART  I— PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT:   ECONOMIC 

PAGE 

Problems  of  Economic  Opportunity,  by  John  A.  Hobson  .      .  3 

Trade  as  a  Cause  of  War,  by  H.  N.  Brailsford   ....  9 

Economic  Imperialism,  by  H.  N.   Brailsford 15 

The  Problem  of   Diplomacy,  by  Walter   Lippmann    ...  22 

Socialists  and  Imperialism,  by  William  English  Walling  .      .  33 

The   Higher   Imperialism,   from  the  New    Republic    ...  38 

PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT:     POLITICAL 

Nationality  and  the  Future,  by  Arnold  J.  Toynbee  ...  43 
Nationality  and  Sovereignty,  by  Arnold  J.  Toynbee  ...  57 
The  Governmental  Theory,  by  G.  Lowes  Dickinson  ....  70 

The  Way  Out  of  War,  by  G.  Lowes  Dickinson 76 

Lowes  Dickinson's  Plan,  from  the  New  Republic  .  .  .81 
The  Morrow  of  the  War,  by  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control  86 
No  Peace  Without  Federation,  by  Charles  W.  Eliot  .  .  .108 

PART  II.     A  LEAGUE   OF   PEACE 

Bases  for  Confederation,  by  John  A.  Hobson 119 

Existing  Alliances  and  a  League  of  Peace,  by  John  Bates 

Clark        135 

Protection  of  Small  Nations,  by  Charles  W.  Eliot  .  .  .143 
A  League  to  enforce  Peace,  by  A.  Lawrence  Lowell  .  .  .  148 
The  Constitution  of  a  League,  by  Hamilton  Holt  .  .  .  160 
Pacifism  and  the  League  of  Peace,  from  the  New  Republic  164 

The  Economic  Boycott,  by  John   A.   Hobson 174 

Economic    Coercion,    by    Norman    Angell 184 

World-Or,ganization  and  Peace,  by  A.  A.  Tenney   ....   189 

iii 


1567180 


PART  III.  TOWARDS  THE  FUTURE 

PAGE 

The  New   Outlook,  by  Nicholas  Murray  Butler    .      .      .      .203 

Above  the  Battle,  by  Romain  Rolland 205 

The  New  Idealism,  by  Rudolf  Eucken 214 

The  Future  of  Patriotism,  by  Walter  Lippmann   .      .      .      .217 
The  Future  of  Civilization,  by  A.  E.  Zimmern    .      .      .      .221 
Towards   the   Peace  that   Shall   Last,   by  Jane   Addams   and 
Others 230 

APPENDIX:  PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROBLEMS 

I  INTERNATIONAL 

1.  Ford    Neutral    Conference    at    Stockholm     .      .  243 

2.  Central  Organization  for  a  Durable  Peace    .      .  247 

3.  Union    of    International    Associations    .      .      .  248 

4.  International  Bureau  of   Peace 249 

5.  International   Congress  of  Women      ....  250 

6.  Conference  of  Socialists  of  Allied  Nations   .      .  259 

7.  Conference  of   Socialists   of  Neutral  Nations    .  261 

II  UNITED  STATES 

8.  League  to   Enforce   Peace 264 

9.  National    Peace    Convention 264 

10.  World    Peace    Foundation 266 

11.  American    School    Peace   League 267 

12.  Women's  Peace  Party 268 

13.  New   York   Peace    Society 270 

14.  Socialist    Party    of    America 271 

15.  David    Starr    Jordan 273 

16.  Nicholas   Murray   Butler      .      .      .      ; ."   .      .      .  275 

17.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  .      .  276 

III  GREAT  BRITAIN 

18.  Union     of     Democratic    Control 277 

19.  Fabian   Society .      .      .      .   278 

20.  Independent  Labor   Party 296 

21.  National    Peace    Council 298 

22.  Women's     Movement     for     Constructive     Peace  298 

23.  Australian  Peace  Alliance   .......   300 

iv 


PAGE 

24.  Charles  Roden  Buxton    .  • 301 

25.  H.    N.    Brailsford 302 

IV  GERMANY 

26.  German  and  Austro-Hungarian   Socialists    .      .   306 

27.  "Deutsche    Friedensgesellschaft" 306 

28.  Manifesto  by  Eighty-eight  Professors  and  States- 

men      308 

29.  South  German  Social  Democrats 310 

30.  German    Socialists •     .      .      .310 

31.  Peace    Manifesto    of    Socialists 311 

32.  Dr.    Bernhard    Dernburg 314 

33.  Prof.  L.  Quidde 316 

34.  Ed.    Bernstein .     .  317 

V  FRANCE 

35.  General  Confederation   of  Labor 322 

VI  SWITZERLAND 

36.  Swiss    Peace    Society 323 

37.  Swiss    Committee    for    Study    of    Principles   of 

Durable   Treaty   of   Peace 323 

VII  HOLLAND 

38.  Nederlandsche  Anti-Oorlog  Eaad    (Dutch  Anti- 

War  Council) 325 

VIII  Norman  Angell  on  Differential  Neutrality  for  America  326 
INDEX  .  333 


INTRODUCTION 

When  the  storm  has  gone  by  and  the  skies  after 
clearing  have  softened,  we  may  discover  that  a  corrected 
perspective  is  the  result  of  the  war  that  we  are  most 
conscious  of.  Familiar  presumptions  will  appear  fore- 
shortened, and  new  distances  of  fact  and  possibility  will 
lie  before  us. 

Before  the  fateful  midsummer  of  1914  the  most 
thoughtful  part  of  mankind  confidently  held  a  lot  of 
agreeable  presumptions  which  undoubtedly  influenced 
individual  and  collective  conduct.  The  more  intangible 
of  them  were  grouped  under  such  name  symbols  as 
"idealism,"  " humanitarian  impulse,"  "human  brother- 
hood," "Christian  civilization."  The  workaday  ones 
were  pigeonholed  under  the  rubric:  "enlightened  eco- 
nomic interest."  Between  the  practical  and  the  aspira- 
tional  were  distributed  all  the  excellent  Aristotelian  mid- 
dle course  presumptions  of  the  "rule  of  reason"  order. 

And  why  not?  The  nineteenth  century  had  closed  in 
a  blaze  of  scientific  glory.  By  patient  inductive  research 
the  human  mind  had  found  out  nature's  way  on  earth 
and  in  the  heavens,  and  with  daring  invention  had  turned 
knowledge  to  immediate  practical  account.  The  struggle 
for  existence  had  become  a  mighty  enterprise  of  prog- 
ress. Steam  and  electricity  had  brought  the  utmost  parts 
of  the  world  together.  Upon  substantial  material  foun- 

vii 


dations  the  twentieth  century  would  build  a  world  repub- 
lic, wherein  justice  should  apportion  abundance. 

Upon  presumption  we  reared  the  tower  of  expectation. 

Yet  on  the  horizon  we  might  have  seen — some  of  us  did 
see — a  thickening  haze  and  warning  thunderheads.  Not 
much  was  said  about  them,  but  to  some  it  seemed  that 
the  world  behaved  as  if  it  felt  the  tension  of  a  rising 
storm.  With  nervous  eagerness  the  nations  pushed 
their  way  into  the  domains  of  the  backward  peoples. 
They  sought  concessions,  opportunities  for  investment, 
command  of  resources,  exclusive  trade,  spheres  of  influ- 
ence. Private  negotiations  were  backed  by  diplomacy, 
and  year  after  year  diplomacy  was  backed  by  an  ever 
more  impressive  show  of  naval  and  military  power. 

But  we  did  not  believe  that  the  Great  War  impended. 
There  would  still  be  restricted  wars  here  and  there  of 
course,  but  more  and  more  they  could  be  prevented.  The 
human  mind  that  had  mastered  nature; 's  way  could 
master  and  control  the  ways  of  man.  Economic  interest 
would  bring  its  resistless  strength  to  bear  against  the 
mad  makers  of  the  wastes  of  war.  A  sensitive  conscience 
would  revolt  against  the  cruelties  of  war.  Reason,  which 
had  invented  rules  and  agencies  to  keep  the  peace  within 
the  state,  would  devise  tribunals  and  procedures  to  sub- 
stitute a  rational  adjustment  of  differences  for  the  arbit- 
rament of  war  between  states. 

The  world  has  recovered  from  disaster  before  now,  it 
will  recover  again.  Presumptions  that  disappointed  have 
been  reexamined  and  brought  into  truer  drawing.  Ex- 
pectation has  been  more  broadly  built,  it  will  be  more 
broadly  built  again. 

There  is  conscience  in  mankind,  and  the  war  has  sub- 

viii 


limely  revealed  it,  as  it  has  revealed  also  undreamed  of 
survivals  of  faithlessness  and  cruelty.  The  presumption 
of  rational  control  in  human  affairs  has  been  foreshort- 
ened, but  not  painted  out.  In  the  background  stand 
forth  as  grim  realities,  forces  of  fear,  distrust,  envy, 
ignorance,  and  hate  that  we  had  thought  were  ghosts. 
Conscience  is  as  strong  and  as  sensitive  as  we  believed 
it  to  be;  reason  is  as  effective  as  we  presumed;  but  the 
forces  arrayed  against  them  we  now  see  are  mightier 
than  we  knew.  So  now  we  ask,  By  what  power  shall  con- 
science and  reason  be  reinforced,  and  the  surviving  forces 
of  barbarism  be  driven  back  ? 

There  is  but  one  answer  left,  all  others  have  been  shot 
to  pieces.  Conscience  and  reason  are  effective  when  they 
organize  material  energies,  not  when  they  dissipate  them- 
selves in  dreams.  Conscience  and  reason  must  assemble, 
coordinate,  and  bring  to  bear  the  economic  resources 
and  the  physical  energies  of  the  civilized  world  to  narrow 
the  area  and  to  diminish  the  frequency  of  war. 

But  how  ?  General  presumptions  will  not  do  this  time. 
There  must  be  a  specific  plan,  concrete  and  practical; 
a  specific  preparedness,  a  specific  method.  And  what  is 
more,  plan,  preparedness,  method  must  be  drawn  forth 
from  the  situation  as  the  war  makes  and  leaves  it,  not 
imposed  upon  it.  They  must  be  a  composition  of  forces 
now  in  operation. 

There  were  academic  plans  aplenty  for  the  creation 
of  pacific  internationalism  before  the  war  began.  The 
bankers  had  invented  theirs;  the  socialists,  the  concilia- 
tionists,  and  the  international  lawyers  respectively  had 
invented  theirs.  The  free  traders,  first  in  the  field,  had 
not  lost  hope. 

ix 


It  would  be  foolish  to  let  ourselves  think  in  discour- 
agement that  all  these  efforts  to  organize  "the  interna- 
tional mind"  were  idle.  They  were  not  ineffective. 
They  did  not  organize  the  international  mind  adequately, 
much  less  did  they  reform  its  habits,  but  they  quickened 
it;  they  organized  it  in  part,  they  pulled  it  together 
enough  to  make  it  powerful  for  the  work  yet  to  be  done. 

What  we  have  to  face,  then,  is  not  the  extinction  or 
abandonment  of  internationalism,  but  the  fact  that  the 
ideal,  the  all-embracing  and  thoroughly  rational  interna- 
tionalism lies  far  in  the  future,  and  that  before  it  can 
be  attained  we  must  have  that  partial  internationalism 
which  is  practically  the  same  thing  as  the  widening  of 
nationalism  that  is  achieved  when  nations  cooperate  in 
leagues  or  combine  in  federations.  The  league  of  peace 
may  be  academic  or  it  may  soon  stand  forth  as  a  tre- 
mendous piece  of  realism,  we  do  not  know  which,  but  the 
forces  that  are  holding  many  of  the  nations  together  in 
military  cooperation  now  are  present  realities,  and  they 
will  be  realities  after  the  military  war  is  over.  There 
will  still  be  tariffs,  but  the  areas  within  which  tariff 
barriers  will  no  longer  be  maintained  will  be  immensely 
widened.  Beyond  these  areas  will  be,  as  now,  various 
arrangements  of  reciprocity.  In  like  manner,  there  will 
be  a  determination  on  the  part  of  the  cooperating  na- 
tions to  stand  together  for  the  enforcement  of  interna- 
tional agreements  and  to  discipline  a  law-breaking  state 
that  would  needlessly  resort  to  arms.  The  international- 
ism of  commerce,  of  travel,  of  communication,  of  intel- 
lectual exchange  and  moral  endeavor  will  continue  to 
grow  throughout  the  world,  but  in  addition  there  will  be 
the  more  definite,  the  more  concrete  internationalism  of 


the  nations  that  agree  in  making  common  cause  for  the 
attainment  of  specific  ends. 

Within  this  relatively  restricted  internationalism  there 
will  be,  there  is  now,  a  certain  yet  more  definite  aggre- 
gation of  peoples,  interests,  and  traditions  upon  which 
rests  a  great  and  peculiar  moral  responsibility.  The 
English-speaking  people  of  the  world  are  together  the 
largest  body  of  human  beings  among  whom  a  nearly  com- 
plete intellectual  and  moral  understanding  is  already 
achieved.  They  have  reached  high  attainments  in  sci- 
ence and  the  arts,  in  education,  in  social  order,  in  justice. 
They  are  highly  organized,  they  cherish  the  traditions 
of  their  common  history.  To  permit  anything  to  en- 
danger the  moral  solidarity  of  this  nucleus  of  a  perfected 
internationalism  would  be  a  crime  unspeakable.  To 
strengthen  it,  to  make  it  one  of  the  supreme  forces  work- 
ing for  peace  and  humanity  is  a  supreme  obligation. 

FRANKLIN  H.  GIDDINGS. 


CONCERNING  THE  AUTHORS  QUOTED 

Jane  Addams  has  been  head  resident  at  Hull  House 
in  Chicago  for  many  years.  She  is  widely  known 
for  her  leadership  in  the  social  movement,  and  par- 
ticularly for  her  connection  with  the  International 
Congress  of  Women  at  The  Hague. 

Norman  Angell  is  the  author  of  "The  Great  Illusion," 
and  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  the  workers  in  the 
cause  of  peace.  He  is  also  the  author  of  "Inter- 
national Polity,"  "Arms  and  Industry,"  and  "The 
World's  Highway." 

Ed.  Bernstein  is  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  German 
Social  Democracy  of  the  revisionist  wing. 

H.  N.  Brailsford  is  a  prominent  English  traveler,  cor- 
respondent, and  essayist,  and  one  of  the  most  il- 
luminating writers  on  world-problems.  His  books 
include  "The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,"  "Shelley, 
Godwin  and  their  Circle." 

Nicholas  Murray  Butler  is  President  of  Columbia 
University,  Acting  Director  of  the  Division  of  Inter- 
course and  Education  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace  and  Chairman  of  the  Ameri- 
can Association  for  International  Conciliation. 

Charles  Roden  Buxton  is  a  prominent  English  Liberal, 
and  member  of  the  Union  for  Democratic  Control. 

John  Bates  Clark  is  Director  of  the  Division  of  Econom- 
ics and  History  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace  and  Professor  of  Political  Econ- 
omy at  Columbia  University. 

Bernhard  Dernburg  is  the  German  ex-Minister  of  Col- 
onies, who  spent  some  time  in  America  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  as  semi-official  spokesman  for 
German  opinion. 

Charles  W.  Eliot  is  President  Emeritus  of  Harvard 
University,  and  a  leader  in  the  peace  movement. 

Rudolf  Eucken  is  one  of  the  most  widely-known  of  living 
German  philosophers.  He  visited  America  in  1913. 
xiii 


G.  Lowes  Dickinson  of  Cambridge  University,  England 
is  author  of  " Letters  of  a  Chinese  Official,"  "Jus 
tice  and  Liberty,"  "A  Modern  Symposium,"  etc. 

Franklin  H.  Giddings  is  Professor  of  Sociology  at  Co- 
lumbia University. 

John  A.  Hobson  is  one  of  the  best-known  English 
economists,  the  author  of  "The  Rise  of  Modern 
Capitalism,"  "The  Science  of  Wealth,"  "The  In- 
dustrial System,"  "Towards  International  Govern- 
ment," etc. 

Hamilton  Holt  is  managing  editor  of  The  Independent. 

Paul  U.  Kellogg  is  an  editor  of  the  Survey  in  New  York. 

Walter  Lippmann  is  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  the 
younger  American  publicists,  an  editor  of  the  New 
Republic,  and  author  of  "A  Preface  to  Politics," 
"Drift  and  Mastery,"  and  "The  Stakes  of  Diplo- 
macy." 

A.  Lawrence  Lowell  is  President  of  Harvard  University. 

Romain  Holland  is  the  author  of  "  Jean-Christophe. " 
His  attitude  on  the  war  has  forced  his  exile  from 
France  to  Geneva.  His  eloquent  book  "Above  the 
Battle"  expresses  the  emotion  of  a  cosmopolitan 
soul  confronted  with  the  madness  of  a  world-war. 

Prof.  L.  Quidde  was  one  of  the  leading  German  pacifists 
before  the  war. 

A.  A.  Tenney  is  assistant  Professor  of  Sociology  at 
Columbia  University. 

Arnold  J.  Toynbee  is  the  son-in-law  of  Prof.  Gilbert 
Murray,  and  the  author  of  "Nationality  and  the 
War,"  and  "Greek  Policy  Since  1882."  He  is 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  students  of  problems  of 
nationality. 

Lillian  Wald  is  head-worker  at  the  Henry  Street  Settle- 
ment in  New  York  City. 

William  English  Walling  is  a  prominent  American 
Socialist,  editor  of  the  New  Review,  and  author  of 
"Socialists  and  the  War,"  etc. 

Alfred  E.  Zimmern  is  in  the  English  Education  service, 

and  is  author  of  "The  Greek  Commonwealth." 

xiv 


PREFACE 

The  aim  of  this  book  is  to  present  a  discussion  of  some 
of  the  most  hopeful  and  constructive  suggestions  for 
the  settlement  of  the  war  on  terms  that  would  make  for 
a  lasting  peace.  The  selections  are  taken  from  books, 
magazines,  manifestoes,  programs,  etc.,  that  have  ap- 
peared since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Part  I  contains 
a  discussion  of  the  general  principles  of  a  settlement, 
economic  and  political.  Part  II  contains  the  more  con- 
crete suggestions  for  the  constitution  of  a  definite  League 
of  Peace.  Part  III  presents  some  of  the  reconstructive 
ideals — "Towards  the  Future" — as  voiced  by  writers 
in  the  different  countries.  In  the  Appendix  are  collected 
definite  programs  for  peace  put  forward  by  associations 
and  individuals,  international  organizations,  etc.,  in  this 
country,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France,  Holland,  Den- 
mark and  Sweden,  and  Switzerland. 

The  books  quoted  form,  it  is  believed,  an  indispensable 
library  for  the  understanding  of  international  questions : 

"Nationality   and  the  War,"  by  Arnold  J.   Toynbee. 
New  York:  E.  P.  Button  and  Co. 

' '  Towards  International  Government, ' '  by  John  A.  Hob- 
son. 

"The    Stakes   of    Diplomacy,"   by   Walter   Lippmann. 
New  York:  Henry  Holt  and  Co. 

"The  Road  Toward  Peace,"  by  Charles  W.  Eliot.    Bos- 
ton: Houghton  Mifflin  Co. 

"The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,"  by  H.  N.  Brailsford. 
New  York:  Macmillan. 

"The  War  and  Democracy,"  by  A.  E.  Zimmern  and 
others.     New  York :  Macmillan. 

"The   World's   Highway,"   by  Norman   Angell.     New 
York:  Geo.  H.  Doran  &  Co. 
xv 


PART  I 
PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT 


PART  I.    PRINCIPLES  OF  THE 
SETTLEMENT:  ECONOMIC 

PROBLEMS  OF  ECONOMIC  OPPORTUNITY 

The    growing   dependence   of   modern    civilized    and  Most 

,  .   ,  ,  i    i    j  j.    •         £         j/u  •  e    Tf      international 

thickly  populated  countries  foi'  the  necessaries  of  life  quarrels  hare 
and  industry,  for  commercial  profits,  and  for  gainful 
investments  of  capital  upon  free  access  to  other  coun- 
tries, especially  to  countries  differing  from  themselves 
in  climate,  natural  resources,  and  degree  of  economic 
development,  is  of  necessity  a  consideration  of  increas- 
ing weight  in  the  foreign  policy  of  to-day.  Every  ac- 
tive industrial  or  commercial  nation  is  therefore  fain  to 
watch  and  guard  its  existing  opportunities  for  foreign 
trade  and  investment,  and  to  plan  ahead  for  enlarged 
opportunities  to  meet  the  anticipated  future  needs  of 
an  expanding  trade  and  a  growing  population.  It 
views  with  fear,  suspicion,  and  jealousy  every  attempt  of 
a  foreign  country  to  curtail  its  liberty  of  access  to  other 
countries  and  its  equal  opportunities  for  advantageous 
trade  or  exploitation.  The  chief  substance  of  the  trea- 
ties, conventions,  and  agreements  between  modern  na- 
tions in  recent  times  has  consisted  in  arrangements  about 
commercial  and  financial  opportunities,  mostly  in  coun- 
tries outside  the  acknowledged  control  of  the  negotiating 
parties.  The  real  origins  of  most  quarrels  between  such 
nations  have  related  to  tariffs,  railway,  banking,  com- 
mercial, and  financial  operations  in  lands  belonging  to 

3 


The  present      one  or  other  of  the  parties,  or  in  lands  where  some 

war   produced  .        .  '        . 

by  economic  sphere  of  special  interest  was  claimed.  Egypt,  Morocco, 
Persia,  Asia  Minor,  China,  Congo,  Mexico,  are  the  most 
sensitive  spots  affecting  international  relations  outside 
of  Europe,  testifying  to  the  predominance  of  economic 
considerations  in  foreign  policy.  The  stress  laid  upon 
such  countries  hinges  in  the  last  resort  upon  the  need  of 
"open  doors"  or  upon  the  desire  to  close  doors  to  other 
countries.  These  keenly  felt  desires  to  safeguard  exist- 
ing foreign  markets  for  goods  and  capital,  to  obtain  by 
diplomatic  pressure  or  by  force  new  markets,  and  in 
other  cases  to  monopolize  markets,  have  everywhere  been 
the  chief  directing  influences  in  foreign  policy,  the  chief 
causes  of  competing  armaments,  and  the  permanent  un- 
derlying menaces  to  peace.  The  present  war,  when  regard 
is  had  to  the  real  directing  pressure  behind  all  diplomatic 
acts  and  superficial  political  ferments,  is  in  the  main  a 
product  of  these  economic  antagonisms.  This  point  of 
view  is  concisely  and  effectively  expressed  in  a  striking 
memorandum  presented  by  the  Reform  Club  of  New 
York  to  President  Wilson : — 

Consider  the  situation  of  the  present  belligerents. 

Serbia  wants  a  window  on  the  sea,  and  is  shut  out  by  Aus- 
trian influence. 

Austria  wants  an  outlet  in  the  East,  Constantinople  or 
Salonica. 

Russia  wants  ice-free  ports  on  the  Baltic  and  Pacific, 
Constantinople,  and  a  free  outlet  from  the  Black  Sea  into 
the  Mediterranean. 

Germany  claims  to  be  hemmed  in  by  a  ring  of  steel,  and 
needs  the  facilities  of  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  for  her  Rhine 
Valley  commerce,  security  against  being  shut  out  from  the 
East  by  commercial  restrictions  on  the  overland  route,  and 
freedom  of  the  seas  for  her  foreign  commerce. 

England  must  receive  uninterrupted  supplies  of  food  and 
raw  materials,  and  her  oversea  communications  must  be 
maintained. 

4 


This  is  true  also  of  France,  Germany,  Belgium,  and  other 
European  countries.  privilege  is 

Japan,  like  Germany,  must  have  opportunity  for  her  ex-    t^primar 
panding  population,  industries,   and  commerce. 

The  foreign  policies  of  the  nations  still  at  peace  are  also 
determined  by  trade  relations.  Our  own  country  desires 
the  open  door  in  the  East. 

South  and  North  American  States  and  Scandinavia  are 
already  protesting  against  the  war's  interference  with  their 
ocean  trade. 

All  nations  that  are  not  in  possession  of  satisfactory  har- 
bors on  the  sea  demand  outlets,  and  cannot  and  ought  not 
to  be  contented  till  they  get  them.  , 

Nations  desiring  to  extend  their  colonial  enterprises  enter- 
tain those  ambitions  for  commercial  reasons,  either  to  pos- 
sess markets  from  which  they  cannot  be  excluded,  or  to  de- 
velop such  markets  for  themselves  and  be  able  to  exclude 
others  from  them  when  they  so  determine. 

The  generalization  from  these  statements  of  fact  is 
expressed  in  the  formula,  "The  desire  for  commercial 
privilege  and  for  freedom  from  commercial  restraint  is 
the  primary  cause  of  war." 

Now,  that  the  foreign  policies  of  nations  are,  in  fact, 
determined  mainly  by  these  commercial  and  financial 
considerations,  and  that  the  desire  to  secure  economic 
privilege  and  to  escape  economic  restraints  is  a  chief 
cause  of  war,  are  indisputable  propositions.  So  long  as 
these  motives  are  left  free  to  work  in  the  future  as  in 
the  past  there  will  be  constant  friction  among  the  com- 
mercially developed  nations,  giving  rise  to  dangerous 
quarrels  that  will  strain,  perhaps  to  the  breaking- 
point,  any  arrangements  for  arbitration  that  may  be 
made.  .  .  . 

Disputes  arising  from  these  economic  causes  are  even 
deeper  seated  and  more  dangerous  than  those  connected 
with  the  claims  of  nationality  and  autonomy.  Indeed, 
political  autonomy  is  shorn  of  most  of  its  value  unless 


tradrnitional  ^  *s  accompanied  by  a  large  measure  of  economic  liberty 
restricted.  as  regards  commercial  relations  with  the  outside  world. 
The  case  of  Serbia,  liable  at  any  moment  to  be  denied 
access  to  the  sea,  or  to  be  cut  off  by  Austria  from  her 
chief  land  markets,  is  a  case  in  point.  Or  once  again, 
would  the  autonomy  of  such  a  country  as  Hungary,  Bo- 
hemia, or  Poland,  however  valid  its  political  guarantees, 
satisfy  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  its  population  if 
high  tariff-walls  encompassed  it  on  every  frontier? 
Such  instances  make  it  evident  that  no  settlement  of 
"the  map  of  Europe"  on  lines  of  nationality  can  suffice 
to  establish  peace.  The  effective  liberty  of  every  people 
demands  freedom  of  commercial  intercourse  with  other 
peoples.  A  refusal  or  a  hindrance  of  such  intercourse 
deprives  a  people  of  its  fair  share  of  the  common  fruits 
of  the  earth,  and  deprives  the  other  peoples  of  the  world 
of  any  special  fruits  which  it  is  able  to  contribute  to  the 
common  stock. 

If  any  international  Government  existed,  representing 
the  commonwealth  of  nations,  it  would  seek  to  remove 
all  commercial  restrictions  which  impair  the  freedom  of 
economic  intercourse  between  nations. 

These  restrictions  are  placed  by  the  Eeform  Club 
Memorandum  under  the  four  following  categories: — 

First.  There  is  the  restriction  of  tariffs  imposed  by  na- 
tions. 

Second.  There  are  restrictions  upon  the  best  uses  of 
International  commerce,  of  the  terminal  and  land  transfer 
facilities  of  the  great  trade  routes  and  seaports  of  the  world. 
A  few  such  ports  command  entrance  to  and  exit  from  vast 
continental  hinterlands.  It  is  vital  to  these  interior  regions 
that  their  natural  communications  with  the  outside  world 
should  be  kept  widely  open,  and  this  is  equally  vital  to  the 
rest  of  the  world.  Obstructive  control  of  such  ports  and 
routes  to  the  detriment  of  the  world's  commerce  cannot  and 
should  not  be  tolerated  by  states  whose  interests  are  ad- 


versely  affected.     But  routes  and  ports  are  needed  for  use,    National 
not  government;  and  port  rivalries  constantly  tend  towards    groupg  control 
offering  the  best  and  equal  facilities  to  all.     The  swelling    foreign  policy, 
tides  of  commerce  are  clearing  their  own  channels,  and  mu- 
tual interests  will  more  and  more  prompt  the  states  through 
which  the  principal  trade  routes  pass  to  facilitate  the  move- 
ment of  commerce. 

Third.  There  are  restrictions  upon  opportunities  to  trade 
with  territories  ruled  as  colonies  or  being  exploited  within 
spheres  of  influence.  This  is  what  now  remains  of  the  old 
mercantile  system  which  flourished  before  our  Revolutionary 
War,  and  which  has  been  weakening  ever  since.  Great 
Britain  claims  no  preference  for  herself  in  her  colonies. 
Other  states  have  been  less  liberal.  The  fear  of  such  re- 
strictions being  applied  against  them  is  to-day  the  main 
motive  for  a  policy  of  colonial  oversea  possessions.  If  in- 
dustrial states  could  be  assured  of  the  application  of  the 
open-door  policy,  no  state  would  envy  another  its  colonies. 
Colonies  should  be  the  world's. 

Fourth.  There  are  restrictions  in  the  free  use  of  the  sea. 
Unlike  land  routes,  ocean  routes  are  offered  practically  with- 
out cost  to  all,  whithersoever  the  sea  runs.  Over  these, 
however,  until  modern  times  commerce  has  been  subject  to 
pillage  by  regular  warships  as  well  as  by  pirates.  The 
claims  of  commerce  have  been  more  slowly  recognized  on  the 
sea  than  on  the  land;  and,  to  an  extent  now  unthinkable  on 
land,  warring  states  still  feel  free  to  interfere  with  neutral 
traders.  .  .  . 

Another  factor  of  increasing  importance  in  the  recent 
conflict  of  nations  has  been  the  competition  between 
groups  of  financiers  and  concessionaires,  organized  upon 
a  "national"  basis,  to  obtain  exclusive  or  preferential 
control  in  the  undeveloped  countries  for  the  profitable 
use  of  exported  capital.  Closely  related  to  commercial 
competition,  this  competition  for  lucrative  investments 
has  played  an  even  greater  part  in  producing  dangerous 
international  situations.  For  these  financial  and  com- 
mercial interests  have  sought  to  use  the  political  and 
the  forcible  resources  of  their  respective  Governments 

7 


opposition*  to  ena^e  them  to  obtain  the  concessions  and  other  priv- 
determine  ileges  they  require  for  the  security  and  profitable  ap- 
poiicy.  plication  of  their  capital.  The  control  of  foreign  policy 

thus  wielded  has  been  fraught  with  two  perils  to  world- 
peace.  It  has  brought  the  Governments  of  the  compet- 
ing financial  groups  into  constant  friction,  and  it  has 
been  the  most  fruitful  direct  source  of  expeditionary 
forces  and  territorial  aggressions  in  the  coveted  areas. 
As  the  struggle  for  lucrative  overseas  investments  has 
come  to  occupy  a  more  important  part  than  the  struggle 
for  ordinary  markets,  the  economic  oppositions  between 
European  Governments  have  become  more  and  more  the 
determinant  factors  in  foreign  policy,  and  in  the  com- 
petition of  armaments,  upon  which  Governments  rely 
to  support  and  to  achieve  the  aims  their  economic  mas- 
ters impose  upon  them. 

John  A.   Hobson,   "Towards   International   Govern- 
ment," pp.  128-139. 


TRADE  AS  A  CAUSE  OF  WAR 
Decent  men  in  the  belligerent  countries  feel  a  natural  idealism  hides 

.  -!••».!        real  causes 

repugnance  in  time  of  war  to  any  discussion  of  the  of  war. 
economic  bearings  of  the  struggle.  If  nations  are  to 
fight  with  clear  consciences  and  single  hearts,  they  must 
fight  on  in  the  belief  that  any  objects  which  concern 
their  statesmen  beyond  the  objects  of  defense  and  na- 
tional security  are  purely  idealistic.  We  are  all  prag- 
matists  in  wartime ;  we  believe  what  will  conduce  to  vic- 
tory. Cool  observers  see  clearly  the  widening  out  of  an 
immense  range  of  colonial,  imperial,  and  economic  is- 
sues which  will  confront  us  at  the  settlement  and  after 
it.  But  these  things  are  not  debated  as  we  debate  the 
issues  of  nationality  in  this  war.  One  might  suppose 
from  a  study  of  our  press  that  we  are  much  more  vitally 
interested  in  the  fate  of  the  Slovenes  than  we  are  in  the 
trade  of  China. 

This  idealism  is  absolutely  sincere,  and  a  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  exaltation  of  emotion  which  belongs  to 
any  war  of  nations.  We  can  endure  the  thought  that 
our  young  men  are  falling  in  many  thousands  for  the 
liberties  of  little  peoples.  That  brief  statement  of  our 
aims  would  end  in  bathos  if  we  were  to  add  to  it  the 
subjection  of  China  to  Japanese  suzerainty,  the  parti- 
tion of  Turkey  into  spheres  of  influence,  the  acquisition 
by  the  Allies  of  the  German  colonies,  and  the  setting  up 
of  a  Russian  customs  house  at  Constantinople.  The  mis- 
chief of  this  obsession  is  that  the  very  field  which  stands 

9 


Our  need  is      most  in  need  of  illumination  from  critical  yet  idealistic 

organization  * 

to  make  thinking  is  left  in  a  half  light  of  semi-secrecy,  and  the 

change  with-  will  of  democracies  hardly  dreams  of  intervening  in  the 
clash  of  the  interests  which  divide  it.  Public  opinion 
and  the  fortunes  of  war  will  govern  the  settlement  of 
Belgium  and  Alsace,  but  in  our  present  temper  it  is  only 
too  probable  that  all  the  colonial  and  economic  issues 
involved  in  it  will  be  left  to  the  diplomatists  with  only 
the  interests  behind  them. 

The  penetrating  memorandum  addressed  by  the  New 
York  Reform  Club  to  President  Wilson  has  sketched 
broadly  but  with  sure  insight  the  commercial  and  colo- 
nial questions  which  helped  to  lead  up  to  this  war. 
None  of  these  issues  appeared  in  the  negotiations  which 
preceded  the  war,  but  most  of  them  were  latent  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  statesmen  and  even  of  the  peoples. 
The  curse  of  our  unorganized  Europe  has  been  that 
fundamental  change  has  rarely  been  possible  save  as  a 
sequel  of  war.  Diplomacy  was  always  busied  with  a 
pathetic  conservatism  in  bolstering  up  the  status  quo, 
or  in  arranging  those  little  readjustments  which  might 
just  avail  to  stave  off  war.  We  shall  not  banish  war 
from  Europe  until  we  are  civilized  enough  to  create 
an  organization  that  can  make  and  impose  fundamental 
changes  without  war.  The  best  we  can  do  in  the  mean- 
time is  to  prepare  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  brief  moment 
of  settlement  during  which  the  structure  of  Europe  will 
still  be  fluid  under  the  shock  of  war,  to  bring  our  ideal- 
istic and  democratic  forces  to  bear  upon  these  larger 
issues. 

The  Reform  Club's  memorandum  deals  with  three  of 
these  questions:  the  abolition  of  capture  at  sea  in  war- 
time, the  freedom  of  the  world's  straits  and  highways 
in  time  of  war,  and  the  exploitation  of  colonies  under  a 
system  of  protection.  The  system  of  legalized  piracy 

10 


which  permits  navies  to  prey  on  commerce  in  wartime  is 
undoubtedly  the  most  potent  incentive  to  swollen  anna-  incentive  for 

.     .  „  colome- — 

ments  at  sea.  So  long  as  it  survives,  the  opinion  of  the 
mercantile  classes  will  never  effectively  back  the  demand 
for  economy  in  armaments,  for  it  is  bound  to  regard 
navies  as  an  insurance.  The  question  of  the  ownership 
of  straits  stands  high  among  the  many  competing  causes 
of  bloodshed.  It  explains  the  German  struggle  for 
Calais  no  less  than  the  Allied  expedition  to  the  Darda- 
nelles. One  may  doubt,  however,  whether  a  proposal 
to  neutralize  any  of  the  more  vital  of  these  straits — the 
Straits  of  Dover  or  Gibraltar,  for  example — would  stand 
a  chance  of  calm  consideration  on  the  morrow  of  such  a 
war  as  this.  It  will  be  feasible  when  war  is  no  longer 
an  ever-present  terror ;  and  when  that  day  comes  it  will 
have  lost  its  importance.  Far  more  central  in  our  prob- 
lem is  the  general  question  of  colonialism.  It  is  a  com- 
monplace to  say  that  modern  industrial  peoples  desire 
colonies  almost  solely  for  economic  reasons,  and  that 
one  of  the  chief  motives  for  this  expansion  would  disap- 
pear with  any  approach  to  free  trade.  If  the  British 
colonies  had  not  granted  a  preference  to  the  mother  coun- 
try, and  if  French  colonies  were  not  hedged  about  with 
an  impenetrable  tariff  wall,  the  feeling  among  German 
industrialists  that  their  expansion  was  " hemmed  in" 
would  have  been  less  acute,  and  the  pressure  for  ' '  places 
in  the  sun"  would  have  been  less  powerful. 

But  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  question  of  markets 
is  as  potent  a  cause  of  armaments  and  war  as  the  com- 
petition to  secure  concessions,  monopolies,  and  spheres 
of  influence.  The  export  of  capital  means  much  more 
for  the  modern  politics  of  imperialism  than  the  export 
of  manufactured  goods.  The  conquistador  of  to-day  is 
the  financier  who  acquires  mining  rights  in  Morocco, 
loan  privileges  in  Turkey,  or  railway  concessions  in 

11 


and  for  con-     China.     The  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  and  our 

cessions    and  ,  „ 

monopolies.  place  in  the  European  system  has  been  governed  tor  a 
generation  by  the  occupation  of  Egypt,  whither  we  went 
in  the  wake  of  the  bond-holders.  It  explains  our  long 
bickerings  with  France;  it  helped  to  fling  an  isolated 
France  into  the  arms  of  Russia;  it  brought  us  finally 
into  the  disastrous  bargain  over  Morocco  which  underlay 
our  feud  with  Germany.  The  competition  of  national 
financial  groups  for  concessions  in  Turkey  or  China  is 
not  the  competition  of  the  market-place  at  home.  Be- 
hind the  financier  stands  the  diplomatist,  and  behind 
the  diplomatist  is  his  navy.  There  is  a  clash  of  armor- 
plates  when  these  competitors  jostle.  The  struggle  for 
a  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe  has  often  seemed  little 
more  than  a  race  for  the  force  and  prestige  which  would 
enable  the  dominant  Power  or  group  of  Powers  to  secure 
the  concessions  of  the  monopoly  spheres  which  it  coveted 
in  the  half-developed  regions  of  the  earth.  No  modern 
nation  would  openly  make  war  to  secure  such  ends  as 
these,  for  no  democracy  would  support  it.  Even  the 
half-evolved  democracy  of  Russia  recoiled  from  the 
Manchurian  War.  But  every  nation,  by  pursuing  these 
ends,  makes  the  armed  peace  and  the  unstable  equili- 
brium which  prepares  our  wars. 

The  remedy  is  so  simple  that  only  a  very  clever  man 
could  sophisticate  himself  into  missing  it,  and  it  is  as 
old  as  Cobden.  It  is  not  necessary  to  establish  universal 
free  trade  to  stop  the  rivalry  to  monopolize  colonial  mar- 
kets ;  it  would  suffice  to  declare  free  trade  in  the  colonies, 
or  even  in  those  which  are  not  self-governing.  To  deal 
with  the  evil  of  "concessions"  all  that  is  required  is  a 
general  understanding  that  financiers  must  win  their 
own  way,  by  merit  or  push  or  bribes,  and  that  the  doors 
of  the  embassies  will  be  banged  in  their  faces  when  they 
seek  support.  These  sentences  are  easily  written,  but 

12 


they  would  involve  the  democratization  of  diplomacy 
everywhere,   the   overthrow   of   the   colonial   group    in  declared  by 

'  «  •!•  »     i  •          i  «  international 

France,  and  the  conioundmg  ot  the  national  economists  agreement, 
in  Germany.  The  force  which  might  work  such  miracles 
is  nowhere  mobilized,  for,  with  all  their  will  to  peace, 
the  democracies  nowhere  understand  the  bearings  of 
these  colonial  and  commercial  issues  on  war  and  arma- 
ments. It  requires  some  imagination  to  understand 
that  when  two  embassies  compete  in  Peking  for  a  rail- 
way concession,  the  issue  may  be  determined  by  the 
balance  of  naval  power  in  the  North  Sea.  It  requires 
some  habit  of  observation  to  realize  that  because  this 
may  happen  in  Peking,  the  investing  and  governing 
classes  are  bound  to  keep  up  the  balance  in  the  North 
Sea.  The  nexus  is  none  the  less  simple  and  clear,  and 
it  will  hold  as  long  as  diplomacy  continues  to  engage  in 
this  disguised  imperial  trading,  so  long  as  capital  pos- 
sesses nationality  and  regards  the  flag  as  an  asset. 

There  are  none  the  less  ways  of  escape  which  are 
neither  Utopian  nor  heroic.  It  ought  not  to  be  utterly 
beyond  the  statesmanship  of  Europe  to  decree  some 
limited  form  of  colonial  free  trade  by  general  agreement 
— to  apply  it,  for  example,  to  Africa.  France  would 
oppose  it,  but  what  if  Alsace  were  to  be  restored  on  this 
condition?  To  open  a  great  colonial  market  to  Ham- 
burg, while  ending  the  dream  of  revanche,  would  be  to 
remove  the  two  chief  causes  of  war  in  western  Europe. 
American  statesmanship  may  ere  long  have  the  power  to 
propose  such  a  bargain  as  this.  For  the  plague  of  con- 
cession-hunting the  best  expedient  would  probably  be 
to  impose  on  all  the  competing  national  groups  in  each 
area  the  duty  of  amalgamating  in  a  permanently  in- 
ternational syndicate.  If  one  such  syndicate  controlled 
all  the  railways  and  another  all  the  mines  of  China  and 
Turkey,  a  vast  cause  of  national  rivalry  would  be  re- 

13 


f  moved.  The  interests  of  China  and  Turkey  might  be 
capital  inter-  secured  by  interposing  a  disinterested  council  or  arbi- 
trator between  them  and  the  syndicate  to  adjust  their 
respective  interests.  Short  of  creating  a  world  state  or 
a  European  federation,  the  chief  constructive  work  for 
peace  is  to  establish  colonial  free  trade  and  internation- 
alize the  export  of  capital. 

H.  N.  Brails  ford,  "Trade  as  a  Cause  of  War,"  The 
New  Republic,  May  8,  1915. 


14 


ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM 

The  evils  of  an  unrestricted  competition  for  conces-  ETU  of 
sions  and  monopolies  between  rival  financial  groups  influeno«."f 
backed  by  their  Governments,  are  so  notorious  that  diplo- 
macy has  found  several  typical  formulae  for  bringing 
them  to  an  end.  The  obvious  method  of  resolving  such 
conflicts  is  the  demarcation  of  spheres  of  "influences," 
"interest"  or  "penetration"  within  which  each  of  the 
competing  Powers  enjoys  a  monopoly  respected  by  the 
others.  This  method  is  open  to  two  grave  objections. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  rarely  adopted  before  a  ruinous 
conflict  has  exhausted  the  competitors.  For  years  or 
decades  they  carry  on  a  trial  of  strength  which  affects  not 
merely  their  local  relationship,  but  their  attitude  to  one 
another  in  Europe,  and  is  measured  year  by  year  in 
their  military  and  naval  estimates.  If  we  were  to  take 
the  sum  by  which  British  and  German  armaments  have 
increased  in  the  present  century,  it  would  be  possible 
to  allocate  the  increase,  roughly,  somewhat  as  follows: 
50  per  cent,  or  less  for  the  settlement  of  the  question, 
Who  shall  exploit  Morocco?;  25  per  cent,  or  more  for 
the  privilege  of  building  a  railway  to  Bagdad  and  be- 
yond it;  25  per  cent,  or  more  for  the  future  eventual- 
ities which  remain  unsettled — the  fate  of  the  Portuguese 
colonies  in  Africa,  and  the  destinies  of  China.  In  the 
second  place,  the  delimitation  of  spheres  of  interest  is 
almost  inevitably  fatal  to  the  national  existence  of  the 
country  partitioned,  and  as  inevitably  adds  a  vast  bur- 
den to  the  commitments  of  the  Imperial  Power.  Persia 

15 


bfc^ees"de  furnishes  the  obvious  illustration.  Sir  Edward  Grey  is 
pendencies."  clearly  resolved  that  he  will  not  allow  himself  by  the 
march  of  events  to  be  drawn  into  the  assumption  of  any 
direct  responsibility  for  the  administration  of  the  Brit- 
ish sphere.  It  is  a  laudable  resolve,  but  Russia  may  at 
any  moment  frustrate  it.  She  deals  with  her  own 
sphere  on  the  opposite  principle,  and  her  sphere  happens 
to  include  the  seat  of  the  central  government.  That 
government  is  already  a  puppet  of  Russian  policy,  en- 
joying only  a  simulacrum  of  independence.  How  much 
longer  can  a  government  which  is  not  a  government  con- 
tinue to  rule  the  southern  sphere?  Sooner  or  later  a 
choice  must  be  made.  Either  Russia  must  withdraw,  or 
some  separate  government  under  British  protection  must 
be  created  for  the  south.  Turkey  is  drifting  rapidly 
towards  a  dissolution  in  which  the  spheres  which  the 
Great  Powers  already  claim  will  be  formally  delimited. 
It  is  easy  to  predict  what  that  will  mean.  There  will 
be  first  provincial  loans,  then  provincial  advisers,  and 
finally  a  military  control,  under  which  each  of  these 
"spheres"  will  become  what  Egypt  already  is,  a  depen- 
dency of  a  European  Power. 

The  method  of  avoiding  financial  competition  by 
marking  off  zones  of  monopoly,  is  clearly  the  worst 
which  can  be  pursued.  There  are  alternatives.  Let  us 
consider  what  methods  might  be  followed  if  the  Powers 
were  sage  enough  to  shrink  from  the  terrific  conflict 
which  may  one  day  overtake  them  for  the  partition  of 
China.  China  is  so  thickly  peopled  that  crude  conquest 
presents  few  attractions.  Even  Japan  could  not  settle 
her  surplus  population  in  a  country  where  every  hill  is 
terraced  and  every  field  subjected  to  intensive  cultiva- 
tion. But  there  is  here  a  field  which  capital  is  already 
eager  to  exploit,  and  every  year  diminishes  the  resistance 
of  prejudice  and  inertia  to  its  ambitions.  The  attempts 

16 


to  mark  out  spheres  of  influence  have  so  far  been  tenta-  ^° 
tive  and  unsuccessful.  Our  own  claim  to  the  lion's  «Til- 
share,  the  Yangtse  Valley,  is  admitted  by  no  other 
Power,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  Foreign  Office 
still  maintains  it.  There  are  several  principles  which 
might  be  adopted  if  the  Powers  desired  to  avoid  the 
jealous  and  dangerous  struggle  for  concessions.  In  the 
first  place,  the  simplest  plan  and  the  best  would  be  the 
adoption  of  a  self-denying  ordinance  by  all  the  chief 
competitors.  Let  it  be  understood  that  British,  French, 
and  German  banks  may  compete  among  themselves  for 
railways  and  loans,  but  that  none  of  them  shall  receive 
any  aid  or  countenance  whatever  from  the  embassies  or 
consulates  of  their  respective  countries.  If  that  could 
be  decided,  the  allotment  of  concessions  would  be  set- 
tled either  by  the  merits  of  the  competitors  or  more  prob- 
ably by  their  skill  and  audacity  in  bribing  Chinese  offi- 
cials. One  may  doubt,  however,  whether  any  of  the 
Powers  has  sufficient  faith  in  the  honor  of  its  competi- 
tors to  enter  on  such  an  undertaking.  A  second  and 
more  hopeful  plan  might  be  borrowed  from  the  under- 
taking negotiated  by  France  and  Germany  over  Morocco. 
They  agreed  to  promote  cooperation  among  their  sub- 
jects, who  were  to  share  in  agreed  percentages  in  the 
coveted  opportunities  for  public  works.  A  vast  "pool" 
or  syndicate  in  which  all  the  rival  financial  groups  were 
represented,  might  be  left  to  internationalize  all  the  op- 
portunities of  monopoly  in  China  on  a  plan  which  would 
give  to  each  its  allotted  share  in  the  risks  and  profits. 
The  scheme  worked  badly  in  Morocco,  and  indeed  created 
the  friction  which  led  to  the  Agadir  incident.  Some- 
thing of  the  kind  existed  in  China  while  the  alliance  of 
the  banks  of  the  Six  Powers  subsisted,  and  it  eventually 
broke  down.  By  this  method  friction  may  be  avoided 
among  the  Great  Powers,  but  China  would  be  subjected 

17 


p^acl  Without 
destroying 

nationality. 


^°  an  intolerable  financial  dictation,  which  would  be 
none  the  less  oppressive  because  it  was  cosmopolitan. 
There  exists,  however,  in  the  Ottoman  Public  Debt,  a 
model  which  might  be  followed  elsewhere.  Its  council 
represents  all  the  bondholders  of  every  nationality,  and 
usually  maintains  good  relations  with  the  Porte.  If  the 
railways  of  Turkey,  China,  and  Persia  could  be  amal- 
gamated, each  in  a  single  system  under  a  cosmopolitan 
administration,  the  risk  of  partition  and  all  the  danger 
to  peace,  which  this  risk  entails,  might  be  removed.  The 
obvious  step  is  to  confer  on  these  syndicates  of  capital- 
ists an  international  legal  personality,  which  would  en- 
able them  to  sue  or  be  sued  before  the  Hague  Tribunal. 
Some  disinterested  council  nominated  by  The  Hague 
should  be  interposed  between  the  syndicate  and  the  State 
in  which  it  operates,  so  that  the  intervention  of  diplo- 
macy may  be  as  far  as  possible  eliminated. 

The  problems  raised  by  the  export  of  capital  have 
been  considered  in  this  chapter  mainly  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  creditor  State,  which  sees  its  diplomacy  in- 
volved in  the  process.  We  have  found,  so  far,  no  solu- 
tion which  is  satisfactory  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
debtor  nation.  The  inroad  of  foreign  capital  always 
means  for  it  some  loss  of  independence,  and  it  has  noth- 
ing to  gain  by  agreements  among  competing  Empires. 
It  may,  indeed,  keep  its  independence  by  playing  on 
their  rivalries.  Its  shadowy  autonomy  vanishes  when 
they  come  to  terms.  The  pacifist  and  the  nationalist 
are  here  divided  in  their  sympathies.  The  former, 
thinking  only  of  European  peace,  rejoices  when  Russia 
and  Britain  end  their  differences  by  the  partition  of 
Persia.  The  latter,  seeing  only  that  a  nation  has  been 
destroyed,  regards  the  agreement  as  a  peculiarly  evil 
development  of  Imperialism.  Both  are  right,  and  both 
are  wrong.  The  ideal  expedient  would  preserve  Euro- 

18 


pean  peace  without  destroying  the  victim  nationality.  j£®go 
To  propose  that  expedient  requires  an  excursion  into  Doctrine. 
the  realms  of  Utopian  construction.  We  can  propose 
nothing  which  seems  feasible  to-day,  but  a  solution  is 
conceivable  which  requires  only  an  easy  step  in  the 
organization  of  the  civilized  world  for  peace.  The  mo- 
tives for  the  partition  of  Persia  were  rather  political 
than  financial.  The  object-lesson  of  Egypt,  where  the 
occupation  had  its  origin  in  debt,  is  a  more  typical  in- 
stance of  modern  processes.  It  happens  that  the  Hague 
Conference  has  laid  down  a  principle  which  is  capable 
of  fruitful  extension  for  dealing  with  such  cases  as  these. 
The  Drago  Doctrine,  put  forward  by  Senor  Drago,  a 
jurist  and  statesman  of  the  Argentine  Republic,  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States  and  eventually  adopted  by 
all  the  Powers,  provides  that  no  creditor  State  may 
use  arms  to  enforce  a  liability  upon  a  debtor  State,  un- 
less a  decision  of  the  Hague  Tribunal  has  recognized 
the  liability  and  prescribed  the  method  of  payment. 
This  doctrine,  even  as  it  stands,  is  of  immense  value  to 
minor  but  civilized  States  like  the  South  American  re- 
publics, Portugal  and  Greece,  which  may  find  themselves 
obliged  to  defer  payment  of  an  external  debt.  The 
Hague  Tribunal  would  in  such  a  case,  if  it  realized  its 
opportunities,  act  as  a  good  County  Court  Judge  would 
do  at  home — refuse  to  admit  a  merely  usurious  claim, 
and  lay  down  terms  and  dates  of  payment  which  would 
admit  of  the  debtor's  recovery  from  any  temporary  dif- 
ficulty. 

But  to  defeat  the  more  unscrupulous  methods  of  the 
international  usurer,  this  idea  requires  some  amplifica- 
tion. It  may  be  necessary  for  a  debtor  State,  some 
grades  below  the  level  of  Portugal  and  Greece  in  civil- 
ization, to  mortgage  some  part  of  its  revenues,  and  to 
accept,  at  least  over  part  of  them,  some  degree  of  foreign 

19 


Permanent        control.     That  means,  if  the  creditor  country  has  also 
Bureau.  political  ambitions,  the  almost  certain  loss  of  its  inde- 

pendence. There  are  also  States  like  Turkey  which 
stand  in  need  of  expert  advice  for  the  reorganization 
of  their  finances,  but  dread  the  consequences  of  admit- 
ting any  foreigner,  who  may  perhaps  think  more  of  the 
interests  of  European  finance  and  of  his  own  mother- 
land, than  of  those  of  the  country  which  employs  him. 
To  draw  the  full  advantage  from  the  international  ma- 
chinery at  The  Hague,  there  ought  to  be  evolved  a  per- 
manent Credit  Bureau  to  which  weak  and  timid  States 
might  apply.  It  might  conduct  enquiries  into  their  sol- 
vency, lend  them  experts  to  reorganize  their  finances, 
help  them  to  negotiate  loans  in  neutral  markets  on  fair 
terms,  and  in  case  of  need  provide  the  commissioners  who 
would  control  their  mortgaged  revenues.  It  would  act 
as  a  trustee  or  as  a  Court  of  Chancery  towards  its  wards. 
It  could  have  no  political  ambitions  to  further,  and  the 
country  which  applied  to  it  need  not  tremble  for  its 
independence.  Persia  or  Egypt,  had  this  Bureau  ex- 
isted, might  have  turned  to  The  Hague  for  help.  If,  in 
the  end,  owing  to  civil  war,  or  the  hopeless  incapacity 
of  native  statesmen,  forcible  intervention  became  inevit- 
able, it  would  lie  not  with  any  interested  Power,  but 
with  The  Hague  itself,  to  take  the  initiative  of  summon- 
ing a  European  Conference  to  prescribe  the  nature  and 
limits  of  the  interference.  It  is  even  possible  that  the 
Bureau  might  be  used  as  an  arbitrator  at  the  request 
of  a  State  like  China,  hard  pressed  by  the  rivalry  of  Em- 
pires competing  for  concessions,  to  decide  between  them 
in  its  name,  and  to  appoint  a  neutral  adviser  or  board  of 
advisers,  who  would  stand  between  it  and  the  greedy 
Powers  in  the  allotment  of  its  financial  patronage. 

A  Europe  which  has  organized  itself  for  peace  will 
be  at  no  loss  for  expedients  wherewith  to  reconcile  th§ 

20 


appetites  of  capital  with  the  rights  of  nationality.  A  faxj^  £fugt 
spectator  of  the  moving  cosmopolitan  drama  which  is  ber™aade 
played,  the  world  over,  around  this  central  motive  of  humane 
the  export  of  capital,  can  readily  invent  attractive 
schemes  for  the  regulation  of  the  process.  But  such  ex- 
ercises tempt  one  to  ignore  the  dynamics  of  the  problem. 
The  same  primitive  forces  of  greed  which  in  earlier  cen- 
turies inspired  conquests  and  migrations  are  still  strong 
enough  to  grip  diplomacy  and  build  navies.  Our  first 
task  is  to  win  at  home  the  power  to  control  this  export 
of  capital,  to  check  it  where  it  disregards  the  current 
ethical  standards,  to  rebuff  it  where  it  would  lead  us  into 
international  rivalry,  and  at  last  to  use  it  as  the  potent 
servant  of  a  humane  diplomacy.  It  can  be  forbidden  to 
carry  the  devastations  of  slavery  into  distant  continents. 
It  can  be  checked  in  its  usurer's  practises  upon  simple 
States.  It  can  be  used,  if  it  be  firmly  mastered,  to  starve 
into  submission  a  semi-civilized  Empire  which  meditates 
aggressive  war,  or  draws  from  Western  stores  the  funds 
to  finance  its  own  oppressions. 

H.  N.  Brails  ford,  "The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,"  pp. 
241-253. 


21 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  DIPLOMACY 


The  chief 
problem  of 
diplomacy  is 
the  weak 
State. 


This  whole  business  of  jockeying  for  position  is  at 
first  glance  so  incredibly  silly  that  many  liberals  regard 
diplomacy  as  a  cross  between  sinister  conspiracy  and  a 
meaningless  etiquette.  It  would  be  all  of  that  if  the 
stakes  of  diplomacy  were  not  real.  Those  stakes  have  to 
be  understood,  for  without  such  an  understanding  diplo- 
macy is  incomprehensible  and  any  scheme  of  world 
peace  an  idle  fancy. 

The  chief,  the  overwhelming  problem  of  diplomacy 
seems  to  be  the  weak  state — the  Balkans,  the  African 
sultanates,  Turkey,  China,  and  Latin  America,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  the  Argentine,  Chile,  and  Brazil. 
These  states  are  "weak"  because  they  are  industrially 
backward  and  at  present  politically  incompetent.  They 
are  rich  in  resources  and  cheap  labor,  poor  in  capital, 
poor  in  political  experience,  poor  in  the  power  of  de- 
fense. The  government  of  these  states  is  the  supreme 
problem  of  diplomacy.  Just  as  the  chief  task  of  Amer- 
ican politics  to  the  Civil  "War  was  the  organization  of 
the  unexploited  West,  so  the  chief  task  of  world  diplo- 
macy to-day  is  the  organization  of  virgin  territory  and 
backward  peoples.  I  use  backward  in  the  conventional 
sense  to  mean  a  people  unaccustomed  to  modern  com- 
merce and  modern  political  administration. 

This  solicitude  about  backward  peoples  seems  to  many 

22 


good  democrats  a  combination  of  superciliousness  and 


and  the 
•    •  weak  gtate 

And  yet  the  plain  fact  is  that  the  interrelation  of 
peoples  has  gone  so  far  that  to  advocate  international 
laissez-faire  now  is  to  speak  a  counsel  of  despair.  Com- 
mercial cunning,  lust  of  conquest,  rum,  bibles,  rifles, 
missionaries,  traders,  concessionaires  have  brought  the 
two  civilizations  into  contact,  and  the  problem  created 
must  be  solved,  not  evaded. 

The  great  African  empires,  for  example,  were  not 
created  deliberately  by  theoretical  imperialists.  Ex- 
plorers, missionaries,  and  traders  penetrated  these  coun- 
tries. They  found  rubber,  oil,  cocoa,  tin  ;  they  could  sell 
cotton  goods,  rifles,  liquor.  The  native  rulers  bartered 
away  enormous  riches  at  trivial  prices.  But  the  trad- 
ing-posts and  the  concessions  were  insecure.  There  were 
raids  and  massacres.  No  public  works  existed,  no  ad- 
ministrative machinery.  The  Europeans  exploited  the 
natives  cruelly,  and  the  natives  retaliated.  Concession 
hunters  and  merchants  from  other  nations  began  to  come 
in.  They  bribed  and  bullied  the  chiefs,  and  created  still 
greater  insecurity.  An  appeal  would  be  made  to  the 
home  government  for  help,  which  generally  meant  de- 
claring a  protectorate  of  the  country.  Armed  forces 
were  sent  in  to  pacify,  and  civil  servants  to  administer 
the  country.  These  protectorates  were  generally  sanc- 
tioned by  the  other  European  governments  on  the  pro- 
viso that  trade  should  be  free  to  all.  .  .  . 

It  is  essential  to  remember  that  what  turns  a  territory 
into  a  diplomatic  "problem"  is  the  combination  of  natu- 
ral resources,  cheap  labor,  markets,  defenselessness,  cor- 
rupt and  inefficient  government.  The  desert  of  Sahara 
is  no  "  problem,  '  '  except  where  there  are  oases  and  trade 
routes.  Switzerland  is  no  "problem,"  for  Switzerland 
is  a  highly  organized  modern  state.  But  Mexico  is  a 

23 


Economic          problem,   and   Haiti,    and   Turkey,    and   Persia.     They 

penetration  *  •" ,  * 

into  weak  have  the  pretension  of  political  independence  which 
protected  they  do  not  fulfil.  They  are  seething  with  corruption, 
eaten  up  with  "foreign"  concessions,  and  unable  to  con- 
trol the  adventurers  they  attract  or  safeguard  the  rights 
which  these  adventurers  claim.  More  foreign  capital  is 
invested  in  the  United  States  than  in  Mexico,  but  the 
United  States  is  not  a  "problem"  and  Mexico  is.  The 
difference  was  hinted  at  in  President  Wilson's  speech 
at  Mobile.  Foreigners  invest  in  the  United  States,  and 
they  are  assured  that  life  will  be  reasonably  safe  and 
that  titles  to  property  are  secured  by  orderly  legal 
means.  But  in  Mexico  they  are  given  "concessions," 
which  means  that  they  secure  extra  privileges  and  run 
greater  risks,  and  they  count  upon  the  support  of  Eu- 
ropean governments  or  of  the  United  States  to  protect 
them  and  their  property. 

The  weak  states,  in  other  words,  are  those  which  lack 
the  political  development  that  modern  commerce  re- 
quires. To  take  an  extreme  case  which  brings  out  the 
real  nature  of  the  "problem,"  suppose  that  the  United 
States  was  organized  politically  as  England  was  in  the 
time  of  William  the  Conqueror.  Would  it  not  be  im- 
possible to  do  business  in  the  United  States?  There 
would  be  an  everlasting  clash  between  an  impossible 
legal  system  and  a  growing  commercial  development. 
And  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United  States  would  con- 
stitute a  diplomatic  "problem." 

This,  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  reason  behind  the  outburst 
of  modern  imperialism  among  the  Great  Powers.  It  is 
not  enough  to  say  that  they  are  "expanding"  or  "seek- 
ing markets"  or  "grabbing  resources."  They  are  do- 
ing all  these  things,  of  course.  But  if  the  world  into 
which  they  are  expanding  were  not  politically  archaic, 
the  growth  of  foreign  trade  would  not  be  accompanied 

24 


by  political  imperialism.  Germany  has  "expanded"  ££ 
wonderfully  in  the  British  Empire,  in  Russia,  in  the  political 
United  States,  but  no  German  is  silly  enough  to  insist 
on  planting  his  flag  wherever  he  sells  his  dyestuffs  or 
stoves.  It  is  only  when  his  expansion  is  into  weak 
states — into  China,  Morocco,  Turkey,  or  elsewhere  that 
foreign  trade  is  imperialistic.  This  imperialism  is  actu- 
ated by  many  motives — by  a  feeling  that  political  con- 
trol insures  special  privileges,  by  a  desire  to  play  a  large 
part  in  the  world,  by  national  vanity,  by  a  passion  for 
' '  ownership, ' '  but  none  of  these  motives  would  come  into 
play  if  countries  like  China  or  Turkey  were  not  politi- 
cally backward. 

Imperialism  in  our  day  begins  generally  as  an  attempt 
to  police  and  pacify.  This  attempt  stimulates  national 
pride,  it  creates  bureaucrats  with  a  vested  interest  in 
imperialism,  it  sucks  in  and  receives  added  strength 
from  concessionaires  and  traders  who  are  looking  for 
economic  privileges.  There  is  no  doubt  that  certain 
classes  in  a  nation  gain  by  imperialism,  though  to  the 
people  as  a  whole  the  adventure  may  mean  nothing  more 
than  an  increased  burden  of  taxes. 

Some  pacifists  have  attempted  to  deny  that  a  nation 
could  ever  gain  anything  by  political  control  of  weak 
states.  They  have  not  defined  the  "nation."  What 
they  overlook  is  that  even  the  most  advanced  nations  are 
governed,  not  by  the  "people,"  but  by  groups  with 
special  interests.  These  groups  do  gain,  just  as  the  rail- 
road men  who  controlled  American  legislatures  gained. 
A  knot  of  traders  closely  in  league  with  the  colonial 
office  of  a  great  Power  can  make  a  good  deal  of  money 
out  of  its  friendships.  Every  government  has  contracts 
to  be  let,  franchises  to  give;  it  establishes  tariffs,  fixes 
railroad  rates,  apportions  taxes,  creates  public  works, 
builds  roads.  To  be  favored  by  that  power  is  to  be 

25 


The 

backward 
States    are 
the  arenas  of 
international 
friction 


favored  indeed.  The  favoritism  may  cost  the  mother- 
land and  the  colony  dear,  but  the  colonial  merchant  is 
not  a  philanthropist.  .  .  . 

The  whole  situation  might  be  summed  up  by  saying 
that  the  commercial  development  of  the  world  will  not 
wait  until  each  territory  has  created  for  itself  a  stable 
and  fairly  modern  political  system.  By  some  means  or 
other  the  weak  states  have  to  be  brought  within  the 
framework  of  commercial  administration.  Their  inde- 
pendence and  integrity,  so-called,  are  dependent  upon 
their  creating  conditions  under  which  world-wide  busi- 
ness can  be  conducted.  The  pressure  to  organize  the 
globe  is  enormous.  .  .  . 

Out  of  this  complexity  of  motive  there  is  created  a 
union  of  various  groups  on  the  imperial  program:  the 
diplomatic  group  is  interested  primarily  in  prestige ;  the 
military  group  in  an  opportunity  to  act;  the  bureau- 
cratic in  the  creation  of  new  positions;  the  financial 
groups  in  safeguarding  investments;  traders  in  securing 
protection  and  privileges,  religious  groups  in  civilizing 
the  heathen,  the  ' '  intellectuals, ' '  in  realizing  theories  of 
expansion  and  carrying  out  "manifest  destinies,"  the 
people  generally  in  adventure  and  glory  and  the  sense 
of  being  great.  These  interested  groups  severally  con- 
trol public  opinion,  and  under  modern  methods  of  pub- 
licity public  opinion  is  easily  "educated." 

Who  should  intervene  in  backward  states,  what  the 
intervention  shall  mean,  how  the  protectorate  shall  be 
conducted — this  is  the  bone  and  sinew  of  modern  diplo- 
macy. The  weak  spots  of  the  world  are  the  arenas  of 
friction.  This  friction  is  increased  and  made  popular 
by  frontier  disputes  over  Alsace-Lorraine  or  Italia  Ir- 
redenta, but  in  my  judgment  the  boundary  lines  of  Eu- 
rope are  not  the  grand  causes  of  diplomatic  struggle. 
Signor  Ferrero  confessed  recently  that  the  present  gen- 

26 


eration  of  Italians  had  all  but  forgotten  Italia  Irredenta,  w*  gai£  of 
and  the  Kevanche  has  been  a  decadent  French  dream  prestige  in 
until  the  Entente  and  the  Dual  Alliance  began  to  clash  countries.6 
in  Morocco,  in  Turkey,  in  China.    Alsace-Lorraine  has 
no  doubt  kept  alive  suspicion  of  Germany,  and  predis- 
posed French  opinion  to  inflicting  diplomatic  defeats  in 
Morocco.     But  the  arena  where  the  European  Powers 
really  measure  their  strength  against  each  other  is  in 
the  Balkans,  in  Africa,  and  in  Asia.  .  .  . 

This  war  is  fought  not  for  specific  possessions,  but 
for  that  diplomatic  prestige  and  leadership  which  are 
required  to  solve  all  the  different  problems.  It  is  like 
a  great  election  to  decide  who  shall  have  the  supreme 
power  in  the  Concert  of  Europe.  Austria  began  the 
contest  to  secure  her  position  as  a  great  Power  in  the 
Balkans;  Kussia  entered  it  to  thwart  this  ambition; 
France  was  engaged  because  German  diplomatic  su- 
premacy would  reduce  France  to  a  "second-class 
power,"  which  means  a  power  that  holds  world  power 
on  sufferance;  England  could  not  afford  to  see  France 
"crushed"  or  Belgium  annexed  because  British  impe- 
rialism cannot  alone  cope  with  the  vigor  of  Germany; 
Germany  felt  herself  "encircled,"  which  meant  that 
wherever  she  went — to  Morocco,  Asia  Minor,  or  China — 
there  a  coalition  was  ready  to  thwart  her.  The  ultimate 
question  involved  was  this :  whenever  in  the  future  diplo- 
mats meet  to  settle  a  problem  in  the  backward  countries, 
which  European  nation  shall  be  listened  to  most  ear- 
nestly? What  shall  be  the  relative  prestige  of  Germans 
and  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen  and  Russians;  what 
sense  of  their  power,  what  historical  halo,  what  threat 
of  force,  what  stimulus  to  admiration  shall  they  possess? 
To  lose  this  war  will  be  like  being  a  Republican  poli- 
tician in  the  solid  South  when  the  Democrats  are  in 

27 


^obiem  is        power  at  Washington.     It  will  mean  political,  social, 

due  to  com-       and  economic  inferiority. 

unorgTnizId  Americans  have  every  reason  to  understand  the  dan- 
gers of  unorganized  territory,  to  realize  clearly  why  it 
is  a  ' '  problem. ' '  Our  Civil  War  was  preceded  by  thirty 
or  forty  years  of  diplomatic  struggle  for  a  balance  of 
power  in  the  West.  Should  the  West  be  slave  or  free, 
that  is,  should  it  be  the  scene  of  homesteads  and  free 
labor,  or  of  plantations  and  slaves?  Should  it  be  formed 
into  States  which  sent  senators  and  representatives  to 
support  the  South  or  the  North?  We  were  virtually 
two  nations,  each  trying  to  upset  the  balance  of  power 
in  its  own  favor.  And  when  the  South  saw  that  it  was 
beaten,  that  is  to  say  ' '  encircled, ' '  when  its  place  in  the 
Western  sun  was  denied,  the  South  seceded  and  fought. 
Until  the  problem  or  organizing  the  West  had  been  set- 
tled, peace  and  federal  union  were  impossible. 

The  world's  problem  is  the  same  problem  tremen- 
dously magnified  and  complicated. 

The  point  I  have  been  making  will,  I  fear,  seem  a  par- 
adox to  many  readers, — that  the  anarchy  of  the  world 
is  due  to  the  backwardness  of  weak  states ;  that  the  mod- 
ern nations  have  lived  in  an  armed  peace  and  collapsed 
into  hideous  warfare  because  in  Asia,  Africa,  the  Bal- 
kans, Central  and  South  America  there  are  rich  terri- 
tories in  which  weakness  invites  exploitation,  in  which 
inefficiency  and  corruption  invite  imperial  expansion, 
in  which  the  prizes  are  so  great  that  the  competition 
for  them  is  to  the  knife. 

This  is  the  world  problem  upon  which  all  schemes  for 
arbitration,  leagues  of  peace,  reduction  of  armaments 
must  prove  themselves.  The  diplomats  have  in  general 
recognized  this.  It  was  commonly  said  for  a  generation 
that  Europe  would  be  lucky  if  it  escaped  a  general  war 
over  the  breakup  of  Turkey  in  Europe.  The  Sick  Man 

28 


has  infected  the  Continent.     Our  own  "preparedness"  European 
campaign  is  based  on  the  fear  that  the  defenselessness  {^"'"^t 
of  Latin  America  will  invite  European  aggression,  that  problem, 
the  defenselessness  of  China  will  bring  on  a  struggle  in 
the  Pacific.     Few  informed  people  imagine  for  a  mo- 
ment that  any  nation  of  the  world  contemplates  seizing 
or  holding  our  own  territory.     That  would  be  an  ad- 
venture so  ridiculous  that  no  statesman  would  think  of 
it.     If  we  get  into  trouble  it  will  be  over  some  place  like 
Mexico,   or  Haiti,  or  the  Philippines,  or  the  Panama 
Canal,  or  Manchuria,  or  Hawaii.  .  .  . 

Europe  has  also  recognized  that  some  kind  of  world 
government  must  be  created.  The  phrase  world  gov- 
ernment, of  course,  arouses  immediate  opposition;  the 
idea  of  a  European  legislature  would  be  pronounced 
Utopian.  Yet  there  have  been  a  number  of  European 
legislatures.  The  Berlin  Conference  of  1885  was  called 
to  discuss  "freedom  of  commerce  in  the  basin  and 
mouths  of  the  Congo;  application  to  the  Congo  and 
Niger  of  the  principles  adopted  at  the  Congress  of  Vi- 
enna with  a  view  to  preserve  freedom  of  navigation  on 
certain  international  rivers  .  .  .  and  a  definition  of 
formalities  to  be  observed  so  that  new  occupations  on 
the  African  coasts  shall  be  deemed  effective."  The 
Powers  represented  made  all  sorts  of  reservations,  but 
they  managed  to  pass  a  ' '  General  Act  of  the  West  Afri- 
can Conference."  The  Congo  Free  State  was  recog- 
nized. As  Mr.  Harris  says:  "Bismarck  saw  in  this  a 
means  of  preventing  armed  conflict  over  the  Congo  Ba- 
sin, of  restricting  the  Portuguese  advance,  and  of  pre- 
serving the  region  to  free  trade."  What  was  it  that 
Bismarck  saw?  He  saw  that  the  great  wealth  of  the 
Congo  and  its  political  weakness  might  make  trouble  in 
Europe  unless  the  Congo  was  organized  into  the  legal 
structure  of  the  world. 

29 


Conference  at  Algeciras  was  an  international 
legislature  in  which  even  the  United  States  was  repre- 
sented; the  London  Conference  after  the  Balkan  wars 
was  a  gathering  of  ambassadors  trying  to  legislate  out 
of  existence  the  sources  of  European  trouble  in  the  Bal- 
kans. But  all  these  legislatures  have  had  one  great 
fault.  They  met,  they  passed  laws,  they  adjourned,  and 
left  the  enforcement  of  their  mandate  to  the  conscience 
of  the  individual  Powers.  The  legislature  was  interna- 
tional, but  the  executive  was  merely  national.  The  leg- 
islature moreover  had  no  way  of  checking  up  or  control- 
ling the  executive.  The  representatives  of  all  the  na- 
tions would  pass  laws  for  the  government  of  weak  ter- 
ritories, but  the  translation  of  those  laws  into  practise 
was  left  to  the  colonial  bureaucrats  of  some  one  nation. 

If  the  law  was  not  carried  out,  to  whom  would  an 
appeal  be  made?  Not  to  the  Conference,  for  it  had 
ceased  to  exist.  There  was  no  way  in  which  a  European 
legislature  could  recall  the  officials  who  did  not  obey  its 
will.  Those  officials  were  responsible  to  their  home 
government,  although  they  were  supposed  to  be  execut- 
ing a  European  mandate.  Those  who  were  injured  had 
also  to  appeal  to  their  home  government,  and  the  only 
way  to  remedy  an  abuse  or  even  sift  out  the  truth  of 
an  allegation  was  by  negotiation  between  the  Powers. 
This  raised  the  question  of  their  sovereignty,  called 
forth  patriotic  feeling,  revived  a  thousand  memories, 
and  made  any  satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  Euro- 
pean Act  or  any  criticism  of  its  administration  a  highly 
explosive  adventure. 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  Congress  had  power  to 
pass  laws,  but  that  the  execution  of  them  was  left  to  the 
States.  Suppose  New  York  had  its  own  notions  of  tariff 
administration.  How  would  the  other  States  compel  the 
New  York  customs  officials  to  execute  the  spirit  and  let- 

30 


ter  of  the  Federal  law?     Suppose  every  criticism  by 
Pennsylvania  of  a  New  York  Collector  was  regarded  as  senate  for 

•       A     •  *»     ik.  T  TT        19  •  it  6RCn  AF6nft 

an  infringement  of  New  York  s  sovereignty,  as  a  blow  of  friction, 
at  New  York's  pride,  what  kind  of  chaos  would  we  suf- 
fer from?     Yet  that  is  the  plight  of  our  world  society. 

The  beginnings  of  a  remedy  would  seem  to  lie  in  not 
disbanding  these  European  conferences  when  they  have 
passed  a  law.  They  ought  to  continue  in  existence  as  a 
kind  of  senate,  meeting  from  time  to  time.  They  ought 
to  regard  themselves  as  watchers  over  the  legislation 
which  they  have  passed.  To  them  could  be  brought 
grievances,  by  them  amendments  could  be  passed  when 
needed.  The  colonial  officials  should  at  least  be  made  to 
report  to  this  senate,  and  all  important  matters  of  policy 
should  be  laid  open  to  its  criticism  and  suggestion.  In 
this  way  a  problem  like  that  of  Morocco,  for  example, 
might  be  kept  localized  to  a  permanent  European  Con- 
ference on  Morocco.  Europe  would  never  lose  its  grip 
on  the  situation,  because  it  would  have  representatives 
on  the  spot  watching  the  details  of  administration,  in  a 
position  to  learn  the  facts,  and  with  a  real  opportunity 
for  stating  grievances. 

The  development  of  such  a  senate  would  probably  be 
towards  an  increasing  control  of  colonial  officials.  At 
first  it  would  have  no  power  of  appointment  or  removal. 
It  would  be  limited  to  criticism.  But  it  is  surely  not 
fantastic  to  suppose  that  the  colonial  civil  service  would 
in  time  be  internationalized;  that  is  to  say,  opened  to 
men  of  different  nationalities.  The  senate,  if  it  devel- 
oped any  traditions,  would  begin  to  supervise  the  bud- 
get, would  fight  for  control  of  salaries,  and  might  well 
take  over  the  appointing  power  altogether.  It  would 
become  an  upper  house  for  the  government  of  the  pro- 
tected territory,  not  essentially  different  perhaps  from 
the  American  Philippine  Commission.  The  lower  house 

31 


Preyention 
of  war  by 
international 
commissions 
for  unorgan- 
ized regions. 


would  be  native,  and  there  would  probably  be  a  minority 
of  natives  in  the  senate.  .  .  . 

An  organization  of  this  kind  would  meet  all  the  diffi- 
culties that  our  Continental  Congress  or  that  any  other 
primitive  legislature  has  had  to  deal  with.  There  would 
be  conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  puzzling  questions  of  inter- 
pretation, and  some  place  of  final  appeal  would  have  to 
be  provided.  It  might  be  the  Senate  of  European  rep- 
resentatives; but  if  the  Senate  deadlocked,  an  appeal 
might  be  taken  to  The  Hague.  The  details  of  all  this 
are  obviously  speculative  at  the  moment. 

The  important  point  is  that  there  should  be  in  exist- 
ence permanent  international  commissions  to  deal  with 
those  spots  of  the  earth  where  world  crises  originate. 
How  many  there  should  be  need  not  be  suggested  here. 
There  should  have  been  one  for  Morocco,  for  the  Congo, 
for  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  perhaps  for  Manchuria ;  there 
may  have  to  be  one  for  Constantinople,  for  certain  coun- 
tries facing  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Such  international  gov- 
erning bodies  are  needed  wherever  the  prizes  are  great, 
the  territory  unorganized,  and  the  competition  active. 

The  idea  is  not  over-ambitious.  It  seems  to  me  the 
necessary  development  of  schemes  which  European  diplo- 
macy has  been  playing  with  for  some  time.  It  repre- 
sents an  advance  along  the  line  that  governments,  driven 
by  necessity,  have  been  taking  of  their  own  accord. 
What  makes  it  especially  plausible  is  that  it  grasps  the 
real  problems  of  diplomacy,  that  it  provides  not  a  pana- 
cea but  a  method  and  the  beginnings  of  a  technique.  It 
is  internationalism,  not  spread  thin  as  a  Parliament  of 
Man,  but  sharply  limited  to  those  areas  of  friction  where 
internationalism  is  most  obviously  needed. 


Walter  Lippmann, 
87-135. 


'The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy/'  pp. 


32 


SOCIALISTS  AND  IMPERIALISM 
Possibly  we  shall  learn  nothing  from  the   war ;   at  Peace 

impossible 

the   present   moment  it  looks  that  way.     For  all   the  without 
world,  including  Socialists,  seem  to  be  divided  between  eco^oSfic0 
militarists  and  pacifists.     By  pacifism  I  mean  of  course  confllcts- 
the  movement  Socialists  have  attacked  for  fifty  years — 
up  to  the  present  war — under  the  name  of  "bourgeois 
pacifism,"  the  idea  that  disarmament,  the  Hague  Trib- 
unal, and  similar  devices  could  put  an  end  to  militarism 
and  war. 

In  one  sense  of  course  every  internationalist,  whether 
Socialist  or  Democrat,  is  a  pacifist.  Every  internation- 
alist is  opposed  to  war.  But  from  the  days  of  Marx 
and  before,  up  to  the  present  time,  all  Socialists  have 
been  prepared  for  certain  war-producing  contingencies 
which  can  be  abolished  neither  by  calling  them  "illu- 
sions," as  Norman  Angell  has  done,  nor  by  any  other 
phrases  or  exorcisms.  Nor  can  the  economic  causes  of 
national  conflict  be  avoided  by  disarmament,  Hague 
tribunals,  international  police,  or  abolition  of  secret  di- 
plomacy, as  proposed  by  the  Women's  Peace  Party,  the 
British  Union  of  Democratic  Control,  the  Independent 
Labor  Party,  etc.  In  a  word,  no  measure  dealing  with 
military  affairs  or  with  mere  political  forms  can  in  the 
long  run  have  any  effect  whatever — as  long  as  the  pres- 
ent conflict  of  economic  interests  between  the  nations 
remains.  The  whole  effort  of  the  bourgeois  pacifist  from 

33 


ofnations  *^e  Socialist  standpoint  is  to  attempt — in  spite  of  the 
do  conflict.  horrible  and  tremendous  lessons  of  the  present  war — to 
close  our  eyes  resolutely  to  the  great  task  that  lies  before 
us,  namely,  to  find  a  way  either  in  the  near  future  or 
ultimately  to  bring  the  conflict  of  national  economic 
interests  to  an  end. 

There  are  two  economic  forces  in  the  world  which  can 
not  be  conjured  away  either  by  words,  by  mere  political 
rearrangements,  or  by  any  action  whatever  with  regard 
to  arms — whether  making  for  more  armament  or  less 
armament.  There  is  no  power  at  present  which  can 
prevent  a  great  independent  nation  like  Russia  or  Japan, 
Germany  or  Austria,  where  the  political  conditions  are 
in  whole  or  in  part  those  of  the  eighteenth  century,  from 
declaring  wars  of  conquest  either  against  helpless,  back- 
ward or  small  countries,  or  against  the  economically 
more  advanced  and  more  democratic  countries  like  Eng- 
land, France,  or  the  United  States.  It  is  true  that  in- 
dustrial capitalism  now  preponderates  in  Germany,  but 
no  German  publicist  has  ever  denied  the  tremendous  in- 
fluence of  the  landlord  nobility,  both  over  the  govern- 
ment and  over  the  economic  and  political  structure  of 
German  society.  It  is  true  also  that  these  great  agri- 
cultural estates  are  partially  operated  under  capitalistic 
conditions,  but  the  position  of  agricultural  labor  through- 
out enormous  districts  of  Prussia  is  certainly  semi- 
feudal.  This  is  equally  true  of  Austria,  and  the  land- 
lord nobility  is  perhaps  even  more  predominant  in  Hun- 
gary than  in  Prussia. 

The  second  fact  which  can  not  be  conjured  away  by 
phrases  or  mere  political  rearrangements  is  that — under 
the  present  system  of  society — there  is  a  direct  conflict 
of  interests  between  all  nations,  even  the  most  civilized. 
This  is  why  Norman  Angell,  in  his  new  book  ("Arms 
and  Industry"),  is  at  such  great  pains  to  deny  that  na- 

34 


tions    are    economic    units    and    "competing    business  ^rkers 
firms."     His  denial  is  futile.  gain  from 

•n  3         •     T    •  -i       T      «  '  ii-i  »    successful 

Even  under  individualistic  capitalism  all  elements  of  imperialism, 
the  capitalist  class  have  a  greater  or  less  interest  in  the 
business  of  the  nation  to  which  they  belong;  under  the 
State  Socialist  policy,  which  is  spreading  everywhere, 
this  community  of  interests  is  still  closer.  Moreover, 
under  State  Socialism  even  the  working  classes  gain  a 
share  (of  course,  a  small  one)  of  whatever  profits  accrue 
from  the  successful  competition  of  one's  own  nation 
with  other  nations,  and  especially  from  such  competition 
in  its  aggressive  form,  "imperialism." 

Socialists  have  sometimes  denied  that  the  economic 
interests  of  the  working  people  of  the  various  nations 
conflict. 

Otto  Bauer,  of  Austria,  the  world's  leading  Socialist 
authority  on  Imperialism — who  was  to  report  on  the  sub- 
ject for  the  International  Socialist  Congress  to  have  been 
held  in  Vienna  last  summer — is  of  the  contrary  opinion. 
He  believes  that  one  of  the  worst  features  of  the  present 
system  is  that,  under  capitalism,  the  immediate  economic 
interests  of  the  working  people  of  the  various  nations  do 
conflict. 

Only  in  so  far  as  the  working  people  attach  greater 
importance  to  attaining  Socialism  than  to  anything  they 
can  gain  under  the  present  society,  are  their  interests  in 
all  nations  the  same.  In  so  far  as  the  working  people 
aim  at  an  improvement  of  their  condition  this  side  of 
Socialism  their  economic  interests  are  often  in  conflict. 

Moreover,  State  Socialism,  political  democracy,  and 
social  reform,  since  they  tend  to  give  the  working  people 
a  slightly  greater  share  in  the  prosperity  of  each  nation, 
intensify  the  workers'  nationalism  and  aggravate  the 
conflict  of  immediate  economic  interests.  This  is  why 
all  the  labor  union  parties  of  the  world  are  tending  in 

35 


Only  solution     the  same  direction,  as  that  in  which  the  German  Party 

is  industrial  » 

and  financial  has  been  so  clearly  headed  since  the  war — a  tendency 
aiization.  very  clearly  formulated  by  Vorwaerts  when  it  recently 

asked  whether  the  German  Party  was  not  becoming  a 
"nationalistic  social  reform  labor  party." 

The  bourgeois  pacifists  consider  war  to  be  the  "great 
illusion."  In  favoring  war,  under  any  conditions,  they 
say,  the  capitalists,  the  middle  classes,  and  the  working 
classes  are  all  mistaken.  The  only  people  that  gain  are 
the  officers  of  armies  and  navies,  and  armament  manu- 
facturers. It  is  needless  for  Socialists — believers  in  the 
economic  interpretation  of  politics — to  point  out  that 
such  a  conclusion  can  only  be  reached  by  an  abandon- 
ment of  the  economic  point  of  view. 

In  the  opinion  of  internationalists,  war  can  be  abol- 
ished neither  by  armament  or  disarmament,  nor  by  any 
measures  leading  in  either  direction.  War  can  be 
abolished  only  by  abolishing  the  causes  of  war,  which 
every  practical  man  admits  are  economic.  By  strength- 
ening already  existing  and  natural  economic  tendencies 
which  are  slowly  bringing  the  nations  together,  the 
causes  of  war  may  be  gradually  done  away  with. 

The  outlook  therefore  is  very  hopeful — provided  the 
intelligent  (if  selfish)  ruling  classes  of  the  great  capital- 
istic nations  (England,  France,  America)  decide  once 
and  for  all  to  place  no  hopes  either  on  militarism  or 
pacifism.  These  natural  economic  tendencies  indeed 
would  already  have  made  war  impossible  if  they  had  not 
been  impeded  by  artificial  obstacles,  such  as  tariff  walls, 
immigration  restriction,  financial  concessions  to  favored 
nations,  etc. 

Socialists  relied  upon  natural  economic  forces  to 
abolish  competition,  establish  the  trusts,  bring  about 
government  ownership,  and  prepare  the  way  for  demo- 
cratic ownership.  They  rely  upon  similar  economic 

36 


forces  to  bring  the  nations  together;  reciprocal  lower-  ^t^a ™°d 
ing  of  tariffs,  the  common  development  of  the  backward  undemocratic 

,  .  ,.  countries. 

countries  by  the  leading  nations,  the  neutralization  of 
canals — and  last  but  not  least,  the  modernization  of  Rus- 
sia, Japan,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  that  is,  the  full  estab- 
lishment in  these  countries  of  industrial  capitalism  and 
the  semi-democratic  political  institutions  that  accompany 
it — as  we  see  them  in  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
America. 

William   English    Walling,    "The    Great    Illusions," 
The  New  Review,  June  1,  1915. 


37 


THE  HIGHER  IMPERIALISM 

Cause  of  When  the  Socialists  in  the  belligerent  countries  voted 

fould  in  for  the  war  budgets  and  took  their  seats  in  the  war  cab- 

motlvM1:—  inets,  their  whole  attitude  towards  war  underwent  a 
fundamental  change.  It  is  true  that  in  Germany  and 
elsewhere  the  Socialists  berated  the  capitalists  and  mil- 
itarists for  bringing  on  the  conflict,  but  having  made 
this  protest,  they  acted  exactly  as  did  every  one  else. 
They  excused  themselves  on  the  ground  that  the  war  was 
defensive.  But  the  Kaiser  and  the  Czar  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  French  Republic  all  made  the  same  excuse. 
It  was  not  that  the  Socialists  did  not  have  power  to  put 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  their  governments.  They  did 
not  have  the  will.  They  were  forced  into  a  painful  posi- 
tion, where  their  love  of  country  struggled  against  their 
adherence  to  the  proletariat  of  the  world.  Despite 
themselves  they  were  moved  by  idealistic  considerations, 
which  according  to  their  theory  should  have  had  no 
weight. 

For  according  to  socialist  doctrine  the  great  events  of 
the  world  are  determined  by  economic  factors.  The 
idealists  may  speak  of  national  honor  and  national  duty, 
of  the  inviolability  of  treaties  and  the  sacred  rights  of 
small  nations,  but  the  cause  of  all  wars  is  really  to  be 
traced  to  the  clash  of  economic  motives.  If  we  are  to 
establish  peace,  we  must  found  it  on  the  customary  reac- 
tions of  selfish  men,  who  want  things  and  are  willing 
to  fight  for  them.  Peace  must  be  a  peace  between  men 

38 


aa  they  are.    It  will  not  come  by  preaching,  nor  by  na- 

tions  surrendering  their  ambitions.     It  will  not  come  of  nationalist 

.  ,  ,  ...  /.      i         capitalistic 

through  non-resistance,  through  the  submission  of  the  groups, 
meek  to  the  overbearing.  It  will  not  come  through  the 
nations  joyously  disarming  as  the  light  of  reason  breaks 
through  the  clouds.  Reason  is  not  so  simple  nor  so  un- 
related a  thing,  for  the  material  things  that  each  nation 
wants,  and  the  means  by  which  the  nation  gets  them, 
seem  to  the  nation  preeminently  just  and  reasonable. 
However  pompous  the  superstructure  of  ethics  and 
ideals,  the  solid  foundation  of  war,  as  of  other  social 
developments,  is  economic.  So  long  as  nations,  or  at 
all  events  their  ruling  groups,  have  conflicting  economic 
interests,  war  is  inevitable. 

According  to  the  Socialist,  therefore,  war  and  capital- 
ism were  inseparable.  War  must  continue  so  long  as 
the  wage-system  continued.  The  argument  was  simple. 
The  great  owners  of  capital,  earning  more  than  they 
could  consume  or  profitably  invest  in  home  industries, 
were  compelled  to  send  their  surplus  to  colonies  and  de- 
pendencies, where  a  new  profit  could  be  made.  With 
the  rapid  increase  of  capital,  however,  the  competition 
between  the  industrial  nations  for  the  possession  of  these 
agricultural  dependencies  became  keener.  Such  com- 
petition meant  war.  As  capitalism  approached  its  cli- 
max wars  were  bound  to  become  more  frequent,  destruc- 
tive, and  violent. 

If  this  theory  had  been  true  it  would  have  followed 
that  the  interests  of  capital  would  make  for  war  and 
the  interests  of  labor  would  make  for  peace.  The  day 
laborer,  with  no  money  in  the  bank,  would  not  be  inter- 
ested in  capital  investments  in  Morocco,  Manchuria,  or 
Asia  Minor.  He  would  have  no  national  interests  what- 
ever. But,  as  we  may  read  in  the  admirable  book  on 
"Socialists  and  the  War,"  by  William  English  Walling, 

39 


But  now 
competitive 
imperialism 
makes  way 
for  imperial- 
ism by  com- 
bination. 


a  few  Socialists  have  for  some  time  begun  to  recognize 
that  wage-earners  do  have  special  national  interests  and 
that  these  interests  may  be  directly  opposed  to  the  in- 
terests of  wage-earners  in  an  adjoining  country.  If 
Serbia  is  completely  shut  off  from  the  sea,  her  wage- 
earners  suffer  as  acutely  as  do  her  peasants.  If  Swit- 
zerland is  surrounded  by  a  wall  of  hostile  tariffs,  if  Hol- 
land and  England  are  deprived  of  their  colonies,  the 
loss  is  felt  not  only  by  great  capitalists  but  by  the  man 
who  works  with  a  trowel  or  a  lathe.  The  ultimate  in- 
terests of  German  and  British  wage-earners  are  identical, 
but  if  their  immediate  interests  conflict,  there  will  grow 
up  a  spirit  of  nationalism  in  both  countries,  and  wage- 
earners  will  clamor  for  a  national  policy  which  may 
lead  to  war. 

This  seems  to  shut  a  door  that  leads  to  peace.  But  in 
shutting  this  door  the  newer  Socialist  thought  has  opened 
another.  It  assumes  that  the  capitalists!  themselves  are 
increasingly  likely  to  profit  by  peace,  to  desire  peace, 
and  to  achieve  peace.  According  to  the  German  Social- 
ist, Karl  Kautsky,  we  are  approaching  a  new  stage  in 
the  industrial  development  of  the  world.  At  first  cap- 
italists exploited  the  resources  of  their  own  country. 
Then  they  competed  nationally  for  the  exploitation  of 
colonies  and  dependencies,  and  this  policy  led  to  im- 
perialism and  war.  Now  they  are  beginning  to  unite 
for  the  joint  exploitation  of  all  backward  lands.  Com- 
petitive imperialism  is  making  way  for  imperialism  by 
combination,  just  as  competitive  industry  gave  way  to 
the  trust.  English,  French,  German,  and  Belgian  cap- 
italists will  unite  to  exploit  dependencies,  will  have  joint 
spheres  of  influence,  and  the  result  will  be  peace  with 
profits.  Imperialism  in  the  old  sense  will  die  out,  and 
its  place  will  be  taken  by  a  pacific  super-imperialism, 
a  higher  imperialism. 

40 


What  this  theory  actually  means  is  that  the  normal  de- 
velopment  of  industry  and  finance  will  automatically  imperialism 
bring  about  international  peace,  and  that  socialism  and  with 
even  democracy  are  quite  unessential  to  that  end.  So- 
cialists may  cry  for  peace,  but  they  might  as  well 
cry  for  free  air.  But  the  theory  concedes  too  much 
and  goes  too  far.  It  is  tainted  with  the  same  ultra- 
rationalistic  spirit  as  is  the  earlier  socialist  theory,  from 
which  it  is  a  reaction.  War  is  not  fought  for  economic 
motives  alone,  although  these  are  important.  Serbia 
would  have  been  less  vindictive  had  Austria  conceded 
her  an  outlet  for  her  trade,  but  in  any  case  Serbia  would 
not  willingly  be  ruled  by  Austria,  nor  Bulgaria  by 
Greece.  Racial  pride,  religious  prejudice,  ancient  tradi- 
tions of  all  sorts  still  divide  nations  irrespective  of  eco- 
nomic interest.  You  cannot  reduce  a  nation  to  a  single 
unit  thinking  only  in  economic  terms. 

Moreover,  even  on  the  purely  economic  side  there  are 
infinite  chances  for  war  in  the  distribution  of  the  profits 
of  joint  enterprises  among  the  capitalists  of  the  various 
nations.  We  all  know  how  "gentlemen's  agreements" 
are  broken  as  soon  as  it  is  profitable  for  the  gentlemen 
to  break  them,  and  we  cannot  wholly  trust  irresponsible 
magnates,  whether  industrial  or  political,  to  be  even  in- 
telligently selfish.  Moreover,  in  the  present  state  of  the 
world  the  higher  imperialism  is  a  policy  fraught  with  the 
very  dangers  and  difficulties  which  it  seeks  to  evade. 
If  the  capitalists  of  Europe  were  determined  to  exploit 
South  America  under  a  joint  European  control,  the  de- 
cision might  directly  lead  to  war.  There  are  too  many 
vested  national  interests  in  colonies,  dependencies  and 
spheres  of  influence  to  make  internationalization  of  in- 
vestment an  immediate  specific  against  war. 

But  in  this  matter  of  the  higher  imperialism  we  are 
less  concerned  to  know  how  false  than  how  true  it  is. 

41 


£  vestment 
one  step 


It  is  a  thing  to  be  desired  if  it  circumscribes  war,  even 
though  it  does  not  end  war,  if  it  tends  towards  peace, 
even  though  it  does  not  by  itself  alone  assure  peace. 
We  believe  that  this  present  war  is  not  unlikely  to  end 
in  a  combination  of  great  nations  with  enormous  capital, 
willing  to  enter  upon  foreign  investments  jointly.  The 
great  capitalists,  who  influence  if  they  do  not  rule  our 
modern  industrial  nations,  will  often  discover  that  it 
is  cheaper  to  divide  than  to  fight.  It  will  be  better  to 
have  twenty  per  cent,  of  a  Chinese  loan  without  going  to 
war  than  thirty  per  cent.  —  or  nothing  at  all  —  after  a 
war.  They  will  strive  for  the  peace  of  "understanding" 
—  the  peace  of  give  and  take. 

If  the  big  speculators  can  thus  merge  their  interests 
and  deal  across  national  boundaries,  the  little  investors 
who  have  less  to  gain  and  more  to  lose  by  war  will  be 
even  more  pacific.  Farmers  and  wage-earners  have  a 
still  more  attenuated  interest  in  war,  and  a  still  more 
obvious  interest  in  peace.  Once  great  liens  of  peace  are 
established,  moreover,  many  of  the  incitements  to  war 
will  of  themselves  disappear.  .  .  . 

In  the  end,  however,  any  internationalization  of  in- 
vestment will  be  only  a  single  step  in  the  direction  of 
peace.  There  are  many  other  steps  to  be  taken.  Edu- 
cation, commerce,  the  development  of  an  international 
morality,  the  creation  of  machinery  for  dealing  with 
international  disputes,  are  all  essential  to  the  evolution 
of  peace.  Industrial  and  political  democracy  are  above 
all  necessary.  Men  must  be  given  a  full  life  and  a  real 
stake  in  the  wealth  that  peace  provides,  and  they  who 
bear  the  burdens  of  war  must  actually  determine  the 
national  policies  which  make  for  war  or  peace. 

The  New  Republic,  June  5,  1915. 


42 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SETTLEMENT: 
POLITICAL 

NATIONALITY  AND  THE  FUTURE 

For  the  first  time  in  our  lives,  we  find  ourselves  in  w»rhas 
complete  uncertainty  as  to  the  future.  To  uncivilized  ourcon6 
people  the  situation  is  commonplace;  but  in  twentieth- 
century  Europe  we  are  accustomed  to  look  ahead,  to 
forecast  accurately  what  lies  before  us,  and  then  to 
choose  our  path  and  follow  it  steadily  to  its  end;  and 
we  rightly  consider  that  this  is  the  characteristic  of 
civilized  men.  The  same  ideal  appears  in  every  side  of 
our  life:  in  the  individual's  morality  as  a  desire  for 
"Independence"  strong  enough  to  control  most  human 
passions:  in  our  Economics  as  Estimates  and  Insur- 
ances: in  our  Politics  as  a  great  sustained  concentration 
of  all  our  surplus  energies  (in  which  parties  are  becom- 
ing increasingly  at  one  in  aim  and  effort,  while  their 
differences  are  shrinking  to  alternatives  of  method),  to 
raise  the  material,  moral,  and  intellectual  standard  of 
life  throughout  the  nation.  From  all  this  fruitful,  con- 
structive, exacting  work,  which  demands  the  best  from 
us  and  makes  us  the  better  for  giving  it,  we  have  been 
violently  wrenched  away  and  plunged  into  a  struggle 
for  existence  with  people  very  much  like  ourselves,  with 
whom  we  have  no  quarrel. 

"We  must  face  the  fact  that  this  is  pure  evil,  and  that 
we   cannot   escape   it.    We   must   fight   with   all   our 

43 


strength :  every  particle  of  our  energy  must  be  absorbed 
in  the  war:  and  meanwhile  our  social  construction  must 
stand  still  indefinitely,  or  even  be  in  part  undone,  and 
every  class  and  individual  in  the  country  must  suffer  in 
their  degree,  according  to  the  quite  arbitrary  chance  of 
war,  in  lives  horribly  destroyed  and  work  ruined.  .  .  . 

The  psychological  devastation  of  war  is  even  more  ter- 
rible than  the  material.  War  brings  the  savage  sub- 
stratum of  human  character  to  the  surface,  after  it  has 
swept  away  the  strong  habits  that  generations  of  civil- 
ized effort  have  built  up.  We  saw  how  the  breath  of 
war  in  Ireland  demoralized  all  parties  alike.  We  have 
met  the  present  more  ghastly  reality  with  admirable 
calmness;  but  we  must  be  on  our  guard.  Time  wears 
out  nerves,  and  War  inevitably  brings  with  it  the  sug- 
gestion of  certain  obsolete  points  of  view,  which  in  our 
real,  normal  life,  have  long  been  buried  and  forgotten. 

It  rouses  the  instinct  of  revenge.  ''If  Germany  has 
hurt  us,  we  will  hurt  her  more — to  teach  her  not  to 
do  it  again."  The  wish  is  the  savage's  automatic  reac- 
tion, the  reason  his  perfunctory  justification  of  it:  but 
the  civilized  man  knows  that  the  impulse  is  hopelessly 
unreasonable.  The  "hurt"  is  being  at  war,  and  the 
evil  we  wish  to  ban  is  the  possibility  of  being  at  war 
again,  because  war  prevents  us  working  out  our  own 
lives  as  we  choose.  If  we  beat  Germany  and  then  hu- 
miliate her,  she  will  never  rest  till  she  has  "redeemed 
her  honor,"  by  humiliating  us  more  cruelly  in  turn. 
Instead  of  being  free  to  return  to  our  own  pressing 
business,  we  shall  have  to  be  constantly  on  the  watch 
against  her.  Two  great  nations  will  sit  idle,  weapon 
in  hand,  like  two  Afghans  in  their  loopholed  towers 
when  the  blood  feud  is  between  them;  and  we  shall 
have  sacrificed  deliberately  and  to  an  ever-increasing 
extent  (for  the  blood  feud  grows  by  geometrical  pro- 

44 


gression),  the  very  freedom  for  which  we  are  now  giving 
our  lives. 

Another  war  instinct  is  plunder.  "War  is  often  the  sav- 
age's  profession:  "  'With  my  sword,  spear  and  shield 
I  plow,  I  sow,  I  reap,  I  gather  in  the  vintage.'  If  we 
beat  Germany  our  own  mills  and  factories  will  have 
been  at  a  standstill,  our  horses  requisitioned  and  our 
crops  unharvested,  our  merchant  steamers  stranded  in 
dock  if  not  sunk  on  the  high  seas,  and  our  'blood  and 
treasure'  lavished  on  the  war:  but  in  the  end  Germany's 
wealth  will  be  in  our  grasp,  her  colonies,  her  markets, 
and  such  floating  riches  as  we  can  distrain  upon  by 
means  of  an  indemnity.  If  we  have  had  to  beat  our 
plowshares  into  swords,  we  can  at  least  draw  some  profit 
from  the  new  tool,  and  recoup  ourselves  partially  for 
the  inconvenience.  It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  irra- 
tional, impulsive  revenge,  perhaps  not  even  of  sweeten- 
ing our  sorrow  by  a  little  gain.  To  draw  on  the  life- 
blood  of  German  wealth  may  be  the  only  way  to  re- 
plenish the  veins  of  our  exhausted  Industry  and  Com- 
merce." So  the  plunder  instinct  might  be  clothed  in 
civilized  garb :  ' '  War, ' '  we  might  express  it,  "  is  an  in- 
vestment that  must  bring  in  its  return." 

The  first  argument  against  this  point  of  view  is  that 
it  has  clearly  been  the  inspiring  idea  of  Germany's 
policy,  and  history  already  shows  that  armaments  are 
as  unbusinesslike  a  speculation  for  civilized  countries 
as  war  is  an  abnormal  occupation  for  civilized  men. 
We  saw  the  effect  of  the  Morocco  tension  upon  German 
finance  in  1911,  and  the  first  phase  of  the  present  war 
has  been  enough  to  show  how  much  Germany's  com- 
merce will  inevitably  suffer,  whether  she  wins  or  loses. 

It  is  only  when  all  the  armaments  are  on  one  side  and 
all  the  wealth  is  on  the  other,  that  war  pays;  when,  in 
fact,  an  armed  savage  attacks  a  civilized  man  possessed 

45 


flghVfor  °^  no  arms  f°r  tne  protection  of  his  wealth.     Our  Af- 

tradeno  ghans  in  their  towers  are  sharp  enough  not  to  steal 

pays.  each  other's  cows  (supposing  they  possess  any  of  their 

own)  for  cows  do  not  multiply  by  being  exchanged,  and 
both  Afghans  would  starve  in  the  end  after  wasting  all 
their  bullets  in  the  skirmish.  They  save  their  bullets 
to  steal  cows  from  the  plainsmen  who  cannot  make  re- 
prisals. 

If  Germany  were  really  nothing  but  a  "  nation  in 
arms,"  successful  war  might  be  as  lucrative  for  her  as 
an  Afghan's  raid  on  the  plain,  but  she  is  normally  a 
great  industrial  community  like  ourselves.  In  the  last 
generation  she  has  achieved  a  national  growth  of  which 
she  is  justly  proud.  Like  our  own,  it  has  been  entirely 
social  and  economic.  Her  goods  have  been  peacefully 
conquering  the  world's  markets.  Now  her  workers  have 
been  diverted  en  masse  from  their  prospering  industry 
to  conquer  the  same  markets  by  military  force,  and  the 
whole  work  of  forty  years  is  jeopardized  by  the  change 
of  method. 

Fighting  for  trade  and  industry  is  not  like  fighting 
for  cattle.  Cattle  are  driven  from  one  fastness  to  an- 
other, and  if  no  better,  are  at  least  no  worse  for  the 
transit.  Civilized  wealth  perishes  on  the  way.  Our 
economic  organization  owes  its  power  and  range  to  the 
marvelous  forethought  and  cooperation  that  has  built 
it  up;  but  the  most  delicate  organisms  are  the  most 
easily  dislocated,  and  the  conqueror,  whether  England 
or  Germany,  will  have  to  realize  that,  though  he  may 
seem  to  have  got  the  wealth  of  the  conquered  into  his 
grip,  the  total  wealth  of  both  parties  will  have  been 
vastly  diminished  by  the  process  of  the  struggle. 

The  characteristic  feature  of  modern  wealth  is  that 
it  is  international.  Economic  gain  and  loss  is  shared 
by  the  whole  world,  and  the  shifting  of  the  economic 

46 


balance  does  not  correspond  to  the  moves  in  the  game  of 
diplomatists  and  armies.  Germany's  economic  growth 
has  been  a  phenomenon  quite  independent  of  her  polit-  compromise 
ical  ambitions,  and  Germany 's  economic  ruin  would  com- 
promise  something  far  greater  than  Germany's  political 
future — the  whole  world's  prosperity.  British  wealth, 
among  the  rest,  would  be  dealt  a  deadly  wound  by  Ger- 
many's economic  death,  and  it  would  be  idle  to  pump 
Germany's  last  life-blood  into  our  veins,  if  we  were  au- 
tomatically draining  them  of  our  own  blood  in  the 
process. 

But  issues  greater  than  the  economic  are  involved. 
The  modern  "Nation"  is  for  good  or  ill  an  organism 
one  and  indivisible,  and  all  the  diverse  branches  of 
national  activity  flourish  or  wither  with  the  whole  na- 
tional well-being.  You  cannot  destroy  German  wealth 
without  paralyzing  German  intellect  and  art,  and  Eu- 
ropean civilization,  if  it  is  to  go  on  growing,  cannot  do 
without  them.  Every  doctor  and  musician,  every  sci- 
entist, engineer,  political  economist  and  historian,  knows 
well  his  debt  to  the  spiritual  energy  of  the  German  na- 
tion. In  the  moments  when  one  realizes  the  full  horror 
of  what  is  happening,  the  worst  thought  is  the  aimless 
hurling  to  destruction  of  the  world's  only  true  wealth, 
the  skill  and  nobility  and  genius  of  human  beings,  and 
it  is  probably  in  the  German  casualties  that  the  intel- 
lectual world  is  suffering  its  most  irreparable  human 
losses. 

"With  these  facts  in  our  minds,  we  can  look  into  the 
future  more  clearly,  and  choose  our  policy  (supposing 
that  we  win  the  war,  and,  thereby,  the  power  to  choose) 
with  greater  confidence.  "We  have  accepted  the  fact 
that  war  itself  is  evil,  and  will  in  any  event  bring  pure 
loss  to  both  parties:  that  no  good  can  come  from  the 
war  itself,  but  only  from  our  policy  when  the  war  is 

47 


over:  and  that  the  one  good  our  policy  can  achieve, 
without  which  every  gain  is  delusive,  is  the  banishing  of 
this  evil  from  the  realities  of  the  future.  This  is  our 
one  supreme  "British  interest,"  and  it  is  a  German 
interest  just  as  much,  and  an  interest  of  the  whole  world. 

This  war,  and  the  cloud  of  war  that  has  weighed 
upon  us  so  many  years  before  the  bursting  of  the 
storm,  has  brought  to  bankruptcy  the  ' '  National  State. ' ' 
Till  1870  it  was  the  ultimate  ideal  of  European  politics, 
as  it  is  still  in  the  Balkans,  where  the  Turk  has  broken 
Time's  wings.  It  was  such  a  fruitful  ideal  that  it  has 
rapidly  carried  us  beyond  itself,  and  in  the  last  genera- 
tion the  life  of  the  world  has  been  steadily  finding  new 
and  wider  channels.  In  the  crisis  of  change  from  na- 
tionalism to  internationalism  we  were  still  exposed  to  the 
plague  of  war.  The  crisis  might  have  been  passed  with- 
out it,  and  war  banished  for  ever  between  the  nations  of 
civilized  Europe.  Now  that  the  catastrophe  has  hap- 
pened (it  is  childish  to  waste  energy  in  incriminations 
against  its  promoters)  we  must  carry  through  the  change 
completely  and  at  once:  we  cannot  possibly  afford  to 
be  exposed  to  the  danger  again. 

No  tool,  machine,  or  idea  made  by  men  has  an  im- 
mortal career.  Sooner  or  later  they  all  run  amuck, 
and  begin  to  do  evil  instead  of  good.  At  that  stage 
savage  or  unskilful  men  destroy  them  by  force  and  re- 
place them  by  their  opposite:  civilized  men  get  them 
under  control,  and  build  them  into  something  new  and 
greater.  Nationality  will  sink  from  being  the  pinnacle 
of  politics  only  to  become  their  foundation,  and  till  the 
foundations  are  laid  true,  further  building  is  impossible. 
But  the  bases  of  nationality  have  never  yet  been  laid 
true  in  Europe.  When  we  say  that  "  nationality  was 
the  political  ideal  of  the  nineteenth  century,"  and  that 
1870  left  the  populations  of  Europe  organized  in  na- 

48 


tional  groups,  we  are  taking  far  too  complacent  a  view  Nationalism 
of  historical  facts.  The  same  century  that  produced  a 
united  Italy  and  Germany,  saw  out  the  whole  tragedy 
of  Poland,  from  the  first  partition  in  1772  to  the  last 
revolt  in  1863.  Human  ideas  do  not  spring  into  the 
world  full-grown  and  shining  like  Athena:  they  trail 
the  infection  of  evil  things  from  the  past. 

In  the  Dark  Ages  Europe's  most  pressing  need  and 
only  practicable  ideal  was  strong  government.  Strong 
government  came  with  its  blessings,  but  it  brought  the 
evil  of  territorial  ambitions.  The  Duke  of  Burgundy 
spent  the  wealth  of  his  Netherland  subjects  in  trying 
to  conquer  the  Swiss  mountaineers.  Burgundy  suc- 
cumbed to  the  king  of  France.  But  the  very  factor 
that  made  the  French  kings  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  between  governments,  the  force  of  compact 
nationality  which  the  French  kingdom  happened  to  con- 
tain, delivered  the  inheritance  of  the  kings  to  the  Nation. 

The  French  Nation  in  the  Revolution  burst  the  chrys- 
alis of  irresponsible  government  beneath  which  it  had 
grown  to  organic  life,  but  like  a  true  heir  it  took  over 
the  Royal  Government's  ideal:  "Peace  within  and  pi- 
racy without."  France  had  already  begun  aggression 
abroad  before  she  had  accomplished  self-government  at 
home,  and  in  delivering  herself  to  Napoleon  she  sacri- 
ficed her  liberty  to  her  ambition.  Napoleon's  only  en- 
during achievements  outside  France  were  the  things  he 
set  himself  to  prevent,  the  realization,  by  a  forceful  re- 
action against  force,  of  German  and  Italian  nationality. 
Nationalism  was  converted  to  violence  from  the  outset, 
and  the  struggle  for  existence  between  absolute  govern- 
ments has  merely  been  replaced  by  a  struggle  between 
nationalities,  equally  blind,  haphazard,  and  non-moral, 
but  far  more  terrific,  just  because  the  virtue  of  self- 
government  is  to  focus  and  utilize  human  energy  so 

49 


Intra- 
national 
oppression 
has  been 
a  chief 
cause 
of  war. 


much  more  effectively  than  the  irresponsible  government 
it  has  superseded. 

Naturally  the  result  of  this  planless  strife  has  been  no 
grouping  of  Europe  on  a  just  and  reasonable  national 
basis.  France  and  England,  achieving  racial  frontiers 
and  national  self-government  early,  inherited  the  Earth 
before  Germany  and  Italy  struggled  up  beside  them, 
to  take  their  leavings  of  markets  and  colonial  areas. 
But  the  government  that  united  Germany  had  founded 
its  power  on  the  partition  of  Poland,  and  in  the  second 
Balkan  War  of  1913  we  saw  a  striking  example  of  the 
endless  chain  of  evil  forged  by  an  act  of  national  in- 
justice. 

The  Hungarians  used  the  liberty  they  won  in  1867 
to  subject  the  Slavonic  population  between  themselves 
and  the  sea,  and  prevent  its  union  with  the  free  prin- 
cipality of  Serbia  of  the  same  Slavonic  nationality. 
This  drove  Serbia  in  1912  to  follow  Hungary's  exam- 
ple by  seizing  the  coast  of  the  non-Slavonic  Albanians; 
and  when  Austria-Hungary  prevented  this  (a  right  act 
prompted  by  most  unrighteous  motives),  Serbia  fought 
an  unjust  war  with  Bulgaria  and  subjected  a  large  Bul- 
garian population,  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  only 
seaboard  left  her,  the  friendly  Greek  port  of  Salonika. 

Hungary  and  Serbia  are  nominally  national  states: 
but  more  than  half  the  population  in  Hungary,  and  per- 
haps nearly  a  quarter  in  Serbia,  is  alien,  only  held 
within  the  state  by  force  against  its  will.  The  energy 
of  both  states  is  perverted  to  the  futile  and  demoraliz- 
ing work  of  "Magy arizing"  and  "Serbizing"  subject 
foreign  populations,  and  they  have  not  even  been  suc- 
cessful. The  resistance  of  Southern  Slav  nationalism  on 
the  defensive  to  the  aggression  of  Hungarian  nation- 
alism has  given  the  occasion  for  the  present  catastrophe. 

The  evil  element  in  nationalism  under  its  many  names, 

50 


"Chauvinism,"  "Jingoism,"  "  Prussianism, "  is  the  one 
thing  in  our  present  European  civilization  that  can  and 
does  produce  the  calamity  of  war.  If  our  object  is  to  justly 
prevent  war,  then,  the  way  to  do  so  is  to  purge  Na- 
tionality of  this  evil.  This  we  cannot  do  by  any  mechan- 
ical means,  but  only  by  a  change  of  heart,  by  converting 
public  opinion  throughout  Europe  from  ' '  National  Com- 
petition" to  "National  Cooperation."  Public  opinion 
will  never  be  converted  so  long  as  the  present  system 
of  injustice  remains  in  force,  so  long  as  one  nation  has 
less  and  another  more  than  its  due.  The  first  step  to- 
wards internationalism  is  not  to  flout  the  problems  of 
nationality,  but  to  solve  them. 

The  most  important  practical  business,  then,  of  the 
conference  that  meets  when  war  is  over,  will  be  the 
revision  of  the  map  of  Europe.  .  .  . 

If  we  do  not  think  about  nationality,  it  is  simply  be- 
cause we  have  long  taken  it  for  granted,  and  our  mind 
is  focussed  on  posterior  developments;  but  it  is  increas- 
ingly hard  to  keep  ourselves  out  of  touch  with  other 
countries,  and  though  our  blindness  has  been  partly 
distraction,  it  has  also  been  in  part  deliberate  policy. 
We  saw  well  enough  that  the  present  phase  of  the  na- 
tional problem  in  Europe  carried  in  it  the  seeds  of  war. 
We  rightly  thought  that  war  itself  was  the  evil,  an 
evil  incomparably  greater  than  the  national  injustices 
that  might  become  the  cause  of  it.  We  knew  that,  if 
these  questions  were  opened,  war  would  follow.  We 
accordingly  adopted  the  only  possible  course.  We  built 
our  policy  on  the  chance  that  national  feeling  could  be 
damped  down  till  it  had  been  superseded  in  the  public 
opinion  of  Europe  by  other  interests,  not  because  Na- 
tionalism was  unjustified,  but  because  it  endangered  so 
much  more  than  it  was  worth.  Knowing  that  we  had 
passed  out  of  the  nationalist  phase  ourselves,  and  that 

51 


otherwise         from  our  present  political  point  of  view  war  was  purely 
manent  evil,  we  hoped  that  it  was  merely  a  question  of  time  for 

Le  possible.  the  Continental  populations  to  reach  the  same  stand- 
point. Notably  in  Germany,  the  focus  of  danger,  we 
saw  social  interests  coming  more  and  more  to  the  front 
at  the  expense  of  militarism.  We  threw  ourselves  into 
the  negative  task  of  staving  off  the  catastrophe  in  the  in- 
terim, by  a  strenuous  policy  of  compromise  and  con- 
ciliation, which  has  been  successful  on  at  least  two  crit- 
ical occasions.  Now  that  the  evil  has  been  too  powerful 
and  the  catastrophe  has  happened,  the  reasons  for  this 
policy  are  dead.  Nationalism  has  been  strong  enough 
to  produce  war  in  spite  of  us.  It  has  terribly  proved 
itself  to  be  no  outworn  creed,  but  a  vital  force  to  be 
reckoned  with.  It  is  stronger  on  the  Continent  than 
social  politics.  It  is  the  raw  material  that  litters  the 
whole  ground.  We  must  build  it  into  our  foundations, 
or  give  up  the  task,  not  only  of  constructive  social 
advance  beyond  the  limits  we  have  already  reached,  but 
even  of  any  fundamental  reconstruction  of  what  the 
war  will  have  destroyed. 

Perhaps  we  might  have  foretold  this  from  the  case  of 
Ireland  immediately  under  our  eyes.  Failure  to  solve 
her  national  problem  has  arrested  Ireland's  develop- 
ment since  the  seventeenth  century,  and  imprisoned  her 
in  a  world  of  ideas  almost  unintelligible  to  an  English- 
man till  he  has  traveled  in  the  Balkans.  This  has  been 
England 's  fault,  and  we  are  now  at  last  in  a  fair  way  to 
remedy  it.  The  moment  we  have  succeeded  in  arrang- 
ing that  the  different  national  groups  in  Ireland  govern 
themselves  in  the  way  they  really  wish,  the  national 
question  will  pass  from  the  Irish  consciousness;  they 
will  put  two  centuries  behind  them  at  one  leap,  and 
come  into  line  with  ourselves.  The  Dublin  strike,  con- 
temporary with  the  arming  of  the  Volunteers,  shows 

52 


how  the  modern  problems  are  jostling  at  the  heels  of 

the  old.    Although  "Unionist"  and  "Nationalist"  poli-  tivenot 

material. 

ticians  could  still  declare  that  their  attitude  towards 
the  strike  was  neutral,  the  parliament  of  the  new  Irish 
state  will  discuss  the  social  problem  and  nothing  else. 

Ireland,  then,  has  forced  us  to  think  about  the  prob- 
lem of  nationalism;  and  our  Irish  experience  will  be  in- 
valuable to  us  when  peace  is  made,  and  we  take  in  hand, 
in  concert  with  our  allies,  the  national  questions  of  the 
rest  of  Europe.  To  begin  with,  we  already  have  a 
notion  of  what  Nationality  is.  Like  all  great  forces  in 
human  life,  it  is  nothing  material  or  mechanical,  but  a 
subjective  psychological  feeling  in  living  people.  This 
feeling  can  be  kindled  by  the  presence  of  one  or  several 
of  a  series  of  factors:  a  common  country,  especially  if 
it  is  a  well  defined  physical  region,  like  an  island,  a 
river  basin,  or  a  mountain  mass;  a  common  language, 
especially  if  it  has  given  birth  to  a  literature ;  a  common 
religion;  and  that  much  more  impalpable  force,  a  com- 
mon tradition  or  sense  of  memories  shared  from  the 
past. 

But  it  is  impossible  to  argue  a  priori  from  the  pres- 
ence of  one  or  even  several  of  these  factors  to  the  exist- 
ence of  a  nationality:  they  may  have  been  there  for 
ages  and  kindled  no  response.  And  it  is  impossible  to 
argue  from  one  case  to  another:  precisely  the  same 
group  of  factors  may  produce  nationality  here,  and 
there  have  no  effect.  Great  Britain  is  a  nation  by  geog- 
raphy and  tradition,  though  important  Keltic-speaking 
sections  of  the  population  in  Wales  and  the  Highlands 
do  not  understand  the  predominant  English  language. 
Ireland  is  an  island  smaller  still  and  more  compact,  and 
is  further  unified  by  the  almost  complete  predominance 
of  the  same  English  language,  for  the  Keltic  speech  is 
incomparably  less  vigorous  here  than  in  Wales;  yet  the 

53 


Bwrtimliu"1        absence  of  common  tradition  combines  with,  religious  dif- 
is  largely          ferences  to  divide  the  country  into  two  nationalities,  at 

factitious.  n  , 

present  sharply  distinct  from  one  another  and  none  the 
less  hostile  because  their  national  psychology  is  strik- 
ingly the  same.  Germany  is  divided  by  religion  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  way  as  Ireland,  her  common  tradition  is 
hardly  stronger,  and  her  geographical  boundaries  quite 
vague:  yet  she  has  built  up  her  present  concentrated 
national  feeling  in  three  generations.  Italy  has  geog- 
raphy, language  and  traditions  to  bind  her  together; 
and  yet  a  more  vivid  tradition  is  able  to  separate  the 
Ticinese  from  his  neighbors,  and  bind  him  to  people  of 
alien  speech  and  religion  beyond  a  great  mountain 
range.  The  Armenian  nationality  does  not  occupy  a 
continuous  territory,  but  lives  by  language  and  religion. 
The  Jews  speak  the  language  of  the  country  where  they 
sojourn,  but  religion  and  tradition  hold  them  together. 
The  agnostic  Jew  accepts  not  only  the  language  but  all 
the  other  customs  of  his  adopted  countrymen,  but  tradi- 
tion by  itself  is  too  strong  for  him:  he  remains  a  Jew 
and  cannot  be  assimilated. 

These  instances  taken  at  random  show  that  each  case 
must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits,  and  that  no  argument 
holds  good  except  the  ascertained  wish,  of  the  living 
population  actually  concerned.  Above  all  we  must  be 
on  our  guard  against  "historical  sentiment,"  that  is, 
against  arguments  taken  from  conditions  which  once 
existed  or  were  supposed  to  exist,  but  which  are  no 
longer  real  at  the  present  moment.  ;They  are  most 
easily  illustrated  by  extreme  examples.  Italian  news- 
papers have  described  the  annexation  of  Tripoli  as  "re- 
covering the  soil  of  the  Fatherland"  because  it  was 
once  a  province  of  the  Roman  Empire;  and  the  entire 
region  of  Macedonia  is  claimed  by  Greek  chauvinists  on 
the  one  hand,  because  it  contains  the  site  of  Pella, 

54 


the  cradle  of  Alexander1  the  Great  in  the  fourth  century 

B.  c.,  and  by  Bulgarians  on  the  other,  because  Ohhrida,  nationalistic 

'  aims  and 

in  the  opposite  corner,  was  the  capital  of  the  Bulgarian  diTersitie 
Tzardom  in  the  tenth  century  A.D.,  though  the  drift  of 
time  has  buried  the  tradition  of  the  latter  almost  as  deep 
as  the  achievements  of  the  "Emathian  Conqueror,"  on 
which  the  modern  Greek  nationalist  insists  so  strongly. 

The  national  problems  of  Europe  are  numerous,  and 
each  one  is  beset  by  arguments  good,  bad,  and  indif- 
ferent, some  no  more  specious  than  the  above,  some  so 
elaborately  staged  that  it  requires  the  greatest  discern- 
ment to  expose  them.  Vast  bodies  of  people,  with  brains 
and  money  at  their  disposal,  have  been  interested  in 
obscuring  the  truth,  and  have  used  every  instrument  in 
their  power  to  do  so.  It  is  therefore  essential  for  us 
in  England  to  take  up  these  hitherto  remote  and  un- 
interesting national  problems  in  earnest,  to  get  as  near 
to  the  truth  as  we  possibly  can,  both  as  to  what  the 
respective  wishes  of  the  different  populations  are,  and 
as  to  how  far  it  is  possible  to  reconcile  them  with  each 
other  and  with  Geography;  and  to  come  to  the  con- 
ference which  will  follow  the  war  and  is  so  much  more 
important  than  the  war  itself,  with  a  clear  idea  of  the 
alternative  solutions  and  a  mature  judgment  upon  their 
relative  merits. 

To  accomplish  this  we  need  a  coordination  of  knowl- 
edge on  a  large  scale,  knowledge  of  history,  geography, 
religion,  national  psychology  and  public  opinion.  .  .  . 

With  the  growth  of  civilization  the  human  and  the 
territorial  unit  become  less  and  less  identical.  In  a 
primitive  community  the  members  are  undifferentiated 
from  one  another:  the  true  human  unit  is  the  total 
group,  and  not  the  individual,  and  the  territory  this 
group  occupies  is  a  unit  too,  self-sufficing  and  cut  off 
from  intercourse  with  the  next  valley.  In  modern  Eu- 

55 


Individuality 
and  tolerance 
must  be  pur 
international 
ideals. 


rope  every  sub-group  and  every  individual  has  devel- 
oped a  "character"  or  "individuality"  of  its  own  which 
must  have  free  play;  while  the  growth  of  communica- 
tions, elaboration  of  organization,  and  economic  interde- 
pendence of  the  whole  world  have  broken  down  the 
barriers  between  region  and  region.  The  minimum  ter- 
ritorial block  that  can  be  organized  efficiently  as  a  sep- 
arate political  unit  according  to  modern  standards  is 
constantly  growing  in  size:  the  maximum  human  group 
which  can  hold  together  without  serious  internal  di- 
vergence is  as  steadily  diminishing. 

This  would  look  like  an  impasse,  were  it  not  corrected 
by  the  virtues  of  civilization  itself.  We  started  with 
the  fact  that  the  essence  of  civilization  was  "Fore- 
thought" and  its  ideal  the  "power  of  free  choice":  the 
complementary  side  of  this  ideal,  on  the  principle  "Do 
as  you  would  be  done  by,"  is  to  allow  free  choice  to 
others  when  they  are  in  your  power.  It  is  a  virtue  with 
as  many  names  as  there  are  spheres  of  human  life: 
"  Forbearance, ""  Toleration, ""  Constitutionalism. "  .  .  . 


Arnold   J.    Toyribee, 
chap.  I. 


'Nationality    and    the    War,' 


56 


NATIONALITY  AND  SOVEREIGNTY 

The  old  Europe  is  dead,  the  old  vision  vanished,  and  Wemust 
we  are  wrestling  in  agony  for  new  inspiration.  .  .  .  forma  of 

We  must  beware  of  putting  our  new  wine  into  old  K1iarantee- 
bottles.  While  guarantees  hold,  they  conserve  their 
charge:  when  they  break,  the  destruction  is  worse  than 
if  they  had  never  existed.  Unless  we  can  ensure  that 
the  sovereign  States  of  Europe  respect  European  guar- 
antees hereafter  in  other  fashion  than  Germany  at  the 
present  crisis,  we  must  modify  the  formula  or  else  dis- 
card it  altogether. 

Can  the  mechanism  of  the  European  system  be  safe- 
guarded against  its  individual  members  ?  .  .  . 

We  have  asked  our  question  and  must  accept  the  an- 
swer. It  is  useless  to  fortify  our  new  European  organ- 
ism by  guarantees  of  the  old  order,  because  we  cannot 
fortify  such  guarantees  themselves  against  the  sovereign 
national  State.  Whenever  it  chooses,  the  sovereign  unit 
can  shatter  the  international  mechanism  by  war.  We 
are  powerless  to  prevent  it :  all  we  can  do  is  to  abandon 
our  direct  attack,  and  look  for  the  causes  which  impel 
States  to  a  choice  as  terrible  for  themselves  as  for  their 
victims. 

"You  ask,"  the  Germans  say,  "why  we  broke  our 
contract  towards  Belgium  ?  It  would  be  more  pertinent 
to  ask  how  we  were  ever  committed  to  such  a  contract 
at  all. 

57 


neart  °f  modem  Germany  is  the  industrial  world 
position.  of  the  Rhineland  and  Westphalia.  The  Belgian  frontier 

and  the  Belgian  tariff-wall  rob  this  region  of  its  natural 
outlet  at  Antwerp,  yet  the  contract  expressly  forbids  us 
to  right  this  economic  and  geographical  wrong  by  unit- 
ing the  sea-port  to  its  hinterland. 

"The  chief  need  of  modern  Germany  is  a  source  of 
raw  produce  and  a  market  for  her  finished  products  in 
the  tropical  zone.  Belgium  has  staked  out  for  herself 
the  one  important  region  in  Africa  which  was  not  al- 
ready occupied  by  Prance  or  Great  Britain.  She  can 
do  nothing  with  it,  while  we — but  this  contract  ex- 
pressly forbids  us  to  kick  the  Belgian  dog  out  of  the 
manger. 

"Because  of  this  Belgian  guarantee  we  must  go  in 
want  of  almost  everything  we  need,  yet  meanwhile  our 
great  neighbors  on  either  flank  have  conspired  to  take 
from  us  even  the  little  we  possess  already.  The  struggle 
with  France  and  Russia  on  which  we  are  now  engaged 
has  been  impending  for  years,  and  on  our  part  it  is  a 
struggle  for  existence,  but  even  here  the  same  remorse- 
less contract  operates  to  paralyze  our  efforts.  On  the 
scale  of  modern  warfare  the  Western  battle-front  must 
extend  from  Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea,  yet  the 
greater  part  of  this  immense  zone  is  neutralized  by  nat- 
ural and  artificial  obstacles  on  either  side.  From  Swit- 
zerland to  the  Ardennes  there  will  be  stalemate:  the  de- 
cision will  be  reached  in  the  open  country  between  the 
Ardennes  and  the  coast.  Here,  as  soon  as  war  broke 
out,  France  and  our  own  fatherland  had  to  concentrate 
the  terrific  energy  of  their  armaments,  yet  we  had  con- 
tracted away  our  initiative  in  this  vital  area,  for  it  lies 
within  the  frontiers  of  the  Belgian  State.  The  Govern- 
ment we  had  guaranteed  might  prepare  the  ground  for 
France  and  ruin  it  for  ourselves,  yet  because  of  the 

58 


guarantee  we  must  look  on  passively  at  the  digging  of 

OUr  grave.  national 

"Why,  then,  had  we  suffered  ourselves  to  be  bound  * 
hand  and  foot?  We  had  not:  our  grandfathers  had  en- 
tailed the  bonds  upon  us.  When  they  signed  the  con- 
tract in  1839,  they  knew  not  what  they  did.  At  that 
time  Germany  had  no  industry,  Belgium  had  no  colonies, 
and  the  Franco-German  frontier  between  the  Ardennes 
and  the  Jura  was  not  closed  to  field  operations  by  two 
continuous  lines  of  opposing  fortifications.  Had  their 
signature  been  demanded  in  1914,  they  would  have  re- 
fused it  as  indignantly  as  we  should  have  refused  it 
ourselves.  To  us  no  choice  was  offered,  and  if  we  have 
asserted  for  ourselves  the  right  to  choose,  who  dares  in 
his  heart  to  condemn  us  ?  Who  will  impose  a  changeless 
law  upon  a  changing  world?" 

This  is  Germany's  argument  about  Belgium.  Her 
facts  may  be  true  or  false,  the  arguments  she  builds 
on  them  valid  or  fallacious.  That  is  not  the  point. 
Behind  arguments  and  facts  there  looms  an  idea  that 
can  inspire  an  individual  nation  to  make  war  on  Europe. 
We  must  do  justice  to  this  idea,  if  it  is  not  to  play  the 
same  havoc  again. 

Humanity  has  an  instinctive  craving  for  something 
eternal,  absolute,  petrified.  This  seems  to  be  a  funda- 
mental factor  in  our  psychology:  it  has  obtruded  itself 
equally  in  spheres  as  diverse  as  religion  and  politics, 
but  it  has  been  especially  dominant  in  diplomacy. 

Whenever  the  European  organism  proves  its  insta- 
bility by  breaking  down,  we  start  in  quest  of  a  perfect 
mechanism,  a  "permanent  settlement."  We  are  invari- 
ably disappointed,  but  invariably  we  return  to  the  quest 
again.  The  Congress  of  statesmen  at  Vienna  followed 
this  will-o'-the-wisp  in  1814:  in  1915  the  belligerent 
democracies  are  preparing  to  lead  themselves  the  same 

59 


European         dance.    "Europe  is  in  a  mess,"  we  are  all  saying:  "Let 

organism          us  tidy  her  up  'once  for  all,'  and  then  we  can  live  corn- 
is  full  of  „  .  *  ML       -it 

dynamic  fortably  ever  after. 

"We  might  as  well  expect  a  baby  to  "live  comfortably 
ever  after"  in  its  swaddling  clothes.  .  .  . 

So  it  is  with  the  European  organism.  It  is  as  full  of 
life,  as  perpetually  in  transformation,  as  the  individual 
national  molecules  of  which  it  is  woven,  yet  we  confuse 
it  in  turn  with  each  of  its  transitory  garments.  If  we 
are  to  find  a  satisfactory  issue  out  of  the  present  crisis, 
we  must  begin  by  correcting  our  standpoint. 

The  impending  settlement  will  not  be  permanent,  and 
the  better  it  fits  the  situation,  the  less  permanent  will  it 
fa 

U".      •     .     • 

Our  real  work  will  be  to  regulate  this  immediate 
settlement  so  that  it  varies  in  harmony  with  the  subse- 
quent growth  of  Europe  and  modifies  its  structure  and 
mechanism  to  meet  the  organism's  changing  needs. 

We  have  now  discovered  the  flaw  in  guarantees  of 
the  old  order.  They  were  framed  for  rigidity,  and 
therefore  were  doomed  to  crack.  Our  new  guarantees 
must  be  elastic :  they  must  be  forged  of  steel  not  cast  in 
iron. 

How  can  we  frame  guarantees  of  this  malleable  char- 
acter? .  .  . 

(i.)  Firstly,  we  propose  guarantees  of  political 
independence  and  integrity  in  the  case  of  the  three 
Scandinavian  States,  the  Slovene  Unit,  the  Greek  islands 
off  Anatolia,  Persia,  and  the  Sultanate  of  Oman.  The 
autonomy  guaranteed  to  Poland  within  the  Russian  Em- 
pire comes  under  the  same  head. 

(ii.)  Secondly,  we  propose  to  guarantee  economic 
rights-of-way  to  one  State  across  the  political  territory 
of  another.  Instances  of  this  type  are  the  Russian  rail- 
way through  Norway  to  the  Atlantic  and  through  Persia 

60 


to  the  Indian  Ocean;  Poland's  title  to  free  trade  down  ^°tlcment 
the  Vistula,  and  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  free  port  at  can  be 
Danzig ;  and  Germany 's  similar  claim  to  an  unhampered 
outlet  at  Trieste. 

Both  these  classes  of  guarantee  are  adapted  from  the 
international  machinery  invented  during  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  first  class  is  an  extension  of  the  political 
guarantee  given  to  Belgium  in  1839,  the  second  of  the 
economic  right-of-way  secured  to  her  through  Dutch 
Avaters,  in  order  to  furnish  the  commerce  of  Antwerp 
with  a  free  passage  down  the  estuary  of  the  Scheldt  to 
the  open  sea. 

Our  standpoint  towards  these  two  classes  is  inevitably 
prejudiced  by  their  associations.  We  envisage  them  as 
embodied  "once  for  all,"  like  their  nineteenth-century 
precedents,  in  a  contract,  and  like  nineteenth-century 
diplomacy  we  tend  to  regard  such  contracts  as  so  many 
girders  in  a  "permanent  settlement." 

(iii.)  There  is  a  third  class,  however,  which  has  no  prec- 
edent in  the  past,  and  which  will  react  upon  our  stand- 
point in  the  very  opposite  direction :  our  proposed  guar- 
antee of  alien  minorities  within  the  national  State.  .  .  . 

The  German  populations  transferred  with  Schleswig 
to  Denmark  and  with  the  Eastern  frontier-zone  to  Au- 
tonomous Poland;  the  Poles  abandoned  to  Germany  in 
West  Prussia;  the  Germans  and  Slovaks  who  cannot  be 
disentangled  from  Hungary;  the  Christian  elements  in 
Anatolia  and  Arabia — these  are  a  few  out  of  many  in- 
stances, and  each  one  of  them  is  a  refutation  of 
"finality." 

The  fact  that  such  minorities  must  inevitably  be  left 
on  our  hands  compels  us  to  recognize  that  beyond  a 
certain  degree  the  economic  and  the  national  factor  are 
not  commensurable.  Here  is  an  essential  imperfection 
in  the  best  settlement  we  can  possibly  devise. 

61 


that  these  minorities  require  a  guarantee  re- 
fSther  veals  a  deficiency  still  more  grave  than  the  other,  inas- 

raciai  much  as  it  is  not  environmental  but  psychological.     It 

toleration.  .,      ,     ,         -,,  ,  ..          ,  .    .        .        _. 

means  that  hardly  a  single  national  society  in  Europe 
has  yet  become  capable  of  national  toleration.  Just 
as  people  were  persecuted  for  their  religious  beliefs  in 
the  sixteenth  century  and  for  their  political  opinions  in 
the  nineteenth,  so  they  are  still  in  the  twentieth  century 
almost  universally  exposed  to  persecution  for  their  na- 
tional individuality.  In  this  sphere  the  social  evolution 
of  Europe  is  exceptionally  backward,  and  the  problem 
of  nationality  will  never  be  solved  till  thisi  psychological 
incongruity  is  removed. 

This  at  once  reduces  to  their  proper  proportion  both 
the  immediate  geographical  settlement  of  the  problem 
which  we  have  elaborated  in  this  book  and  that  guarantee 
of  alien  minorities  which  we  have  found  to  be  its  neces- 
sary supplement.  In  this  light,  the  contracts  in  which 
such  guarantees  are  enshrined  appear  as  the  transitory 
scaffolding  they  are.  Weakened  by  the  morbid  hyper- 
trophy of  nationalism  which  has  been  preying  upon  her 
for  years,  exhausted  by  the  convulsion  of  war  in  which 
the  malady  has  culminated,  Europe  must  walk  on 
crutches  now  or  else  collapse ;  yet  she  will  not  be  a  crip- 
ple forever.  Relieved  by  these  guarantees  from  the 
immediate  strain  of  unmitigated  national  friction,  she 
will  be  able  to  concentrate  all  her  energy  upon  her 
spiritual  convalescence.  As  soon  as  she  has  trained  her- 
self to  national  toleration,  she  will  discard  the  guarantees 
and  walk  unaided. 

So  far  from  constituting  a  "permanent  settlement," 
our  third  type  of  guarantee  is  an  intimation  that  the 
problem  still  remains  unsettled.  The  work  will  not  be 
complete  until  we  can  dispense  with  the  instrument,  but 
the  instrument  will  not  accomplish  the  work  unless  it  is 

62 


wielded  by  a  craftsman's  hand.      Not  only  are  guaran-  ^®nKing 
tees  of  our  third  type  merely  the  means  to  an  end  beyond  organism 
themselves :  the  contract  in  which  it  is  embodied  is  in  this  new  form  of 
case  the  least  important  part  of  the  guarantee.  exec 

When  we  guarantee  a  national  minority  we  have  of 
course  to  define  certain  liberties  which  it  is  to  enjoy — 
liberties,  for  instance,  of  religion,  education,  local  self- 
government — and  all  the  parties  to-  the  Conference  must 
contract  responsibility  for  the  observance  of  such  stipula- 
tions ;  yet  when  we  have  done  this,  we  cannot  simply  de- 
posit our  document  in  some  international  "Ark  of  the 
Covenant"  and  go  our  ways.  The  essence  of  the  guar- 
antee is  its  subsequent  interpretation. 

The  relation  between  the  different  elements  in  a  coun- 
try is  continually  changing.  One  church  dwindles  while 
another  makes  converts;  one  race  advances  in  culture 
while  another  degenerates;  man's  indefatigable  strug- 
gle to  dominate  his  physical  environment  alters  the  nat- 
ural boundaries  between  localities:  a  barrier  that  once 
seemed  insurmountable  is  pierced,  and  leaves  one  for- 
merly insignificant  in  relative  prominence.  Each  of 
these  modifications  demands  an  adjustment  of  the  guar- 
antee, and  since  they  are  an  infinite  series,  the  guarantee 
itself  requires  ceaseless  manipulation  if  it  is  to  perform 
its  function  aright. 

This  need  cannot  be  satisfied  by  the  original  fiat  of 
the  International  Conference :  it  can  only  be  met  by  the 
appointment  of  a  standing  international  committee  with 
executive  powers,  empowered,  that  is,  to  administer  and 
interpret  the  contracts  to  which  the  members  of  the 
Conference  have  originally  subscribed.  Our  third  type 
of  guarantee  has  thus  presented  us  with  the  clue  we 
sought.  The  letter  of  international  law  has  proved  inef- 
fective hitherto  because  it  has  lacked  the  inspiration  of 
a  living  spirit,  and  this  spirit  can  only  be  breathed 

63 


^7  a  numan  organ  of  international  authority, 
and  the  Supposing  that  such  an  organ  were  called  into  exist- 

guarantees.  i          i  •     -i       ..    •  •-,-,• 

ence,  what  kind  of  international  relations  would  natu- 
rally fall  within  its  scope?  We  can  analyze  its  probable 
sphere  of  activity  into  several  departments. 

(i.)  The  first  branch  would  of  course  be  those  guar- 
antees of  national  minorities  which  have  just  taught  us 
the  necessity  for  its  existence. 

(ii.)  The  second  branch  would  include  the  two  sub- 
jects of  guarantee  we  dealt  with  first,  namely,  "Polit- 
ical Independence ' '  and  ' '  Rights  of  Way. ' '  We  can  see 
now  that  their  administration  by  a  representative  inter- 
national executive  would  eliminate  that  defect  of  rigidity 
which  has  always  proved  fatal  to  them  heretofore. 

Between  them  these  two  branches  would  cover  all  the 
machinery  we  have  suggested  for  our  regenerated  Euro- 
pean organism.  Are  there  any  further  spheres  of  na- 
tional interaction  over  which  our  international  organ 
might  properly  assume  control?  It  would  be  logical  to 
assign  to  it,  if  possible,  all  relations  between  sovereign 
national  States  which  are  peculiarly  subject  to  change. 

Change  is  a  harmonization  of  two  rhythms — Growth 
and  Decay.  Some  sovereign  units  are  continually  wax- 
ing in  population,  material  wealth  and  spiritual  energy : 
such  are  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  France  and  the 
Russian  Empire.  Others,  like  the  Ottoman  Empire  or 
Spain,  are  as  continually  waning  in  respect  of  the  same 
factors. 

This  ebb  and  flow  in  the  current  of  life  causes,  and 
must  cause,  a  perpetual  readjustment  of  the  relations 
between  units  in  the  two  complementary  phases.  Units 
in  the  positive  phase  inevitably  absorb  the  fibers  and 
trespass  upon  the  environment  of  those  which  have 
passed  over  into  the  negative  rhythm.  We  cannot  ar- 
rest this  process  any  more  than  we  can  abolish  change 

64 


itself:  what  we  can  do  is  to  regulate  it  on  the  lines  of  P?1*01.'? 

.  .  l  international 

civilization,  instead  of  letting  it  run  riot  m  a  blind  strug-  organ  would 

,      „  .    .  function. 

gle  for  existence. 

The  current  radiates  in  an  almost  infinite  variety  of 
interactions.  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  India  are 
discharging  surplus  population  into  the  empty  lands  of 
the  New  World ;  Great  Britain  and  France  are  applying 
surplus  wealth  to  evoke  the  latent  resources  of  countries 
with  no  surplus  of  their  own ;  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
are  putting  forth  spiritual  energy  to  inspire  primitive 
peoples  with  the  vitality  of  civilization. 

Our  international  organ  can  handle  no  more  than  a 
fraction  of  this  world-wide  interchange. 

(i.)  We  may  exclude  at  once  from  its  competence 
every  interaction  that  is  confined  within  the  limits  of  a 
single  sovereign  unit.  Within  the  British  Empire,  for 
example,  it  is  patently  impracticable  to  "internation- 
alize" the  problems  of  Indian  emigration  to  Vancouver 
or  the  Transvaal,  of  the  closure  of  the  Australian  labor- 
market  against  labor  from  the  British  Isles,  of  commer- 
cial exploitation  in  Nigeria  or  Rhodesia,  of  autonomy  in 
Ireland  or  the  Asiatic  Dependencies.  The  Empire  may 
handle  its  own  problems  well  or  ill,  but  it  will  never 
consent  to  waive  its  sovereignty  in  respect  of  them.  We 
should  regard  the  proposition  of  international  inter- 
vention as  a  menace  to  the  Empire's  existence.  We 
should  undoubtedly  fight  rather  than  submit  to  it,  and 
every  other  sovereign  State  would  do  the  same  under 
similar  circumstances.  In  purely  internal  affairs  inter- 
national authority  will  never  obtain  a  footing  at  the 
expense  of  the  individual  unit. 

(ii.)  We  may  likewise  exclude  interactions  between 
two  or  more  sovereign  States  in  spheres  that  fall  entirely 
within  their  respective  sovereignty.  The  Dominion  of 
Canada  or  the  U.  S.  A.  would  never  submit  to  interna- 

65 


tional  regulation  the  question  of  Japanese  immigration 


and  of  along  their  Pacific  seaboard.     If  Russia  wished  to  float 

a  loan,  she  would  never  allow  our  international  organ  to 
decide  where  and  in  what  proportions  it  should  be  placed  : 
she  would  insist  on  keeping  her  hands  free,  and  making 
the  best  bargain  for  herself  both  from  the  financial  and 
the  political  point  of  view.  Italy  and  the  Argentine 
would  never  relinquish  their  respective  sovereign  rights 
over  the  Italian  laborers  who  cross  the  Atlantic  every 
year  to  reap  the  South  American  harvests.  Interna- 
tional authority  would  be  flouted  as  uncompromisingly 
in  these  instances  as  in  the  former. 

(iii.)  There  are  some  units,  however,  so  raw  in  their 
growth  or  so  deeply  sunk  in  their  decay  as  to  lack  the 
attribute  of  sovereignty  altogether  —  units  which  through 
want  of  population,  wealth,  spiritual  energy,  or  all  three 
together  are  unable  to  keep  the  spark  of  vitality  aglow. 
Such  dead  units  are  the  worst  danger  that  threatens  the 
peace  of  the  world:  each  one  of  them  is  an  arena  entic- 
ing the  living  units  around  to  clash  in  conflict,  a  vacuum 
into  which  the  current  of  life  swirls  like  a  maelstrom. 
In  these  "no-man's-lands"  where  no  sovereignty  exists, 
our  international  organ  can  and  must  assert  its  own 
sovereignty  against  the  sovereign  States  outside. 

(a)  In  every  such  area  the  standing  international  ex- 
ecutive should  regulate  immigration  from  over-populated 
sovereign  units  —  German  colonization,  for  instance,  in 
Anatolia,  or  Indian  settlement  on  the  alluvium  of  Irak. 

(&)  It  should  likewise  regulate  the  inflow  of  cap- 
ital. .  .  . 

(c)  In  areas  where  the  pressure  of  spiritual  energy 
is  so  low  that  the  population  cannot  save  itself  by  its 
own  efforts  from  political  anarchy,  the  international 
executive  should  be  prepared  to  step  in  and  organize. 
"strong  government."  .  .  . 

66 


Morocco,  the  Balkans,  the  Ottoman  Empire — the  pres-  f^^ye 
ent  war  is  not  really  being  waged  to  settle  these  prob-  could  have 
lems:  it  is  being  waged  because  they  have  been  settled  the  war  of 
already,  and  settled  on  such  unjust  and  injudicious  lines 
that  all  parties  concerned  have  found  it  worth  while  to 
stake  their  existence  for  the  reversal  of  the  settlement. 
No  one  need  have  been  involved  by  such  problems  in  a 
struggle  for  life.     They  were  all  problems  of  expansion, 
and  their  solution  ought  at  worst  to  have  disappointed 
the  expectation  of  immoderate  gains:  it  ought  never,  as 
it  has  done,  to  have  threatened  the  parties  with  the  loss 
of  what  they  possessed  already  before  the  problems  were 
probed. 

Why  has  the  contrary  occurred?  Because,  just  for 
lack  of  that  international  executive  with  the  sovereign 
authority  we  postulate,  these  issues  that  were  not  vital 
have  been  fought  out,  like  issues  of  life  and  death,  by 
war — not  by  the  war  of  arms  which  has  descended  upon 
us  now  like  some  recurrent  plague,  into  which  we  re- 
lapse at  rarer  and  rarer  intervals  as  we  advance  in  civil- 
ization, but  by  the  unobtrusive,  unremittent  war  of  di- 
plomacy which  is  being  waged  year  in  and  year  out  be- 
tween the  sovereign  States  of  Europe,  and  which  has  in- 
creased appallingly  in  violence  during  the  last  genera- 
tion. 

In  this  disastrous  diplomatic  warfare  our  opponents 
in  the  present  war  of  arms  have  been  uniformly  the 
aggressors.  If  Austria-Hungary  is  now  struggling  for 
existence,  it  is  because  she  deliberately  embarked  nearly 
forty  years  ago  upon  a  diplomatic  campaign  of  aggran- 
dizement against  South-Slavonic  nationality.  If  Ger- 
many is  fighting  back  to  back  with  her  in  the  same 
ghastly  struggle,  it  is  because  Germany  has  wielded  dip- 
lomatic weapons  still  more  ruthlessly  against  her  other 
European  neighbors. 

67 


-^or  tne  terrible  embitterment  of  the  diplomatic  con- 
test Germany  herself  is  entirely  responsible,  but  she 
has  inevitably  exposed  herself  to  reprisals  as  severe  as 
her  own  provocative  blows.  She  opened  the  battle  over 
Morocco  by  forcibly  intruding  upon  a  sphere  where  she 
had  no  shadow  of  claim  to  expansion :  thereby  she  drew 
France  and  Great  Britain  into  diplomatic  alliance 
against  her,  and  laid  herself  open  to  the  humiliation  of 
1911,  when  Franco-British  diplomacy  mobilized  its  finan- 
cial forces  and  drove  her  to  retreat  by  cutting  off  her 
supplies.  In  Turkey  she  might  easily  have  satisfied  her 
needs  without  any  battle  at  all.  The  untenanted  area 
was  vast,  the  claims  staked  out  on  it  were  singularly  nar- 
row: when  German  enterprise  circumvented  the  enter- 
prise of  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  secured  all  the 
railway-concessions  in  the  virgin  hinterland  of  Anatolia, 
French  and  British  diplomacy  grumbled  but  did  not  at- 
tempt to  open  hostilities.  Yet  instead  of  reaping  her 
harvest  in  peace,  Germany  again  precipitated  a  diplo- 
matic conflict  by  extending  her  ambitions  to  Bagdad  and 
the  Persian  Gulf.  The  moment  she  aspired  to  absorb 
the  whole  Ottoman  Empire,  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
entered  into  diplomatic  cooperation,  and  opposed  her 
purpose  with  all  their  might.  Germany's  Arabian  ven- 
ture has  jeopardized  her  Anatolian  gains,  and  if  she  is 
defeated  in  the  present  struggle,  she  will  probably  be 
excluded  from  the  Ottoman  area  altogether. 

The  diplomatic  warfare  over  three  secondary  issues, 
which  ought  never  to  have  been  settled  by  fighting  at  all, 
has  thus  left  none  of  the  combatants  unscathed.  On 
the  contrary,  the  wounds  inflicted  then  have  festered 
till  their  poison  has  threatened  each  combatant  with 
the  pains  of  dissolution,  and  made  that  quack-physician 
the  diplomatist  call  out  in  panic  for  the  knife  of  that 
quack-surgeon  the  war  lord. 

68 


This  diplomatic  warfare  is  the  objective  of  our  new 
international  organization.  Upon  diplomacy  we  can  and 
must  make  a  direct  attack.  If  we  can  draw  this  mon- 
ster's teeth,  we  shall  no  longer  be  troubled  by  its  still 
more  monstrous  offspring — War. 

Arnold   J.    Toyribee,   "Nationality   and   the    War," 
chap.  XII. 


69 


THE  GOVERNMENTAL  THEORY 


International 
politics 
dominated 
by  a 
theory. 


The  position  I  intend  to  put  forward  and  defend  is 
this:  War  is  made — this  war  has  been  made — not  by 
any  necessity  of  nature,  any  law  beyond  human  con- 
trol, any  fate  to  which  men  must  passively  bow;  it  is 
made  because  certain  men  who  have  immediate  power 
over  other  men  are  possessed  by  a  certain  theory.  Some- 
times they  are  fully  conscious  of  this  theory.  More 
often,  perhaps,  it  works  in  them  unconsciously.  But  it 
is  there,  the  dominating  influence  in  international  poli- 
tics. I  shall  call  it  the  governmental  theory,  because  it 
is  among  governing  persons — Emperors,  Kings,  Mini- 
sters, and  their  diplomatic  and  military  advisers — that 
its  influence  is  most  conspicuous  and  most  disastrous. 
But  it  is  supported  also  by  historians,  journalists,  and 
publicists,  and  it  is  only  too  readily  adopted  by  the  ordi- 
nary man,  when  he  turns  from  the  real  things  he  knows 
and  habitually  handles  to  consider  the  unknown  field  of 
foreign  affairs. 

Very  briefly,  and,  therefore,  crudely  expressed,  the 
theory  is  this:  "The  world  is  divided,  politically,  into 
States.  These  States  are  a  kind  of  abstract  beings,  dis- 
tinct from  the  men,  women,  and  children  who  inhabit 
them.  They  are  in  perpetual  and  inevitable  antagonism 
to  one  another;  and  though  they  may  group  themselves 
in  alliances,  that  can  be  only  for  temporary  purposes  to 
meet  some  other  alliance  or  single  power.  For  States 
are  bound  by  a  moral  or  physical  obligation  to  expand 

70 


indefinitely,  each  at  the  cost  of  the  others.  They  are  nat- 
ural  enemies,  they  always  have  been  so,  and  they  always  ernme 
will  be;  and  force  is  the  only  arbiter  between  them. 
That  being  so,  war  is  an  eternal  necessity.  As  a  neces- 
sity, it  should  be  accepted,  if  not  welcomed,  by  all  sound- 
thinking  and  right-feeling  men.  Pacifists  are  men  at 
once  weak  and  dangerous.  They  deny  a  fact  as  funda- 
mental as  any  of  the  facts  of  the  natural  world.  And 
their  influence,  if  they  have  any,  can  only  be  disastrous 
to  their  State  in  its  ceaseless  and  inevitable  contest  with 
other  States." 

Stated  thus  briefly,  and  in  its  most  uncompromising 
terms,  this  is  what  I  have  called  the  governmental  theory. 
I  propose  to  criticize  it  in  detail.  But  before  doing  so  I 
will  ask  the  reader  to  compare  with  it  the  ordinary  atti- 
tude of  the  plain  men  and  women  who  inhabit  these 
States,  and  who  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  wars  in 
which  the  theory  involves  them.  These  ordinary  people, 
in  the  course  of  their  daily  lives,  do  not  think  at  all  in 
terms  of  the  State.  They  think  about  the  people  they 
come  in  contact  with,  about  their  business,  their  friends, 
and  their  families.  When  they  come  across  foreigners, 
as  many  of  them  do,  in  business  or  in  travel,  they  may 
like  or  dislike  them,  but  they  do  not  regard  them  as  pre- 
destined enemies.  On  the  contrary,  if  they  are  intelli- 
gent, they  know  themselves  to  be  cooperating  with  them 
in  innumerable  complicated  ways,  implying  mutual  ad- 
vantage. Differences  of  language  and  of  social  habit 
make  it  easier  for  most  people  to  associate  with  their 
fellow-countrymen  than  with  foreigners.  But  that  is  all. 
There  are,  of  course,  among  these  men  and  women  real 
enmities  and  spontaneous  quarrels.  But  these  do  not  oc- 
cur because  men  belong*  to  different  States.  They  occur 
because  they  really  have  injured  one  another,  or  hate  one 
another ;  and  they  occur,  naturally,  for  the  most  part,  be- 

71 


Governments,     tween  men  of  the  same  State,  because  it  is  these  who  most 

not  peoples, 

make  wars.  often  come  into  direct  contact  with  one  another.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  these  enmities  of  ordinary  men  that  give 
rise  to  wars. 

Wars  are  made  by  governments,  acting  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  governmental  theory.  And  of  this  fact — 
for  a  fact  it  is  among  civilized  "Western  peoples  in 
modern  times — no  better  example  could  be  given  than 
the  present  war.  Before  it  broke  out  nobody  outside 
governmental  and  journalistic  circles  was  expecting  it. 
Nobody  desired  it.  And  though,  now  that  it  is  being 
waged,  all  the  nations  concerned  are  passionately  inter- 
ested in  it,  and  all  believe  themselves  to  be  fighting  in 
a  righteous  cause,  yet  no  ordinary  citizen,  in  the  days 
preceding  its  outbreak,  would  have  maintained  that  there 
was  any  good  reason  for  war,  and  few  even  knew  what 
the  reasons  alleged  were  or  might  be.  Even  now  the  dif- 
ferent nations  have  quite  opposite  views  as  to  which  Gov- 
ernment was  responsible.  We  believe  it  was  the  German 
Government;  and  with  equal  conviction  Germans  be- 
lieve it  was  the  British.  But  nobody  believes  that  it  was 
the  mass  of  the  people  in  any  nation.  The  millions  who 
are  carrying  on  the  war,  at  the  cost  of  incalculable  suf- 
fering, would  never  have  made  it  if  the  decision  had 
rested  with  them.  That  is  the  one  indisputable  fact. 
How  can  such  a  fact  occur  ?  How  is  it  possible  for  Gov- 
ernments to  drag  into  war  people  who  did  not  desire  war 
and  who  have  no  quarrel  with  one  another? 

The  immediate  answer  is  simple  enough.  In  no  coun- 
try is  there  any  effective  control  by  the  people  over  for- 
eign policy.  That  is  clear  in  the  case  of  the  great  mili- 
tary empires.  But  it  is  true  also  of  France  and  of  Eng- 
land, where,  in  other  respects,  government  is  more  or 
less  under  popular  control.  The  country  has  no  real 
choice,  for  it  gets  its  information  only  after  the  decisive 

72 


action  has  been  taken.  That  is  an  important  truth  which 
ought  to  lead  to  important  changes  in  our  methods  of  obsessed  by 
conducting  foreign  affairs.  But  it  is  only  part  of  the 
truth.  For  we  have  now  to  notice  this  further  fact: 
that  in  all  countries,  in  Germany  no  less  than  in  England 
and  France,  no  sooner  is  the  war  declared  than  it  is  sup- 
ported by  the  whole  nation.  The  voice  of  criticism  is 
silenced,  and  every  one,  whatever  his  opinion  about  the 
origin  of  the  war,  gives  his  help  to  see  it  through.  Why 
is  that  ?  The  reason  is  obvious.  As  soon  as  war  is  made, 
the  people  of  one  country,  conscious  just  before  of  no 
cause  of  enmity,  do  really  become  enemies  of  the  people 
of  another  country ;  for  armed  populations  are  marching 
on  armed  populations  to  massacre  them.  Everybody, 
therefore,  is  bound  to  fight  in  self-defense.  It  is  too 
late  to  ask  whether  there  was  any  real  cause  of  quarrel ; 
for,  quarrel  or  no,  there  is  real  and  imminent  danger. 
To  meet  that  danger  becomes,  therefore,  the  immediate 
necessity  which  overbears  every  other  consideration. 
And  that  is  the  deepest  reason  why  wars  made  by  govern- 
ments without,  and  even  against,  the  will  of  peoples,  will 
always  be  supported  by  peoples. 

But  though  that  is  the  most  powerful  reason,  it  is  not 
the  only  one.  There  is  a  further  fact.  The  ordinary 
man,  though  he  does  not  live  under  the  obsession  of 
the  governmental  theory,  is  not  protected  against  it  by 
any  knowledge  or  reflection.  As  far  as  he  is  concerned, 
he  knows  no  reason  for  war,  and,  left  to  himself,  would 
never  make  it.  But  he  has  a  blank  mind  open  to  sug- 
gestion; and  he  has  passions  and  instincts  which  it  is 
easy  to  enlist  on  the  side  of  the  governmental  theory. 
He  has  been  busy  all  his  life ;  and  he  has  no  education, 
or  one  that  is  worse  than  none,  about  those  issues  which, 
in  a  crisis  like  that  which  has  come  upon  us,  suddenly 
reveal  themselves  as  the  issues  of  life  and  death.  His- 

73 


gorvlrnament       tor^'  no  doubt,  should  have  informed  him.    But  history, 
poison  the        for  the  most  part,  is  written  without  intelligence  or  con- 

pubhc  mind.  .  . 

vietion.  It  is  mere  narrative,  devoid  of  instruction,  and 
seasoned,  if  at  all,  by  some  trivial,  habitual,  and  second- 
hand prejudice  of  the  author.  History  has  never  been 
understood,  though  it  has  often  been  misunderstood.  To 
understand  it  is  perhaps  beyond  the  power  of  the  human 
intellect.  But  the  attempt  even  has  hardly  begun  to  be 
made. 

Deprived,  then,  of  this  source  of  enlightenment,  the 
ordinary  man  falls  back  upon  the  press.  But  the  press 
is  either  an  agent  of  the  very  governments  it  should  exist 
to  criticize  (it  is  so  notoriously  and  admittedly  on  the 
Continent,  and,  to  an  extent  which  we  cannot  measure, 
also  in  England),  or  else  it  is  (with  a  few  honorable  ex- 
ceptions) an  instrument  to  make  money  for  certain  in- 
dividuals or  syndicates.  But  the  easiest  way  for  the 
press  to  make  money  is  to  appeal  to  the  most  facile  emo- 
tions and  the  most  superficial  ideas  of  the  reader;  and 
these  can  easily  be  made  to  respond  to  the  suggestion  that 
this  or  that  foreign  State  is  our  natural  and  inevitable 
enemy.  The  strong  instincts  of  pugnacity  and  self-ap- 
probation, the  nobler  sentiment  of  patriotism,  a  vague 
and  unanalyzed  impression  of  the  course  of  history, 
these  and  other  factors  combine  to  produce  this  result. 
And  the  irony  is  that  they  may  be  directed  indifferently 
against  any  State.  In  England,  for  instance,  a  hundred 
years  ago,  it  was  France  against  whom  they  were  mar- 
shaled; sixty  years  ago  it  was  Russia;  thirty  years  ago 
it  was  France  again;  now  it  is  Germany;  presently,  if 
governments  have  their  way,  it  will  be  Russia  again. 

The  foreign  offices  and  the  press  do  with  nations  what 
they  like.  And  they  will  continue  to  do  so  until  ordi- 
nary people  acquire  right  ideas  and  a  machinery  to 
make  them  effective.  .  .  . 

74 


The  governmental  theory  holds  that  States  are  the 
great  realities,  and  that  they  are  natural  enemies.     My  states  are 

unreul 

reply  is  that  States  are  unreal  abstractions;  that  the  abstractions, 
reality  is  the  men  and  women  and  children  who  are  the 
members  of  the  States ;  and  that  as  soon  as  you  substitute 
real  people  for  the  abstract  idea  that  symbolizes  them 
you  find  that  they  have  no  cause  of  quarrel,  no  interests 
or  desires  of  a  kind  to  justify  or  necessitate  aggressive 
war.  And,  if  there  were  no  aggressive  war,  there  could, 
of  course,  be  no  cause  for  defensive  war.  .  .  . 

O.  Lowes  Dickinson,  "The  War  and  the  Way  Out," 
Atlantic  Monthly,  January,  1915. 


75 


THE  WAY  OUT  OF  WAR 

Noaggran-  We   will   to  perpetuate   European   peace.    How   are 

dizementl  ,.  ~     .    „      T»       i  ...  , 

we  to  accomplish  it?  By  keeping  in  view  and  putting 
into  effect  certain  clear  principles. 

First,  the  whole  idea  of  aggrandizing  one  nation  and 
humiliating  another  must  be  set  aside.  What  we  are 
aiming  at  is,  not  that  this  or  that  group  of  States  should 
dominate  the  others,  but  that  none  should  in  future  have 
any  desire  or  motive  to  dominate.  With  that  view,  we 
must  leave  behind  the  fewest  possible  sores,  the  least 
possible  sense  of  grievance,  the  least  possible  humiliation. 
The  defeated  States,  therefore,  must  not  be  dismembered 
in  the  hope  of  making  or  keeping  them  weak;  and  that 
means,  in  detail,  that,  if  the  Allies  win,  the  English 
and  the  French  must  not  take  the  German  colonies,  or 
the  Russians  the  Baltic  Coast,  the  Balkans,  or  Constanti- 
nople ;  and  that,  if  Germany  wins,  she  must  not  dismem- 
ber or  subordinate  to  her  system  France  or  England  or 
the  neutral  powers.  That  is  the  first  clear  condition  of 
the  future  peace  of  Europe. 

Secondly,  in  rearranging  the  boundaries  of  States — 
and  clearly  they  must  be  rearranged — one  point,  and 
one  only,  must  be  kept  in  mind:  to  give  to  all  peoples 
suffering  and  protesting  under  alien  rule  the  right  to  de- 
cide whether  they  will  become  an  autonomous  unit,  or 
will  join  the  political  system  of  some  other  nation. 
Thus,  for  example,  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  should 
be  allowed  to  choose  whether  they  will  remain  under 

76 


Germany,  or  become  an  autonomous  community,  or  be 
included  in  France.  The  same  principles  shall  be  ap-  of  small 
plied  to  the  Poles.  The  same  to  Schleswig-Holstein. 
The  same  to  the  Balkan  States.  The  same  to  the  Slav 
communities  included  in  Austria-Hungary.  There  would 
arise,  of  course,  difficulties  in  carrying  this  principle 
through.  For,  in  the  Balkan  States,  in  Bohemia,  and 
elsewhere,  there  is  an  almost  inextricable  tangle  of  na- 
tionalities. But  with  good-will  these  difficulties  could 
be  at  least  partially  met. 

Even  the  wholesale  transference  of  peoples  of  one 
nationality  from  one  location  to  another  is  a  possibility ; 
and,  indeed,  it  is  now  going  on.  In  any  case  the  prin- 
ciple itself  is  clear.  Political  rule  must  cease  to  be  im- 
posed on  peoples  against  their  will  in  the  supposed  in- 
terest of  that  great  idol,  the  abstract  state.  Let  the  Ger- 
mans, who  belong  together,  live  together  under  the  same 
government,  pursuing  in  independence  their  national 
ideal  and  their  national  culture.  But  let  them  not  im- 
pose that  ideal  and  that  culture  on  reluctant  Poles  and 
Slavs  and  Danes.  So,  too,  let  Russia  develop  her  own 
life  over  the  huge  territory  where  Russians  live.  But 
let  her  not  impose  that  life  on  unwilling  Poles  and  Finns. 
The  English,  in  history,  have  been  as  guilty  as  other  na- 
tions of  sacrificing  nationality  to  the  supposed  exigencies 
of  the  State.  But  of  late  they  have  been  learning  their 
lesson.  Let  them  learn  it  to  the  end.  Let  no  community 
be  coerced  under  British  rule  that  wants  to  be  self-gov- 
erning. The  British  have  had  the  courage,  though  late, 
to  apply  this  principle  to  South  Africa  and  Ireland. 
There  remains  their  greatest  act  of  courage  and  wisdom 
— to  apply  it  to  India. 

A  Europe  thus  rearranged,  as  it  might  be  at  the  peace, 
on  a  basis  of  real  nationality  instead  of  on  a  basis  of 
States,  would  be  a  Europe  ripe  for  a  permanent  league. 

77 


7  suc^  &  ^e&^Q  only,  in  my  judgment,  can  its  fu- 
ture  peace,  prosperity,  happiness,  goodness,  and  great- 
ness be  assured.  There  must  be  an  end  to  the  waste 
upon  armaments  of  resources  too  scanty,  at  the  best,  to 
give  to  all  men  and  women  in  all  countries  the  material 
basis  for  a  good  life.  But  if  States  are  left  with  the 
power  to  arm  against  one  another  they  will  do  so,  each 
asserting,  and  perhaps  with  truth,  that  it  is  arming  in 
defense  against  the  imagined  aggression  of  the  others. 
If  all  are  arming,  all  will  spend  progressively  more  and 
more  on  their  armaments,  for  each  will  be  afraid  of  be- 
ing outstripped  by  the  others.  This  circle  is  fatal,  as  we 
have  seen  in  the  last  quarter  of  a  century. 

To  secure  the  peace  of  Europe  the  peoples  of  Europe 
must  hand  over  their  armaments,  and  the  use  of  them 
for  any  purpose  except  internal  police,  to  an  interna- 
tional authority.  This  authority  must  determine  what 
force  is  required  for  Europe  as  a  whole,  acting  as  a 
whole  in  the  still  possible  case  of  war  against  powers  not 
belonging  to  the  league.  It  must  apportion  the  quota 
of  armaments  between  the  different  nations  according 
to  their  wealth,  population,  resources,  and  geographical 
position.  And  it,  and  it  alone,  must  carry  on,  and  carry 
on  in  public,  negotiations  with  powers  outside  the  league. 
All  disputes  that  may  arise  between  members  of  the 
league  must  be  settled  by  judicial  process.  And  none  of 
the  forces  of  the  league  must  be  available  for  purposes 
of  aggression  by  any  member  against  any  other. 

With  such  a  league  of  Europe  constituted,  the  problem 
of  reduction  of  armaments  would  be  automatically 
solved.  Whatever  force  a  united  Europe  might  suppose 
itself  to  require  for  possible  defense  would  clearly  be  far 
less  than  the  sum  of  the  existing  armaments  of  the  sepa- 
rate States.  Immense  resources  would  be  set  free  for  the 
general  purposes  of  civilization,  and  especially  for  those 

78 


costly  social  reforms  on  the  accomplishment  of  which 
depends  the  right  of  any  nation  to  call  itself  civilized  at 
all.  And  if  any  one  insists  on  looking  at  the  settlement 
from  the  point  of  view  of  material  advantage — and  that 
point  of  view  will  and  must  be  taken — it  may  be  urged, 
without  a  shadow  of  doubt,  that  any  and  every  nation, 
the  conquerors  no  less  than  the  conquered,  would  gain 
from  a  reduction  of  armaments  far  more  than  they  could 
possibly  gain  by  pecuniary  indemnities  or  cessions  of 
territory  which  would  leave  every  nation  still  arming 
against  the  others  with  a  view  to  future  squandering  of 
resources'  in  another  great  war.  This  is  sheer  common 
sense  of  the  most  matter-of-fact  kind. 

A  League  of  Europe  is  not  Utopian.  It  is  sound  busi- 
ness. 

Such  a  league,  it  is  true,  could  hardly  come  into  being 
immediately  at  the  peace.  There  must  be  preparation  of 
opinion  first ;  and,  not  less  important,  there  must  be  such 
changes  in  the  government  of  the  monarchic  States  as 
will  insure  the  control  of  their  policy  by  popular  opinion ; 
otherwise  we  might  get  a  league  in  which  the  preponder- 
ating influence  would  be  with  autocratic  emperors.  But 
in  making  peace  the  future  league  must  be  kept  in  view. 
Everything  must  be  done  that  will  further  it,  and  noth- 
ing that  will  hinder  it.  And  what  would  hinder  it  most 
would  be  a  peace  by  which  either  there  should  be  a  re- 
turn to  the  conditions  before  the  war — but  of  that  there 
is  little  fear — or  by  which  any  one  power,  or  group  of 
powers,  should  be  given  a  hegemony  over  the  others. 
For  that  would  mean  a  future  war  for  the  rehabilitation 
of  the  vanquished. 

The  mood,  therefore,  which  seems  to  be  growing  in 
England,  that  the  British  must  "punish"  Germany  by 
annihilating  her  as  a  political  force;  the  mood  which 
seems  to  be  growing  in  Germany,  that  she  must  annihilate 

79 


View  of 
peoples  must 
supersede 
view  of 
governments. 


the  British  as  the  great  disturbers  of  the  peace — all 
such  moods  must  be  resolutely  discouraged.  For  on 
those  lines  no  permanent  peace  can  be  made.  Militarism 
must  be  destroyed,  not  only  in  Germany  but  everywhere. 
Limitation  of  armaments  must  be  general,  not  imposed 
only  on  the  vanquished  by  victors  who  propose  them- 
selves to  remain  fully  armed.  The  view  of  peoples  must 
be  substituted  once  for  all  for  the  view  of  governments, 
and  the  view  of  peoples  is  no  domination,  and,  there- 
fore, no  war,  but  a  union  of  nations  developing  freely 
on  their  own  lines,  and  settling  all  disputes  by  arbitra- 
tion. 

G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  "The  War  and  the  Way  Out," 
Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan.  1915. 


80 


LOWES  DICKINSON'S  PLAN 

Writing  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  Mr.  Lowes  Dickin-  J 
son  attempts  to  point  the  moral  of  the  war  and  to  offer  !*<*«  hard- 

TT>     A.-L.  •     A.-L.  j     i.  headednees. 

a  way  out.  His  theory  is  that  wars  are  made  by  govern- 
ments without  the  consent  and  against  the  interest  of 
their  subjects;  they  are  made  because  the  governmental 
mind  is  obsessed  with  the  illusion  that  States  are  "natural 
enemies, ' '  that  they  have  always  been  so  and  always  will 
be,  that  force  is  the  only  arbiter  between  them.  This 
fantasy  of  the  governing  caste,  says  Mr.  Dickinson,  is 
what  rules  the  State,  and  through  control  of  foreign 
policy  and  the  press  drags  the  population  to  slaughter. 
The  remedy  is  to  shatter  the  illusion,  to  assert  against 
the  criminal  nonsense  of  the  governing  mind  the  human- 
ity and  commonsense  of  ordinary  people.  .  .  . 

Now  peace  will  have  to  be  built  on  a  very  hard-headed 
basis  or  it  will  be  fragile  and  illusory.  But  it  is  just  this 
hard-headedness  which  Mr.  Dickinson's  argument  seems 
to  lack.  In  our  opinion  he  himself  is  building  on  an 
illusion,  and  if  his  doctrine  prevails  among  the  workers 
for  peace  their  passion  will  be  misdirected,  and  their  dis- 
appointment will  be  as  deep  as  their  hopes  are  high. 

To  prove  these  assertions,  we  need  not  go  beyond  the 
example  which  Mr.  Dickinson  uses,  the  case  of  Russia 
and  her  desire  to  hold  Constantinople.  Mr.  Dickinson 
dismisses  this  ambition  with  the  statement  that  "for  all 
purposes  of  trade,  for  all  peace  purposes,  the  Darda- 

81 


^werh-reie-      ne^es  are  open.    And  it  is  the  interest  of  all  nations 
vantto  alike  that  they  should  remain  so."    "What  he  is  assuming 

power™10  here  is  that  it  makes  no  economic  difference  whether  Con- 
stantinople is  under  one  political  government  or  another. 
This  is  the  center  of  Mr.  Dickinson's  argument,  and  it 
rests  on  the  doctrine  of  Norman  Angell  that  "political 
power  is  a  consideration  irrelevant  to  economic  power." 
Is  it  irrelevant  in  a  case  like  that  of  the  Dardanelles? 
The  Black  Sea  region  is  already  a  great  agricultural 
exporting  region;  it  is  destined  most  probably  to  be- 
come the  industrial  center  of  Russia.  But  to  carry  out 
goods,  Russian  ships  must  pass  through  a  narrow  Turkish 
strait.  Mr.  Dickinson  says  that  for  all  "peace  pur- 
poses" the  passage  is  free.  Is  it?  Let  us  suppose  that 
Mexico  held  New  York  harbor,  or  that  Ecuador  held 
Liverpool.  Would  these  harbors  be  free  to  American 
and  English  commerce?  They  would  be  free  if  Mexico 
and  Ecuador  were  highly  efficient  governments  imbued 
with  the  doctrine  of  absolute  free  trade.  Then  commerce 
might  pass  through  easily.  But  if  Mexicans  or  Ecua- 
dorians took  it  into  their  heads  to  exercise  sovereignty 
by  setting  up  a  tariff  zone  around  New  York  or  Liver- 
pool, who  would  regard  political  power  as  irrelevant  to 
economic  power?  Certainly  not  the  Manchester  ex- 
porter as  he  paid  his  customs  tax  to  the  pleasant  official 
from  Ecuador. 

Although  England  is  in  no  danger  from  Ecuador, 
there  are  nations  in  the  world  which  suffer  just  as  fan- 
tastically. There  is  the  case  of  Servia,  shut  off  from  a 
"window  on  the  sea."  Servia  exports  pigs,  when  she 
isn't  fighting  for  the  privilege  of  exporting  them.  But 
to  export  anything  she  has  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  an 
Austrian  tariff  to  the  north,  Albanian  and  Greek  dis- 
crimination to  the  west  and  south.  Shut  off  from  the 
sea,  she  is  like  a  man  trying  to  get  out  of  a  restaurant 

82 


who  has  still  to  tip  the  waiter,  the  headwaiter,  the  girl  ^ltic&l 
who  took  care  of  his  hat,  and  the  boy  who  brushed  it.       p°wer  is  an 

...  .  -11  •        'i  •      instrument 

Political  power  is  not  in  the  least  irrelevant  to  economic  for 
power.  Mr.  Dickinson  has  no  doubt  heard  of  a  thing  Conc 
which  we  Americans  call  vulgarly  "dollar  diplomacy." 
European  powers  do  not  call  it  that,  but  they  practise 
it.  They  call  it  staking  out  ' '  spheres  of  influence, ' '  and 
there  is  nothing  sentimental  or  illusory  about  it.  The 
nation  that  can  secure  political  control  of  an  undeveloped 
country  can  decide  who  shall  receive  the  mining  rights 
and  the  railroad  franchises,  can  fix  railroad  rates  to 
favor  its  own  manufacturers,  can  use  all  the  methods 
which  Americans  describe  as  restraint  of  trade.  It  may 
have  been  dishonest,  it  certainly  wasn  't  a  delusion,  when 
capitalists  in  those  dreadful  early  days  of  this  republic 
bought  political  power  to  further  economic  ends.  A 
legislature  or  a  governor  was  generally  worth  the  price 
in  this  country,  and  we  presume  that  they  would  be 
worth  the  price  in  Asia  Minor.  If  German  bureau- 
crats governed  Morocco,  they  would,  we  suppose,  be  good 
to  their  friends,  almost  all  of  whom  have  at  least  a  nomi- 
nal residence  east  of  Belgium,  and  French  capitalists 
might  then  be  prospecting  fresh  mines  and  pastures  new. 

Mr.  Dickinson  ignores  these  considerations  when  he 
speaks  of  national  antagonisms  arising  "because  a  few 
men  of  the  military  and  diplomatic  caste  have  a  theory 
about  States,  their  interests  and  destinies."  He  ignores 
the  monopolies,  the  use  of  tariffs,  the  special  privileges 
of  which  political  power  is  the  instrument.  He  does  not 
face  the  fact  that  in  every  country  there  are  exporters 
of  goods  and  capital,  concession-hunters  and  traders,  who 
stand  to  gain  by  the  use  of  governmental  power  in  half 
developed  territory.  To  them  at  least  it  is  not  a  matter 
of  indifference  whether  Germany  is  politically  supreme 
in  say  India  or  China.  Since  Germany  has  brought  the 

83 


theorrnnotntol    doctrine  °^  protection  to  its  highest  point,  it  would  make 
mere  illusion,     a  very  great  difference  to  the  commerce  of  other  nations 
if  Germany  developed  a  world-empire. 

How  little  reality  there  is  in  Mr.  Dickinson's  con- 
tention may  be  seen  by  analyzing  his  concrete  propos- 
als. Apart  from  the  shattering  of  the  great  illusion  of 
the  governmental  mind  by  a  propaganda,  he  suggests 
a  settlement  of  Europe  on  the  basis  of  nationality,  capped 
by  a  League  of  Europe  to  maintain  the  peace. 

Now  there  are  all  sorts  of  reasons  for  trying  to  found 
States  on  nationality,  and  the  only  reason  against  the 
proposal  is  the  reason  on  which  Mr.  Dickinson's  article 
is  built.  He  tells  us  on  one  page  that  "ordinary  peo- 
ple, in  the  course  of  their  daily  lives,  do  not  think  at  all 
in  terms  of  the  state."  Then  what  difference  does  it 
make  to  people  of  the  same  nationality  that  they  should 
be  under  different  governments,  and  how  is  the  world's 
peace  to  be  assured  by  gathering  into  one  State  people 
who  do  not  care  about  the  State  ?  Either  the  people  have 
an  interest  in  the  State  or  they  have  not,  but  surely  it  is 
futile  for  Mr.  Dickinson  to  argue  in  one  place  against 
the  German  contention  that  their  emigrants  are  "lost," 
and  in  another  that  the  Danes  of  Schleswig-Holstein 
should  go  back  to  Denmark.  And  what  does  he  mean 
by  telling  us  that  in  the  event  of  an  Austro-German 
victory  "Italy  and  the  Balkans  will  be  pillaged  to 
the  benefit  of  Austria,  and  Russia  rolled  back — though 
that  would  be  all  to  the  good — from  her  ambition  to  ex- 
pand in  the  West."  Is  Mr.  Dickinson  also  afflicted  with 
the  "governmental  mind,"  that  he  should  talk  of  "bene- 
fit" to  Austria  and  pronounce  it  good  that  "Russia"  be 
rolled  back?  What  does  he  mean  by  telling  us  that 
"the  English  and  the  French  must  not  take  the  German 
colonies,  or  the  Russians  the  Baltic  coast,  the  Balkans, 
or  Constantinople,"  for  what  difference  does  it  make, 

84 


except  to  the  "governmental  mind,"  who  exercises  polit-  J 
ical  power?  crucial 

As  for  the  League  of  Europe,  surely  no  one  here  would 
wish  to  obstruct  the  plan.  But  if  the  League  is  to  be 
based  on  nothing  more  realistic  than  an  absence  of  gov- 
ernmental thinking,  it  will  be  a  very  precarious  league. 
Every  argument  advanced  by1  Mr.  Dickinson  is  based  on 
the  assumption  of  absolute  free  trade  in  the  world,  yet 
in  his  plan  of  peace  he  says  not  one  syllable  about  how 
tariffs  and  discriminations  and  monopolies  are  to  be 
wiped  out.  The  conflict  between  Germany  and  Eng- 
land is  world-wide,  yet  Mr.  Dickinson  is  thinking  only 
of  rectified  frontiers  in  Europe. 

When  he  proposes  so  readily  a  League  of  Europe  with 
a  police  force  to  carry  out  its  jurisdiction,  has  he  con- 
sidered the  possibility  of  civil  war  within  the  League? 
If  Germany  and  Austria  rebelled  against  the  League, 
they  would  presumably  be  attacked  on  all  sides.  But 
they  are  now  attacked  on  all  sides.  We  had  on  this  con- 
tinent a  league  of  States  with  a  central  government,  a 
Supreme  Court,  and  an  army.  In  1861  some  of  the 
States  seceded,  and  the  struggle  which  followed,  called  a 
Civil  War,  was  a  terrible  conflict.  Has  Mr.  Dickinson 
faced  the  fact  that  a  League  of  Europe  would  be  based 
on  the  status  quo,  would  be  a  sort  of  legalization  of  every 
existing  injustice?  And  how  does  he  propose  to  amend 
peacefully  the  constitution  of  Europe  if  some  nation  ob- 
jects too  seriously? 

The  New  Republic,  Jan.  2,  1915. 


85 


THE  MORROW  OF  THE  WAR 

DUE  PURPOSE 

^war*  This  countIT  (Great  Britain)  is  at  war,  and  has  for 

prepare  the  moment  one  overwhelming  preoccupation:  to  render 

safe  our  national  inheritance. 

The  Union  of  Democratic  Control  has  been  founded 
for  the  purpose  of  trying  to  secure  for  ourselves  and 
the  generations  that  succeed  us  a  new  course  of  policy 
which  will  prevent  a  similar  peril  ever  again  befalling 
our  Empire.  Many  men  and  women  have  already 
joined  us  holding  varying  shades  of  opinion  as  to  the 
origins  of  the  war.  Some  think  it  was  inevitable,  some 
that  it  could  and  should  have  been  avoided.  But  we 
believe  that  all  are  in  general  agreement  about  two 
things:  First,  it  is  imperative  that  the  war,  once  be- 
gun, should  be  prosecuted  to  a  victory  for  our  country. 
Secondly,  it  is  equally  imperative,  while  we  carry  on  the 
war,  to  prepare  for  peace.  Hard  thinking,  free  discus- 
sion, the  open  exchange  of  opinion  and  information  are 
the  duty  of  all  citizens  to-day,  if  we  are  to  have  any  hope 
that  this  war  will  not  be  what  most  wars  of  the  past 
have  been — merely  the  prelude  to  other  wars. 

Our  contribution  to  this  necessary  discussion  are  the 
principles  put  forward  for  consideration  by  the  Union 
of  Democratic  Control. 

The  Union  of  Democratic  Control  has  been  created  to 
insist  that  the  following  policy  shall  inspire  the  actual 

86  " 


conditions  of  peace,  and  shall  dominate  the  situation 
after  peace  has  been  declared: 

1.  No  Province  shall  be  transferred  from  one  Govern- 
ment to  another  without  consent  by  plebiscite  or  other- 
wise of  the  population  of  such  Province. 

2.  No  Treaty,  Arrangement,  or  Undertaking  shall  be 
entered  upon  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  without  the 
sanction  of  Parliament.    Adequate  machinery  for  en- 
suring  democratic  control  of  foreign  policy  shall   be 
created. 

3.  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  shall  not  be 
aimed  at  creating  Alliances  for  the  purpose  of  maintain- 
ing the  "Balance  of  Power";  but  shall  be  directed  to 
the  establishment  of  a  Concert  of  the  Powers  and  the 
setting  up  of  an  International  Council  whose  delibera- 
tions and  decisions  shall  be  public,  part  of  the  labor  of 
such  Council  to  be  the  creation  of  definite  Treaties  of 
Arbitration  and  the  establishment  of  Courts  for  their 
interpretation  and  enforcement. 

4.  Great  Britain  shall  propose  as  part  of  the  Peace 
settlement  a  plan  for  the  drastic  reduction  by  consent 
of  the  armaments  of  all  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  to 
facilitate  that  policy  shall  attempt  to  secure  the  general 
nationalization  of  the  manufacture  of  armaments,  and 
the  control  of  the  export  of  armaments  by  one  country 
to  another. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  pamphlet  to  elaborate  and 
explain  the  considerations  which  underlie  the  policy  out- 
lined above. 


No  Province  shall  be  transferred  from  one  Govern- 
ment to  another  without  the  consent  of  plebiscite  of  the 
population  of  such  Province. 

87 


There 
must  b« 
general 
recognition 
of  principle 
of  plebiscite. 


This  condition  has  been  placed  first  because  if  ad- 
hered to  practically  and  in  spirit,  and  if  recognized  by 
the  European  Powers  as  a  principle  that  must  guide 
all  frontier  rearrangements,  it  would  help  to  put  an 
end  to  European  war. 

If  no  province  were  retained  under  a  Government's 
power  against  the  will  of  its  inhabitants,  the  policy  of 
conquest  and  the  imposition  of  political  power  would 
lose  its  raison  d'etre. 

The  subject  as  a  whole  is  wrapped  up,  of  course,  with 
the  principle  of  democratic  government  and  is  not  merely 
a  problem  of  international  but  of  internal  politics,  and 
could  not  be  treated  briefly  in  a  mere  outline  like  the 
present.  But  any  one  who  reflects  carefully  on  the  sub- 
ject will  see  that  the  peace  in  Europe  ultimately  depends 
upon  the  acceptance  of  this  idea. 

It  is  obvious  that  there  are  many  difficulties  of  detail 
in  its  application ;  that  a  plebiscite  may  be  a.  mere  form 
and  not  reflect  the  real  wishes  of  the  population  con- 
cerned, and  under  military  control  it  can  be  used  as  an 
instrument  for  obtaining  an  apparent  sanction  for  op- 
pression, and  that  in  populations  of  mixed  race  it  is 
very  difficult  of  application.  But  it  should  not  be  im- 
possible to  guard  against  the  defeat  of  the  principle 
through  defects  in  the  working  machinery.  Plebiscites, 
where  used  at  the  end  of  the  war,  might  be  carried  out 
under  international  supervision.  The  essential  is  that 
the  principle  involved  should  be  clearly  enunciated. 

Fortunately  the  Government  has  already  given  the 
country  a  valuable  lead  in  this  matter.  For  Mr. 
Churchill,  speaking  on  September  11,  said: 

"Now  the  war  has  come,  and  when  it  is  over  let  us 
be  careful  not  to  make  the  same  mistake  or  the  same  sort 
of  mistake  as  Germany  made  when  she  had  France  pros- 
trate at  her  feet  in  1870.  [Cheers.]  Let  us,  what- 

88 


ever  we  do,  fight  for  and  work  towards  great  and  sound 
principles  for  the  European  system,  and  the  first  of 
those  principles  which  we  should  keep  before  us  is  the  another 
principle  of  nationality  —  that  is  to  say,  not  the  conquest 
or  subjugation  of  any  great  community,  or  of  any  strong 
race  of  men,  but  the  setting  free  of  those  races  which 
have  been  subjugated  and  conquered;  and  if  doubt 
arises  about  disputed  areas  of  country  we  should  try  to 
settle  their  ultimate  destination  in  the  reconstruction 
of  Europe  which  must  follow  from  this  war  with  a  fair 
regard  to  the  wishes  and  feelings  of  the  people  who  live 
in  them." 

We  agree  with  Mr.  Churchill  that  the  terms  of  peace 
should  secure  that  there  shall  in  the  future  be  no  more 
Alsace-Lorraines  to  create  during  half  a  century  resent- 
ment, unrest,  and  intrigues  for  a  revanche.  The  power 
of  the  victorious  parties  must  not  be  used  for  vindictive 
oppression  and  dismemberment  of  beaten  nationalities, 
but  for  the  creation,  by  cooperation  with  all  the  bellig- 
erents, victors  and  vanquished  alike,  of  a  true  society  of 
nations,  banded  together  for  mutual  security.  The 
future  relationship  of  the  States  of  Europe  must  be  not 
that  of  victor  and  vanquished,  domination  or  subserv- 
iency, but  of  partnership.  The  struggle  of  one  nation 
for  domination  over  another  must  be  replaced  by  the 
association  of  the  people  for  their  common  good. 


n 

No  Treaty,  Arrangement,  or  Undertaking  shall  "be 
entered  upon  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  without  the 
sanction  of  Parliament.  Adequate  machinery  for  en- 
suring democratic  control  of  foreign  policy  shall  be 
created. 

89 


The  peoples  of  all  constitutionally-governed  countries 
are  justified  in  demanding  that  diplomatic  relations 
with  their  neighbors  shall  be  conducted  with  the  main 
object  of  maintaining  friendly  international  intercourse. 
The  increasing  social  and  economic  interdependence,  the 
ramifications  of  the  credit  system,  the  facility  and  ra- 
pidity of  intercommunication,  the  developing  community 
of  intellectual  interest,  the  growth  of  a  collective  social 
consciousness,  are  combining  to  minimize  the  significance 
of  the  purely  political  frontiers  which  divide  civilized 
States.  For  these  reasons  the  world  is  moving  towards 
conferences  when  political  difficulties  arise  as  a  substi- 
tute for  war.  The  determination  to  preserve  national 
ideals  and  traditions  offers  no  real  obstacle.  But  the 
common  interest  of  civilized  democracies  cannot  be  ad- 
vanced by  a  secret  diplomacy  out  of  touch  with  demo- 
cratic sentiment. 

The  anomaly  of  such  practises  in  a  democratic  State 
has  only  to  be  understood  to  be  condemned.  All  the  do- 
mestic activities  of  a  constitutional  Government  are 
tested  in  the  crucible  of  public  analysis  and  criticism. 
But  the  Government  department  charged  with  the  super- 
vision of  the  nation's  intercourse  with  its  neighbors, 
which  if  wrongly  handled  may  react  with  ruinous  effect 
upon  the  whole  field  of  its  domestic  activities  and  upon 
the  future  of  its  entire  social  economy,  not  only  escapes 
efficient  public  control,  but  considers  itself  empowered 
to  commit  the  nation  to  specific  courses  and  to  involve 
it  in  obligations  to  third  parties  entailing  the  risk  of  war, 
without  the  nation's  knowledge  of  consent. 

During  the  past  eight  years  particularly,  the  manage- 
ment of  the  Foreign  department  has  become  avowedly 
and  frankly  autocratic.  Parliamentary  discussion  of 
foreign  policy  has  become  so  restricted  as  to  be  per- 
functory. It  is  confined  to  a  few  hours'  roving  debate 

90 


on  one  day  in  each  session.  The  eliciting  of  information 
by  means  of  questions,  never  satisfactory,  is  rendered  policy 
extremely  difficult  by  the  ingenuity  employed  in  evading  autocratic, 
the  issues  it  is  attempted  to  raise.  Advantage  has  been 
taken  of  the  wholesome  desire  that  discussion  of  foreign 
policy  should  not  partake  of  mere  party  recriminations, 
to  burke  discussion  altogether,  and  this  process  has  re- 
ceived the  endorsement  of  both  Front  Benches.  A  claim 
to  ' '  continuity ' '  has  been  further  evolved  to  stifle  debate 
on  foreign  affairs,  whereas  in  point  of  fact,  if  one  feature 
more  than  another  has  characterized  British  foreign  pol- 
icy of  recent  years,  it  has  been  its  bewildering  fluctua- 
tions. Parliamentary  paralysis  has  had  its  counterpart 
in  the  country.  The  present  Government's  tenure  of 
office  has  been  marked  by  an  almost  complete  abstention 
from  public  reference  to  foreign  affairs.  The  public  has 
been  treated  as  though  foreign  affairs  were  outside — and 
properly  outside — its  ken.  And  the  public  has  ac- 
quiesced. Every  attempt  to  shake  its  apathy  has  been 
violently  assailed  by  spokesmen  of  the  Foreign  Office 
in  the  press.  The  country  has  been  told  that  its  affairs 
were  in  the  wisest  hands,  and  that  mystery  and  silence 
are  the  indispensable  attributes  to  a  successful  direction 
of  foreign  policy.  The  caste  system  which  prevails  in 
the  diplomatic  service,  and  which  has  survived  unim- 
paired the  democratizing  of  the  majority  of  the  public 
services,  facilitates  these  outworn  political  dogmatisms. 
Appointment  is  made  by  nomination  and  selection.  Can- 
didates are  required  to  possess  an  income  per  annum 
of  £400.  The  natural  result  is  that  the  vast  bulk  of  the 
national  intelligence  is  debarred  from  the  diplomatic 
field  of  employment.  A  study  of  the  Foreign  Office 
list  will  disclose  the  fact  that  over  95  per  cent,  of  the 
British  diplomatic  staff  is  composed  of  members  of  the 
aristocracy  and  landed  gentry. 

91 


Inevitable   exile  from   their   country  results  in  our 
diplomatic  representatives  abroad  losing  touch  with  the 
nessi"  center  of  affairs  and  living  in  a  mental  atmosphere  re- 

mote from  the  popular  and  progressive  movements  of  the 
time.  Another  pronounced  characteristic  of  the  system 
is  the  indifference  displayed  by  the  Foreign  Office  to  the 
business  interests  of  the  nation.  Our  vast  commercial 
interests,  so  intimately  affected  by  our  relations  with 
foreign  Powers,  are  regarded  as  lying  outside  the  orbit 
of  diplomatic  considerations.  The  connection  between 
politics  and  business — and  by  business  we  mean  the 
entire  framework  of  peaceful  commerce  upon  which  the 
prosperity  of  this  country  depends — appears  to  be  ig- 
nored, or,  at  least,  treated  with  indifference  and  some- 
thing like  contempt.  The  services  of  our  Consuls  abroad 
are  not  sufficiently  utilized,  and  the  Consular  machinery 
requires  complete  overhauling.  Such  questions  as,  for 
instance,  the  effect  upon  British  commercial  interest  of 
British  diplomacy  supporting  the  acquisition  of  unde- 
veloped areas  of  the  world's  surface  by  a  Power  like 
France,  which  imposes  differential  tariffs  upon  British 
goods,  and  opposing  the  acquisition  of  such  areas  by  a 
Power  like  Germany,  which  admits  British  goods  on 
terms  of  equality,  does  not  appear  to  enter  into  Foreign 
Office  calculations. 

In  the  last  few  years  also  has  been  added  another  in- 
stitution which  modifies  national  policy  without  coming 
under  Parliamentary  control,  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defense.  Its  influence  upon  the  Cabinet  is  nominally 
indirect,  and  its  activities  confined  to  the  discussion  of 
hypothetical  events.  But  no  one  can  doubt  that  its 
recommendations  exercise  a  powerful  effect  on  the  execu- 
tive decisions  of  the  Government.  No  criticism  of  the 
advice  given  by  the  Committee  is  possible  in  Parliament. 
Momentous  military  and  naval  schemes  are  prepared 

92 


there  on  which  hang  the  issues  of  peace  and  war,  as  in 
the  case  of  our  recent  relations  to  France.     It  is  an  inti-  military. ex- 
mate  and  powerful  means  of  framing  Government  policy  Parliamentary 
according  to  the  ideas  of  military  experts,  without  the 
knowledge  and  control  of  Parliament. 

In  the  various  ways  indicated,  opportunities  of  evinc- 
ing an  intelligent  concern  in  its  foreign  policy  has  been 
increasingly  withdrawn  from  the  nation.  The  work  of 
the  Department  escapes  all  outside  control,  loses  all 
sense  of  contact  with  national  life,  and  tends  more  and 
more  to  become  an  autocratic  institution,  contemptuous 
of  the  efforts  of  a  small  group  of  members  in  the  House 
to  acquire  information,  and  utilizing  a  powerful  section 
of  the  press  to  mold  public  opinion  in  the  direction  it 
considers  public  opinion  should  travel. 

The  nation  awoke  with  a  shock  to  the  evils  of  this  state 
of  affairs  in  the  summer  of  1911,  when  it  suddenly  found 
itself  on  the  very  brink  of  war  with  Germany  over  a 
Franco-German  quarrel  about  Morocco,  and  became  cog- 
nizant of  the  existence  of  diplomatic  entanglements  of 
which  it  had  no  previous  intimation. 

It  is  obviously  impossible  to  attempt  here  a  full  pre- 
sentment of  the  Moroccan  crisis  of  1911.  But  the  story 
is  inseparably  intertwined  with  the  avowals  to  the  House 
of  Commons  on  August  3rd,  1914,  of  the  secret  under- 
standing with  France  which  has  played  so  capital  a  part 
in  bringing  about  British  intervention  in  the  present 
war. 

So  long  as  this  situation  prevails  it  must  be  perfectly 
clear  to  any  man  of  ordinary  intelligence  that  the  sys- 
tem of  government  under  which  we  live  is  not  a  demo- 
cratic system,  but  its  antithesis.  It  cannot  be  too  often 
insisted  upon  that  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  nation, 
its  constitutional  liberties,  its  social  reforms,  all  its  in- 
ternal activities  in  short,  depend  upon  the  preservation 

93 


Nation  must     Of  peaceful  relations  with  its  neighbors.     War  in  which 

participate  in  .  ° 

direction  of  this  country  is  involved  is  certain  to  prove  a  serious 
check  to  social  progress.  Hence  it  is  a  matter  of  abso- 
lutely vital  concern  to  the  nation  that  the  machinery  of 
its  Foreign  Office  should  be  thoroughly  capable  of  per- 
forming its  functions,  and  that  the  policy  pursued  by 
that  department  should  be  pursued  with  the  knowledge 
and  the  consent  of  the  nation.  It  is  imperative  not  only 
that  a  treaty  with  a  foreign  Power  should  require  endorse- 
ment by  Parliament,  but  that  no  agreement  or  under- 
standing possessing  binding  force  and  postulating  the  use 
of  the  national  military  and  naval  forces  should  be  valid 
without  the  assent  of  Parliament.  The  nation  should 
insist  upon  this  essential  reform,  and  should  seriously 
apply  itself  to  considering  what  other  steps  are  needed 
to  ensure  some  mechanical  means  whereby  a  greater  na- 
tional control  of  foreign  policy  can  be  secured;  whether 
by  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  by  the  adaptation  to  suit  our  needs 
of  the  American  system  under  which,  a  two-thirds  ma- 
jority of  one  branch  of  the  Legislature  is  required  for 
the  validity  of  international  agreements,  or  other  pro- 
cedure. But  real  and  permanent  reforms  will  not  "be 
obtained  unless  the  nation  is  determined  to  assert  its 
fundamental  right  to  participate  in  the  formation  of  its 
own  foreign  policy. 

m 

The  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  shall  not  ~be  aimed 
at  creating  Alliances  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining 
the  "Balance  of  Power" ;  but  shall  be  directed  to  the 
establishment  of  a  Concert  of  Europe  and  the  setting 
up  of  an  International  Council  whose  deliberati&ns  and 
decisions  shall  be  public. 

94 


What  does  the  "Balance  of  Power"  mean?  ^Balance 

It  is  popularly  supposed  to  mean  that  no  single  Power  of  Power." 
or  group  of  Powers  should,  in  the  interests  of  interna- 
tional peace,  be  allowed  to  acquire  a  preponderating 
position  in  Europe,  and  that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain 
should  be  directed  against  such  a  consummation.  Brit- 
ish policy  during  the  past  few  years  has  been  based  upon 
the  assumption  that  Germany  had  attained,  or  was  seek- 
ing to  attain,  that  position  of  eminence. 

It  is  that  idea  which,  in  the  minds  of  masses  of  our 
people,  justifies  the  present  war. 

But  if  this  policy  has  been  right  in  the  past,  what 
prospect  does  the  future  hold  ?  The  victory  of  the  Allies 
— which  is  a  vital  necessity — must  enormously  upset  the 
''balance"  by  making  Russia  the  dominant  military 
power  of  Europe,  possibly  the  dictator  both  in  this  Con- 
tinent and  in  Asia. 

Eussia  can  draw  upon  vast  sources  of  human  military 
material,  only  partly  civilized.  At  present  she  is  gov- 
erned by  a  military  autocracy  which  is  largely  hostile 
to  "Western  ideas  of  political  and  religious  freedom. 
There  is  hope  in  the  minds  of  Western  Liberals  that  the 
war  may  bring  political  liberation  to  Russia.  At  pres- 
ent that  is  only  a  hope.  For  wars  have  as  often  been  a 
prelude  to  tyranny  as  to  liberty.  It  is  only  too  likely 
that  after  a  victorious  war  our  national  feeling  may  re- 
vert to  its  old  anti-Russian  channel,  and  we  shall  again 
have  the  "Balance  of  Power"  invoked  to  protect  Europe 
and  India  against  a  new  Russian  preeminence. 

Speaking  generally,  the  "Balance  of  Power"  is  little 
more  than  a  diplomatic  formula  made  use  of  by  the 
mouthpieces  of  the  interests  from  whose  operations  war 
comes.  It  signifies  nothing  more  than  that,  at  a  given 
moment,  in  a  given  country,  there  is  an  effort  to  hold  up 
to  the  public  gaze  the  Government  and  the  people  of  an- 

95 


<3?the0™L  other  country  as  being  intent  upon  the  destruction  of  its 
in  making  neighbors.  At  one  moment  it  is  Russia,  at  another 
France,  and  at  another  Germany.  The  "Balance  of 
Power"  was  invoked  for  several  years  and  down  to 
within  a  few  weeks  of  the  Crimean  "War  to  inflame  Brit- 
ish public  opinion  against  France.  It  was  invoked 
against  Russia  to  justify  the  Crimean  War,  and  France 
was  chosen  as  the  ally  with  which  to  fight  Russia!  No 
sooner  had  peace  been  signed  than  France  became  once 
more  the  potential  threat  to  the  "Balance  of  Power"; 
and  again  during  the  period  of  rivalry  in  West  and  Cen- 
tral Africa,  and  in  the  Far  East,  in  the  late  nineties. 

Once  the  ball  has  been  set  rolling  in  the  required  direc- 
tion, influences  of  all  kinds  are  brought  to  bear  for  the 
purpose  of  permanently  fixing  this  idea  in  the  public 
mind.  A  flood  of  innuendo,  denunciation,  and  distorted 
information  is  let  loose.  Every  dishonorable  motive  and 
the  most  sinister  of  projects  are  attributed  to  the  Gov- 
ernment and  the  people  selected  for  attack.  The  public 
becomes  the  sport  of  private  ambitions  and  interests,  of 
personal  prejudices  and  obscure  passions,  which  it  can 
neither  detect  nor  control,  and,  for  the  most  part,  does 
not  even  suspect.  The  power  for  mischief  wielded  by 
these  forces  is  to-day  immense,  owing  to  a  cheap  press 
and  to  the  concentration  of  a  large  number  of  news- 
papers, possessing  in  the  aggregate  an  enormous  circula- 
tion, under  one  directing  will.  At  the  present  moment 
the  editorial  and  news  columns  of  some  fifty  British 
newspapers  echo  the  views  of  one  man,  who  is  thus  able 
to  superimpose  in  permanent  fashion  upon  public  thought 
the  dead  weight  of  his  own  prejudices  or  personal  aims 
and  intentions,  and  to  exercise  a  potent  influence  upon 
the  Government  of  the  day. 

For  the  last  few  years  these  newspapers  have  striven 
with  unceasing  pertinacity  to  create  an  atmosphere  of 

96 


ill-will  and  suspicion  between  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many.  The  effort  has  been  continuous,  systematic,  and  °f  Power" 
magnificently  organized,  and  inferential  evidence  is  not 
lacking  that  it  has  been  pursued  with  the  approval  and 
even  with  the  assistance  of  certain  official  influences,  and 
to  the  satisfaction  of  certain  foreign  Governments.  This 
propaganda  has  had,  needless  to  say,  its  counterpart  in 
Germany.  The  net  result  of  the  latest  recrudescence  of 
the  "Balance  of  Power"  policy  with  its  Alliances  and 
Ententes  as  the  dominating  factor  in  international  rela- 
tionships is  now  visible  to  all  men.  A  quarrel  (whose 
culminating  episode  was  the  murder  in  a  Bosnian  town 
of  the  heir  to  the  Austrian  throne  last  June)  between 
Austria  and  Serbia,  to  which  the  Russian  Government 
determined  to  become  a  party,  has  already  involved  the 
peoples  of  France,  Belgium,  Britain,  and  Germany,  the 
first  three  of  whom  were  not  even  remotely  concerned,  in 
a  terrible  and  desolating  war. 

Japan  and  Montenegro  have  also  become  involved,  and 
the  same  fate  may  overtake  Holland,  Italy,  the  other 
Balkan  States,  and  the  Scandinavian  Powers.  But  for 
the  policy  of  the  "Balance  of  Power"  the  results  of  the 
quarrel  would  almost  certainly  have  been  confined  to 
the  parties  immediately  affected,  and  an  early  mediation 
by  the  neutral  Powers  would  have  been  possible. 

Bright 's  scathing  denunciation  of  the  fetish  of  the 
"Balance  of  Power"  appeals  with  even  greater  force  to 
us  to-day: 

"You  cannot  comprehend  at  a  thought  what  is  meant 
by  this  balance  of  power.  If  the  record  could  be 
brought  before  you — but  it  is  not  possible  to  the  eye 
of  humanity  to  scan  the  scroll  upon  which  are  recorded 
the  sufferings  which  the  theory  of  the  balance  of  power 
has  entailed  upon  this  country.  It  rises  up  before  me 
when  I  think  of  it  as  a  ghastly  phantom  .  .  .  which  has 

97 


it  must  be         loaded  the  nation  with  debt  and  with  taxes,  has  sacri- 

superseded 

by  a  council  ficed  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Englishmen, 
has  desolated  the  homes  of  millions  of  families,  and  has 
left  us,  as  the  great  result  of  the  profligate  expenditure 
which  it  has  caused,  a  doubled  peerage  at  one  end  of  the 
social  scale,  and  far  more  than  a  doubled  pauperism 
at  the  other." 

For  a  system  therefore  which  carries  with  it  the  im- 
plication that  the  interests  of  nations  are  necessarily  in 
constant  conflict  and  which  involves  the  permanent  divi- 
sion of  Europe  into  two  hostile  competing  groups,  we 
must  substitute  machinery  which  will  facilitate  coopera- 
tion and  a  reasonable  solution  of  differences  between  all 
the  peoples  of  the  world. 

The  objective  should  be  a  real  council  of  the  nations 
with  at  first  very  limited  powers,  rather  an  expansion 
of  an  alliance  of  three  Powers  against  three,  into  a 
league  of  six  Powers,  designed  to  act  against  any  one 
recalcitrant  member  which  might  threaten  the  peace  of 
the  whole.  To  this  ideal,  indeed,  the  pronouncement  of 
Mr.  Asquith  in  his  Dublin  speech  has  already  pointed, 
while  it  is  noteworthy  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  himself 
seems  in  a  significant  passage  of  one  of  his  despatches 
to  admit  the  failure  of  the  balance  principle  and  to  indi- 
cate that  the  nations  must ' '  start  afresh ' '  on  the  basis  of 
a  general  council.  This  passage  is  as  follows : 

"If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the 
present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavor  will  be  to 
promote  some  arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be 
a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no  aggres- 
sive or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or 
her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or 
separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked  for  it  as 
far  as  I  could  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis;  and  Ger- 
many having  a  corresponding  object,  our  relations  sen- 

98 


sibly  improved.     The  idea  has  hitherto  been  too  Utopian  ^ 
to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this  mentof 

'  diplomacy 

present  cnsis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  Europe  has  must  be 
gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am 
hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow 
may  make  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement 
between  the  Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto." 

It  is  from  some  such  simple  beginning,  pursued  with 
good  will  and  perseverance  by  all  parties,  that  the  na- 
tions may  hope  to  arrive  at  a  system  of  cooperation  to 
replace  the  system  of  hostile  alliances,  the  fruits  of 
which  are  the  present  war. 

It  is  essential,  of  course,  if  the  negotiations  of  such  a 
council  are  to  be  lifted  out  of  the  atmosphere  of  diplo- 
matic intrigue  which  the  secrecy  of  negotiations  always 
involves,  that  its  deliberations  be  public.  Publicity  will 
at  one  and  the  same  time  be  a  guarantee  of  openness,  of 
good  faith,  and  of  democratic  control. 

rv 

Great  Britain  shall  propose  as  part  of  the  Peace  settle- 
ment a  plan  for  the  drastic  reduction  by  consent  of  the 
armaments  of  all  the  belligerent  Poivers,  and  to  facili- 
tate that  policy  shall  attempt  to  secure  the  general  na- 
tionalization of  the  manufacture  of  armaments,  and  the 
control  of  the  export  of  armaments  by  one  country  to 
another. 

The  theory  of  the  "Balance  of  Power"  and  secret 
diplomacy  are  two  factors  which,  in  combination,  make 
for  war. 

Two  other  factors  intimately  connected  with  these 
ensure  its  certainty.  They  are:  a  constant  progression 
in  expenditure  upon  armaments,  and  the  toleration  of  a 
private  armament  interest. 

99 


e  labor  wasted  to  endeavor  to  apportion 
mean  the          responsibility   between   the  various  European   Govern- 

bankruptcy  .  . 

of  states-  ments  for  the  insane  competition  in  armaments  which  of 
recent  years  has  attained  incredible  proportions.  No 
government  can  escape  liability.  Each  government  has 
defended  its  policy  on  the  ground  that  its  neighbor's 
action  compelled  it  to  do  so.  Many  of  the  governing 
statesmen  of  the  world  have  alternately  confessed  their 
helplessness,  attacked  their  rivals,  appealed  to  public 
opinion,  and  blamed  the  warlike  tendencies  inherent  in 
the  people  whose  destinies  they  control.  Every  govern- 
ment, without  exception,  has  proceeded  on  the  assump- 
tion that  in  order  to  ensure  peace  it  had  to  be  stronger 
than  its  neighbor,  a  philosophy  which  could  have  but  one 
possible  outcome — war.  In  pursuance  of  this  phantom, 
a  considerable  proportion  of  the  wealth  of  the  European 
States  has  been  wasted,  and  activities  have  been  with- 
drawn from  the  constructive  work  of  the  world,  to  pre- 
pare for  the  world  *s  destruction.  And  with  every  fresh 
outburst  of  expenditure,  responding  to  some  diplomatic 
check  or  alarmist  propaganda,  fresh  fagots  have  been 
piled  around  Europe's  powder  magazine.  The  disaster 
which  has  fallen  upon  Europe  is  the  fitting  sequel  to 
the  bankruptcy  of  statesmanship  which  this  policy  em- 
bodies. 

The  more  extensive  the  armaments,  the  greater  the 
temptation  to  seize  an  opportunity  for  testing  their 
efficiency;  the  greater  the  nervousness  and  irritation  of 
Governments  when  negotiating;  the  greater  the  pres- 
sure upon  those  Governments  of  the  powerful  profes- 
sional and  other  interests  concerned  in  armament  con- 
struction. 

The  policy  of  gigantic  armaments  cannot  in  the  very 
nature  of  things  ensure  any  final  settlement  of  disputes 
between  States.  It  leads,  and  can  only  lead,  to  an  in- 

100 


tolerable  situation  from  which  war  comes  to  be  regarded 

by  diplomacy  as  the  only  escape.  rests  in 

government 

An  all-round  limitation  of  armaments  must  follow  the  demand, 
present  war  if  the  world  is  to  be  permanently  relieved 
of  the  nightmare  which  has  weighed  upon  it  for  so  long. 
We  can  no  longer  afford  to  listen  to  arguments  as  to  the 
impracticability  of  such  a  course  from  those  whose  claims 
to  the  possession  of  human  wisdom  and  experienced 
guidance  have  so  utterly  broken  down. 

The  difficulty  of  compelling  a  change  in  the  policy  of 
European  Governments  has  been  intensified  by  the  con- 
ditions under  which  armament  construction  is  carried  on 
in  this  and  other  countries.  Every  one  is  familiar  with 
the  fact  that  the  object  of  a  commercial  firm  is  to  push 
its  wares  in  every  legitimate  manner,  to  advertise  them, 
and  systematically  to  tout  for  orders  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  Every  one  is  aware  that  there  exists  a  power- 
fully-equipped industry  for  the  manufacture  of  military 
and  naval  engines  and  instruments  of  offense.  Disguise 
it  as  we  may,  that  industry  waxes  and  wanes,  the  profits 
its  management  derives  rise  and  fall,  the  dividends 
earned  by  its  shareholders  increase  and  dwindle  in  the 
measure  of  the  demand  for  the  articles  it  produces. 
That  demand  does  not  emanate  from  members  of  the 
public.  It  emanates  from  the  military  and  naval  de- 
partments of  the  public  services.  The  industry  relies, 
therefore,  for  its  existence  and  for  its  profits  not  upon  a 
private  demand,  but  upon  a  Government  demand,  and 
the  extent  of  that  Government  demand  will  depend  upon 
the  view  which  the  Government  may  take  of  the  number 
and  nature  of  these  articles  required  to  ensure  the  na- 
tional safety.  Such  a  condition  of  affairs  is  a  permanent 
and  terrible  danger  both  to  democratic  government  and 
to  international  peace.  What  are  its  implications? 

There  is  created  in  every  country  an  economi'  force 
101 


and  creates       jn  private  hands  directly  interested  in  war  and  in  the 

an  economic  * .  .  .  .      . 

force  inter-  preparation  for  war;  directly  interested  in  assisting 
preparedness,  to  bring  about  a  general  atmosphere  advantageous  to  an 
industry  which,  were  wars  to  cease  or  the  expenditure 
on  armaments  to  be  substantially  reduced,  would  suffer 
accordingly.  What  the  successful  prosecution  of  an  or- 
dinary commercial  undertaking  requires  this  industry 
also  requires.  The  demand  for  the  article  must  be 
created.  That  basic  situation  engenders  effects  which 
can  only  be  appreciated  in  their  cumulative  significance. 
It  is  not  at  all  necessary  to  attribute  sinister  machina- 
tions to  individuals.  These  effects  are  automatic.  An 
industry  disposing,  as  does  this  one,  of  an  enormous  ag- 
gregate of  capital  possesses  almost  unlimited  power  of 
influence  and  suggestion.  For  such  purposes  the  press 
is  a  potent  instrument  ready  at  hand.  Many  of  those 
most  closely  associated  with  this  great  industry  are  men 
of  considerable  influence.  Some  have  been  in  the  public 
service  and  have  acquaintances  in  the  Government  De- 
partments. Others  may  be  on  friendly  and  perfectly 
honorable  terms  with  the  proprietors  or  editors  of  news- 
papers or  associations  of  newspapers.  The  proprietor 
of  a  newspaper  may  be  honestly  convinced,  or  may  by 
arguments  be  persuaded,  that  an  agitation  for  increased 
armaments  is  advisable.  If  he  is  acquainted  with  one 
of  the  directors  of  the  armament  industry  that  ac- 
quaintance will  hardly  act  as  a  deterrent  to  his  enter- 
taining those  views.  He  may  be  furnished  with  special 
information,  accurate  or  otherwise,  as  to  the  projects, 
real  or  alleged,  of  other  Governments,  which  will  be  fa- 
miliar to  the  director  through  his  connection  with  Con- 
tinental branches  of  the  same  industry.  The  press  may 
be  utilized  in  a  similar  manner  by  certain  permanent 
officials  in  the  nation's  Foreign  Department,  who  feel 
that  their  views  of  the  international  situation  can  be  best 

102 


served  by  a  press  campaign  of  a  certain  kind.     The  in-  ?"e™!fts 
fluence  of  the  industry  which  stands  to  gain  from  the  manipulate 

.    ,  «    ,,  I  «IT  is  government. 

existence  of  these  views,  and  the  willingness  of  news- 
paper editors  and  proprietors  to  push  them  on  to  the 
public,  cannot  be  expected  to  intervene  against  their 
propagation.  Again,  an  ambitious  Minister,  in  charge 
of  one  of  the  fighting  branches  of  the  public  service, 
desirous  of  placing  his  personality  in  the  limelight  and 
focusing  public  attention  upon  the  affairs  of  his  De- 
partment, will  be  from  that  circumstance  a  readier  lis- 
tener to  representations  from  the  industry  in  question. 
Those  representations  may  quite  legitimately  take  the 
form  of  pointing  out  that  heavy  expenses  have  been  in- 
curred in  providing  a  certain  type  of  machinery  or  spe- 
cial accommodation  for  the  construction  of  a  particular 
kind  of  offensive  instrument,  that  the  orders  have  not 
kept  pace  with  the  expenditure,  and  that  if  further 
orders  be  not  forthcoming  losses  will  ensue  and  future 
facilities  for  production  be  necessarily  restricted.  There 
would  be  nothing  indefensible  in  representations  of  this 
character.  And  again,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  a  member 
of  Parliament,  convinced  of  certain  public  dangers  as- 
sociated with  the  existing  system,  but  representing  a 
constituency  where  this  great  industry  is  established  and 
employs,  perhaps,  not  an  inconsiderable  section  of  the 
local  labor,  may  find  his  freedom  of  speech  considerably 
curtailed  lest  he  should  be  accused  of  taking  the  bread 
from  the  mouths  of  some  of  his  constituents. 

Endless,  indeed,  are  the  ramifications  of  a  private  in- 
dustrial interest  so  wealthy  and  so  well  organized,  and 
dependent  for  its  profits  upon  national  expenditure  in 
instruments  of  warfare,  and,  consequently,  in  the  ulti- 
mate resort,  upon  war  itself.  The  general  influence 
exerted  upon  public  life  as  a  whole  ~by  the  very  fact  that 
this  industry  is  a  private  one,  and  possesses  a  large  body 

103 


of  shareholders  usually  belonging  to  the  upper  strata 
of  society,  cannot  be  regarded  otherwise  than  as  an  un- 
healthy and  dangerous  element  in  the  nation.  Empha- 
sis is  lent  to  this  aspect  of  the  case  when  it  is  borne  in 
mind  that  the  armaments  industry  has  of  late  years  be- 
come internationalized  to  a  remarkable  degree.  Recent 
disclosures,  the  accuracy  of  which  has  not  been  disputed, 
in  Germany,  France,  England,  and  Japan,  have  clearly 
shown  an  inter-connection  of  the  armament  interest  pro- 
ductive of  repellent  accompaniments.  This  inter-con- 
nection of  interest  has,  for  example,  made  it  possible  for 
a  body  of  British  shareholders,  including  prominent  ec- 
clesiastics, members  of  Parliament,  and  even  Cabinet 
Ministers,  to  be  financially  interested  in  enterprises  en- 
gaged in  the  manufacture  of  engines  of  destruction 
impartially  used  in  the  slaughter  of  Englishmen,  French- 
men, Germans,  and  Russians. 

But  however  revolting  this  may  be,  it  is  insignificant 
compared  with  the  graver  peril  to  which  precedent  allu- 
sion has  been  made.  Reflection  must  bring  with  it  the 
conviction  that  the  armament  industry  is  not  one  which 
the  nation  can  safely  permit  to  be  retained  in  private 
hands  and  to  be  the  subject  of  private  profit. 

What,  then,  is  to  be  our  policy  in  connection  with  the 
war?  First  and  foremost  we  must  be  victorious.  That 
is  a  prime  necessity  upon  which  the  nation  is  unanimous. 
We  must  win  not  only  because  many  British  institutions 
of  the  highest  value  would  be  destroyed  by  our  defeat, 
not  only  because  Prussia,  our  principal  enemy,  is  the 
leading  exponent  of  that  doctrine  of  military  domina- 
tion and  intolerance  which  is  incompatible  with  a  per- 
manently peaceful  Europe;  but  also  because  we  must 
see  justice  done,  as  far  as  may  be,  to  the  least  powerful 
of  our  Allies.  Ample  compensation  must  be  secured  for 

104 


Belgium  to  repair  her  material  loss  and  in  recognition 

of  the  wrong  done  to  her.  must  do. 

What  of  the  future?  What  lessons  do  the  incompet- 
ence and  secret! veness,  the  jealousies  and  vanities  of  that 
vaunted  European  statecraft  which  has  plunged  the 
world  in  war  convey  to  the  peoples  who  are  its  victims? 

What  can  the  people  do  to  amend  a  system  under 
which  they  are  used  as  pawns  in  a  game  of  chess  ? 

They  can  begin  to  understand  what  that  system  is  and 
that  its  existence  is  their  undoing.  They  can  begin  to 
understand  the  monstrous  errors  and  fallacies  which 
underlie  the  whole  teaching  imposed  upon  their  intelli- 
gence. They  can  begin  to  understand  that  this  im- 
munity from  public  control  enjoyed  by  the  small  group 
of  professional  men  who  manipulate  international  rela- 
tions has  led  to  the  establishment  amongst  the  latter  of 
a  standard  of  conduct  which  would  not  be  tolerated  in 
the  ordinary  affairs  of  a  well-ordered  community.  They 
can  begin  to  understand  that  "high  politics"  in  the 
diplomatic  world  has  become  a  synonym  for  intrigue; 
that  a  code  of  morals  is  therein  practised  which,  in  other 
branches  of  the  public  service,  would  entail  dismissal, 
and  in  the  business  world  would  involve  disgrace. 

They  can  force  themselves  to  a  mental  effort  which 
shall  lead  them  to  the  realization  of  the  complete  arti- 
ficiality of  the  conditions  under  which  they  suffer,  the 
remoteness  from  their  real  and  vital  needs  of  the  issues 
for  which  they  are  asked  to  sacrifice  all  that  they  hold 
dear.  They  can  rid  themselves  of  the  paralyzing  belief 
that  their  relations  with  their  neighbors  are  so  compli- 
cated and  mysterious  as  to  be  beyond  their  comprehen- 
sion. They  can  bring  themselves  to  grasp  a  plain  and 
demonstrable  truth,  and  to  appreciate  its  full  signifi- 
cance, which  is  that  those  to  whom  they  have  looked 
for  guidance,  *hose  who  have  told  them  that  in  the  pre- 
105 


servation  of  the  "Balance  of  Power,"  and  in  the  multi- 
plication of  colossal  armaments  lay  the  one  chance  of 
international  peace,  have  been  utterly,  hopelessly,  calam- 
itously wrong.  They  can  put  to  themselves  these  simple 
issues. 

"By  the  terrible  logic  of  events  which  now  confront 
us  we  see  that  the  methods  advocated  by  those  to  whose 
training  and  wisdom  we  trusted  to  ensure  peace  among 
the  nations  have  entirely  failed.  The  system  which  we 
were  induced  reluctantly  to  support,  far  from  preserving 
peace,  has  precipitated  us  into  the  greatest  conflict  in 
history,  a  conflict  we  passionately  desired  to  avoid,  and 
for  the  avoidance  of  which  we  made  heavy  sacrifices 
because,  we  were  told,  that  therein  lay  our  hope  of 
averting  it.  The  system  was  wrong.  We  must  evolve 
another. ' ' 

The  idea  of  a  federalized  Europe,  regulated  by  an 
Areopagus,  involving  the  disappearance,  or  substantial 
reduction,  of  standing  armies  and  navies,  and  the  sub- 
mission of  all  disputes  to  a  Central  Council,  is  not  to 
be  dismissed.  It  is  the  ultimate  goal  to  aim  at.  But  it 
cannot  be  attained  until  the  constitutionally  governed 
democracies  of  the  "West  are  brought  to  realize  how  im- 
possible it  is  that  their  moral  and  spiritual  development 
and  their  happiness  and  well-being  can  be  secured  under 
a  system  of  government  which  leaves  them  at  the  mercy 
of  the  intrigues  and  imbecilities  of  professional  diplo- 
matists and  of  the  ambitions  of  military  castes ;  helpless, 
too,  in  the  face  of  an  enormously  powerful  and  inter- 
nationalized private  interest  dependent  for  its  profits 
upon  the  maintenance  of  that  "armed  peace"  which  is 
the  inevitable  prelude  to  the  carnage  and  futility  of 
war. 

To  awaken  these  sentiments  among  the  democracies  of 
this  and  other  countries,  to  instil  into  them  these  con- 

106 


victions,  to  ensure  the  cooperation  of  all  forces  in  all 
countries  working  to  that  end — is  the  task  to  which  different 

countries 

we  must  all  turn  our  attention.  must  co- 

Potentates,  diplomatists,  and  militarists  made  this 
war.  They  should  not  be  allowed  to  arrange  unchecked 
and  uncontrolled  the  terms  of  peace  and  to  decide  alone 
the  conditions  which  will  follow  it.  The  mass  of  the 
people  who  suffer  from  their  blunders  and  their  quar- 
rels must  claim  the  ineradicable  right  of  participating 
in  the  future  settlement. 

And,  when  peace  has  come,  the  democratic  parties  of 
Europe  must  set  before  themselves  a  new  province  of 
political  effort.  That  peace  will  be  permanently  pre- 
served only  if  our  artisans  and  industrialists  keep  up 
with  the  artisans  and  industrialists  of  other  countries  a 
constant  and  deliberate  communication  through  their 
political  parties  and  other  organizations  which  will  pre- 
vent misunderstandings  and  subdue  the  hatreds  out  of 
which  war  ultimately  comes. 

"The  Morrow   of  the   War,"   Union   of  Democratic 
Control,  London,  Bulletin  No.  1. 


107 


NO  PEACE  WITHOUT  FEDERATION 

The  war  has  The  great  war  has  now  been  going  on  long  enough  to 
mankind.  enable  mankind  to  form  approximately  correct  views 
about  its  vast  extent  and  scale  of  operations,  its  sud- 
den interference  with  commerce  and  all  other  helpful 
international  intercourse,  its  unprecedented  wrecking 
of  family  happiness  and  continuity,  its  wiping  out,  as 
it  proceeds,  of  the  accumulated  savings  of  many  former 
generations  in  structures,  objects  of  art,  and  industrial 
capital,  and  the  huge  burdens  it  is  likely  to  impose  on 
twentieth-century  Europe.  From  all  these  points  of 
view,  it  is  evidently  the  most  horrible  calamity  that  has 
ever  befallen  the  human  race,  and  the  most  crucial  trial 
to  which  civilization  has  been  exposed.  It  is,  and  is  to 
be,  the  gigantic  struggle  of  these  times  between  the  forces 
which  make  for  liberty  and  righteousness  and  those 
which  make  for  the  subjection  of  the  individual  man, 
the  exaltation  of  the  State,  and  the  enthronement  of 
physical  force  directed  by  a  ruthless  collective  will.  It 
threatens  a  sweeping  betrayal  of  the  best  hopes  of  man- 
kind. 

Each  of  the  nations  involved,  horrified  at  the  immen- 
sity of  the  disaster,  maintains  that  it  is  not  responsible 
for  the  war;  and  each  Government  has  issued  a  state- 
ment to  prove  that  some  other  Government  is  respon- 
sible for  the  outbreak.  This  discussion,  however,  re- 
lates almost  entirely  to  actions  by  monarchs  and  Cab- 
inets between  July  23  and  August  4 — a  short  period  of 

108 


hurried  messages  between  the  chancelleries  of  Europe  ^ 
— actions  which  only  prove  that  the  monarchs  and  min-  th« 
isters  for  foreign  affairs  could  not,  or  at  least  did  not, 
prevent  the  long-prepared  general  war  from  breaking 
out.  The  assassination  of  the  Archduke  and  Duchess  of 
Hohenberg,  on  the  28th  of  June,  was  in  no  proper  sense 
a  cause  of  the  war,  except  as  it  was  one  of  the  conse- 
quences of  the  persistent  aggressions  of  Austria-Hungary 
against  her  southeastern  neighbors.  Neither  was  Rus- 
sian mobilization  in  four  military  districts  on  July  29 
a  cause  of  the  war;  for  that  was  only  an  external  mani- 
festation of  the  Russian  state  of  mind  toward  the  Bal- 
kan peoples,  a  state  of  mind  well  known  to  all  publicists 
ever  since  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878.  No  more  was 
the  invasion  of  Belgium  by  the  German  army  on  August 
4  a  true  cause  of  the  war,  or  even  the  cause,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  occasion,  of  Great  Britain's  becom- 
ing involved  in  it.  By  that  action,  Germany  was  only 
taking  the  first  step  in  carrying  out  a  long-cherished 
purpose,  and  in  executing  a  judicious  plan  of  campaign 
prepared  many  years  in  advance.  The  artificial  panic 
in  Germany  about  its  exposed  position  between  two 
powerful  enemies,  France  and  Russia,  was  not  a  gen- 
uine cause  of  the  war;  for  the  General  Staff  knew  they 
had  crushed  France  once,  and  were  confident  they  could 
do  it  again  in  a  month.  As  to  Russia,  it  was,  in  their 
view,  a  huge  nation,  but  very  clumsy  and  dull  in  war. 
The  real  causes  of  the  war  are  all  of  many  years' 
standing ;  and  all  the  nations  now  involved  in  the  fearful 
catastrophe  have  contributed  to  the  development  of  one 
or  more  of  these  effective  causes.  The  fundamental 
causes  are:  (1)  The  maintenance  of  monarchical  Gov- 
ernments, each  sanctioned  and  supported  by  the  national 
religion,  and  each  furnished  with  a  Cabinet  selected  by 
the  monarch, — Governments  which  can  make  war  with- 

109 


T^™°st          out  any  previous  consultation  of  the  peoples  through 
cause  is          their  elected  representatives;  (2)  the  constant  mainten- 

the    lust  I**]  .  i         i  •    T     .1  -•  11 

for  world-  ance  of  conscript  armies,  through  which  the  entire  able- 
bodied  male  population  is  trained  in  youth  for  service 
in  the  army  or  navy,  and  remains  subject  to  the  instant 
call  of  the  Government  till  late  in  life,  the  officering  of 
these  permanent  armies  involving  the  creation  of  a  large 
military  class  likely  to  become  powerful  in  political,  in- 
dustrial, and  social  administration;  (3)  the  creation  of 
a  strong,  permanent  bureaucracy  within  each  nation  for 
the  management  of  both  foreign  and  domestic  affairs, 
much  of  whose  work  is  kept  secret  from  the  public  at 
large;  and  finally  (4)  the  habitual  use  of  military  and 
naval  forces  to  acquire  new  territories,  contiguous  or 
detached,  without  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  people 
annexed  or  controlled.  This  last  cause  of  the  war  is  the 
most  potent  of  the  four,  since  it  is  strong  in  itself,  and 
is  apt  to  include  one  or  more  of  the  other  three.  It  is 
the  gratification  of  the  lust  for  world-empire. 

Of  all  the  nations  taking  part  in  the  present  war, 
Great  Britain  is  the  only  one  which  does  not  maintain  a 
conscript  army;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain 
is1  the  earliest  modern  claimant  of  world-empire  by 
force,  with  the  single  exception  of  Spain,  which  long 
since  abandoned  that  quest.  Every  one  of  these  nations 
except  little  Servia  has  yielded  to  the  lust  for  empire. 
Every  one  has  permitted  its  monarch  or  its  Cabinet  to 
carry  on  secret  negotiations  liable  at  any  time  to  com- 
mit the  nation  to  war,  or  to  fail  in  maintaining  the  peace 
of  Europe  or  of  the  Near  East.  In  the  crowded  diplo- 
matic events  of  last  July,  no  phenomenon  is  more  strik- 
ing than  the  exhibition  of  the  power  which  the  British 
people  confide  to  the  hands  of  their  Foreign  Secretary. 
In  the  interests  of  public  liberty  and  public  welfare  no 
official  should  possess  such  powers  as  Sir  Edward  Grey 

110 


used    admirably — though    in    vain — last    July.     In    all  Pen?anyt. 

*    .  *  has  been  the 

three  of  the  empires  engaged  in  the  war  there  has  lone  leader  in  im- 

..,,.,.,  •    perialism. 

existed  a  large  military  caste  which  exerts  a  strong  in- 
fluence on  the  Government  and  its  policies,  and  on  the 
daily  life  of  the  people. 

These  being  the  real  causes  of  the  terrific  convulsion 
now  going  on  in  Europe,  it  cannot  be  questioned  that 
the  nation  in  which  these  complex  causes  have  taken 
strongest  and  most  complete  effect  during  the  last  fifty 
years  is  Germany.  Her  form  of  government  has  been 
imperialistic  and  autocratic  in  the  highest  degree.  She 
has  developed  with  great  intelligence  and  assiduity  the 
most  formidable  conscript  army  in  the  world,  and  the 
most  influential  and  insolent  military  caste.  Three 
times  since  1864  she  has  waged  war  in  Europe,  and  each 
time  she  has  added  to  her  territory  without  regard  to  the 
wishes  of  the  annexed  population.  For  twenty-five  years 
she  has  exhibited  a  keen  desire  to  obtain  colonial  posses- 
sions ;  and  since  1896  she  has  been  aggressive  in  this  field. 
In  her  schools  and  universities  the  children  and  youth 
have  been  taught  for  generations  that  Germany  is  sur- 
rounded by  hostile  peoples,  that  her  expansion  in  Europe 
and  in  other  continents  is  resisted  by  jealous  Powers 
which  started  earlier  in  the  race  for  foreign  possessions, 
and  that  the  salvation  of  Germany  has  depended  from 
the  first,  and  will  depend  till  the  last,  on  the  efficiency  of 
her  army  and  navy  and  the  warlike  spirit  of  her  people. 
This  instruction,  given  year  after  year  by  teachers,  pub- 
licists, and  rulers,  was  first  generally  accepted  in  Prussia, 
but  now  seems  to  be  accepted  by  the  entire  empire  as 
unified  in  1871. 

The  attention  of  the  civilized  world  was  first  called 
to  this  state  of  the  German  mind  and  will  by  the  tri- 
umphant policies  of  Bismarck;  but  during  the  reign  of 
the  present  Emperor  the  external  aggressiveness  of  Ger- 

111 


German  many  and  her  passion  for  world-empire  have  grown  to 

ethics  is  much  more  formidable  proportions.  Although  the  Ger- 
valor"  and  man  Emperor  has  sometimes  played  the  part  of  the 
peacemaker,  he  has  habitually  acted  the  war-lord  in 
both  speech  and  bearing,  and  has  supported  the  military 
caste  whenever  it  has  been  assailed.  He  is  by  inheri- 
tance, conviction,  and  practise  a  divine-right  sovereign 
whose  throne  rests  on  an  "invincible"  army,  an  army 
conterminous  with  the  nation.  In  the  present  tremen- 
dous struggle  he  carries  his  subjects  with  him  in  a  rush- 
ing torrent  of  self-sacrificing  patriotism.  Mass-fanati- 
cism and  infectious  enthusiasm  seem  to  have  deprived  the 
leading  class  in  Germany,  for  the  moment,  of  all  power 
to  see,  reason,  and  judge  correctly — no  new  phenomenon 
in  the  world,  but  instructive  in  this  case  because  it  points 
to  the  grave  defect  in  German  education — the  lack  of 
liberty  and,  therefore,  of  practise  in  self-control. 

The  twentieth-century  educated  German  is,  however, 
by  no  means  given  over  completely  to  material  and  phys- 
ical aggrandizement  and  the  worship  of  might.  He 
cherishes  a  partly  new  conception  of  the  State  as  a  col- 
lective entity  whose  function  is  to  develop  and  multiply, 
not  the  free,  healthy,  and  happy  individual  man  and 
woman,  but  higher  and  more  effective  types  of  humanity, 
made  superior  by  a  strenuous  discipline  which  takes 
much  account  of  the  strong  and  ambitious,  and  little  of 
the  weak  or  meek.  He  rejects  the  ethics  of  the  Beati- 
tudes as  unsound,  but  accepts  the  religion  of  Valor, 
which  exalts  strength,  courage,  endurance,  and  the  ready 
sacrifice  by  the  individual  of  liberty,  happiness,  and  life 
itself  for  Germany's  honor  and  greatness.  A  nation  of 
sixty  millions  holding  these  philosophical  and  religious 
views,  and  proposing  to  act  on  them  in  winning  by  force 
the  empire  of  the  world,  threatens  civilization  with  more 
formidable  irruptions  of  a  destroying  host  than  any  that 

112 


history  has  recorded.     The  rush  of  the  German  army  ^ 
into  Belgium,  France,  and  Russia  and  its  consequences  |J°^"ye* 
to  those  lands  have  taught  the  rest  of  Europe  to  dread  domination 
German  domination,  and — it  is  to  be  hoped — to  make  it 
impossible. 

The  real  cause  of  the  present  convulsion  is,  then,  the 
state  of  mind  or  temper  of  Germany,  including  her  con- 
ception of  national  greatness,  her  theory  of  the  State, 
and  her  intelligent  and  skilful  use  of  all  the  forces  of 
nineteenth-century  applied  science  for  the  destructive 
purposes  of  war.  It  is,  therefore,  apparent  that  Europe 
can  escape  from  the  domination  of  Germany  only  by 
defeating  her  in  her  present  undertakings ;  and  that  this 
defeat  can  be  brought  about  only  by  using  against  her 
the  same  effective  agencies  of  destruction  and  the  same 
martial  spirit  on  which  Germany  itself  relies.  Horrible 
as  are  the  murderous  and  devastating  effects  of  this  war, 
there  can  be  no  lasting  peace  until  Europe  as  a  whole  is 
ready  to  make  some  serious  and  far-reaching  decisions 
in  regard  to  governmental  structures  and  powers.  In 
all  probability  the  sufferings  and  losses  of  this  wide- 
spread war  must  go  farther  and  cut  deeper  before  Eu- 
rope can  be  brought  to  the  decisions  which  alone  can 
give  securities  for  lasting  peace  against  Germany  on  the 
one  hand  and  Russia  on  the  other,  or  to  either  of  these 
nations,  or  can  give  security  for  the  future  to  any  of 
the  smaller  nations  of  Continental  Europe.  There  can, 
indeed,  be  no  security  for  future  peace  in  Europe  until 
every  European  nation  recognizes  the  fact  that  there  is 
to  be  no  such  thing  in  the  world  as  one  dominating  na- 
tion— no  such  thing  as  world-empire  for  any  single 
nation — Great  Britain,  Germany,  Russia,  Japan,  or 
China.  There  can  be  no  sense  of  security  against  sud- 
den invasion  in  Europe  so  long  as  all  the  able-bodied 
men  are  trained  to  be  soldiers,  and  the  best  possible 

113 


The  hopes  for     armies  are  kept  constantly  ready  for  instant  use.     There 

federation  .^  J 

instead  of  can  be  no  secure  peace  in  Europe  until  a  federation  of 
,the  European  States  is  established,  capable  of  making 
public  contracts  intended  to  be  kept,  and  backed  by  an 
overwhelming  international  force  subject  to  the  orders 
of  an  international  tribunal.  The  present  convulsion 
demonstrates  the  impotence  toward  permanent  peace  of 
secret  negotiations,  of  unpublished  agreements,  of  trea- 
ties and  covenants  that  can  be  broken  on  grounds  of  mili- 
tary necessity,  of  international  law  if  without  sanctions, 
of  pious  wishes,  of  economic  and  biological  predictions, 
and  of  public  opinion  unless  expressed  through  a  firm 
international  agreement,  behind  which  stands  an  inter- 
national force.  When  that  international  force  has  been 
firmly  established  it  will  be  time  to  consider  what  pro- 
portionate reductions  in  national  armaments  can  be  pru- 
dently recommended.  Until  that  glorious  day  dawns, 
no  patriot  and  no  lover  of  his  kind  can  expect  lasting 
peace  in  Europe  or  wisely  advocate  any  reduction  of 
armaments. 

The  hate-breeding  and  worse  than  brutal  cruelties  and 
devastations  of  the  war  with  their  inevitable  moral  and 
physical  degradations  ought  to  shock  mankind  into  at- 
tempting a  great  step  forward.  Europe  and  America 
should  undertake  to  exterminate  the  real  causes  of  the 
catastrophe.  In  studying  that  problem  the  coming  Eu- 
ropean conference  can  profit  by  the  experience  of  the 
three  prosperous  and  valid  countries  in  which  public 
liberty  and  the  principle  of  federation  have  been  most 
successfully  developed — Switzerland,  Great  Britain,  and 
the  United  States.  Switzerland  is  a  democratic  federa- 
tion which  unites  in  a  firm  federal  bond  three  different 
racial  stocks  speaking  three  unlike  languages,  and  di- 
vided locally  and  irregularly  between  the  Catholic 
Church  and  the  Protestant.  The  so-called  British  Em- 

114 


pire  tends  strongly  to  become  a  federation;  and  the 

methods  of  government  both  in  Great  Britain  itself  and  possible,  even 

0  .  if  the  road 

in  its  affiliated  commonwealths  are  becoming  more  and  is  long, 
more  democratic  in  substance.  The  war  has  brought 
this  fact  out  in  high  relief.  As  to  the  United  States,  it 
is  a  strong  federation  of  forty-eight  heterogeneous  States 
which  has  been  proving  for  a  hundred  years  that  free- 
dom and  democracy  are  safer  and  happier  for  mankind 
than  subjection  to  any  sort  of  autocracy,  and  afford  far 
the  best  training  for  national  character  and  national  ef- 
ficiency. Republican  France  has  not  yet  had  time  to  give 
this  demonstration,  being  encumbered  with  many  sur- 
vivals of  the  Bourbon  and  Napoleonic  regimes,  and  be- 
ing forced  to  maintain  a  conscript  army. 

It  is  an  encouraging  fact  that  every  one  of  the  polit- 
ical or  governmental  changes  needed  is  already  illus- 
trated in  the  practise  of  one  or  more  of  the  civilized 
nations.  To  exaggerate  the  necessary  changes  is  to  post- 
pone or  prevent  a  satisfactory  outcome  from  the  present 
calculated  destructions  and  wrongs  and  the  accompany- 
ing moral  and  religious  chaos.  Ardent  proposals  to  re- 
make the  map  of  Europe,  reconstruct  European  society, 
substitute  republics  for  empires,  and  abolish  armaments 
are  in  fact  obstructing  the  road  toward  peace  and  good- 
will among  men.  That  road  is  hard  at  best. 

The  immediate  duty  of  the  United  States  is  presum- 
ably to  prepare,  on  the  basis  of  its  present  army  and 
navy,  to  furnish  an  effective  quota  of  the  international 
force,  servant  of  an  international  tribunal,  which  will 
make  the  ultimate  issue  of  this  most  abominable  of  wars, 
not  a  truce,  but  a  durable  peace. 

Charles  W.  Eliot,  "The  Road  Toward  Peace,"  chap. 
XI. 


115 


PART  II 
A  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE 


PART  II.    A  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE 

BASES  FOR  CONFEDERATION 

After  this  war  is  over,  will  the  nations  fall  back  again  The  substitu- 
into  the  armed  peace,  the  rival  alliances,  the  Balance  of  nership  for 
Power  with  competing  armaments,  the  preparations  for 
another  war  thus  made  ' '  inevitable, ' '  or  will  they  go  for- 
ward to  the  realization  of  the  idea  of  ' '  public  right, ' '  as 
expounded  by  Mr.  Asquith,  "the  substitution  for  force, 
for  the  clash  of  competing  ambitions,  for  groupings  and 
alliances  and  a  precarious  equipoise,  of  a  real  European 
partnership,  based  on  the  recognition  of  equal  rights  and 
established  and  enforced  by  the  common  will?"  The 
preservation  and  progress  of  civilization  demand  that 
the  peoples  go  forward.  But  how  shall  "public  right" 
be  realized? 

The  issue  is,  perhaps,  best  approached  by  putting  a 
narrower,  more  concrete  question:  How  can  nations  be 
got  to  reduce  their  armaments?  For  this  action  will  be 
the  best  test  and  pledge  of  the  establishment  of  ' '  public 
right"  and  the  reliance  on  a  pacific  future.  Could  a 
conference  of  Powers  bring  about  a  reduction  of  arma- 
ments by  agreement?  Surely  not  unless  the  motives 
which  have  led  them  in  the  past  to  arm  are  reversed. 
These  motives  are  either  a  desire  to  be  stronger  than 
some  other  Power,  in  order  to  take  something  from  him 
by  force — the  aggressive  motive ;  or  a  desire  to  be  strong 
enough  to  prevent  some  other  Power  from  acting  in  this 
way  to  us — the  defensive  motive.  Now  how  can  these 

119 


The  League 
of  Peace  must 
become  an  In- 
ternational 
government. 


motives  be  reversed?  Nations  may  enter  into  a  solemn 
undertaking  to  refer  all  differences  or  disputes  that  may 
arise  to  arbitration  or  to  other  peaceful  settlement.  If 
they  can  be  got  to  adhere  to  such  a  general  agreement, 
international  law  and  public  right  will  take  the  place  of 
private  force,  and  wars  of  aggression  and  defense  will 
no  longer  happen.  But  what  will  ensure  the  fulfilment 
of  their  undertaking  by  all  the  signatory  Powers  ?  Pub- 
lic opinion  and  a  common  sense  of  justice  are  found  in- 
adequate safeguards.  There  must  be  an  executive  power 
enabled  to  apply  an  economic  boycott,  or  in  the  last  re- 
sort an  international  force.  If  this  power  is  adequate, 
it  will  secure  the  desired  reversal  of  the  offensive  and  the 
defensive  motives  to  armaments,  and  will  by  a  natural 
process  lead  to  a  reduction  of  national  forces. 

But  it  is  not  safe  for  the  League  of  Nations  to  wait 
until  difficulties  ripen  into  quarrels.  There  must  be 
some  wider  power  of  inquiry  and  settlement  vested  in  a 
representative  Council  of  the  Nations.  This  will  in  sub- 
stance mean  a  legislative  power.  For  peace  cannot  be 
secured  by  adopting  a  purely  statical  view  of  the  needs 
and  rights  of  nations  in  relation  to  one  another.  New 
applications  of  the  principles  of  political  "autonomy" 
and  of  "the  open  door"  will  become  necessary,  and  some 
international  method  of  dealing  with  them  is  essential. 
So  there  emerges  the  necessity  of  extending  the  idea  of  a 
League  of  Peace  into  that  of  an  International  Govern- 
ment. 

The  new  era  of  internationalism  requires  the  replace- 
ment of  the  secret  diplomacy  of  Powers  by  the  public 
intercourse  of  Peoples  through  their  chosen  representa- 
tives. If  the  Peace  which  ends  this  war  is  to  be  durable, 
it  must  be  of  a  kind  to  facilitate  the  setting-up  of  these 
new  international  arrangements.  No  timid,  tentative 
quarter  measures  will  suffice.  Courage  and  faith  are 

120 


needed  for  a  great  new  extension  of  the  art  of  govern-  "Arm,ea 

peace 

ment.  .  .  .  must 

Almost  everybody  hopes  that,  when  this  war  is  over,  renewed. 
it  will  be  possible  to  secure  the  conditions  of  a  lasting 
peace  by  reducing  the  power  of  militarism  and  by  setting 
the  relations  between  nations  on  a  better  footing.  To 
watchers  of  the  present  conflict  it  seems  an  intolerable 
thought  that,  after  the  fighting  is  done,  we  should  once 
more  return  to  a  condition  of  " armed  peace,"  with 
jealous,  distrustful,  and  revengeful  Powers  piling  up 
armaments  and  plotting  singly  or  in  groups  against  their 
neighbors  until  Europe  is  plunged  into  another  war  more 
terrible,  more  bloody,  and  more  costly  than  this.  Yet 
nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  this  will  happen  unless 
the  Peoples  which  are  so  vitally  concerned  are  able  to 
mobilize  their  powers  of  clear  thought,  sane  feeling,  and 
goodwill  in  carefully  considered  plans  for  a  cooperative 
policy  of  nations. 

The  first  great  obstacle  to  the  performance  of  this  task 
is  the  state  of  mind  of  those  who  seem  to  think  that  all 
that  is  required  is  "to  crush  German  militarism,"  and 
that,  this  incubus  once  removed,  the  naturally  pacific 
disposition  of  all  other  nations  will  dispose  them  to  live 
together  in  amity.  It  is  not  easy  to  induce  such  persons 
to  consider  closely  what  they  mean  by  "crushing  Ger- 
man militarism, ' '  or  how  its  destruction,  whatever  it  does 
mean,  would  secure  the  peace  of  Europe,  we  will  not  say 
in  perpetuity,  but  for  a  single  generation.  But  let  us 
suppose  the  most  complete  success  for  the  arms  of  the 
Allies,  the  slaughter  or  the  capture  of  great  German 
forces,  the  invasion  of  Germany,  and  the  dictation  of 
terms  of  peace  by  the  Allies  at  Berlin.  Such  terms  as 
were  imposed  might  cripple  her  military  power  of  ag- 
gression or  revenge  for  some  years.  But  would  it  kill 
what  we  know  as  German  militarism?  If  our  accepted 

121 


The  peril  of       political  analysis  be  right,  the  German  militarism  that 

"crushing"  J        , 

Germany.  must  be  crushed  is  not  an  army  and  a  navy,  but  a  spirit 
of  national  aggression,  proud,  brutal,  and  unscrupulous, 
the  outcome  of  certain  intellectual  and  moral  tendencies 
embodied  in  the  "real"  politics  and  the  "real"  culture 
of  the  nation.  Can  we  seriously  suppose  that  this  evil 
spirit  will  be  exorcised  by  a  crushing  defeat  on  land  and 
sea,  followed  by  a  humiliating  peace?  If  Germany 
could  be  permanently  disabled  from  entertaining  any 
hopes  of  recovering  her  military  strength,  or  from  exer- 
cising any  considerable  influence  in  the  high  policy  of 
Europe,  her  feelings  of  resentment  and  humiliation 
might  perhaps  be  left  to  rankle  in  impotence,  or  to  die 
out  by  lapse  of  time.  But  nothing  which  the  Allies 
can  do  to  Germany  will  leave  her  in  such  long-lasting 
impotence.  Even  if  stripped  of  her  non-Teutonic  lands 
and  populations,  she  will  remain  a  great  Power — great 
in  area,  population,  industry,  and  organizing  power — 
and  no  temporary  restrictions  or  guarantees  can  long 
prevent  her  from  once  more  developing  a  military 
strength  that  will  give  dangerous  meaning  to  her  thirst 
for  vengeance.  Whether  the  hegemony  of  Prussia  over 
a  confederation  of  German  States  (possibly  including 
Austria)  be  retained  or  not,  Europe  can  have  no  security 
that  the  same  passions  which  stirred  France  to  the  most 
strenuous  efforts  to  recover  her  military  strength  after 
1870  will  not  be  similarly  operative  throughout  Germany. 
We  cannot  feel  sure  that  the  experience  of  the  most 
disastrous  war  will  effectively  destroy  the  hold  of  Prus- 
sianism,  and  that  the  efficiency  of  intellect  and  will  which 
constitute  that  power  will  not  be  able  to  reassert  their 
sway  over  a  broken  Germany. 

The  fear  of  such  a  revival  of  German  strength  will  re- 
main ever-present  in  her  neighbors,  and  will  compel 
them  to  maintain  great  military  preparations.  A  beaten 

122 


Germany,  with  a  ring  of  military  Powers  round  her, 
watching  every  phase  of  her  recovery  with  suspicion,  and  militarism  in 

.  .          general  must 

always  liable  to  quarrel  among  themselves,  will  not  give  be  broken, 
peace  to  Europe.  Even,  therefore,  if  we  assign  to  Ger- 
many a  monopoly  of  the  spirit  of  aggressive  militarism, 
European  peace  is  not  secured  by  crushing  Germany. 
A  saner  review  of  the  situation,  however,  will  recognize 
that  Germany  has  no  such  monopoly  of  the  spirit  of  ag- 
gression, though  that  spirit  has  in  her  recent  policy  found 
its  most  formidable  and  most  conscious  expression.  If 
the  craving  for  a  colonial  Empire  with  "places  in  the 
sun"  was,  as  seems  likely,  the  principal  factor  in  the 
aggressive  designs  of  Germany,  can  we  confidently  assert 
that  no  other  State  has  in  the  past  harbored  such  designs, 
or  may  not  harbor  them  again?  The  expansive  Impe- 
rialism of  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  even  more 
recently  of  Japan,  gives  the  lie  to  any  such  assertion. 
Pan-Slavism  is  in  spirit  identical  with  the  Pan-Teuton- 
ism  which  has  contributed  to  this  debacle,  and  Great 
Britain  and  France  are  already  sated  with  the  overseas 
Empire  which  Germany  was  craving.  History  shows 
that,  in  every  militarist  State,  aggressive  and  defensive 
motives  and  purposes  are  present  together  in  different 
degrees  at  all  times.  While,  therefore,  we  may  reason- 
ably think  that  the  aggressive  militarism  of  Germany 
held  increasing  sway  in  the  political  direction  of  that 
Empire  during  recent  years,  and  was  the  direct  efficient 
cause  of  the  present  conflict,  we  cannot  hold  that,  with 
the  defeat  or  even  the  destruction  of  the  military  and 
naval  power  of  Germany,  militarism  would  tend  to  dis- 
appear from  the  European  system,  and  that  the  relations 
between  nations  would  henceforth  undergo  so  radical  a 
change  as  to  secure  the  world  against  all  likelihood  of 
forcible  outbreaks  in  the  future. 

Clearly,  it  is  not  German  militarism  alone,  but  mili- 
123 


Real  problem,     tarism  in  general  that  must  be  broken.     The  real  ques- 

to  change  in-  **  .  „ 

ner  attitudes  tion  is  how  to  change  the  inner  attitude  of  nations,  their 
beliefs  and  feelings  towards  one  another,  so  as  to  make 
each  nation  and  its  rulers  recognize  that  it  is  no  longer 
either  desirable  or  feasible  to  seek  peculiar  advantages 
for  itself  by  bringing  force  to  bear  upon  another  nation. 
But  it  may  be  urged,  granted  that  disarmament  may 
not  be  set  afoot  spontaneously  and  separately  by  the 
different  nations,  mutual  disarmament  can  occur  by  ar- 
rangement between  the  Powers,  which,  after  the  menace 
of  German  aggression  is  removed,  will  be  disposed  to 
take  this  step  in  concert.  Such  disarmament,  it  is  usu- 
ally conceived,  will  not  stand  alone,  but  will  form  an  im- 
portant feature  of  a  larger  international  policy,  by  which 
the  Powers  will  agree  among  themselves  to  settle  any 
differences  that  may  arise  by  reference  to  courts  of  con- 
ciliation or  of  arbitration,  and  perhaps  also  to  concert 
measures  of  common  action  in  dealing  with  States  and 
territories  not  within  their  jurisdiction.  Such  a  concert 
of  European  Powers  has  hitherto  appeared  to  many  to 
yield  an  adequate  basis  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  if  it 
could  be  brought  about.  It  has  also  seemed  to  most  men 
the  utmost  limit  of  the  actually  attainable.  The  idea  of 
the  possibility  of  any  closer  relation  between  sovereign 
independent  States  has  been  dismissed  as  chimerical. 

Now  in  any  discussion  of  the  feasibility  of  such  a 
concert  of  European  or  world  Powers  as  will  by  mutual 
agreement  secure  disarmament  and  a  settlement  of  dif- 
ferences by  judicial  methods,  it  must  be  recognized  at 
the  outset  that  this  war  may  make  the  successful  pursu- 
ance of  such  a  policy  more  difficult  than  it  would  have 
been  before.  A  Balance  of  Power,  whatever  may  have 
been  its  other  disadvantages,  seemed  in  itself  favorable  to 
the  possibilities  of  an  agreement  in  which  each  nation, 
or  group  of  nations,  might  be  an  equal  gainer.  But  a 

124 


decisive  victory  in  war,  which  leaves  the  Allied  nations 
with  a  strong  preponderance  of  power,  is  less  likely  to 
yield  a  satisfactory  basis  of  agreement  for  a  mutual 
disarmament.  Is  it  likely  that  they  will  readily  consent 
to  a  reduction  in  their  several  military  and  naval  forces 
equivalent  to  the  reduction  they  will  demand  in  the 
forces  of  the  nations  that  have  been  their  enemies?  To 
put  the  difficulty  in  concrete  terms :  "Would  France  con- 
sent to  an  early  reduction  of  her  army  upon  terms  which 
would  leave  her  fighting-strength  as  compared  with  that 
of  Germany  relatively  the  same  as  before  the  war? 
Would  Great  Britain  consent  to  reduce  her  navy  in  the 
same  proportion  as  the  reduction  she  required  of  Ger- 
many? Even  if  the  Allies  believed  that  the  proportion- 
ate reduction  would  be  duly  carried  out  by  Germany, 
would  they  regard  such  an  arrangement  as  affording  the 
desired  security?  Obviously  not.  It  may,  of  course,  be 
urged  that  an  agreed  basis  of  reduction  might  be  reached, 
according  to  which  the  relative  strength  of  army  and 
navy  assigned  to  Germany  would  be  smaller  than  before. 
But  the  more  closely  the  proposition  is  examined  the  less 
feasible  does  it  appear.  What  basis  for  the  size  of 
armies  could  reasonably,  or  even  plausibly,  be  suggested 
-  which  would  not  assign  to  Germany  a  larger  preponder- 
ance over  France  in  number  of  soldiers  than  she  pos- 
sesses at  present?  Size  of  population,  or  of  frontiers, 
the  two  most  reasonable  considerations  for  apportioning 
defensive  needs,  would  tell  in  favor  of  Germany  against 
France.  True  it  would  tell  even  more  strongly  in  favor 
of  Eussia,  assigning  her,  in  fact,  a  relatively  larger  mili- 
tary predominance  in  Europe  than  she  has  ever  claimed. 
But  would  either  France  or  Germany  regard  the  new 
military  situation  as  safe  or  desirable  ?  Nor  would  there 
be  any  permanence  in  an  arrangement  based  on  such  a 
mutable  factor  as  population,  according  to  which  the 

125 


NO  standard      German  preponderance  over  France  and  of  Russia  over 

for  proper-  ^  . 

tioning  arma-  Germany  would  be  continually  increasing.  If  area  of 
territory,  as  well  as  population  and  frontiers,  were  taken 
into  consideration  in  fixing  a  basis,  France  would  come 
off  a  little  better  in  relation  to  Germany,  but  the  size  of 
Russia,  even  if  her  European  lands  were  alone  included, 
would  give  her  an  overwhelming  advantage.  If,  as 
might  not  unreasonably  be  claimed,  the  extra-European 
possessions  of  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and  France  must  be 
reckoned  in,  either  on  a  basis  of  territory  or  of  popula- 
tion, Great  Britain  and  Russia  would  possess  a  superi- 
ority of  military  strength  which  would  give  them,  acting 
together,  a  complete  control  over  the  politics  of  Europe 
and  Asia.  Or,  were  the  United  States  to  come  into  the 
arrangement,  the  military  strength  of  Anglo-Saxondom 
might  too  obviously  surpass  that  of  any  likely  combina- 
tion of  other  Powers. 

Again,  what  basis  of  naval  strength  would  be  satis- 
factory? Great  Britain  would  not  think  of  accepting 
the  area,  population,  or  frontier  factors  unless  the  Em- 
pire as  well  as  the  British  Isles  were  counted  in.  On  the 
other  hand,  her  proposal,  that  volume  of  shipping  and  of 
foreign  trade  should  count  heavily  in  the  basis,  might 
give  her  for  the  time  being  an  even  greater  preponder- 
ance over  other  navies  than  she  has  hitherto  possessed. 

If  the  comparison  of  the  military  and  naval  strength 
of  nations  were  conducted,  as  in  the  past,  by  direct  con- 
sideration of  the  numerical  strength  and  the  fighting 
value  of  the  several  items  of  an  army  and  a  navy,  agree- 
ment upon  a  basis  of  reduction  would  be  manifestly  im- 
possible. The  discovery  and  acceptance  of  any  standard 
unit  of  naval  or  military  value  applicable  to  changing 
conditions  of  modern  warfare  are  found  to  be  impractic- 
able. For  though  every  military  budget  implies  the  ac- 
ceptance of  some  scale  of  values  by  which  the  worth  of  a 

126 


battery  of  artillery  is  compared  with  that  of  a  battalion  Must  get 

,  ..  nd   o*   motives 

of  infantry,  while  every  naval  budget  involves  a  calcula-  which  impel 

.  ,     ,  ,        „  ,  ,  armament. 

tion  or  the  worth  01  a  submarine  or  a  seaplane  as  com- 
pared with  an  armored  cruiser  and  a  super-Dreadnought, 
no  two  budgets  would  be  found  to  support  the  same  scale 
of  values.  It  is  quite  manifest  that  no  agreement  for 
reducing  armaments  could  be  attained  by  stipulations  as 
to  the  number,  size,  or  quality  of  the  several  forces  and 
arms  employed.  This  difficulty  in  itself,  however,  is 
not  fatal  to  the  proposal.  For  a  far  simpler  and  more 
satisfactory  method  of  agreement  might  be  found  by 
disregarding  the  concrete  armaments  and  accepting  a 
financial  basis  of  expenditure  which  would  leave  each 
nation  complete  liberty  to  apply  the  money  prescribed 
to  it  as  a  maximum  expenditure  on  armaments  in  what- 
ever way  it  chose.  Though  each  nation,  considering  its 
defense,  would  doubtless  have  to  take  into  account  the 
sort  of  preparations  for  possible  attack  its  neighbors 
might  be  making,  it  would  be  entitled  to  spend  as  large 
a  proportion  of  its  authorized  expenditure  upon  guns, 
torpedo-boats,  aircraft,  Dreadnoughts,  as  it  chose. 

The  real  difficulty,  therefore,  turns  upon  the  agree- 
ment upon  a  basis  of  comparative  expenditure.  Now 
this  difficulty  appears  insuperable,  if  reduction  of  arma- 
ments be  regarded  as  the  sole,  or  the  chief,  mainstay  of 
a  durable  peace.  For  so  long  as  the  motives  which  have 
hitherto  impelled  nations  to  increase  their  armaments 
still  retain  the  appearance  of  validity  in  any  nation  or 
group  of  nations,  no  agreed  basis  for  reduction  will  be 
reached,  or,  were  it  reached,  no  reliable  adherence  to  its 
terms  could  be  expected.  For  the  reduction  of  arma- 
ments involves  the  acceptance  of  and  the  adherence  to  a 
principle  of  reduction  by  all  the  Great  Powers.  If  any 
single  Great  Power  refused  to  come  into  the  agreement, 
or,  coming  in,  was  suspected  of  evading  the  fulfilment  of 

127 


Mere  agree- 
ment to  re- 
duce arma- 
ment will 
be  futile. 


its  pledge  by  concealing  some  of  its  expenditure  on  arma- 
ments, this  method  would  have  failed  pro  tanto,  both  as 
an  economy  and  a  security.  For  each  of  the  would-be 
pacific  nations  would  have  to  make  adequate  provision 
against  the  warlike  outsider  or  suspect.  Now,  that  a 
mere  agreement  for  mutual  disarmament  would  thus  be 
baffled  is  almost  certain.  So  long  as  a  Power,  by  simply 
refusing  to  come  in,  could  retain  full  liberty  to  pile  up 
arms  with  a  view  to  a  future  policy  of  menace  or  ag- 
gression, would  there  not  be  Governments  which  would 
find  some  more  or  less  plausible  excuses  for  declining 
the  invitation  to  come  in?  Or  could  we  feel  complete 
assurance  that  a  Power  with  an  aggressive  past,  after  en- 
tering into  such  an  agreement,  would  faithfully  fulfil  it 
when  so  many  facilities  of  evasion  present  themselves? 
Nay,  there  would  be  a  positive  incentive  to  an  aggres- 
sive or  revengeful  Power  either  to  stay  outside,  or,  en- 
tering in,  to  violate  secretly  its  obligations.  For,  by 
either  course,  it  would  be  enabled  to  steal  a  march  in 
military  strength  over  its  intended  enemy,  if  the  latter 
were  a  faithful  adherent  to  such  a  treaty.  The  slight- 
est reflection  suffices  to  show  that  a  mere  agreement  for 
disarmament  or  reduction  of  armament  must  be  futile. 

But,  it  will  be  contended,  these  difficulties  may  be 
overcome  by  extending  the  agreement  so  as  to  bind  the 
signatory  Powers  to  bring  their  united  force  to  bear 
upon  any  member  convicted  of  a  wilful  evasion  or  in- 
fraction of  the  agreement.  That  is  to  say,  they  must 
engage  to  secure  the  agreement  by  an  ultimate  sanc- 
tion of  physical  force.  The  administration  of  such  an 
agreement  would,  of  course,  involve  the  setting  up  of 
some  standing  Court  or  Committee  of  Inquiry,  vested 
with  full  rights  of  inspection  and  judgment,  and  en- 
dowed with  a  power  of  armed  executive. 

But  if  a  treaty  of  reduction  of  armaments  could  be 
128 


secured  by  such  a  guarantee  of  collective  force,  it  would 

still  find  itself  confronted  by  the  problem  of  the  law-  Hnkedw 

r,  .  .  reversal 

less  outsider.  So  long  as  an  aggressive  outsider  were  at 
liberty  to  threaten  or  coerce  a  member  ^f  the  League 
without  involving  the  hostility  of  the  other  members, 
this  danger  would  compel  members  of  the  League  to 
maintain  large  armaments,  though  they  were  secure 
against  internal  hostility.  A  single  Power,  such  as  Ger- 
many, Russia,  or  Japan,  standing  out  for  its  absolute 
right  to  determine  its  own  expenditure  and  policy,  would 
cancel  nearly  all  the  economy  of  the  agreement.  It 
would  become  self-evident  that  the  Powers  entering  such 
an  agreement  must  bind  themselves  to  a  common  defense 
against  such  an  outsider.  They  would  be  impelled  to 
this  course  by  a  double  motive.  In  no  other  way  could 
each  member  gain  that  security  which  would  win  his 
consent  to  a  basis  of  reduction  that  would  lower  his 
separate  defensive  power.  Again,  by  pledging  them- 
selves to  united  action  against  an  aggressive  outside 
Power,  they  would  diminish,  perhaps  destroy,  the  aggres- 
sive design  or  policy  of  such  a  Power.  For  such  aggres- 
sive policy  and  the  armed  force  which  supports  it  are 
only  plausible  upon  the  assumption  that  they  can  be 
successfully  applied  to  gain  a  selfish  national  end.  If 
the  united  strength  of  the  Treaty  Powers  remained  so 
great  as  to  render  the  pursuance  of  its  aggressive  de- 
signs impossible  or  too  dangerous,  the  lawless  Powers 
might  learn  the  lesson  of  the  law,  and,  abandoning  its 
hopes  of  aggression,  come  into  the  League. 

In  a  word,  the  proposal  for  reduction  of  armaments 
only  becomes  really  feasible  when  it  is  linked  with  a 
provision  for  reversing  the  motives  which  lead  nations 
to  increase  their  armed  forces.  Once  bring  to  bear  upon 
the  Governments  of  States  a  clear  recognition  of  the 
two  related  facts :  first,  that  by  no  increase  of  their  armed 

129 


Must  make  it     force  will  they  be  reasonably  likely  to  succeed  in  any 

too  dangeroas  ...  .    ,  ,  ,      ,,      ,    ,         ,-. 

for  one  Power  aggressive  design  upon  a  neighbor ;  second,  that  by  the 
lnotherk  pledged  cooperation  of  their  cosignatories  they  are  not 
dependent  for  defense  upon  their  own  force  alone,  then 
obvious  motives  of  economy  and  self-interest  will  lead 
them  to  reduce  their  armaments.  Though  the  military 
caste  may  still  plead  the  instability  of  pacific  agree- 
ments and  the  disciplinary  advantages  of  National  Serv- 
ice, while  contractors  for  armaments  do  their  best  to  sow 
dissension  among  the  leagued  Powers  and  to  arouse  the 
military  ambitions  of  new  nations,  these  war  interests 
would  no  longer  be  able  to  play  as  heretofore  upon  the 
fears  and  passions  of  the  peoples.  For  whatever  the 
secret  political  and  business  policy  behind  the  race  for 
armaments,  its  engineers  could  only  make  that  policy 
effective  by  periodic  appeals  to  the  menace  of  invasion. 
Once  make  it  manifest  that  no  evil-minded  foreigner  can 
threaten  aggression  against  one  country  without  meet- 
ing an  overwhelming  strength  of  leagued  forces,  to  which 
one  particular  contribution  is  not  of  determinant  im- 
portance, and  the  balance  of  national  motives  leans 
heavily  and  constantly  towards  smaller  and  less  ex- 
pensive forces. 

The  absolute  strength  of  the  rational  and  moral  case 
against  war  and  militarism  has  in  some  degree  obscured 
the  fact  that,  so  long  as  pushful  statesmen  and  diplo- 
matists, ambitious  soldiers,  covetous  financiers,  and  war- 
traders  were  able  to  stimulate  and  carry  out  aggressive 
policies  of  conquest  and  aggrandizement  on  the  part  of 
stronger  against  weaker  States,  the  apprehensions  upon 
which  these  same  interests  played  in  urging  the  neces- 
sity of  large  expenditure  upon  defense  were  not  un- 
reasonable. It  is  only  by  making  it  too  obviously  diffi- 
cult and  dangerous  for  any  one  Power  to  attack  any 
other  Power  that  the  balance  of  reasonable  motives  is 

130 


firmly  weighted  against  armaments.     This  can  only  be 
achieved  by  substituting  for  a  world  of  isolated  inde-  ^^ 
pendent  States,  or  of  Balances  of  Power,  a  world  in  aggression, 
which  the  united  strength  of   a  sufficient  number  of 
States  is  brought   to  bear  immediately   and   certainly 
against  any  disturber  of  the  public  peace. 

"Splendid  isolation"  is  no  longer  practicable  in  the 
modern  world  of  international  relations.  Group  alli- 
ances in  pursuit  of  the  Balance  of  Power  are  seen  to  be 
nothing  else  than  an  idle  feint.  For  the  sole  and  con- 
stant aim  of  each  such  group  and  Power  is  not  to  achieve 
or  to  maintain  the  balance,  but  to  weight  it  on  one  side. 
Such  an  alternating  and  oscillating  balance  gives  the 
maximum  of  insecurity,  and  thus  plays  most  effectively 
the  game  of  war  and  armaments.  The  only  possible  al- 
ternative is  the  creation  of  such  a  concert  or  confedera- 
tion of  Powers  as  shall  afford  to  each  the  best  available 
security  against  the  aggression  of  another  within  the 
concert  and  the  best  defense  of  all  against  aggression 
from  outside. 

The  general  form  in  which  a  cooperation  of  nations  for 
these  objects  presents  itself  is  that  of  a  League  or  Con- 
federation. The  primary  object  of  such  a  League  is  to 
bind  all  its  members  to  submit  all  their  serious  differ- 
ences to  arbitration  or  some  other  mode  of  peaceful  set- 
tlement, and  to  accept  the  judgment  or  award  thus  ob- 
tained. Some  advocates  of  a  League  of  Peace  think  that 
the  sense  of  moral  obligation  in  each  State,  fortified  by 
the  public  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  would  form  a 
valid  sanction  for  the  fulfilment  of  such  undertakings, 
and  would  afford  a  satisfactory  measure  of  security. 
But  most  hold  that  it  is  advisable  or  essential  that  the 
members  of  such  a  League  should  bind  themselves  to  take 
joint  action  against  any  member  who  breaks  the  peace. 
.  Assuming  that  a  considerable  body  of  nations  entered 

131 


Success 
depends  on 
the  size  of 
the    nucleus 
of   leagued 
States. 


such  a  League  with  good  and  reliable  intentions,  how  far 
would  it  be  likely  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  world  and  a 
reduction  of  armed  preparations?  The  answer  to  this 
question  would  depend  mainly  upon  the  number  and 
status  of  the  Powers  constituting  the  League,  and  their 
relations  to  outside  nations.  If,  as  is  not  unlikely,  at 
first  only  a  small  number  of  nations  were  willing  to  enter 
such  a  League,  the  extent  of  the  pacific  achievement 
would  be  proportionately  circumscribed.  If,  say,  Brit- 
ain, France,  and  the  United  States  entered  the  League, 
undertaking  to  settle  all  their  differences  by  peaceful 
methods,  such  a  step,  however  desirable  in  itself,  would 
not  go  far  towards  securing  world-peace  or  enabling 
these  leagued  Powers  to  reduce  their  national  arma- 
ments. This  is  so  obvious  that  most  advocates  of  the 
League  of  Peace  urge  that  the  leagued  Powers  should  not 
confine  their  undertakings  to  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
differences  among  themselves,  but  should  afford  a  united 
defense  to  any  of  their  members  attacked  by  any  outside 
Power  which  was  unwilling  to  arbitrate  its  quarrel.  A 
defensive  alliance  of  three  such  Great  Powers  (for  that 
is  what  the  League  of  Peace  would  amount  to  at  this 
stage  of  development)  would  no  doubt  form  a  force  which 
it  would  be  dangerous  for  any  nation,  or  combination  of 
nations,  to  attack.  But  it  would  secure  neither  peace 
nor  disarmament.  Nor  would  it,  as  an  earnest  advocate 
of  this  procedure  argues,  necessarily,  or  even  probably, 
form  a  nucleus  of  a  larger  League  drawing  in  other  na- 
tions. A  few  nations  forming  such  a  League  would  not 
differ  substantially  from  the  other  nominally  defensive 
alliances  with  which  the  pages  of  history  are  filled. 
Their  purely  defensive  character  would  be  suspected  by 
outside  Powers,  who  would  tend  to  draw  together  into 
an  opposing  alliance,  thus  reconstituting  once  more  the 
Balance  of  Power  with  all  its  perils  and  its  competing 

132 


armaments.    Nay,  if  such  a  League  of  Peace  were  con- 

stituted  in  the  spirit  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of  a  century  have  absolute 

»,,  ..  »     .1  ••,         ••««••        preponderance 

ago,  or  of  the  resurrection  of  that  spirit  which  Mr.  offeree. 
Roosevelt  represents  in  order  "to  back  righteousness  by 
force"  in  all  quarters  of  the  earth,  such  an  opposition  of 
organized  outside  Powers  would  be  inevitable.  The 
League  of  Peace  idea,  in  order  to  have  any  prima  facie 
prospect  of  success,  must  at  the  outset  be  so  planned  as 
to  win  the  adherence  of  the  majority  of  the  Great  Powers, 
including  some  of  those  recently  engaged  in  war  with 
one  another.  For  until  there  was  an  absolute  prepon- 
derance of  military  and  naval  strength  inside  the  League, 
the  relief  from  internal  strife  would  do  very  little,  if 
anything,  to  abate  the  total  danger  of  war,  or  to  enable 
any  country  to  reduce  its  armed  preparations.  Further, 
it  would  seem  essential  that  such  a  League  should  in  its 
relations  to  outside  Powers  assume  a  rigorously  defensive 
attitude,  abstaining  from  all  interference  in  external  pol- 
itics until  they  encroached  directly  upon  the  vital  in- 
terests of  one  or  more  of  its  members.  Such  an  en- 
croachment it  would  presumably  treat  as  an  attack  upon 
the  League,  and  would  afford  the  injured  member  such 
power  of  redress  as  was  deemed  desirable  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Powers  forming  the  League. 

Before  entering  upon  the  fuller  consideration  of  the 
practicability  of  a  League  of  Nations  formed  upon  these 
lines,  it  may  be  well  to  set  forth  in  a  brief,  formal  man- 
ner the  nature  of  the  chief  implications  which  appear  to 
be  contained  in  the  proposal.  We  shall  then  be  in  a 
position  to  examine  seriatim  the  various  steps  which  the 
advocates  of  this  method  of  securing  world-peace  and  dis- 
armament desire  to  take,  and  the  many  difficulties  which 
are  involved. 

The  signatory  Powers  to  the  Treaty  or  Agreement 
establishing  such  a  League  of  Peace  would  undertake : 

133 


(1)  To  submit  to  arbitration  or  conciliation  all  dis- 
putes  or  differences  between  them  not  capable  of  set- 
tlement by  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy,  and  to  ac- 
cept and  carry  out  any  award  or  terms  of  settlement  thus 
attained. 

(2)  To  bring  joint  pressure,  diplomatic,  economic,  or 
forcible,  to  bear  upon  any  member  refusing  to  submit  a 
disputed  matter  to  such  modes  of  peaceable  settlement, 
sr  to  accept  and  carry  out  the  award,  or  otherwise  threat- 
ening or  opening  hostilities  against  any  other  member. 

(3)  To  take  joint  action  in  repelling  any  attack  made 
by  an  outside  Power,  or  group  of  Powers,  upon  any  of 
the  members  of  the  League. 

(4)  To  take  joint  action  in  securing  the  redress  of  any 
injury  which,  by  the  general  assent  of  the  signatory 
Powers,  had  been  wrongfully  inflicted  upon  any  member 
of  the  League. 

J.  A.  Hobson,  "Towards  International  Government," 
pp.  5-27. 


134 


EXISTING  ALLIANCES  AND  A  LEAGUE 
OF  PEACE 

The  war  has  converted  the  belligerent  world  to  that  Already 

i  •     j        n  . «  ,  .   •,  .    .       .  .          ,  .  the  League 

Kind  01  pacifism  which  consists  in  a  grim  detenmna-  of  Peace  is 
tion  that  the  present  Armageddon  shall  never  be  re-  fl 
peated,  however  long  it  may  be  necessary  to  fight  in 
order  to  ensure  this  outcome.  To  perpetuate  the  peace, 
however,  a  strong  League  of  Nations  is  indispensable, 
and  various  plans  for  such  a  league  are  forming.  Some 
of  these  rely  on  an  extension  of  treaties  of  arbitration 
and  conciliation,  some  would  fortify  these  treaties  by 
giving  to  the  league  a  power  to  coerce  recalcitrant  mem- 
bers, and  still  others  would  create  a  world  State  with 
a  central  government,  an  army  and  a  navy.  The  first 
question  to  be  answered  is,  What  kind  of  international 
union  can  be  secured?  since,  in  the  case  of  any  new 
league  of  this  kind,  the  more  ambitious  the  plan,  the  less 
probable  it  is  that  nations  will  adopt  it.  In  many  minds 
grave  doubt  exists  whether  even  a  modest  plan  will  be 
carried  into  execution.  In  the  face  of  this  doubt  I  wish 
to  express  the  audacious  opinion  that  something  having 
the  characteristics  of  a  league  of  peace  is  rapidly  evolv- 
ing and  in  all  probability  will,  at  the  close  of  the  war, 
require  only  a  small  modification  to  enable  it  to  pre- 
vent, so  long  as  it  lasts,  the  recurrence  of  a  great  war 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  create  a  league  of  peace  de 
novo  and  without  reference  to  combinations  which  now 

135 


Even  am-          exist.     Two  great  leagues  have  been  formed,  each  em- 

ances  tend  to 

prevent  war.  bracing  powerf  ul  States  and  each  so  firmly  held  together 
that  it  acts  toward  the  outer  world  much  as  a  single 
great  empire  would  do.  Since  they  are  now  waging 
against  each  other  the  greatest  war  in  history,  the  con- 
clusion is  much  too  lightly  reached  that  such  unions  are, 
by  their  nature,  war-breeders.  Defensive  unions,  how- 
ever, are  in  line  with  the  whole  trend  of  political  evolu- 
tion. Great  nations,  created  by  combining  smaller  ones, 
are  in  the  order  of  the  day,  and  so  are  federations  of  a 
looser  kind,  such  as  those  which  preceded  the  German 
Empire  and  our  own  Federal  State. 

Every  such  consolidation  involves  a  risk  that,  if  a 
war  occurs,  it  will  be  larger  than  it  might  otherwise  be; 
but  it  reduces  the  frequency  with  which  wars  occur. 
Peace  between  great  States  continues  through  longer 
periods  than  it  does  between  warring  districts  which 
later  unite  in  such  States.  The  prospect  that  peace  shall 
ever  be  universal  depends  on  its  tendency  to  establish 
itself  within  larger  and  larger  areas  till  it  shall  end  by 
embracing  the  world.  European  wars  have  occurred  in 
spite  of  alliances  rather  than  because  of  them  and  the 
general  effect  even  of  imperfect  unions  has  been  to 
lengthen  the  intervals  of  peace.  It  is  an  even  century 
since  a  war  akin  to  this  one  was  waging  in  Europe,  and 
it  is  forty-four  years  since  a  war  between  any  two  great 
nations  has  taken  place  on  that  continent.  The  con- 
solidating tendency  in  itself  makes  for  peace. 

The  present  leagues  have  several  times  acted  as  peace 
preservers.  During  the  Moroccan  trouble  and  the  two 
Balkan  wars  they  averted  a  general  struggle  and  they 
might  have  averted  the  present  one  if,  as  unions,  they 
had  been  more  complete  than  they  were.  It  is  a  safe 
guess  that  if  it  had  been  definitely  known  that  Russia, 
France  and  England  would  act  as  a  unit  in  opposing  the 

136 


invasion  of  Serbia,  the  knowledge  would  have  delayed  ^e*gc°^" 
the  invasion  and  possibly  prevented  it  with  all  its  fate-  s.^e  °f  » 
ful  consequences.     The  first  thing  to  be  remembered  is  league  are 
that  these  two  great  leagues,  both  formed  for  defense, 
will  be  in  existence  and  probably  vigorous  when  the  war 
shall  end. 

Let  us  assume  that  peace  has  been  made,  that  both 
the  Entente  and  the  Alliance  continue  to  be  strong  and 
that  in  everything  political  they  are  the  Powers  which 
must  first  be  reckoned  with.  Let  us  assume  that,  in 
each  of  them,  the  constituent  countries  are  held  firmly 
together  because  no  single  country  can  think  of  sur- 
rendering the  protection  which  union  affords.  Outside 
of  the  Entente,  France  would  be  helpless  against  an  at- 
tack by  Germany  and  outside  of  the  Alliance  Austria 
would  be  helpless  against  one  by  Italy  and  Russia.  Any 
country  standing  alone  would  have  a  precarious  hold  on 
its  territory  and  its  freedom. 

The  chief  dangers  that  threaten  a  great  league  spring 
from  within,  while  those  that  threaten  a  small  league 
are  from  without.  A  union  of  all  Europe  would  be  en- 
tirely immune  against  foreign  attack  and,  for  that  very 
reason,  would  be  far  more  easily  disrupted  and  plunged 
into  something  like  civil  war.  Such  unions  as  the  Al- 
liance and  the  Entente,  each  of  which  has  a  great  power 
now  arrayed  against  it,  are  held  together  much  more 
firmly.  The  bond  that  unites  its  members  is  the  impera- 
tive need  of  mutual  protection. 

If,  as  we  have  assumed,  the  war  has  ended  neither  in 
a  draw  nor  in  a  sweeping  victory  for  one  side — if  the 
unsuccessful  league  has  kept  most  of  its  territories  and 
its  fighting  strength — the  situation  will  throw  an  enor- 
mous power  into  the  hands  of  the  neutral  States.  By 
joining  either  union  they  might  cause  it  to  preponderate 
over  the  other;  and  by  joining  the  victorious  one  they 

137 


Present  could  make  it  safe  against  any  attack  and  able,  if  it  were 

nucleus  for  disposed  to  do  so,  to  guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe.  In 
the  smaller  States  of  Europe  the  opinion  is  growing  that 
for  them  liberty  and  union  are  one  and  inseparable.  It 
may  be  vital  for  them  to  join  a  defensive  league  and, 
by  their  union  with  it,  cause  it  to  become,  if  it  were  not 
already,  a  true  commonwealth  of  nations,  great  and 
small,  and  fully  committed  to  a  just  and  peaceful  policy. 
In  order  to  be  a  nucleus  of  such  a  commonwealth  a 
league  should,  if  possible,  already  contain  enough  great 
States  to  prevent  any  one  from  dominating  the  others. 
If  possible  it  should  contain  a  number  of  the  smaller 
States  and,  as  a  group,  it  should  be  so  free  from  aggres- 
sive designs  as  to  merit  the  confidence  of  States  not  as 
yet  in  any  combination.  Since  the  Entente  now  virtu- 
ally includes  five  great  States  and  four  small  ones  and 
may  soon  be  joined  by  more  it  already  has  important 
qualifications  for  becoming  such  a  league  of  peace  as  we 
are  suggesting — a  commonwealth  of  nations  powerful 
enough  to  preserve  peace  and  vitally  interested  in  doing 
it. 

The  original  purpose  of  each  of  the  two  leagues  now 
existing  was  protective.  It  aimed  primarily  to  secure 
each  of  its  members  against  attacks  by  other  Powers, 
and  this  security,  which  all  the  members  continue  to 
need,  is  what  the  small  neutral  countries  are  also  com- 
pelled to  look  for.  What  they  must  demand  of  any 
combination  which  they  are  asked  to  join  is,  above  all 
else,  protection.  Now  the  more  promising  plans  for  new 
leagues  of  peace  which  have  been  suggested  contain  no 
provision  for  protecting  their  members  from  attacks  by 
nations  outside  of  their  circle.  They  content  themselves 
with  preventing  warfare  between  the  members.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  present  combinations  have  no  formal  and 
constitutional  machinery  for  settling  internal  disputes. 

138 


A  true  commonwealth  of  nations  needs  to  be  assured 
against  both  dangers  and  its  constitution,  therefore,  will  League 

01  A CflCG 

need  to  contain  the  best  provisions  that  it  is  humanly 
possible  to  devise  for  settling  peacefully  all  internal  dis- 
putes and  also  for  preventing  or  repelling  attacks  by 
other  States.  This  is  saying  that  an  enlarged  Entente, 
besides  protecting  its  members,  as  it  is  now  using  all  its 
force  in  doing,  will  need  to  guard  itself  against  the  perils 
that  necessarily  beset  large  leagues,  those,  namely,  that 
originate  from  within.  The  institutions  of  The  Hague 
will  be  for  it  well  nigh  a  sine  qua  non  of  success,  and 
there  must  be  measures  for  compelling  a  resort  to  them 
in  disputes  between  members  of  the  league  and  in  those 
arising  between  any  of  them  and  States  outside  of  it. 
Such  provisions  as  have  been  contained  in  the  best  con- 
stitutions that  have  been  suggested  for  new  leagues  will 
be  needed  in  one  that  may  evolve  out  of  one  of  the  exist- 
ing combinations. 

If  a  new  league  should  be  formed  without  affording 
protection  against  external  attacks  it  would  be  necessary 
that  the  Entente  and  the  Alliance  should  continue.  It 
would  be  vain  to  ask  their  members  to  dissolve  them  and 
trust  to  a  new  league  that  would  leave  each  of  them  to 
fight  its  own  battles.  The  Entente  or  the  Alliance,  as 
the  ease  might  be,  would  then  constitute  a  union  within 
a  union — a  compact  defensive  body  within  a  loosely  or- 
ganized combination  for  promoting  the  friendly  settle- 
ment of  disputes.  This  is  entirely  possible.  A  new 
league  of  many  States  might  conceivably  be  formed  and 
either  the  Entente  or  the  Alliance  might  join  it  bodily 
and  give  its  own  members  the  protection  which  the  larger 
league  would  not  give ;  but  a  simpler  and  more  natural 
plan  would  be  to  enlarge  one  of  the  present  leagues  and 
adopt  the  needed  provisions  for  peacefully  settling  all 
disputes  of  which  a  member  is  a  party. 

139 


Power  of 
neutrals  to 
help  in  form- 
ing such  a 
League. 


Of  a  league  so  formed  the  objection  that  it  is  the- 
oretical and  Utopian  certainly  cannot  be  urged.  Nine 
countries  are  already  in  effect  in  the  Entente  and  that 
combination  is  now  fulfiling  the  one  function  that,  in 
making  constitutions  for  new  leagues,  few  persons  are 
bold  enough  to  require  of  the  members — that  of  lavish- 
ing life  and  treasure  in  defending  each  other.  In  this 
respect,  the  present  reality  outstrips  our  dreams.  As  the 
leagues  will  almost  certainly  continue  it  should  be  pos- 
sible to  give  to  one  of  them  the  relatively  easy  function 
of  settling  peacefully  the  disputes  occurring  within  its 
membership. 

Herein  lies  the  golden  opportunity  for  the  neutral 
States.  They  have  a  sense  of  danger  and  the  protec- 
tive feature  of  a  league  will  attract  them,  though  the 
chance  of  being  involved  in  a  general  war  will,  in  itself, 
repel  them.  It  will  probably  repel  them  less  than  the 
danger  of  being  conquered  by  some  great  State,  and 
both  dangers  will  be  at  a  minimum  if  the  international 
body  that  they  join  is  too  strong  to  be  attacked  and  if 
its  spirit  as  well  as  its  formal  constitution  and  the 
interest  of  its  members  hold  it  in  ways  of  peace  and 
justice.  It  will  be  in  the  power  of  the  neutral  coun- 
tries to  help  effectively  in  making  it  so.  They  can  con- 
sent to  join  only  a  union  of  this  character. 

It  will  be  hard  indeed  for  the  two  leagues  now  in 
deadly  war  with  each  other  at  once  to  unite  in  any  single 
union.  Will  the  fact  that  one  of  them  for  a  time  holds 
aloof  be  a  source  of  danger?  In  one  essential  way  it 
will  be  a  cause  of  security.  It  is  sadly  to  be  admitted 
that,  in  'the  present  moral  status  of  the  world,  treaties 
are  not  bands  of  steel  and  there  is  danger  that  they  may 
be  broken  when  they  are  not  buttressed  by  national  in- 
terests. Against  the  danger  of  disruption  a  defensive 
league  which  does  not  include  all  States  of  Europe  may 

140 


be  stronger  than  one  which  does  so.  The  treaty  that 
binds  such  a  league  together  will  be  powerfully  reen- 

„,.„„,,  ,  ±  J,  consolidated. 

forced  it  all  the  members  have  a  sense  or  common  danger 
— a  sense  of  the  presence  of  a  foe  strong  enough  to  over- 
come any  country  singly.  Pressure  from  without  means 
solidarity  within  and,  while  enmities  are  strong,  a  hostile 
nation  might  impart  to  a  league  more  strength  by  remain- 
ing outside  of  it  than  by  joining  it. 

In  the  long  run,  all  Europe  should  be  consolidated. 
The  chance  that  it  will  become  so  by  a  single  step  is  small, 
and  the  best  beginning  of  a  general  union  will  be  fur- 
nished by  one  of  the  existing  leagues,  enlarged  by  the 
adherence  of  neutral  States  and  fortified  against  the 
danger  of  disruption  from  within  by  the  exposure  of 
any  seceding  State  to  the  peril  of  attacks  from  without. 
The  league  may  thrive  on  external  hostility  until  the 
good  time  shall  come  when  the  desired  system  of  set- 
tling international  disputes  shall  be  thoroughly  estab- 
lished and  peace  shall  prevail  by  the  supremacy  of 
reason.  Guarding  always  the  territory  and  protecting 
the  sovereignty  of  its  members  the  league  will  develop 
mutual  interests  so  important  that  a  new  and  powerful 
tie  will  bind  the  countries  together  in  addition  to  the 
bond  furnished  by  the  necessity  for  defense.  That  neces- 
sity itself  will  grow  less,  armaments  may  be  curtailed 
and  the  forces  now  engaged  in  mutual  destruction  may 
become  available  for  raising  in  many  ways  the  level  of 
human  life.  Under  such  influences  the  league  should 
become  too  powerful  to  be  attacked  from  without  and 
too  indispensable  to  humanity  to  be  weakened  or  dis- 
rupted from  within. 

For  these  reasons  I  conclude  that  in  the  leagues  now 
at  war  may  be  afforded  the  most  practical  means  of  creat- 
ing the  league  of  peace.  There  is  inspiration  in  this 
possibility  and  there  is  a  terrible  spur  to  action  in  what 

141 


Present  wjn  ensue  if  it  is  not  realized — desolated  lands  under 

leagues  . 

maybe  enormous  debts  with  no   assurance  against   a  further 

peace.  struggle;  neutral  lands  as  well  as  belligerent  ones  in- 

volved in  the  competition  for  larger  armies,  navies,  ar- 
senals, guns  and  fortifications;  the  people  demanding 
costly  reforms  by  governments  unable  to  afford  them 
and  in  peril  of  revolution  if  they  refuse  to  do  so.  Only 
in  the  relief  from  war  and  its  burdens  lies  the  possibility 
of  meeting  such  needs  and  giving  to  social  progress  an 
upward  trend.  Such  is  the  plain  teaching  of  the  pend- 
ing struggle.  It  is  as  though  the  war  demon  himself 
had  led  humanity  to  the  parting  of  the  roads  where  the 
guide  boards  indicate,  on  the  one  side,  the  long  way  to 
the  Delectable  Mountains  and  on  the  other,  a  short  route 
to  the  pit.  Far  reaching  beyond  all  precedent  is  the 
choice  that  humanity  must  soon  make  and  lands  at  war 
and  lands  at  peace  must  participate  in  the  decision. 

John  Bates  Clark,  Address  at  Lake  Mohonk  Confer- 
ence, 1915. 


142 


PROTECTION  OF  SMALL  NATIONS 

A  small  nation — a  nation  of  not  more  than  fifteen  mil-  only  a 
lions,  for  example — can  have  no  independent  existence  in  Jin  protect" 
Europe  except  as  a  member  of  a  federation  of  States  sma11  nations- 
having  similar  habits,  tendencies,  and  hopes,  and  united 
in  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  or  under  guaran- 
tees given  by  a  group  of  strong  and  trustworthy  nations. 
The  firm  establishment  of  several  such  federations,  or  the 
giving  of  such  guarantees  by  a  group  of  powerful  and 
faith-keeping  nations  ought  to  be  one  of  the  outcomes  of 
the  war  of  1914-15.    Unless  some  such  arrangement  is 
reached,  no  small  State  will  be  safe  from  conquest  and 
absorption   by   any   strong,    aggressive   military  power 
which  covets  it — not  even  if  its  people  live  chiefly  by 
mining  and  manufacturing  as  the  Belgians  did. 

The  small  States,  being  very  determined  to  exist  and 
to  obtain  their  natural  or  historical  racial  boundaries,  the 
problem  of  permanent  or  any  durable  peace  in  Europe 
resolves  itself  into  this:  How  can  the  small  or  smaller 
nations  be  protected  from  attack  by  some  larger  nation 
which  believes  that  might  makes  right  and  is  mighty  in 
industries,  commerce,  finance,  and  the  military  and  naval 
arts?  The  experience  gained  during  the  past  year 
proves  that  there  is  but  one  effective  protection  against 
such  a  Power,  namely,  a  firm  league  of  other  Powers — 
not  necessarily  numerous — which  together  are  stronger 
in  industries,  commerce,  finance,  and  the  military  and 

143 


naval  arts  than  the  aggressive  and  ambitious  nation 
which  heartily  believes  in  its  own  invincibility  and  cher- 
ishes the  ambition  to  conquer  and  possess. 

Such  a  league  is  the  present  combination  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  Italy,  and  Japan  against  the 
aggressive  Central  Monarchies  and  Turkey;  but  this 
combination  was  not  formed  deliberately  and  with  con- 
scious purpose  to  protect  small  States,  to  satisfy  natural 
aspirations,  and  to  make  durable  peace  possible  by  re- 
moving both  fear  of  invasion  and  fear  of  the  cutting  off 
of  overseas  food  and  raw  materials.  In  spite  of  the  lack 
of  an  explicit  and  comprehensive  purpose  to  attain  these 
wise  and  precious  ends,  the  solidity  of  the  alliance  dur- 
ing a  year  of  stupendous  efforts  to  resist  military  aggres- 
sion on  the  part  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  cer- 
tainly affords  good  promise  of  success  for  a  somewhat 
larger  league  in  which  all  the  European  nations — some, 
like  the  Scandinavian  and  the  Balkan,  by  representation 
in  groups — and  the  United  States  should  be  included. 
Such  a  league  would  have  to  act  through  a  distinct  and 
permanent  council  or  commission  which  would  not  serve 
arbitrary  power,  or  any  peculiar  national  interest,  and 
would  not  in  the  least  resemble  the  "Concert  of  Eu- 
rope," or  any  of  the  disastrous  special  conferences  of 
diplomatists  and  Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs,  called 
after  wars  since  that  of  1870-71  to  ''settle"  the  questions 
the  wars  raised. 

The  experience  of  the  past  twelve  months  proves  that 
such  a  league  could  prevent  any  nation  which  disobeyed 
its  orders  from  making  use  of  the  oceans  and  from  occu- 
pying the  territory  of  any  other  nation.  Reduction  of 
armaments,  diminution  of  taxation,  and  durable  peace 
would  ensue  as  soon  as  general  confidence  was  estab- 
lished that  the  league  would  fairly  administer  interna- 
tional justice,  and  that  its  military  and  naval  forces 

144 


were  ready  and  effective.     Its  function  would  be  limited 

to  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  violations  of  inter-  for  Tftr 

*,  *     .  promises 

national  agreements,  or,  in  other  words,  to  the  enforce-  effectiveness 
ment  of  treaty  obligations,  until  new  treaties  were  made. 

The  present  alliance  is  of  good  promise  in  three  im- 
portant respects — its  members  refuse  to  make  any  sepa- 
rate peace,  they  cooperate  cordially  and  efficiently  in 
military  measures,  and  the  richer  members  help  the 
poorer  financially.  These  policies  have  been  hastily  de- 
vised and  adopted  in  the  midst  of  strenuous  fighting  on 
an  immense  scale.  If  deliberately  planned  and  per- 
fected in  times  of  peace,  they  could  be  made  in  the 
highest  degree  effective  toward  durable  peace. 

The  war  has  demonstrated  that  the  international 
agreements  for  the  mitigation  of  the  horrors  of  war, 
made  by  treaties,  conferences,  and  conventions  in  times 
of  peace,  may  go  for  nothing  in  time  of  war;  because 
they  have  no  sanction,  or,  in  other  words,  lack  penalties 
capable  of  systematic  enforcement.  To  provide  the  lack- 
ing sanction  and  the  physical  force  capable  of  compel- 
ling the  payment  of  penalties  for  violating  international 
agreements  would  be  one  of  the  best  functions  of  the  in- 
ternational council  which  the  present  alliance  fore- 
shadows. Some  years  would  probably  be  required  to 
satisfy  the  nations  concerned  that  the  sanction  was  real 
and  the  force  trustworthy  and  sufficient.  The  absolute 
necessity  of  inventing  and  applying  a  sanction  for  in- 
ternational law,  if  Europe  is  to  have  international  peace 
and  any  national  liberty,  will  be  obvious  to  any  one  who 
has  once  perceived  that  the  present  war  became  inevit- 
able when  Austria-Hungary,  in  violation  of  an  interna- 
tional agreement  to  which  she  was  herself  a  party,  seized 
and  absorbed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  became  gen- 
eral and  fierce  when  Germany,  under  Prussian  lead,  in 
violation  of  an  international  agreement  to  which  she  was 

145 


Such  a  League    herself  a  party,  entered  and  plundered  neutralized  Bel- 

could  benefit 

Germany  glum. 

England?  A  strong,  trustworthy  international  alliance  to  pre- 

serve the  freedom  of  the  seas  under  all  circumstances 
would  secure  for  Great  Britain  and  her  federated  com- 
monwealths everything  secured  by  the  burdensome  two- 
navies  policy  which  now  secures  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
for  British  purposes.  The  same  international  alliance 
would  secure  for  Germany  the  same  complete  freedom  of 
the  seas  which  in  times  of  peace  between  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  she  has  long  enjoyed  by  favor  of  Great 
Britain,  but  has  lost  in  time  of  war  with  the  Triple  En- 
tente. This  security,  with  the  general  acceptance  of  the 
policy  of  the  ' '  open  door, ' '  would  fully  meet  Germany 's 
need  of  indefinite  expansion  for  her  manufacturing  in- 
dustries and  her  commerce,  and  of  room  "in  the  sun" 
for  her  surplus  population. 

It  is  a  safe  inference  from  the  events  of  the  past  six 
months  that  the  longer  the  war  lasts  the  more  significant 
will  be  the  political  and  social  changes  which  result  from 
it.  It  is  not  to  be  expected,  and  perhaps  not  to  be  de- 
sired, that  the  ruling  class  in  the  countries  autocrat- 
ically governed  should  themselves  draw  this  inference  at 
present,  but  all  lovers  of  freedom  and  justice  will  find 
consolation  for  the  prolongation  of  the  war  in  this  hope- 
ful reflection. 

To  devise  the  wise  constitution  of  an  international 
council  or  commission  with  properly  limited  powers,  and 
to  determine  the  most  promising  composition  of  an  in- 
ternational army  and  an  international  navy  are  serious 
tasks,  but  not  beyond  the  available  international  wisdom 
and  goodwill,  provided  that  the  tasks  be  intrusted  to 
international  publicists,  business  men  of  large  experi- 
ence, and  successful  administrators,  rather  than  to  pro- 
fessional diplomatists  and  soldiers.  To  dismiss  such  a 

146 


noble  enterprise  with  the  remark  that  it  is  ' '  academic, ' 
or  beyond  the  reach  of  ' '  practical ' '  politics,  is  unworthy  «ur  » 
of  courageous  and  humane  men;  for  it  seems  now  to  be 
the  only  way  out  of  the  horrible  abyss  into  which  civili- 
zation has  fallen.  At  any  rate,  some  such  machinery 
must  be  put  into  successful  operation  before  any  limita- 
tion of  national  armaments  can  be  effected.  The  war 
has  shown  to  what  a  catastrophe  competitive  national 
arming  has  led,  and  would  probably  again  lead  the  most 
civilized  nations  of  Europe.  Shall  the  white  race  de- 
spair of  escaping  from  this  hell?  The  only  way  of  es- 
cape in  sight  is  the  establishment  of  a  rational  interna- 
tional community.  Should  the  enterprise  fail  after  fair 
trial,  the  world  will  be  no  worse  off  than  it  was  in  July, 
1914,  or  is  to-day. 

Whoever  studies  the  events  of  the  past  year  with  some 
knowledge  of  political  philosophy  and  history,  and  with 
the  love  of  his  neighbor  in  his  heart,  will  discover,  amid 
the  horrors  of  the  time  and  its  moral  chaos,  three  hope- 
ful leadings  for  humanitarian  effort,  each  involving  a 
great  constructive  invention.  He  will  see  that  humanity 
needs  supremely  a  sanction  for  international  law,  rescue 
from  alcoholism,  and  a  sound  basis  for  just  and  unselfish 
human  relations  in  the  great  industries,  and  particularly 
in  the  machinery  industries.  The  war  has  brought  out 
all  three  of  these  needs  with  terrible  force  and  vividness. 
Somehow  they  must  be  met,  if  the  white  race  is  to  suc- 
ceed in  "the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  or  even  to  hold  the 
gains  already  made. 

Charles  W.  Eliot,  N.  Y.  Times,  July  16,  1915. 


147 


A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE 

T^pro-  Without    attempting    to    cover    details    of    operation 

the  League.  (which  are,  indeed,  of  vital  importance  and*  will  require 
careful  study  by  experts  in  international  law  and  diplo- 
macy), the  proposal  contains  four  points  stated  as  gen- 
eral/ objects.  The  first  is  that  before  resorting  to  arms 
the  members  of  the  league  shall  submit  disputes  with 
one  another,  if  justiciable,  to  an  international  tribunal; 
second,  that  in  like  manner  they  shall  submit  non- 
justiciable  questions — that  is,  such  as  cannot  be  decided 
on  the  basis  of  strict  international  law — to  an  interna- 
tional council  of  conciliation,  which  shall  recommend 
a  fair  and  amicable  solution ;  third,  that  if  any  member 
of  the  league  wages  war  against  another  before  sub- 
mitting the  question  in  dispute  to  the  tribunal  or  coun- 
cil, all  the  other  members  shall  jointly  use  forthwith 
both  their  economic  and  military  forces  against  the  State 
that  so  breaks  the  peace;  and  fourth,  that  the  signatory 
Powers  shall  endeavor  to  codify  and  improve  the  rules 
of  international  law. 

The  kernel  of  the  proposal,  the  feature  in  which  it  dif- 
fers from  other  plans,  lies  in  the  third  point,  obliging 
all  the  members  of  the  league  to  declare  war  on  any 
member  violating  the  pact  of  peace.  This  is  the  provi- 
sion that  provokes  both  adherence  and  opposition;  and 
at  first  it  certainly  gives  one  a  shock  that  a  people  should 
be  asked  to  pledge  itself  to  go  to  war  over  a  quarrel 
which  is  not  of  its  making,  in  which  it  has  no  interest, 

148 


and  in  which  it  may  believe  that  substantial  justice  lies  The  use 
on  the  other  side.  If,  indeed,  the  nations  of  the  earth  to  compel 
could  maintain  complete  isolation,  could  pursue  each  its  beforeVa 
own  destiny  without  regard  to  the  rest ;  if  they  were  not 
affected  by  a  war  between  two  others  or  liable  to  be 
drawn  into  it;  if,  in  short,  there  were  no  overwhelming 
common  interest  in  securing  universal  peace,  the  provi- 
sion would  be  intolerable.  It  would  be  as  bad  as  the 
liability  of  an  individual  to  take  part  in  the  posse  comi- 
tatus  of  a  community  with  which  he  had  nothing  in  com- 
mon. But  in  every  civilized  country  the  public  force  is 
employed  to  prevent  any  man,  however  just  his  claim, 
from  vindicating  his  own  right  with  his  own  hand  in- 
stead of  going  to  law,  and  every  citizen  is  bound  when 
needed  to  assist  in  preventing  him,  because  that  is  the 
only  way  to  restrain  private  war,  and  the  maintenance 
of  order  is  of  paramount  importance  for  every  one. 
Surely  the  family  of  nations  has  a  like  interest  in  re- 
straining war  between  States. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  members  of  the  league 
are  not  to  bind  themselves  to  enforce  the  decision  of  the 
tribunal  or  the  award  of  the  council  of  conciliation. 
That  may  come  in  the  remote  future,  but  it  is  no  part 
of  this  proposal.  It  would  be  imposing  obligations  far 
greater  than  the  nations  can  reasonably  be  expected  to 
assume  at  the  present  day;  for  the  conceptions  of  in- 
ternational morality  and  fair  play  are  still  so  vague  and 
divergent  that  a  nation  can  hardly  bind  itself  to  wage 
war  on  another,  with  which  it  has  no  quarrel,  to  enforce 
a  decision  or  a  recommendation  of  whose  justice  or  wis- 
dom it  may  not  be  itself  heartily  convinced.  The  pro- 
posal goes  no  further  than  obliging  all  the  members  to 
prevent,  by  a  threat  of  immediate  war,  any  breach  of  the 
public  peace  before  the  matter  in  dispute  has  been  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration;  and  this  is  neither  unreasonable 

149 


^t  mean  nor  impracticable.  There  are  many  questions,  especially 
cession  of  Of  &  non-justiciable  nature,  on  which  we  should  not  be 
willing  to  bind  ourselves  to  accept  the  decision  of  an 
arbitration,  and  where  we  should  regard  compulsion  by 
armed  intervention  of  the  rest  of  the  world  as  outrage- 
ous. Take,  for  example,  the  question  of  Asiatic  immi- 
gration, or  a  claim  that  the  Panama  Canal  ought  to  be 
an  unfortified  neutral  highway,  or  the  desire  by  a  Euro- 
pean Power  to  take  possession  of  Colombia.  But  we 
ought  not,  in  the  interest  of  universal  peace,  to  object 
to  making  a  public  statement  of  our  position  in  these 
matters  at  a  court  or  council  before  resorting  to  arms; 
and  in  fact  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
England,  ratified  on  November  14,  1914,  provides  that 
all  disputes  between  the  high  contracting  parties,  of 
every  nature  whatsoever,  shall,  failing  other  methods  of 
adjustment,  be  referred  for  investigation  and  report  to 
a  permanent  international  commission,  with  a  stipulation 
that  neither  country  shall  declare  war  or  begin  hostili- 
ties during  such  investigation,  and  before  the  report  is 
submitted. 

What  is  true  of  this  country  is  true  of  others.  To 
agree  to  abide  by  the  result  of  an  arbitration,  on  every 
non-justiciable  question  of  every  nature  whatsoever,  on 
pain  of  compulsion  in  any  form  by  the  whole  world, 
would  involve  a  greater  cession  of  sovereignty  than  na- 
tions would  now  be  willing  to  concede.  This  appears, 
indeed,  perfectly  clear  from  the  discussions  at  The 
Hague  Conference  of  1907.  But  to  exclude  differences 
that  do  not  turn  on  questions  of  international  law  from 
the  cases  in  which  a  State  must  present  the  matter  to  a 
tribunal  or  council  of  conciliation  before  beginning  hos- 
tilities, would  leave  very  little  check  upon  the  outbreak 
of  war.  Almost  every  conflict  between  European  na- 
tions for  more  than  half  a  century  has  been  based  upon 

150 


some  dissension  which  could  not  be  decided  by  strict  fiut  would 

.  .  *  reduce  prob- 

rules  of  law,  and  in  which  a  violation  of  international  ability  of 
law  or  of  treaty  rights  has  usually  not  even  been  used 
as  an  excuse.  This  was  true  of  the  war  between  France 
and  Austria  in  1859,  and,  in  substance,  of  the  war  be- 
tween Prussia  and  Austria  in  1866.  It  was  true  of  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  in  1870,  of  the  Russo-Turkish 
War  in  1876,  of  the  Balkan  War  against  Turkey  in  1912, 
and  of  the  present  war. 

No  one  will  claim  that  a  league  to  enforce  peace,  such 
as  is  proposed,  would  wholly  prevent  war,  but  it  would 
greatly  reduce  the  probability  of  hostilities.  It  would 
take  away  the  advantage  of  surprise,  of  catching  the 
enemy  unprepared  for  a  sudden  attack.  It  would  give 
a  chance  for  public  opinion  on  the  nature  of  the  con- 
troversy to  be  formed  throughout  the  world  and  in  the 
militant  country.  The  latter  is  of  great  importance,  for 
the  moment  war  is  declared  argument  about  its  merits  is 
at  once  stifled.  Passion  runs  too  high  for  calm  debate, 
and  patriotism  forces  people  to  support  their  govern- 
ment. But  a  trial  before  an  international  tribunal 
would  give  time  for  discussion  while  emotion  is  not  yet 
highly  inflamed.  Men  opposed  to  war  would  be,  able  to 
urge  its  injustice,  to  ask  whether,  after  all,  the  object  is 
worth  the  sacrifice,  and  they  would  get  a  hearing  from 
their  fellow  citizens  which  they  cannot  get  after  war 
begins.  The  mere  delay,  the  interval  for  consideration, 
would  be  an  immense  gain  for  the  prospect  of  a  peaceful 
settlement. 

Most  people  who  have  been  thinking  seriously  about 
the  maintenance  of  peace  are  tending  to  the  opinion  that 
a  sanction  of  some  kind  is  needed  to  enforce  the  observ- 
ance of  treaties  and  of  agreements  for  arbitration. 
Among  the  measures  proposed  has  been  that  of  an  inter- 
national police  force,  under  the  control  of  a  central  coun- 

151 


The  u,  s.          cil  which  could  use  it  to  preserve  order  throughout  the 

and  the  in-  ...  ,... 

ternationai  world.  At  present  such  a  plan  seems  visionary.  The 
force  would  have  to  be  at  least  large  enough  to  cope  with 
the  army  that  any  single  nation  could  put  into  the  field 
— under  existing  conditions  let  us  say  five  millions  of 
men  fully  equipped  and  supplied  with  artillery  and  am- 
munition for  a  campaign  of  several  months.  These 
troops  need  not  be  under  arms,  or  quartered  near  The 
Hague,  but  they  must  be  thoroughly  trained  and  ready 
to  be  called  out  at  short  notice.  Practically  that  would 
entail  yearly  votes  of  the  legislative  bodies  of  each  of  the 
nations  supplying  a  quota;  and  if  any  of  them  failed  to 
make  the  necessary  appropriation  there  would  be  great 
difficulty  in  preventing  others  from  following  its  ex- 
ample. The  whole  organization  would,  therefore,  be  in 
constant  danger  of  going  to  pieces. 

But  quite  apart  from  the  practical  difficulties  in  the 
permanent  execution  of  such  a  plan,  let  us  see  how  it 
would  affect  the  United  States.  The  amount  of  the  con- 
tingents of  the  various  countries  would  be  apportioned 
with  some  regard  to  population,  wealth,  and  economic 
resources;  and  if  the  total  were  five  million  men,  our 
quota  on  a  moderate  estimate  might  be  five  hundred 
thousand  men.  Is  it  conceivable  that  the  United  States 
would  agree  to  keep  anything  like  that  number  drilled, 
equipped,  and  ready  to  take  the  field  on  the  order  of  an 
international  council  composed  mainly  of  foreign  na- 
tions? Of  course  it  will  be  answered  that  these  figures 
are  exaggerated,  because  any  such  plan  will  be  accom- 
panied by  a  reduction  in  armaments.  But  that  is  an 
easier  thing  to  talk  about  than  to  effect,  and  especially 
to  maintain.  One  must  not  forget  that  the  existing  sys- 
tem of  universal  compulsory  military  service  on  the  con- 
tinent of  Europe  arose  from  Napoleon 's  attempt  to  limit 
the  size  of  the  Prussian  army.  He  would  be  a  bold 

152 


or  sanguine  man  who  should  assert  that  any  treaty  to  Objections, 
limit  armaments  could  not  in  like  manner  be  evaded ;  and 
however  much  they  were  limited,  the  quantity  of  troops 
to  be  held  at  the  disposal  of  a  foreign  council  would  of 
necessity  be  large,  while  no  nation  would  be  willing  to 
pledge  for  the  purpose  the  whole  of  its  military  force. 
Such  a  plan  may  be  practicable  in  some  remote  future 
when  the  whole  world  is  a  vast  federation  under  a  central 
government,  but  that  would  seem  to  be  a  matter  for  com- 
ing generations,  not  for  the  men  of  our  day. 

Moreover,  the  nations  whose  troops  were  engaged  in 
fighting  any  country  would  inevitably  find  themselves 
at  war  with  that  country. 

One  cannot  imagine  saying  to  some  foreign  State, 
"Our  troops  are  killing  yours,  they  are  invading  your 
land,  we  are  supplying  them  with  recruits  and  muni- 
tions of  war,  but  otherwise  we  are  at  peace  with  you. 
You  must  treat  us  as  a  neutral,  and  accord  to  our  citi- 
zens, to  their  commerce  and  property,  all  the  rights  of 
neutrality."  In  short  the  plan  of  an  international  po- 
lice force  involves  all  the  consequences  of  the  proposal 
of  a  league  to  enforce  peace,  with  other  complex  provi- 
sions extremely  hard  to  execute. 

A  suggestion  more  commonly  made  is  that  the  members 
of  the  league  of  nations,  instead  of  pledging  themselves 
explicitly  to  declare  war  forthwith  against  any  of  their 
number  that  commits  a  breach  of  the  peace,  should 
agree  to  hold  at  once  a  conference,  and  take  such  meas- 
ures— diplomatic,  economic,  or  military — as  may  be 
necessary  to  prevent  war.  The  objection  to  this  is  that 
it  weakens  very  seriously  the  sanction.  Conferences  are 
apt  to  shrink  from  decisive  action.  Some  of  the  mem- 
bers are  timid,  others  want  delay,  and  much  time  is 
consumed  in  calling  the  body  together  and  in  discus- 
sions after  it  meets.  Meanwhile  the  war  may  have 

153 


broken  out,  and  be  beyond  control.  It  is  much  easier 
to  prevent  a  fire  than  to  put  it  out.  The  country  that 
is  planning  war  is  likely  to  think  it  has  friends  in  the 
conference,  or  neighbors  that  it  can  intimidate,  who  will 
prevent  any  positive  decision  until  the  fire  is  burning. 
Even  if  the  majority  decides  on  immediate  action,  the 
minority  is  not  bound  thereby.  One  great  Power  re- 
fuses to  take  part;  a  second  will  not  do  so  without  her; 
the  rest  hesitate,  and  nothing  is  done  to  prevent  the  war. 

A  conference  is  an  excellent  thing.  The  proposal  of  a 
league  to  enforce  peace  by  no  means  excludes  it ;  but  the 
important  matter,  the  effective  principle,  is  that  every 
member  of  the  league  should  know  that  whether  a  con- 
ference meets  or  not,  or  whatever  action  it  may  take 
or  fail  to  take,  all  the  members  of  the  league  have 
pledged  themselves  to  declare  war  forthwith  on  any 
member  that  commits  a  breach  of  the  peace  before  sub- 
mitting its  case  to  the  international  tribunal  or  council 
of  conciliation.  Such  a  pledge,  and  such  a  pledge  alone, 
can  have  the  strong  deterrent  influence,  and  thus  furnish 
the  sanction,  that  is  needed.  Of  course  the  pledge  may 
not  be  kept.  Like  other  treaties  it  may  be  broken  by  the 
parties  to  it.  Nations  are  composed  of  human  beings 
with  human  weaknesses,  and  one  of  these  is  a  disin- 
clination to  perform  an  agreement  when  it  involves  a 
sacrifice.  Nevertheless,  nations,  like  men,  often  do  have 
enough  sense  of  honor,  of  duty,  or  of  ultimate  self-in- 
terest, to  carry  out  their  contracts  at  no  little  immediate 
sacrifice.  They  are  certainly  more  likely  to  do  a  thing 
if  they  have  pledged  themselves  to  it  than  if  they  have 
not;  and  any  nation  would  be  running  a  terrible  risk 
that  went  to  war  in  the  hope  that  the  other  members  of 
the  league  would  break  their  pledges. 

The  same  objection  applies  to  another  alternative  pro- 
posed in  place  of  an  immediate  resort  to  military  force : 

154 


that  is  the  use  of  economic  pressure,  by  a  universal  agree- 
ment,  for  example,  to  have  no  commercial  intercourse  rarand 
with  the  nation  breaking  the  peace.  A  threat  of  uni- 
versal boycott  is,  no  doubt,  formidable,  but  by  no  means 
so  formidable  as  a  threat  of  universal  war.  A  large 
country  with  great  natural  resources  which  has  de- 
termined to  make  war,  might  be  willing  to  face  com- 
mercial non-intercourse  with  the  other  members  of  the 
league  during  hostilities,  when  it  would  not  for  a  mo- 
ment contemplate  the  risk  of  fighting  them.  A  threat, 
for  example,  by  England,  France,  and  Germany  to  stop 
all  trade  with  the  United  States  might  or  might  not  have 
prevented  our  going  to  war  with  Spain ;  but  a  declaration 
that  they  would  take  part  with  all  their  armies  and 
navies  against  us  would  certainly  have  done  so. 

It  has  often  been  pointed  out  that  the  threat  of  gen- 
eral non-intercourse  would  bear  much  more  hardly  on 
some  countries  than  on  others.  That  may  not  in  itself 
be  a  fatal  objection,  but  a  very  serious  consideration 
arises  from  the  fact  that  there  would  be  a  premium 
on  preparation  for  war.  A  nation  which  had  accumu- 
lated vast  quantities  of  munitions,  food,  and  supplies  of 
all  kinds,  might  afford  to  disregard  it ;  while  another  less 
fully  prepared  could  not. 

Moreover,  economic  pressure,  although  urged  as  a 
milder  measure,  is  in  fact  more  difficult  to  apply  and 
maintain.  A  declaration  of  war  is  a  single  act,  and  when 
made  sustains  itself  by  the  passion  it  inflames;  while 
commercial  non-intercourse  is  a  continuous  matter,  sub- 
ject to  constant  opposition  exerted  in  an  atmosphere  rel- 
atively cool.  Our  manufacturers  would  complain  bit- 
terly at  being  deprived  of  dye-stuffs  and  other  chemical 
products  on  account  of  a  quarrel  in  which  we  had  no 
interest ;  the  South  would  suffer  severely  by  the  loss  of  a 
market  for  cotton ;  the  shipping  firms  and  the  exporters 

155 


Drastic 
threats  by 
a  League 
could  prob- 
ably pre- 
vent war. 


and  importers  of  all  kinds  would  be  gravely  injured ;  and 
all  these  interests  would  bring  to  bear  upon  Congress  a 
pressure  well-nigh  irresistible.  The  same  would  be  true 
of  every  other  neutral  country,  a  fact  that  would  be  per- 
fectly well  known  to  the  intending  belligerent  and  reduce 
its  fear  of  a  boycott. 

But,  it  is  said,  why  not  try  economic  pressure  first, 
and,  if  that  fails,  resort  to  military  force,  instead  of  in- 
flicting at  once  on  unoffending  members  of  the  league 
the  terrible  calamity  of  war ?  What  do  we  mean  by  "if 
that  fails"?  Do  we  mean,  if,  in  spite  of  the  economic 
pressure,  the  war  breaks  out?  But  then  the  harm  is 
done,  the  fire  is  ablaze  and  can  be  put  out  only  by  blood. 
The  object  of  the  league  is  not  to  chastise  a  country 
guilty  of  breaking  the  peace,  but  to  prevent  the  out- 
break of  war,  and  to  prevent  it  by  the  immediate  pros- 
pect of  such  appalling  consequences  to  the  offender  that 
he  will  not  venture  to  run  the  risk.  If  a  number  of 
great  Powers  were  to  pledge  themselves  with  serious  in- 
tent, to  wage  war  jointly  and  severally  on  any  one  of 
their  members  that  attacked  another  before  submitting 
the  case  to  arbitration,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  im- 
probable that  the  casus  foederis  would  ever  occur,  while 
any  less  drastic  provision  would  be  far  less  effective. 

An  objection  has  been  raised  to  the  proposal  for  a 
league  to  enforce  peace  on  the  ground  that  it  has  in  the 
past  often  proved  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  deter- 
mine which  of  two  belligerents  began  a  war.  The  crit- 
icism is  serious,  and  presents  a  practical  difficulty,  grave 
but  probably  not  insurmountable.  The  proposal  merely 
lays  down  a  general  principle,  and  if  adopted  the  de- 
tails would  have  to  be  worked  out  very  fully  and  care- 
fully in  a  treaty,  which  would  specify  the  acts  that 
would  constitute  the  waging  of  war  by  one  member  upon 
another.  These  would  naturally  be,  not  the  mere  creat- 

156 


ing  of  apprehension,  but  specific  acts,  such  as  a  declara- 
tion  of  war,  invasion  of  territory,  the  use  of  force  at 
sea  not  disowned  within  forty-eight  hours,  or  an  advance 
into  a  region  in  dispute.  This  last  is  an  especially  dif- 
ficult point,  but  those  portions  of  the  earth's  surface  in 
which  different  nations  have  conflicting  claims  are  grow- 
ing less  decade  by  decade. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  cases  which  would 
arise  are  not  like  those  which  have  arisen  in  the  past, 
where  one  nation  is  determined  to  go  to  war  and  merely 
seeks  to  throw  the  moral  responsibility  on  the  other  while 
getting  the  advantage  of  actually  beginning  hostilities. 
It  is  a  case  where  each  will  strive  to  avoid  the  specific 
acts  of  war  that  may  involve  the  penalty.  The  reader 
may  have  seen,  in  a  country  where  personal  violence  is 
severely  punished,  two  men  shaking  their  fists  in  each 
other's  faces,  each  trying  to  provoke  the  other  to  strike 
the  first  blow ;  and  no  fight  after  all. 

There  are  many  agreements  in  private  business  which 
are  not  easy  to  embody  in  formal  contracts;  agreements 
where,  as  in  this  case,  the  execution  of  the  terms  calls 
for  immediate  action,  and  where  redress  after  an  elab- 
orate trial  of  the  facts  affords  no  real  reparation.  But 
if  the  object  sought  is  good,  men  do  not  condemn  it  on 
account  of  the  difficulty  in  devising  provisions  that  will 
accomplish  the  result  desired;  certainly  not  until  they 
have  tried  to  devise  them.  It  may,  indeed,  prove  impos- 
sible to  draft  a  code  of  specific  acts  that  will  cover  the 
ground;  it  may  be  impracticable  to  draft  it  so  as  to 
avoid  issues  of  fact  that  can  be  determined  only  after  a 
long  sifting  of  evidence,  which  would  come  too  late ;  but 
surely  that  is  no  reason  for  failure  to  make  the  attempt. 
We  are  not  making  a  treaty  among  nations.  "We  are 
merely  putting  forward  a  suggestion  for  reducing  war, 
which  seems  to  merit  consideration. 

157 


though  the 
League 
could  not 
meet  all 
possible  con- 
tingencies. 


A  second  difficulty  that  will  sometimes  arise  is  the 
rule  of  conduct  to  be  followed  pending  the  presentation 
of  the  question  to  the  international  tribunal.  The  con- 
tinuance or  cessation  of  the  acts  complained  of  may  ap- 
pear to  be,  and  may  even  be  in  fact,  more  important 
than  the  final  decision.  This  has  been  brought  to  our 
attention  forcibly  by  the  sinking  of  the  Liisitania.  We 
should  have  done  very  wisely  to  submit  to  arbitration 
the  question  of  the  right  of  submarines  to  torpedo  mer- 
chant ships  without  warning,  provided  Germany  aban- 
doned the  practise  pending  the  arbitration;  and  Ger- 
many would  probably  not  have  refused  to  submit  the 
question  to  a  tribunal  on  the  understanding  that  the 
practise  was  to  continue  until  the  decision  was  rendered, 
because  by  that  time  the  war  would  be  over.  This  diffi- 
culty is  inherent  in  every  plan  for  the  arbitration  of  in- 
ternational disputes,  although  more  serious  in  a  league 
whose  members  bind  themselves  to  prevent  by  force  the 
outbreak  of  war.  It  would  be  necessary  to  give  the 
tribunal  summary  authority  to  decree  a  modus  vivendi, 
to  empower  it,  like  a  court  of  equity,  to  issue  a  tem- 
porary injunction. 

In  short,  the  proposal  for  a  league  to  enforce  peace 
cannot  meet  all  possible  contingencies.  It  cannot  pre- 
vent all  future  wars,  nor  does  any  sensible  person  believe 
that  any  plan  can  do  so  in  the  present  state  of  civiliza- 
tion. But  it  can  prevent  some  wars  that  would  other- 
wise take  place,  and  if  it  does  that  it  will  have  done  much 
good. 

People  have  asked  how  such  a  league  would  differ 
from  the  Triple  Alliance  or  Triple  Entente — whether 
it  would  not  be  nominally  a  combination  for  peace  which 
might  in  practise  have  quite  a  different  effect.  But  in 
fact  its  object  is  quite  contrary  to  those  alliances.  They 
are  designed  to  protect  their  members  against  outside 

158 


Powers.     This  is  intended  to  insure  peace  among  the  Lea°Rifeh  meant 
members  themselves.     If  it  grew  strong  enough,  by  in-  1"  its 

eluding  all  the  great  Powers,  it  might  well  insist  on  uni- 
versal peace  by  compelling  the  outsiders  to  come  in. 
But  that  is  not  its  primary  object,  which  is  simply  to 
prevent  its  members  from  going  to  war  with  one  another. 
No  doubt  if  several  great  nations,  and  some  of  the  smaller 
ones,  joined  it,  and  if  it  succeeded  in  preserving  constant 
friendly  relations  among  its  members,  there  would  grow 
up  among  them  a  sense  of  solidarity  which  would  make 
any  outside  Power  chary  of  attacking  one  of  them ;  and, 
what  is  more  valuable,  would  make  outsiders  want  to 
join  it.  But  there  is  little  use  in  speculating  about 
probabilities.  It  is  enough  if  such  a  league  were  a  source 
of  enduring  peace  among  its  own  members. 

How  about  our  own  position  in  the  United  States? 
The  proposal  is  a  radical  and  subversive  departure  from 
the  traditional  policy  of  our  country.  Would  it  be  wise 
for  us  to  be  parties  to  such  an  agreement?  At  the 
threshold  of  such  a  discussion  one  thing  is  clear.  If  we 
are  not  willing  to  urge  our  own  government  to  join  a 
movement  for  peace,  we  have  no  business  to  discuss  any 
plan  for  the  purpose.  It  is  worse  than  futile,  it  is  an 
impertinence,  for  Americans  to  advise  the  people  of  Eu- 
rope how  they  ought  to  conduct  their  affairs  if  we  have 
nothing  in  common  with  them;  to  suggest  to  them  con- 
ventions with  burdens  which  are  well  enough  for  them, 
but  which  we  are  not  willing  to  share.  If  our  peace  or- 
ganizations are  not  prepared  to  have  us  take  part  in  the 
plans  they  devise,  they  had  better  disband,  or  confine 
their  discussions  to  Pan-American  questions.  .  .  . 

A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  "A  League  to  Enforce  Peace," 
Atlantic  Monthly,  Sept.,  1915. 

159 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  A  LEAGUE 

Force  for  de-  The  problem  of  the  League  of  Peace  is  actually  the 
for*cl  for  ag-  problem  of  the  use  of  force.  Force  internationally  ex- 
pressed is  measured  in  armaments.  The  chief  discussion 
which  has  been  waged  for  the  past  decade  between  the 
pacifists  and  militarists  has  been  over  the  question  of 
armaments.  The  militarists  claim  that  armaments  in- 
sure national  safety.  The  pacifists  declare  they  inev- 
itably lead  to  war.  Both  disputants  insist  that  the  pres- 
ent war  furnishes  irrefutable  proof  of  their  contentions. 
As  is  usual  in  cases  of  this  kind  the  shield  has  two 
sides.  The  confusion  has  arisen  from  a  failure  to  recog- 
nize the  threefold  function  of  force: 

1.  Force  used  for  the  maintenance  of  order — police 
force. 

2.  Force  used  for  attack — aggression. 

3.  Force  used  to  neutralize  aggression — defense. 
Police  force  is  almost  wholly  good. 

Offense  is  almost  wholly  bad. 

Defense  is  a  necessary  evil,  and  exists  simply  to  neu- 
tralize force  employed  for  aggression. 

The  problem  of  the  peace  movement  is  how  to  abol- 
ish the  use  of  force  for  aggression,  and  yet  to  maintain 
it  for  police  purposes.  Force  for  defense  will  of  course 
automatically  cease  when  force  for  aggression  is  abol- 
ished. 

The  chief  problem  then  of  a  League  of  Peace  is  this: 
160 


Shall  the  members  of  the  League  "not  only  keep  the  P16  pVnclples 

^  J  for   a   League 

peace  themselves,  but  prevent  by  force  if  necessary  its  °f  Peace, 
being  broken  by  others,"  as  ex-President  Roosevelt  sug- 
gested in  his  Nobel  Peace  Address  delivered  at  Chris- 
tiania,  May  5,  1910?  Or  shall  its  force  be  exercised 
only  within  its  membership  and  thus  be  on  the  side  of 
law  and  order  and  never  on  the  side  of  arbitrary  will 
or  tyranny?  Or  shall  it  never  be  used  at  all?  Which- 
ever one  of  these  conceptions  finally  prevails  the  Great 
War  has  conclusively  demonstrated  that  as  long  as  War 
Lords  exist  defensive  force  must  be  maintained.  Hence 
the  League  must  be  prepared  to  use  force  against  any 
nations  which  will  not  forswear  force.  Nevertheless  a 
formula  must  be  devised  for  disarmament.  For  unless 
it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  war  is  to  consume  all  the  fruits 
of  progress  disarmament  somehow  and  some  way  must 
take  place.  How  then  can  the  maintenance  of  a  force 
for  defense  and  police  power  be  reconciled  with  the  the- 
ory of  disarmament? 

In  this  way:  Let  the  League  of  Peace  be  formed  on 
the  following  five  principles: 

First.  The  nations  of  the  League  shall  mutually  agree 
to  respect  the  territory  and  sovereignty  of  each  other. 

Second.  All  questions  that  cannot  be  settled  by  diplo- 
macy shall  be  arbitrated. 

Third.  The  nations  of  the  League  shall  provide  a 
periodical  assembly  to  make  all  rules  to  become  law  un- 
less vetoed  by  a  nation  within  a  stated  period. 

Fourth.  The  nations  shall  disarm  to  the  point  where 
the  combined  forces  of  the  League  shall  be  a  certain 
per  cent,  higher  than  those  of  the  most  heavily  armed 
nation  or  alliance  outside  of  the  League.  Detailed  rules 
for  this  pro  rata  disarmament  shall  be  formulated  by 
the  Assembly. 

Fifth.  Any   member   of   the   League   shall   have   the 
161 


Rights  »nd       right  to  withdraw  on  due  notice,  or  may  be  expelled  by 

duties    within 

the  League.      the  unanimous  vote  or  the  others. 

The  advantages  that  a  nation  would  gain  in  becom- 
ing a  member  of  such  a  league  are  manifest.  The  risk 
of  war  would  be  eliminated  within  the  League.  Obvi- 
ously the  only  things  that  are  vital  to  a  nation  are  its 
land  and  its  independence.  Since  each  nation  in  the 
League  will  have  pledged  itself  to  respect  the  territory 
and  the  sovereignty  of  every  other,  a  refusal  to  do  so 
will  logically  lead  to  expulsion  from  the  League.  Thus 
every  vital  question  will  be  automatically  reserved  from 
both  war  and  arbitration.  All  other  questions  are  of 
secondary  importance  and  can  readily  be  arbitrated. 

By  the  establishment  of  a  periodical  assembly  a 
method  would  be  devised  whereby  the  members  of  the 
League  could  develop  their  common  intercourse  and 
interests  as  far  and  as  fast  as  they  could  unanimously 
agree  upon  ways  and  means.  As  any  law  could  be  ve- 
toed by  a  single  nation,  no  nation  could  have  any  fear 
that  it  would  be  coerced  against  its  will  by  a  majority 
vote  of  the  other  nations.  By  such  an  assembly  the 
League  might  in  time  agree  to  reduce  tariffs  and  postal 
rates  and  in  a  thousand  other  ways  promote  commerce 
and  comity  among  its  members. 

As  a  final  safeguard  against  coercion  by  the  other 
members  of  the  League,  each  member  will  have  the  right 
of  secession  on  due  notice.  This  would  prevent  civil 
war  within  the  League.  The  right  of  expulsion  by  the 
majority  will  prevent  one  nation  by  its  veto  power  in- 
definitely blocking  all  progress  of  the  League. 

But  it  will  be  said  that  all  these  agreements  will  have 
no  binding  effect  in  a  crisis.  A  covenant  is  a  mere 
"scrap  of  paper"  whose  provisions  will  be  violated  by 
the  first  nation  which  fancies  it  is  its  interest  to  do  so. 
In  order  to  show  that  their  faith  is  backed  up  by  deeds, 

162 


however,  the  nations  on  entering  the  League  agree  to 
disarm  to  a  little  above  the  danger  point,  and  put  all 
their  defensive  power  under  a  federal  authority.  This 
is  the  real  proof  of  their  conversion  to  the  peace  idea. 

Thus  the  nations  which  join  the  League  will  enjoy 
all  the  economic  and  political  advantages  which  come 
from  mutual  cooperation  and  the  extension  of  interna- 
tional friendship  and  at  the  same  time  will  be  protected 
by  an  adequate-  force  against  the  aggressive  force  of  the 
greatest  nation  or  alliance  outside  the  League.  The 
League  therefore  reconciles  the  demand  of  the  pacif- 
ists for  the  limitation  of  armaments  and  eventual  dis- 
armament and  the  demand  of  the  militarists  for  the 
protection  that  armament  affords.  Above  all  the  estab- 
lishment of  such  a  league  will  give  the  liberal  parties  in 
the  nations  outside  the  League  an  issue  on  which  they 
can  attack  their  governments  so  as  sooner  or  later  to 
force  them  to  apply  to  the  League  for  membership.  As 
each  one  enters  there  will  be  another  pro  rata  reduc- 
tion of  the  military  forces  of  the  League  down  to  the 
armament  of  the  next  most  powerful  nation  or  alliance 
outside  it;  until  finally  the  whole  world  is  federated  in 
a  brotherhood  of  universal  peace  and  armies  and  navies 
are  reduced  to  an  international  police  force. 

Hamilton  Holt,  "The  Way  to  Disarm,"  Independent, 
Sept.  28, 1914. 


163 


PACIFISM  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE 

Peace  is  not  in  short,  we  have  little  faith,  in  a  pacifism  which  is 
resistance.  mere  laissez-faire,  in  the  doctrine  that  peace  is  the 
vacuum  created  by  the  absence  of  war.  Peace  is  some- 
thing1 more  original  than  that.  It  is  a  great  construc- 
tion, of  infinite  complexity,  which  will  be  aided  but  not 
consummated  by  good  intentions.  It  involves  dangers, 
failures,  disappointments.  The  interests  of  the  world 
are  interwoven,  and  no  nation  can  work  for  peace  by 
adopting  counsels  of  perfection  in  a  policy  of  isolation. 
Yet  that  is  what  mere  non-resistance  implies.  It  im- 
plies an  unwillingness  to  take  the  risk  of  participation 
in  world  politics,  it  trusts  vaguely  that  by  staying  at 
home  and  minding  our  business,  we  can  make  our  own 
little  cultivated  garden  bloom  in  peace  and  prosperity. 
There  is  no  internationalism  in  such  a  view  of  things. 
The  real  internationalist  is  one  who  works  first  of  all 
to  keep  his  own  nation  from  aggressive  action,  who  in- 
fuses his  own  national  policy  with  a  desire  for  interna- 
tional peace.  He  works  to  control  his  own  government 
so  as  to  make  it  adopt  a  humanely  constructive  foreign 
policy.  He  does  not  refuse  to  have  part  in  the  world's 
affairs  because  the  world  may  soil  his  hands.  He  real- 
izes that;  peace  can  be  created  only  out  of  the  strength 
of  intelligent  people,  that  even  God  when  he  fought  the 
devil  had  to  compromise  his  own  perfection. 

It  is  more  than  a  century  since  Thomas  Paine  pro- 
posed to  secure  the  world's  peace  forever  by  a  league 

164 


between  Britain,   France  and  the  United   States.     He  ^htedeafde 
made  the  suggestion  on  the  eve  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  jst  sees  a 

r  League  of 

and  it  is  hardly  an  accident  that  the  idea  was  revived  Peace, 
with  a  different  trinity  a  few  months  before  the  pres- 
ent struggle.  It  was  Britain,  France  and  Germany  that 
Jean  Jaures  would  have  united  in  a  League  of  Peace. 
At  the  parting  of  the  ways  the  clear-sighted  idealist  has 
always  understood  that  the  choice  is  not  between  war 
and  that  sort  of  peace  which  is  only  a  negation  of  war. 
The  choice  in  both  these  crises  lay  between  shattering 
war  and  constructive  peace,  between  an  open  and  de- 
structive enmity  and  a  peace  based  on  a  common  will 
and  an  active  partnership.  Mirabeau  had  the  same 
vivid  perception,  and  what  these  three  saw  is  still  a 
vision  that  haunts  us  among  the  mists  of  war.  Of  the 
several  proposals  that  arise  inevitably  in  men's  minds 
when  we  think  of  preventing  the  renewal  of  this  Con- 
tinental struggle,  there  is  none  which  sober  thinkers  pro- 
pound so  readily  and  none  which  has  been  worked  out 
with  greater  detail  in  England  than  this  expedient  of 
the  League  of  Peace.  There  are,  indeed,  a  few  who 
dare  to  speak  of  the  United  States  of  Europe,  and  some 
who  discuss  the  creation  of  an  international  police  force 
to  secure  the  law  of  nations  and  repress  aggression. 
But  even  they  do  not  deny  the  inordinate  difficulties. 
This  war  has  lasted  long  enough  to  teach  all  but  the 
unteachable  that  neither  side  will  be  able  to  crush  and 
dominate  the  other.  But  short  of  the  compulsion  of 
irresistible  might,  will  any  influence  suffice  to  bring  the 
enemies  of  to-day  by  their  spontaneous  choice  into  a 
European  federation?  Is  any  people,  even  the  most  pa- 
cific, prepared  as  yet  to  accept  the  surrender  of  sover- 
eignty which  entry  into  even  a  loosely-knit  federation 
would  involve? 

The  League  of  Peace  presents  itself  to  practical  men 
165 


A  practicable  ag  a  dream  capable  of  an  early  translation  into  fact. 
The  allies  need  only  agree  to  join  their  forces  against 
any  power  which  persisted,  after  offers  of  arbitration 
or  mediation  (a  reservation  which  no  old-fashioned  alli- 
ance ever  made)  in  attacking  any  one  of  them.  It 
would  differ  from  other  alliances  partly  by  its  insist- 
ence on  the  duty  of  arbitration,  partly  by  its  frank  and 
public  constitution,  but  mainly  by  the  ready  welcome 
which  it  would  offer  even  to  the  enemy  of  yesterday, 
should  he  elect  to  enter  it.  The  United  States  would 
rally  to  it,  seeing  in  it  their  best  hope  of  safety,  and 
ultimately  it  might  become  a  genuine  Pan-European 
League.  It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  Paine 's  Anglo- 
Franco-American  combination  might  form  its  nucleus. 
More  often  its  advocates  base  their  hopes  on  the  Anglo- 
Franco-Russian  entente,  expanded  by  adhesion  of  some 
of  the  present  neutrals.  No  one  suggests,  and  this  is 
the  weakest  point  of  the  whole  scheme,  that  Germany 
and  Austria  would  be  likely  to  join  such  a  League  at  the 
start,  though  no  one  of  this  way  of  thinking  would  de- 
sire to  exclude  them. 

Much  would  depend  on  the  nucleus  of  the  federation. 
Crude  military  considerations  render  an  Anglo-French- 
American  trinity  impossible.  Without  discussing 
whether  the  United  States  would  care  to  enter  "the 
vortex  of  European  militarism,"  it  is  enough  to  point 
out  that  such  a  combination  could  not  hope  to  hold  the 
rest  of  Europe  in  check,  could  not  even  safeguard 
France  against  Germany  alone,  unless  one  or  both  of  the 
English-speaking  nations  adopted  compulsory  military 
service.  France  must  ally  herself  to  some  first-rate 
military  power ;  no  navy  can  protect  her  land  frontiers. 
The  Anglo-Franco-Russian  combination  is  open  to  other 
objections.  It  does  not  represent  a  homogeneous  civili- 
zation. Every  outbreak  of  anti-Jewish  fanaticism  in 

166 


Russia,  every  assault  on  Finland  or  Persia,  every  re-  ^t^^ore 
minder  that  official  Russia  still  belongs  to  the  Dark  Ages,  J^n  Jf  old 
would  tend  to  weaken  the  moral  authority  of  such  a 
League.  It  has,  moreover,  too  long  a  history.  It  would 
seem  even  to  charitable  Germans  a  mere  perpetuation 
under  a  new  name  of  the  combination  which  M.  Del- 
casse  and  King  Edward  were  accused  of  forming  to  ' '  pen 
Germany  in. ' '  It  would  seem  to  be  nothing  better  than 
an  alliance  to  assure  the  victors  in  the  perpetual  pos- 
session of  the  fruits  of  victory,  and  the  new  pacifist  fa- 
c.ade  to  the  old  armed  fortress  would  only  aggravate  by 
hypocrisy  the  sin  of  success.  Germany  would  never  join 
this  League ;  she  would  scheme  with  all  the  arts  of  barter 
and  intrigue  to  detach  Russia  from  it,  and  the  old  game 
of  the  Balance  of  Power  would  go  on. 

The  fatal  objection  to  any  alliance  of  this  kind  is 
that  it  does  not  really  meet  the  difficulty  that  no  State 
will  abandon  its  sovereignty.  This  alliance  would  not 
be  a  League  of  Peace  unless  it  were  prepared  to  exer- 
cise a  very  sharp  supervision  over  the  foreign  policy  of 
its  members.  If  the  old  Anglo-Franco-Russian  entente 
had  been  a  genuine  League  of  Peace,  it  would  have  had 
to  say,  for  example,  to  Serbia,  "You  may  join  us,  but 
if  you  do  join  us,  you  must  abandon  forever  your  Ir- 
redentist ambitions  at  the  expense  of  Austria.  We  will 
protect  you  against  any  unprovoked  attack  by  Austria. 
But  you  on  your  side  must  refrain  from  any  encour- 
agement to  those  who  would  dismember  her. ' '  It  would 
have  had  to  say  with  equal  decision  to  France,  "Join  us 
by  all  means,  but  at  the  cost  of  refraining  from  any 
expansion  in  Morocco.  You  cannot  march  on  Fez  with- 
out provoking  some  German  reply."  Such  a  League, 
in  short,  would  be  a  mutual  insurance  society,  but  the 
risks  would  be  too  high  unless  the  society  could  prohibit 
its  members  from  any  deliberate  playing  with  fire.  It 

167 


vid™uforpr°-  ig  not  enough  to  say,  "We  will  murder  an  Archduke 
changing  con-  once  in  a  way,  but  when  he  is  dead  and  buried  we  will 
go  to  The  Hague  about  him";  or,  "We  will,  to  be  sure, 
take  places  in  the  sun  which  other  people  covet,  but 
when  we  have  taken  them  we  shall  not  wantonly  attack 
any  unsuccessful  rivals."  The  League  of  Peace  would 
either  be  the  old  imperialistic  alliance  under  a  dishon- 
est name,  or  else  it  would  be  a  highly  conservative 
federation  which  would  keep  its  members  in  a  very 
strait  pacifist  jacket.  If  great  powers  would  really 
endure  such  a  control  they  might  as  well  face  at  once  the 
limitation  of  sovereignty  implied  in  a  United  States  of 
Europe. 

The  vice  of  all  such  schemes  is  that  they  are  based 
too  one-sidedly  on  the  idea  of  preventing  wars.  They 
take  a  static  view  of  the  world.  They  come  quite  natu- 
rally from  citizens  of  satisfied  powers,  weary  of  the  bur- 
den of  defending  what  they  have  got.  They  ignore  the 
fact  that  life  is  change.  They  make  no  provision  for 
any  organic  alterations  in  the  world's  structure.  We 
can  no  more  prevent  war  by  organizing  a  defensive 
league  than  revolution  by  creating  a  police.  We  must 
deal  with  causes,  must  provide  some  means  alternative 
to  war  by  which  large  grievances  can  be  redressed  and 
legitimate  ambitions  satisfied.  To  recur  to  our  concrete 
cases:  if  it  is  desired  to  insure  that  Serbia  shall  not 
again  embroil  a  continent  in  war,  some  machinery  must 
be  provided  by  which  Austria  can  be  required  to  treat 
her  subject  Serbs  reasonably  well.  When  a  "place  in 
the  sun"  like  Morocco,  one  of  the  few  unappropriated 
parts  of  the  earth  fit  for  settlement  by  a  white  race,  can 
no  longer  maintain  its  independence,  there  must  be  some 
impartial  Power  which  can  say,  ' '  This  rich  potential  col- 
ony ought  not  to  go  to  a  State  like  France,  with  two 
similar  colonies  already  under  its  flag  and  a  dwindling 

168 


population  at  home,  but  rather  to  a  State  like  Germany, 
with  no  such  colony  of  her  own,  despite  her  teeming  reconciled 
population,  her  great  birth-rate,  her  vigorous  and  ex- 
pansive commerce." 

For  such  problems  as  this  there  is  no  solution  in  the 
quasi-legal  processes  of  arbitration.  The  fundamental 
fact  in  the  European  history  of  the  last  twenty  years  has 
been  the  restless  search  of  Germany  for  colonies  and 
fields  of  exploitation.  She  felt  her  way  in  South  Africa ; 
the  British  Empire  expanded  to  exclude  her.  She 
turned  a  timid  glance  to  Brazil;  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  the  flaming  sword  at  the  gate  of  that  Paradise. 
She  coveted  Morocco ;  the  British  navy  cleared  its  decks. 
She  penetrated  Turkey  down  the  spine  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway;  she  was  met  at  the  Gulf  with  opposing  sea- 
power.  A  League  of  the  Satisfied  might  appeal  to  Lon- 
don and  Paris  and  Petrograd.  But  Berlin  will  ask, 
"What  hope  does  it  offer  to  me  that  when  my  popula- 
tion is  still  denser,  my  industry  still  more  expansive,  my 
need  for  markets  and  fields  of  exploitation  for  my  capi- 
tal even  more  clamant  than  it  is  to-day,  your  League  of 
Peace  will  provide  me  with  an  outlet  ?  You  bar  the  fu- 
ture, and  you  call  it  peace." 

The  recent  Philadelphia  conference  on  The  League  to 
Enforce  Peace  was  extraordinarily  sensible  because  it 
recognized  so  clearly  its  own  limitations.  It  did  not 
propose  to  stop  the  war.  It  did  not  urge  anybody  to 
act  before  he  was  ready  to  act.  It  did  not  try  to 
stampede  our  government  or  any  European  government 
into  some  theoretical  program.  It  tried  merely  to  focus 
the  ideas  which  have  been  most  common  in  England  and 
America  during  the  last  ten  months.  Under  impressive 
circumstances,  in  a  hall  filled  with  noble  memories,  it 
crystallized  a  number  of  vague  ideas  into  an  hypothesis. 
The  conference  was  visibly  trying  to  reach,  some  mini- 

169 


The  Phiia-        mum  agreement  for  the  purpose  of  clarifying  the  think- 
ing  of  individuals  and  groups  all  over  the  world. 

Nobody  is  expected  to  act  upon  the  resolutions,  but 
everybody  is  expected  to  give  what  thought  and  knowl- 
edge and  imagination  he  may  have  towards  maturing 
the  intentions  which  they  expressed.  The  conference 
did  what  every  person  must  do  constantly  for  himself 
whenever  he  is  trying  to  think  out  a  long  and  complex 
problem.  It  stopped  for  breath  and  for  a  renewal  of 
faith;  it  made  a  tentative  proposal  as  a  guide  for  the 
thought  which  is  to  follow.  With  great  sanity  it  took 
no  doctrinaire  position,  laid  down  no  rule,  such  as  peace- 
at-any-price,  honor-cannot-be-arbitrated,  sovereignty-is- 
one-and-indivisible,  or  any  of  the  other  assumptions 
which  obscure  pacifist  and  militarist  argument.  The 
delegates  in  Philadelphia  were  scientific  in  their  spirit; 
they  did  not  even  attempt  that  over-precise  definition 
of  the  final  end  which  always  results  in  the  misleading 
use  of  theory.  They  were  not  doctors  who  begin  their 
study  of  disease  by  trying  to  define  the  ideal  healthy 
man,  they  were  not  political  doctrinaires  who  begin  by 
defining  the  ideally  peaceful  world.  They  were  agreed, 
as  doctors  are  agreed,  that  a  sounder  organic  constitu- 
tion is  required,  and  that  pain  and  suffering  should  be 
lessened  as  much  as  possible,  but  they  did  not  attempt  to 
say  that  they  would  not  inflict  pain  to  cure  pain,  or 
wage  war  to  preserve  the  peace. 

The  idea  which  the  delegates  had  uppermost  in  their 
thoughts  was  a  league  of  nations  that  should  give  power 
to  international  law.  It  is  an  extension  of  The  Hague 
plan  by  which  the  nations  attempt  not  only  to  set  up  a 
court,  but  to  compel  those  who  have  a  dispute  to  go  to 
the  court.  As  we  understand  the  resolutions,  they  do 
not  take  the  added  step  of  agreeing  to  enforce  the  deci- 
sion of  the  court. 

170 


The  idea  is  based  on  a  tremendous  compromise,  as  £• 

.^  '  back    mterna- 

our  own  history  shows.  We  were  once  a  league  of  for-  tumaiiaw. 
eign  States,  suspicious  of  common  action  and  jealous  of 
each  sovereign  prerogative.  On  the  greatest  issue  of 
our  history  we  fought  our  greatest  war,  and  the  States 
which  represented  union  and  federalism  put  an  end  once 
for  all  to  the  unlimited  sovereignty  of  any  individual 
State.  Our  Civil  War  established  the  supremacy  of  the 
federal  power  over  the  States. 

The  United  States  of  the  World  would  face  the  same 
problem,  though  on  a  much  more  difficult  scale.  It  will 
find  that  a  court  to  adjust  mistakes  is  not  enough,  for 
the  really  important  conflicts  that  provoke  war  are  not 
"justiciable."  They  are  matters  upon  which  a  policy 
has  to  be  declared — upon  which,  in  brief,  legislation  is 
needed.  Some  kind  of  legislature  a  League  of  Peace 
would  have  to  establish,  and  with  a  legislature  and 
court  would  have  to  go  an  executive.  This  would  open 
up  the  problem  of  representation,  of  the  large  and  popu- 
lous State  as  against  the  small  ones,  of  the  "satisfied 
Powers ' '  against  the  ' '  unsatisfied. ' '  For  it  is  clear  that 
the  British  Empire  will  not  consent  to  give  to  Montene- 
gro equal  representation,  or  the  United  States  to  Vene- 
zuela. Here  will  be  the  question  of  conflicts  between 
international  and  national  legislation,  similar  to  the  con- 
flicts which  our  Supreme  Court  is  called  upon  to  settle. 
All  the  problems  of  home  rule,  such  as  that  of  Ireland 
within  the  Empire,  and  of  Ulster  within  Ireland,  would 
have  to  be  met  in  territory  like  that  of  the  Balkans, 
by  the  League  of  Peace.  It  would  have  to  determine 
whether,  for  example,  the  sovereignty  of  a  national  India 
was  an  internal  question  for  the  British  Empire,  or  a 
legitimate  subject  for  international  settlement. 

The  League  would  have  to  work  out  the  problem  of 
unexploited  territories,  of  weaker  peoples,  and  of  dis- 

171 


The  business     orderly   States.     Just   as   our  original  Union   had  the 
League.  whole   West   to   organize,   so  the  League   would   have 

Africa,  large  parts  of  Asia,  and  the  middle  Americas 
as  a  kind  of  international  domain.  It  would  have  to 
meet  those  who  want  merely  to  exploit,  and  to  support 
those  who  are  liberal  enough  to  throw  about  weaker  peo- 
ples that  protection  under  which  they  can  really  grow 
to  freedom.  Nor  would  that  be  all.  The  League  would 
have  to  legislate  about  concessions,  trading  rights,  tariffs, 
about  spheres  of  influence,  about  the  use  of  great  ocean 
and  land  highways.  As  soon  as  it  grappled  with  the 
economic  aspects  of  diplomacy,  it  would  find,  just  as  our 
government  found,  that  interstate  commerce  cannot  be 
regulated  satisfactorily  by  conflicting  state  interests. 

In  other  words,  there  is  no  stopping  short  at  a  league 
to  prevent  war.  Such  a  league  would  either  grow  to  a 
world  federalism,  or  it  would  break  up  in  civil  war. 
But  that,  far  from  being  an  argument  against  the 
League,  is  the  strongest  possible  argument  for  it.  It  is 
the  first  step  towards  a  closer  world  organization,  and 
once  that  step  is  taken,  the  world  will  have  to  choose 
between  taking  some  of  the  next  steps  and  returning  to 
the  anarchy  of  sovereign  nationalities.  The  vast  impli- 
cations of  the  League  of  Peace  are  what  make  it  im- 
portant. And  its  real  service  to  mankind  may  well  be 
that  it  will  establish  the  first  rallying  point  of  a  world 
citizenship. 

The  development  of  such  a  citizenship  is  one  of  the 
great  moral  and  educational  problems  of  this  century. 
It  cannot  mean  a  vague  cosmopolitanism.  It  must  mean 
the  training  of  people  who  have  learned  to  modify  their 
national  policies  so  that  these  do  not  make  impossible 
an  international  allegiance.  This  war  has  offered  us  an 
example  of  such  citizenship.  The  Canadians,  Aus- 
tralians, and  New  Zealanders  who  are  fighting  in  Flan- 

172 


ders  and  at  the  Dardanelles  are  living  and  dying  for  aV 
the  largest  political  organization  the  world  has  so  far  federalism 
known.  Their  allegiance  in  the  British  Empire  is  to  a 
State  which  embraces  one-quarter  of  the  human  race. 
Never  before  in  history  have  men  been  loyal  to  so  great 
and  so  diversified  a  unit.  They  have  literally  come  from 
all  the  ends  of  the  earth  to  preserve  a  union  of  democra- 
cies. They  have  shown  by  example  what  any  World 
League  most  needs  to  know,  that  federalism  on  a  grand 
scale  is  not  an  idle  dream. 

The  New  Republic,  March  20  and  June  26,  1915. 


173 


THE  ECONOMIC  BOYCOTT 


The  nations 
have  a  power- 
ful   non-mili- 
tary   weapon. 


In  the  discussion  of  an  International  Executive  en- 
trusted with  powers  to  compel  the  fulfilment  of  treaty 
obligations,  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  coercion  can 
only  be  exercised  by  the  employment  of  armed  force. 
The  boycott  is  a  weapon  which  could  be  employed  with 
paralyzing  power  by  a  circle  of  nations  upon  an  of- 
fender against  the  public  law  of  the  world.  No  nation 
to-day,  least  of  all  the  great  industrial  and  military 
Powers,  is  or  can  become  socially  and  economically  self- 
sufficient.  It  depends  in  countless  ways  upon  inter- 
course with  other  nations.  If  all  or  most  of  these  ave- 
nues of  intercourse  were  stopped,  it  would  soon  be  re- 
duced to  worse  straits  than  those  which  Germany  is  now 
experiencing.  If  all  diplomatic  intercourse  were  with- 
drawn; if  the  international  postal  and  telegraphic  sys- 
tems were  closed  to  a  public  law-breaker;  if  all  inter- 
state railway  trains  stopped  at  his  frontiers;  if  no 
foreign  ships  entered  his  ports,  and  ships  carrying  his 
flag  were  excluded  from  every  foreign  port;  if  all  coal- 
ing stations  were  closed  to  him;  if  no  acts  of  sale  or 
purchase  were  permitted  to  him  in  the  outside  world — 
if  such  a  political  and  commercial  boycott  were  seriously 
threatened,  what  country  could  long  stand  out  against 
it?  Nay,  the  far  less  rigorous  measure  of  a  financial 
boycott,  the  closure  of  all  foreign  exchanges  to  members 
of  the  outlaw  State,  the  prohibition  of  all  quotations  on 

174 


foreign  stock  exchanges,  and  of  all  dealings  in  stocks  * 
and  shares,  all  discounting  and  acceptances  of  trade  bills,  co-operation, 
all  loans  for  public  or  private  purposes,  and  all  pay- 
ments of  moneys  due — such  a  withdrawal  of  financial 
intercourse,  if  thoroughly  applied  and  persisted  in,  would 
be  likely  to  bring  to  its  senses  the  least  scrupulous  of 
States. 

Assuming  that  the  members  of  the  League  included 
all  or  most  of  the  important  commercial  and  financial 
nations,  and  that  they  could  be  relied  upon  to  press 
energetically  all  or  even  a  few  of  these  forms  of  boy- 
cott, could  any  country  long  resist  such  pressure? 
Would  not  the  threat  of  it  and  the  knowledge  that  it 
could  be  used  form  a  potent  restraint  upon  the  law- 
breaker? Even  the  single  weapon  of  a  complete  postal 
and  telegraphic  boycott  would  have  enormous  efficiency 
were  it  rigorously  applied.  Every  section  of  the  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  community  would  bring  organ- 
ized pressure  upon  its  Government  to  withdraw  from  so 
intolerable  a  position  and  to  return  to  its  international 
allegiance.  It  may  be  said,  Why  is  it  that  such  a 
powerful  weapon  of  such  obvious  efficacy  has  never  been 
applied  ?  The  answer  is  that  the  conditions  for  its  rapid 
and  concerted  application  have  never  hitherto  existed. 
For  in  order  that  it  may  be  effective,  a  considerable 
number  of  nations  must  have  previously  undertaken  to 
apply  it  simultaneously  and  by  common  action.  And, 
what  is  more,  each  nation  must  have  confidence  in  the 
~b&na  fides  of  the  intention  of  other  nations  to  apply 
it.  For  the  detailed  application  of  the  boycott,  in  most 
points,  must  of  necessity  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  sev- 
eral national  Governments.  Here  comes  the  practical 
difficulty.  Every  boycott  has  a  certain  injurious  re- 
bound. It  hits  back  the  nation  that  applies  it.  The 
injury  of  suspended  intercourse  is,  of  course,  not  equal, 

175 


And  »  boycott  otherwise  the  process  would  be  futile.  If  the  whole  cir- 
those  who  cle  of  A 's  neighbors  boycott  him,  each  suffers  half  the 
loss  of  his  separate  intercourse  with  A,  but  A  suffers 
this  loss  multiplied  by  the  number  of  his  neighbors. 
Now  if  A's  intercourse  with  all  his  neighbors  is  of  equal 
magnitude,  each  of  them  can  probably  afford  easily  to 
bear  the  sacrifice  involved  in  the  boycott,  trusting  to 
the  early  effect  of  their  action  in  bringing  A  to  terms. 
But  if  one  or  two  of  A's  neighbors  are  in  much  closer 
relations  with  A  than  the  others,  and  if,  as  may  be  the 
case,  they  are  getting  more  advantage  from  this  inter- 
course than  A,  the  risk  or  sacrifice  they  are  called  upon 
to  undergo  will  be  proportionately  greater.  They  must 
bear  the  chief  brunt  of  a  policy  in  the  adoption  of  which 
they  have  not  the  determinant  voice. 

Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  Germany.  An  all- 
round  boycott  applied  to  her  would  evidently  cause  more 
damaging  reactions  to  Holland,  Belgium,  and  Denmark 
than  to  any  of  the  greater  nations  whose  united  voice 
might  have  determined  its  application.  The  injury  to 
Holland,  in  particular,  might  in  the  first  instance  be  al- 
most as  grave  as  that  sustained  by  Germany,  the  sup- 
posed object  of  the  boycott.  It  would  evidently  be  nec- 
essary to  make  provision  against  this  unequal  incidence 
by  devising  a  system  of  compensations  or  indemnity  to 
meet  the  case  of  such  a  special  injury  or  sacrifice. 

A  brief  allusion  to  the  other  side  of  the  objection  will 
suffice,  viz.,  the  fact  that  any  such  boycott  would  be  far 
less  potent  or  immediate  in  its  pressure  against  some 
nations  than  against  others.  "While  Great  Britain  would 
have  to  yield  at  once  to  the  threat  of  such  pressure, 
Russia,  or  even  the  United  States,  could  stand  out  for 
a  considerable  time,  and  China  might  even  regard  the 
boycott  as  a  blessing.  But  it  is  pretty  evident  that  in  the 
long  run  no  civilized  nation  could  endure  such  isolation, 

176 


and  that  this  weapon  is  one  which  the  League  might  in  °.^er 
certain  cases  advantageously  employ. 

Other  aspects  of  the  social-economic  boycott  raise 
other  difficulties.  While  certain  modes  and  paths  of 
intercourse  lie  directly  under  the  control  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  cooperating  States,  others  belong  to  pri- 
vate enterprise.  Though  postal,  railway,  and  tele- 
graphic intercourse  could  be  cut  off  easily  by  agreements 
between  Governments,  private  trading  could  not  so  easily 
be  stopped.  It  is  not  found  a  simple  matter  to  stop  all 
trading  between  members  of  nations  actually  at  war 
when  national  sentiment  sides  strongly  with  the  legal 
prohibition.  It  might  be  much  more  difficult  to  prevent 
all  commercial  intercourse  for  private  gain  when  there 
was  no  special  hostility  between  the  two  nations  in  ques- 
tion. But  this  is,  after  all,  only  a  minor  difficulty. 
Provided  that  the  respective  Governments  were  prepared 
to  use  their  normal  powers  of  control  over  the  principal 
modes  of  communication  and  of  transport,  the  potency 
of  the  boycott  so  established  would  appear  exceedingly 
effective. 

It  involves,  however,  a,  risk  which  needs  recognition. 
The  extreme  pressure  of  the  boycott  might  lead  to  for- 
cible reprisals  on  the  part  of  the  boycotted  State  which 
would,  in  fact,  precipitate  a  war.  Declaring  what  would 
be  in  effect  a  blockade  by  sea  and  land,  it  might  be 
necessary  for  the  League  to  patrol  the  seas  in  order  to 
stop  "illegal  traffic,"  and  to  keep  some  force  along 
the  land  frontiers  for  general  purposes.  A  boycotted 
nation  might,  in  the  stress  and  anger  of  the  case,  begin 
hostilities  against  those  of  its  neighbors  who  were  most 
active  in  the  operations  of  the  boycott.  In  that  event 
the  economic  boycott  would  have  to  be  supported  by 
armed  pressure.  This  would  also  be  the  case  where  the 
breach  of  international  law  against  which  action  was 

177 


international     taken  consisted,  not  in  refusing  to  arbitrate  or  concili- 

Bank  would  .  .-T-- 

strengthen  ate  an  issue  but  in  an  actual  opening  01  hostilities. 
Such  an  act  of  war,  directed  necessarily  against  some  one 
or  more  States,  could  not  be  met  merely  by  a  boycott. 
It  would  involve  armed  cooperation  as  well,  the  economic 
boycott  forming  an  accompaniment. 

There  is  another  method  of  bringing  financial  pressure 
upon  a  law-breaking  State  which  deserves  consideration. 
It  is  put  forward  in  the  following  terms  by  Mr.  F.  N. 
Keen  in  his  able  little  book,  "The  World  in  Alliance": 
"The  States  comprised  in  the  international  scheme 
might  be  required  to  keep  deposited  with,  or  under  the 
control  of,  the  International  Council  sums  of  money, 
proportioned  in  some  way  to  their  relative  populations 
or  financial  resources,  which;  might  be  made  available  to 
answer  international  obligations,  and  an  international 
bank  might  be  organized,  which  would  facilitate  the  giv- 
ing of  security  by  States  to  the  International  Council 
for  the  performance  of  their  obligations  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  payments  between  one  State  and  another  (as 
well  as  probably  assisting  in  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national currency  and  discharging  other  useful  interna- 
tional functions)." 

The  organized  concentration  of  international  finance 
by  the  formation  of  an  international  bank  is  a  line  of 
action  which  might  immensely  strengthen  that  body  of 
pacific  forces  the  rising  importance  of  which  Mr.  Nor- 
man Angell  has  so  effectively  expounded.  It  might  con- 
solidate to  an  almost  incalculable  degree  the  effective 
unity  of  the  International  League  by  placing  under  it 
the  solid  foundation  of  world-peace,  while  the  power 
which  such  an  institution  would  wield,  either  for  pur- 
poses of  fiscal  or  financial  boycott,  would  be  enor- 
mous. 

But  however  highly  we  estimate  the  potentialities  of 
178 


the  boycott  as  a  valuable  adjunct  to  the  pressure  of  pub- 
lie  opinion  in  compelling  obedience  to  treaty  obligations,  police 
it  is  idle  to  pretend  that  the  confidence  required  to  in- 
duce the  chief  nations  to  rely  upon  the  due  perform- 
ance of  these  obligations  by  all  their  co-signatories  will 
be  possible  without  placing  at  their  disposal,  for  use  in 
the  last  resort,  an  adequate  armed  force  to  break  the 
resistance  of  an  armed  law-breaking  State.  Somewhere 
behind  international  law  there  must  be  placed  a  power 
of  international  compulsion  by  arms.  If  that  force  were 
really  adequate,  it  is  probable  that  it  would  never  be 
necessary  to  employ  it  for  any  purpose  save  that  of  re- 
pelling invasions  or  dangerous  disorders  on  the  part  of 
outsiders.  Its  existence  and  the  knowledge  of  its  pres- 
ence might  suffice  to  restrain  the  aggressive  or  lawless 
tendencies  which  will  survive  in  members  of  the  League. 
But  in  the  beginnings  of  the  organization  of  interna- 
tional society  it  is  at  least  possible,  perhaps  likely,  that 
some  dangerous  outbreak  of  the  old  spirit  of  state-ab- 
solutism should  occur,  and  that  some  arrogant  or  greedy 
Power,  within  the  circle  of  the  League,  might  endeavor 
to  defy  the  public  law. 

For  the  States  entering  such  a  League  will  be  of  vari- 
ous grades  of  political  development:  some  may  enter 
with  reluctance  and  rather  because  they  fear  to  be  left 
out  than  because  they  believe  in  or  desire  the  success 
of  the  League.  It  is  idle  to  imagine  that  a  society  start- 
ing with  so  little  inner  unity  of  status  and  of  purpose 
can  dispense  entirely  with  the  backing  of  physical  force 
with  which  the  most  highly  evolved  of  national  societies 
has  been  unable  to  dispense. 

What  form,  then,  should  the  required  international 
force  take,  and  who  should  exercise  it? 

The  proposal  to  endow  some  executive  international 
body  with  the  power  of  levying  and  maintaining  a  new 

179 


HOW  con-  land  and  sea  force,  superior  to  that  of  any  Power  or 
combination  it  may  be  called  upon  to  meet,  scarcely 
merits  consideration.  Apart  from  the  hopelessness  of 
getting  the  Powers  to  consent  to  set  up  a  Super-State 
upon  this  basis,  the  mere  suggestion  of  curing  militar- 
ism by  creating  a  large  additional  army  and  navy  would 
be  intolerable.  Nor  is  it  any  more  reasonable  to  ex- 
pect the  Powers  to  abandon  their  separate  national 
forces,  simply  contributing  their  quota  towards  an  inter- 
national force  under  the  permanent  control  of  an  Inter- 
national Executive.  No  such  abandonment  of  sovereign 
power,  no  such  complete  confidence  in  the  new  interna- 
tionalism, could  for  a  long  time  to  come  be  even  con- 
templated. Each  nation  would  insist  upon  retaining 
within  its  own  territory  and  at  its  own  disposal  the 
forces  necessary  to  preserve  internal  order  and  to  meet 
at  the  outset  any  sudden  attack  made  from  outside.  It 
is  evident,  in  other  words,  that  the  forces  required  by 
the  International  League  in  the  last  resort,  for  the  main- 
tenance of  public  law  and  the  repression  of  breaches 
of  the  treaty,  must  be  composed  of  contingents  drawn 
upon  some  agreed  plan  from  the  national  forces  and 
placed  for  the  work!  in  hand  at  the  disposal  of  an  inter- 
national command.  Such  armed  cooperation  is,  of 
course,  not  unknown.  Several  times  within  recent  years 
concerted  action  has  been  taken  by  several  European 
Powers,  and  though  the  Pekin  expedition  in  1900  can- 
not be  regarded  as  a  very  favorable  example,  it  illus- 
trates the  Avillingness  of  Powers  to  act  together  for  some 
common  end  which  seems  to  them  of  sufficient  impor- 
tance. Is  it  too  much  to  expect  that  the  nations  enter- 
ing the  Confederation  will  realize  with  sufficient  clear- 
ness the  importance  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  their 
international  agreement  to  be  willing  to  entrust  a  per- 
manent executive  with  the  duty  of  commandeering  the 

180 


forces  necessary  to  achieve  this  purpose  when  they  may 

be  required?  beheld 

It  will  doubtless  be  objected  that  there  is  a  world  of  for  the  world- 
difference  between  the  occasional  willingness  of  a  group 
of  Powers  to  take  concerted  action  upon  a  particular  oc- 
casion, for  which  each  reserves  full  liberty  of  determina- 
tion as  to  whether  and  to  what  extent  it  will  cooperate, 
and  the  proposal  before  us.  It  is  absurd,  we  shall  be 
told,  to  expect  that  States  bred  in  the  sense  of  sover- 
eignty and  military  pride  will  seriously  entertain  a  pro- 
posal which  may  bring  them  into  war  in  a  quarrel  not 
specifically  theirs  and  compel  them  to  furnish  troops  to 
serve  under  an  international  staff.  But  many  events 
that  have  seemed  as  absurd  are  brought  to  pass.  A  few 
decades  ago  nothing  would  have  seemed  more  absurd 
than  to  suppose  that  our  nation  would  be  willing  to 
equip  an  Expeditionary  Force  of  several  million  men 
to  operate  upon  the  Continent  under  the  supreme  con- 
trol of  a  French  general.  Whether,  in  fact,  such  co- 
operation as  we  here  desiderate  is  feasible  at  any  early 
period  will  depend  upon  two  factors:  first,  the  realiza- 
tion on  the  part  of  Governments  and  peoples  of  the  civ- 
ilized world  of  the  supreme  importance  of  the  issue  at 
stake  in  this  endeavor  to  lay  a  strong  foundation  for  the 
society  of  nations;  secondly,  the  diminution  in  the  in- 
fluence of  militarism  and  navalism  as  factors  in  national 
life  that  is  likely  to  occur  if  sufficient  belief  in  the 
permanence  and  efficacy  of  the  new  arrangement  is  once 
secured.  If  nations  can  be  brought  to  believe  that 
national  armies  and  navies  are  too  dangerous  toys  to  be 
entrusted  to  the  indiscretion  of  the  national  statesmen 
and  generals,  and  are  only  safe  if  they  are  held  in  trust 
for  the  wider  world  community,  this  conviction  will 
modify  the  surviving  sentiments  of  national  pride  and 
national  pugnacity  and  make  it  easier  to  accept  the  new 

181 


Each  nation  international  status.  Moreover,  if,  as  the  first-fruits  of 
the  new  order,  a  sensible  reduction  of  national  arma- 
ments  can  be  achieved,  this  lessening  of  the  part  which 
armed  force  plays  within  each  national  economy  will  be 
attended  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  willingness 
to  place  the  reduced  forces  at  the  international  disposal. 
For  the  root  motive  of  the  international  policy  is  the 
desire  of  each  nation  to  get  a  larger  amount  of  security 
at  a  smaller  cost  than  under  the  old  order.  Those, 
therefore,  who  confidently  assert  that  States  will  not 
consent  on  any  terms  to  entrust  their  national  forces  to 
an  international  command  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
treaty  obligations  under  the  proposed  scheme  in  effect 
simply  assert  the  permanency  of  the  reign  of  unreason  in 
the  relations  between  States. 

For  though  the  general  agreement  of  States  to  sub- 
mit their  disagreements  to  processes  of  arbitration  and 
conciliation  with  pledges  to  abide  by  the  results  would 
be  a  considerable  advance  towards  better  international 
relations,  even  if  no  sanction  beyond  the  force  of  pub- 
lic opinion  existed  to  enforce  the  fulfilment  of  the  ob- 
ligations, it  would  not  suffice  to  establish  such  confidence 
in  future  peace  as  to  secure  any  sensible  and  simultane- 
ous reduction  of  armed  preparations.  No  Government 
would  consent  to  any  weakening  of  its  national  forces 
so  long  as  there  was  danger  that  some  Power  might  re- 
pudiate its  treaty  obligations.  This  being  the  case,  the 
burdens  and  the  perilous  influences  of  militarism  and 
navalism  would  remain  entrenched  as  strongly  as  before 
in  the  European  system,  advertising,  by  their  very  pres- 
ence, the  lack  of  faith  in  the  efficacy  of  the  new  pa- 
cific arrangements.  So  long  as  these  national  armaments 
remained  unchecked  the  old  conception  of  State  absolut- 
ism would  still  survive.  There  would  still  be  danger  of 
militarist  Governments  intriguing  for  aggression  or  de- 

182 


fense  in  new  groupings,  and  new  efforts  to  tip  the  bal- 
ance of  armed  power  in  their  favor. 

It  is  ultimately  to  the  dread  and  despair  of  this  al- 
ternative that  I  look  for  the  motive-power  to  induce  na- 
tions to  make  the  abatements  of  national  separatism 
necessary  to  establish  an  international  society.  Whether 
the  end  of  this  war  will  leave  these  motives  sufficiently 
powerful  to  achieve  this  object  will  probably  depend 
upon  the  degree  of  enlightenment  among  mankind  at 
large  upon  the  old  ideas  of  States  and  statecraft. 

J.  A.  Hobson,  "Toward  International  Government," 
pp.  90-100. 


183 


ECONOMIC  COERCION 

I  want  to  suggest  here  that  the  forces  of  Europe  will 
not  be  readily  deterrent  of  aggression  until  the  following 
conditions  at  least  are  fulfilled:  (a)  The  forces  placed 
behind  a  policy  the  first  object  of  which  shall  be  to  deter 
aggression;  (b)  aggression  so  defined  as  to  have  no  refer- 
ence to  the  merits  of  a  dispute  between  two  nations  or 
groups,  but  to  consist  simply  in  taking  any  belligerent 
action  to  enforce  a  State's  claim  against  another  with- 
out first  having  submitted  that  claim  to  international 
enquiry;  (c)  the  economic  pressure  which  is  an  essential 
part  of  military  operations  rendered  effective  by  the  co- 
operation of  States  which  do  not  necessarily  give  military 
aid  at  all;  (d)  economic  pressure  so  organized  as  to  be 
capable  of  prolongation  beyond  the  period  of  military 
operations;  and  (e)  the  penalties  attaching  to  aggression 
made  so  plain  as  to  be  realized  beforehand  by  any  people 
whose  government  tends  to  drift  towards  aggression. 

If  the  new  Congress  of  Vienna  is  effective,  these  con- 
ditions will  be  fulfilled. 

Any  arrangement  which  includes  them  would  partake 
of  the  nature  of  a  league  of  mutual  guarantee  of  in- 
tegrity, and  would  be  one  in  which  there  would  be  fair 
hope  of  economic  pressure  gradually  replacing  military 
force  as  the  compelling  sanction.  Economic  pressure 
might  be  that  first  felt  if  the  outstanding  feature  of  the 
arrangement  were  that  any  constituent  State  resorting 
to  hostilities  as  the  result  of  a  difference  with  another, 

184 


not  previously  submitted  to  an  international  court  of 
enquiry,  by  that  fact  caused  boycott  or  non-intercourse  to  be  outlawed, 
be  proclaimed  and  maintained  against  it  by  the  whole 
group.  This  would  not  prevent  certain  members  of  the 
group  from  carrying  on  military  operations,  as  well, 
against  it.  Some  of  the  group  would  go  to  war  in  the 
military  sense — all  in  the  economic  sense;  the  respective 
roles  would  be  so  distributed  as  to  secure  the  most  ef- 
fective action.  From  the  moment  of  the  offending  na- 
tion's defiance  of  the  international  agreement  to  which 
it  had  been  a  party,  its  ships  could  enter  no  civilized 
ports  outside  its  own,  nor  leave  them.  Payment  of 
debts  to  it  would  be  withheld ;  the  commercial  paper  of 
its  citizens  would  not  be  discounted;  its  citizens  could 
not  travel  in  any  civilized  country  in  the  world,  their 
passports  being  no  longer  recognized. 

Thus,  the  outlaw  nation  could  neither  receive  from  nor 
send  to  the  outside  world  material  or  communication  of 
any  kind — neither  food  nor  raw  material  of  manufacture, 
nor  letters,  nor  cables.  Money  due  to  him  throughout 
the  world  would  be  sequestrated  for  disposal  finally  as 
the  international  court's  judgment  should  direct;  and 
that  rule  would  apply  to  royalties  on  patents  and  pub- 
lications, and  would,  of  course,  involve  precautionary 
seizure  or  sequestration  of  all  property — ships,  goods, 
bank  balances,  business — held  by  that  nation's  citizens 
abroad. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  at  the  present  stage  of  interna- 
tional understanding  this  arrangement  could  be  carried 
beyond  the  point  of  using  it  as  a  means  to  secure  delay 
for  enquiry  in  international  disputes.  Its  use  as  a  sanc- 
tion for  the  judgments  of  international  tribunals  will 
probably  require  a  wider  agreement  as  to  the  founda- 
tions of  international  law  than  at  present  exists.  But  a 
union  of  Christendom  on  the  basis  of  common  action 

185 


Terms  of          affainst  aggression  would  be  a  very  great  step  to  the 

outlawry :  Tf °. 

the  Fabian        more  ambitious  plans. 

It  has,  however,  been  suggested  (by  the  Fabian  So- 
ciety) to  use  this  method  as  a  sanction  for  the  judgment 
of  an  international  court  in  the  following  terms: 

In  the  event  of  non-compliance  with  any  decision  or 
decree  or  injunction  of  the  International  High  Court,  or 
of  non-payment  of  the  damages,  compensation,  or  fine 
within  the  time  specified  for  such  payment,  the  Court 
may  decree  execution  and  may  call  upon  the  Constituent 
States  or  upon  some  or  any  of  them,  to  put  in  operation, 
after  duly  published  notice,  for  such  period  and  under 
such  conditions  as  may  be  arranged,  the  following  sanc- 
tions : 

(a)  To  prohibit  all  postal,  telegraphic,  telephonic,  and 
wireless  communication  with  the  recalcitrant  State ; 

(b)  To  prohibit  all  passenger  traffic  (other  than  the 
exit  of  foreigners),   whether  by  ship,   railway,   canal, 
or  road,  to  or  from  the  recalcitrant  State ; 

(c)  To  prohibit  the  entrance  into  any  port  of  the  Con- 
stituent States  of  any  of  the  ships  registered  as  belong- 
ing to  the  recalcitrant  State,  except  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  for  any  of  them  to  seek  safety,  in  which  case 
such  ship  or  ships  shall  be  interned ; 

(d)  To  prohibit  the  payment  of  any  debts  due  to  the 
citizens,  companies,  or  subordinate  administrations  of  the 
recalcitrant  State,  or  to  its  national  Government ;  and,  if 
thought  fit,  to  direct  that  payment  of  such  debts  shall  be 
made  only  to  one  or  other  of  the  Constituent  Govern- 
ments, which  shall  give  a  good  and  legally  valid  dis- 
charge for  the  same,  and  shall  account  for  the  net  pro- 
ceeds thereof  to  the  International  High  Court; 

(e)  To  lay  an  embargo  on  any  or  all  ships  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  such  Constituent  State  or  States  reg- 
istered as  belonging  to  the  recalcitrant  State ; 

186 


(f)  To    prohibit   any    lending    of    capital    or    other  £u°tPbeati<m 
moneys  to  the  citizens,  companies,  or  subordinate  ad-  organized 

...  *»  part  of 

ministrations  of  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  to  its  national  international 
Government ; 

(g)  To  prohibit  the  issue  or  dealing  in  or  quotation  on 
the  Stock  Exchange  or  in  the  press  of  any  new  loans, 
debentures,  shares,  notes,  or  securities  of  any  kind  by 
any  of  the  citizens,  companies  or  subordinate  adminis- 
trations of  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  of  its  national  Gov- 
ernment ; 

(h)  To  prohibit  all  imports,  or  certain  specified  im- 
ports, coming  from  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  originating 
within  it; 

(i)  To  prohibit  all  exports,  or  certain  specified  exports 
consigned  directly  to  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  destined 
for  it. 

It  should  be  noted  that  if  the  future  European  coali- 
tion means  business  at  all  in  giving  permanent  effect  to 
its  settlement  provisions,  the  chief  Powers  would  be  com- 
mitted, during  any  period  of  war,  by  virtue  of  their 
military  obligations,  to  everything  contained  in  the  plan 
just  outlined.  All  that  the  project  under  discussion  in- 
volves in  addition  is  that  (1)  certain  States  interested 
in  the  observance  of  public  right,  but  which,  by  their 
circumstances,  are  not  suited  to  military  cooperation, 
should  give  economic  aid  by  taking  part  in  the  embargo 
arrangements.  They  should  not  be  neutral,  but  should 
refuse  intercourse  with  the  recalcitrant  State  while  ac- 
cording it  to  the  others.  (2)  That  such  cooperation 
should  be  duly  organized  beforehand  by  public  arrange- 
ment and  be  recognized  as  part  of  the  normal  measures 
of  international  public  safety  and,  being  duly  recog- 
nized in  this  way,  should  become  part  of  international 
law — an  amended  law  in  so  far  as  the  rules  of  neutrality 
are  concerned.  (3)  That  the  arrangements  should  in- 

187 


Boycott  elude  provisions  for  prolonging  embargo  or  diserimina- 

threaten  tion  against  an  offending  State  after  the  period  of  mili- 

offending  ° 

nation  after       tary  operations  had  ceased. 

The  first  point  that  occurs  to  one,  of  course,  in  consid- 
ering such  a  plan  is  that  it  has  proven  ineffective  in  the 
present  war  since  this  condition  of  non-intercourse  is 
exactly  that  in  which  Germany  now  finds  herself,  and  it 
is  not  at  all  effective. 

To  which  I  reply: 

1.  That  Germany,  as  already  pointed  out,  is  not  yet 
subject  to  a  condition  of  complete  non-intercourse,  since 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  she  has  been  receiving  her 
mail  and  cables  and  maintaining  communication  with  the 
outside  world,  morally  an  immensely  important  factor. 
Nor  is  it  entirely  moral.     Large  supplies  have,  despite 
the  naval  blockade,  come  to  her  through  Scandinavia 
and  Holland. 

2.  That,  though,  of  slow  operation,  it  is  the  economic 
factor  which  in  the  end  will  be  the  decisive  one  in  the 
operations  against  Germany;  as  the  ring  tightens  and  a 
necessary   raw   material   like    cotton   is    absolutely   ex- 
cluded, the  time  will  come  when  this  fact  will  tell  most 
heavily.     If  the  non-intercourse  had  been  world-organ- 
ized the  effect  would  have  operated  from  the  first.     Inci- 
dentally, of  course,  America  and  England,  between  them, 
control  the  cotton  of  the  world. 

3.  The  effect  of  the  suggested  embargo,  boycott  or  eco- 
nomic pressure  would  be  most  decisive  as  a  deterrent  to 
aggression,  not  so  much  by  what  it  might  be  able  to  ac- 
complish during  a  war  as  by  what  its  prolongation  would 
mean  to  the  aggressor  afterwards. 

Norman  Angell,  "The  World's  Highway,"  pp.  318- 
324. 


188 


WORLD-ORGANIZATION  AND  PEACE 
The  end  of  armed  conflict  is  conceivable  as  the  result  Types  of 

.  social 

of  either  of  two  achievements.  Permanent  peace  may  organization, 
come  either  upon  the  establishment  of  successful  means 
for  the  settlement  of  disputes  or  upon  the  elimination 
of  the  causes  which  produce  disputes.  This  paper  is 
limited  to  discussion  of  the  second  of  these  alterna- 
tives. .  .  . 

In  large-scale  organizations  purposefully  created  be- 
cause of  their  utility,  history  discloses  few  in  which  that 
utility,  in  its  broader  aspect,  has  been  appreciated  by  all 
of  the  cooperating  members.  Only  in  organizations  ap- 
proaching a  pure  democracy  has  an  approximation  to 
such  conditions  been  attained.  In  other  forms  of  or- 
ganization, force  or  reward  has  been  employed  to  gain 
the  cooperation  of  persons  outside  a  limited  number  of 
organizers,  who  alone  have  appreciated  the  full  utility 
of  organization.  Even  in  democracies,  however,  when 
population  is  too  large  for  all  to  participate  in  gov- 
ernment, it  is  possible  only  for  the  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  organization  to  exercise  control  over  general 
policies;  executive  functions  are  of  necessity  delegated. 
Thus  three  sub-forms  of  the  utility  type  of  organiza- 
tion are  to  be  distinguished.  They  may  be  termed  re- 
spectively the  organizer-force,  the  organizer-reward,  and 
the  democratic-control-expert-executive  forms. 

Brief  analysis  and  appeal  to  history  will  serve  to  indi- 
cate the  relative  stability  of  these  forms,  both  with  re- 

189 


Peace  can- 
not come 
from  the 
organizer- 
force  system. 


spect  to  each  other  and  to  the  sympathy  type  of  organi- 
zation. 

Of  the  organizer-force  form  the  slavery  system  and  the 
militaristic  empire  are  examples.  Neither  of  these  sys- 
tems, however,  has  inherent  stability.  Both  run  the  dan- 
ger of  revolt.  The  militaristic  empire  breaks  down  sooner 
or  later  because  unlikeness  of  peripheral  regions  causes 
local  patriotism  to  assert  itself  whenever  there  is  possi- 
bility of  success.  Slavery  does  not  survive  the  growth 
of  intelligence.  Governments  of  the  organizer-force 
form,  moreover,  have  to  face  the  constant  threat  of  revo- 
lution. If  Germany  be  cited  as  a  possible  exception,  the 
reply  is,  that  special  conditions  have  stimulated  the  loy- 
alty of  the  Germans  to  their  sovereign.  Germany  was 
unified  but  recently  and  then  only  by  war.  Her  people 
have  not  yet  wholly  overcome  the  distrust  of  one  another 
engendered  by  long-standing  local  differences.  Ger- 
many has  thus  required  a  strong  hand  to  create  and  to 
preserve  her  unity.  In  addition,  the  Germans,  not  alto- 
gether without  reason,  have  believed  themselves  sur- 
rounded by  hostile  nations.  These  conditions  sufficiently 
account  for  the  exception.  It  must  not  be  overlooked, 
however,  that  even  in  Germany  there  has  been  a  growing 
dissatisfaction  with  the  form  of  organization  of  her  gov- 
ernment. Thus  the  briefest  examination  of  the  organ- 
izer-force form  of  organization  discloses  the  futility  of 
expecting  permanent  international  peace  to  result  from 
an  extension  of  this  form  throughout  the  world.  Even 
in  its  local  manifestations  this  form  exhibits  inherent 
instability  and  lack  of  harmony. 

The  organizer-reward  form  of  organization  also  ap- 
pears to  have  its  own  peculiar  tendency  towards  insta- 
bility. This  was  true  of  the  feudal  systems  of  the  past, 
and  is  true  of  the  great  business  corporations  of  to-day, 
both  of  which  are  examples  of  the  organizer-reward 

190 


form.     In  the  feudal  system  the  reward  offered  by  the  ^ardS££ 
organizers  in  return  for  service  was  protection ;  in  mod-  democratic 

.     ,  ,  .  systems. 

ern  industry  the  reward  is  a  money  wage.  In  both  cases, 
however,  when  subordinate  members  of  the  organization 
have  been  ignorant,  there  has  been  some  tendency  to- 
wards the  exploitation  as  well  as  the  utilization  of  such 
members.  To  the  extent,  however,  that  intelligence  has 
developed,  there  has  been  less  and  less  voluntary  con- 
tinuance of  organizations  whose  utility  has  been  thought 
by  the  subordinate  members  to  be  limited  to  one  class  in 
the  organization.  Force  has  been  met  by  force.  Since 
intelligence  is  increasing,  it  is  not  fortuitous  that  the 
great  internal  problem  of  advanced  nations  is  the  control 
of  such  exploitive  industry  as  exists,  while  the  great  po- 
litical problem  of  less  advanced  nations  is  the  struggle 
for  democracy.  In  both  cases  the  struggle  is  to  prevent 
the  organizer-reward  form  from  becoming  the  organizer- 
force  form  and  to  replace  the  instability  and  the  lack  of 
harmony  of  these  forms  by  the  greater  stability  and 
greater  harmony  of  the  democratic-control-expert-execu- 
tive form.  Far  more  than  is  the  case  in  the  other  utility 
forms,  the  democratic  form  directs  its  policies  with  a 
view  to  the  welfare  of  all  its  members.  Minorities  are 
represented  on  the  executive  staff.  All  members  of  the 
organization  participate  in  control.  The  danger  of  dis- 
satisfaction on  the  part  of  non-executive  members  is  re- 
duced to  a  minimum. 

The  most  striking  fact,  however,  with  respect  to  the 
question  of  the  relative  stability  and  harmony  of  the 
various  forms  of  organization  is  that  the  largest  and  the 
most  permanent  relatively  harmonious  organizations  that 
have  appeared  among  men  are  those  great  modern  na- 
tions whose  inhabitants  live  in  a  unified  area  of  char- 
acterization and  are  essentially  alike  in  language,  race, 
customs,  traditions  and  religion.  Homogeneity  in  all 

191 


National  these  respects,  it  is  true,  does  not  as  yet  exist  even  on  a 

homogeneity  *  '  ' .  . 

means  national  scale  and  there  is  certainly  no  prospect  of  such 

homogeneity  on  a  world  scale  in  the  near  future.  These 
considerations  must  not  blind  us  to  the  fact,  however, 
that  England,  France,  Spain,  Germany,  Russia,  Italy, 
the  Scandinavian  nations,  the  United  States,  Japan  and 
China — the  largest  and  internally  the  most  harmonious 
organizations  yet  known  to  man — are  each  composed  of 
individuals  the  vast  majority  of  whom  are  relatively 
alike  in  language,  customs  and  traditions,  and  for  the 
most  part  in  race  and  religion.  Nations  that  are 
markedly  heterogeneous  in  the  characteristics  mentioned, 
such  as  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  the  Balkan 
States  and  European  Turkey,  are  notoriously  unstable. 
Furthermore,  the  stability  possessed  by  the  various  util- 
ity-form organizations  that  exist  within  or  among  the 
stable  nations  of  the  world  is,  in  large  part,  the  result 
of  the  stability  and  permanence  of  the  nations  them- 
selves. The  stability  of  all  three  of  the  utility  forms 
thus  rests  upon  the  inherent  stability  of  the  sympathy 
type  of  organization. 

If  the  foregoing  analysis  be  correct,  certain  proposi- 
tions of  great  importance  for  the  problem  of  interna- 
tional peace  may  now  be  stated.  First,  nationality  on 
the  basis  of  sympathy  is  likely  to  persist  for  an  indefinite 
period.  Second,  because  of  the  ignorance  of  the  inhab- 
itants of  a  number  of  important  nations,  the  organizer- 
force  and  the  organizer-reward  forms  of  government  and 
of  business  organization  are  also  likely  to  persist,  for 
a  considerable  period,  in  various  parts  of  the  globe. 
Third,  where  the  organizer-force  or  organizer-reward 
form  of  organization  is  superimposed  on  nationality, 
readiness  to  maintain  harmony  with  other  national 
groups  can  exist  only  when  such  international  harmony 
is  to  the  interest  of  the  organizer  class  in  each  of  such 

192 


nations.     Where  the  democratic-control-expert-executive  Peace  win 
, .  .       .  follow  in- 

form prevails,  readiness  to  maintain  harmony  with  other  creasing  like- 
national  groups  can  exist  only  when  such  international  ITmong  the" 
harmony  is  to  the  interest  of  each  nation  so  organized,  n 
taken  as  a  whole. 

These  propositions  mean  that,  under  present  condi- 
tions, permanent  world  peace  can  be  produced  only  if 
in  the  organizer-force  and  in  the  organizer-reward  na- 
tions the  organizer  is  less  interested  in  personal  fame 
than  in  the  welfare  of  the  whole  organization,  if  the 
organizing  class  does  not  seek  aggrandizement  or  if  the 
organizing  class  is  willing  to  permit  a  peaceful  transi- 
tion within  the  nation  to  the  democratic-control-expert- 
executive  form  of  organization  rather  than  to  seek  per- 
petuation of  its  own  control  through  foreign  war.  They 
mean  also  that  such  peace  can  be  maintained  only  if 
democratic  nations  can  be  kept  free  from  that  trooping 
of  emotion  which  sometimes  suddenly  sweeps  vast  bodies 
of  men  into  unreasoning  demand  for  aggressive  action, 
and  if  the  interests  of  such  nations  lead  them  to  desire 
international  peace.  .  .  . 

Let  there  ~be  produced  sufficient  likeness  among  the  peo- 
ples of  the  world,  and  harmonious  organization  based  on 
sympathy  will  follow  of  itself.  If  there  be  created  a  suf- 
ficient likeness  among  all  peoples  in  ideals  of  progress, 
in  the  desire  for  the  betterment  of  the  entire  human 
race,  and  in  other  equally  important  mental  and  moral 
respects,  then  world  harmony,  based  on  sympathy,  will 
ultimately  develop  in  the  same  way  that  the  present  har- 
mony within  homogeneous  nations  has  resulted,  in  large 
part,  from  a  sympathy  spontaneously  created  by  resem- 
blance in  race,  language,  religion  and  customs. 

That  final  permanent  international  peace  can  come, 
however,  only  on  the  basis  of  world-wide  like-minded- 
ness  is  the  chief  contention  of  this  essay.  If  this  con- 

193 


Action 

be  taken 
towards 
securing 
this    like- 
mindedness. 


tention  is  correct,  advocates  of  international  peace  must 
not  only  adopt  policies  calculated  to  produce  like-minded- 
ness,  but  must  not  shrink  from  the  endeavor  to  produce 
the  central  executive  organization — the  natural  result 
of  like-mindedness,  and  in  itself,  if  established,  a  creator 
of  like-mindedness. 

From  the  standpoint  of  producting  like-mindedness  it 
is  of  comparatively  small  moment  what  one  of  a  num- 
ber of  possible  projects  is  used  for  the  initial  attempt. 
It  is  of  supreme  importance  only  that  the  project  chosen 
should  be  the  one  most  likely  to  succeed  in  evolving  com- 
mon response  and  cooperation. 

The  practical  suggestions  which  follow,  therefore,  are 
based  on  these  two  notions:  first,  the  desirability  of  cre- 
ating like-mindedness  among  the  peoples  of  the  world 
on  a  plane  above  race,  religion,  language  and  customs; 
and  second,  the  desirability  of  creating  a  central  execu- 
tive organization,  so  far  as  possible  responsible  to  the 
peoples  behind  each  national  government,  rather  than 
responsible  to  constituent  governments.  They  suggest 
action  on  the  basis  of  combining  the  two  most  stable 
forms  of  harmonious  organization,  namely,  the  sym- 
pathy form  growing  out  of  like-mindedness,  and  the 
democratic-control-expert-executive  form  of  the  utility 
type. 

The  first  suggestion  under  the  principles  thus  outlined 
is  that  there  be  established  a  world  consular  staff,  to 
assume  some  at  least  of  the  functions  of  the  present 
national  consular  services.  The  first  duty  undertaken 
by  a  world  consular  service  would  be  to  systematize,  for 
the  benefit  of  business  the  world  over,  such  investiga- 
tions as  are  now  carried  on  in  a  somewhat  haphazard 
way  by  each  national  consular  service.  By  centraliza- 
tion, much  duplication  of  effort  would  be  eliminated  and 
a  much  more  comprehensive  plan  of  investigation  car- 

194 


ried  out.  The  results,  as  now,  would  be  available  for  all  £0™\ar 
business  men  of  all  nationalities.  From  the  beginning,  service, 
so  far  as  possible,  the  chief  executives  of  such  a  con- 
sular staff  should  be  elected  by  the  people  of  each  na- 
tion, rather  than  appointed  by  governments — the  pur- 
pose of  this  being  to  create  in  each  voter  the  world  over, 
some  sense  of  participation  in  a  world-undertaking,  and 
to  some  extent  a  sympathy  with  other  voters  the  world 
over.  The  cost  both  of  the  consular  service  and  of  the 
election  of  the  executive  officers  of  the  service  should  be 
met,  not  by  appropriations  from  national  governments, 
but  by  a  fixed  percentage  of  the  revenues  of  each  na- 
tion. The  usefulness  of  the  service  itself  to  all  the  peo- 
ple of  the  world  would  be,  eventually,  the  guarantee  that 
the  contribution  of  this  percentage  would  be  maintained. 
Proposed  changes  in  the  percentage  would  ultimately 
have  to  be  submitted  to  the  voters  of  all  peoples. 

The  suggestion  as  thus  outlined  is  an  ideal  not  likely 
to  be  soon  realized,  but  it  is  possible  that  some  begin- 
ning toward  a  world  consular  service  could  be  provided 
for  by  the  peace  treaty  to  be  signed  at  the  close  of  the 
present  war.  Such  a  beginning  might  well  be  a  pro- 
visional world-chamber  of  commerce,  organized  on  the 
basis  of  constituent  national  chambers,  the  character  and 
organization  of  which  should  be  provided  for  in  the 
treaty.  The  subject  will  hardly  receive  notice  during 
the  peace  negotiations,  however,  unless,  as  the  result  of 
previous  publicity  and  discussion,  the  possibilities  of 
world  organization  latent  in  the  proposition  are  fully 
realized. 

The  second  suggestion  for  the  production  of  world- 
wide like-mindedness  is  that  there  be  undertaken  a 
world  investigation  into  the  natural  resources  of  the 
earth,  and  that  a  central  world-conservation  investiga- 
tion commission  be  created.  At  the  present  time  the 

195 


world-  conservation  movement  is  organized  on  national  rather 

bureaus  for  .  .  ° 

conservation  than  on  world-wide  lines,  and  the  natural  result  is  to 
strengthen  local  rather  than  international  sympathy. 
The  principle  of  scientific  management  would  become 
much  more  effective  if  adopted  from  a  world  standpoint. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  results  of  a  world- 
wide conservation  investigation  should  not  produce  rec- 
ommendations that,  through  appeals  to  the  peoples  back 
of  the  national  governments,  the  governments  themselves 
would  be  forced  to  heed.  The  machinery  for  the  con- 
servation investigation  might  develop  out  of  the  world 
consular  service  or  become  a  part  of  the  work  of  that 
service. 

The  third  suggestion  for  the  production  of  world-wide 
like-mindedness  is  that  there  be  established  a  central 
bureau  of  advice  and  information  on  all  "human  bet- 
terment" projects.  Thus  far  we  have  not  advanced  be- 
yond the  point  of  developing  national  bureaus  of  com- 
merce and  labor,  hygiene,  child  welfare  and  other 
similar  interests,  and  of  holding  "international  con- 
gresses. ' '  A  permanent  world  bureau  would  be  far  more 
systematic  in  the  dissemination  of  knowledge  of  success- 
ful experiments.  It  would  also  tend  to  create  world 
sympathy.  "With  increasing  prestige  the  bureau  would 
naturally  extend  its  functions  to  those  of  recommenda- 
tion and  advice  to  national  and  local  governments. 

The  fourth  suggestion  is  that  there  be  established  a 
permanent  world  commission  on  international  migra- 
tion. At  the  present  time  problems  of  migration,  such, 
for  example,  as  those  of  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  to 
the  United  States,  are  settled  by  the  nations  primarily 
interested,  without  recognition  of  the  fact  that  migra- 
tion is  essentially  a  world  problem  in  which  all  human- 
ity has  an  interest.  The  local  problems  of  migration 

196 


that  arise  from  time  to  time  are  but  a  part  of  an  age- 
long  movement  of  population  which  is  gradually  pro- 
ducing  an  equilibrium  between  density  of  population  and  systems. 
natural  resources  in  every  part  of  the  world.  Move- 
ments between  two  nations,  however,  will  never  be  set- 
tled on  reasons  other  than  local.  A  world  commission 
would  at  least  work  toward  a  world-policy  in  this  possi- 
bly the  most  important  of  world-problems. 

The  fifth  suggestion  is  that  these  and  all  other  projects 
for  the  creation  of  the  world-mind  and  centralized  or- 
ganization be  furthered  by  utilizing  all  the  modern  meth- 
ods of  the  commercial  "accelerator  of  public  opinion," 
the  publicity  agent  and  the  advertiser  versed  in  psy- 
chologically efficient  methods.  There  should  be  an  ade- 
quate world-publicity  service,  the  task  of  which  should 
be  to  develop  like  responses  to  the  proposed  projects  in 
the  populations  back  of  governments,  and  by  publicity 
methods  to  develop  that  like-mindedness  which  is  es- 
sential for  world-wide  organization  on  the  sympathy 
basis. 

The  development  of  many  other  projects  similar  to 
those  outlined  above,  it  is  apparent,  would  inevitably 
tend  toward  the  production  of  centralized  organization 
with  many  departments.  Separate  world  organizations 
for  different  purposes  could  not  long  exist  without  inte- 
gration. The  central  organization  would  inevitably  as- 
sume the  duties  of  the  international  postal  union;  it 
would  create  a  world  monetary  system;  and  it  would 
assume  the  functions  of  an  international  court.  With 
increasing  prestige,  such  an  organization  would  gain 
greater  and  greater  moral  power.  Resting  on  like- 
mindedness  in  the  populations  back  of  national  govern- 
ments, it  would  ultimately  develop  a  world-loyalty  and 
find  its  recommendations  enforced  by  the  moral  sense 

197 


Peace 

proposals 

should 

inaugurate 

like- 

tuindedness. 


of  the  world.     Force,  except  for  local  police  purposes, 
would  not  be  needed. 

The  final  suggestion  based  on  the  preceding  analysis 
is  that  the  principle  underlying  these  projects  be 
adopted  as  at  least  one  of  the  fundamental  propositions 
for  the  guidance  of  peace  negotiators  at  the  close  of 
the  present  war.  Peace  should  be  established  not  upon 
the  basis  of  the  interests  of  victorious  nations  alone,  nor 
even  upon  the  combined  interests  of  victors  and  van- 
quished, but  upon  the  basis  of  the  future  welfare  of  all 
peoples.  The  inauguration  of  policies  for  the  produc- 
tion of  like-mindedness  might  well  be  provided  for  in 
the  peace  treaty  itself.  National  boundaries  should  not 
be  set  on  a  basis  which  will  intensify  national  self-suffi- 
ciency and  aloofness,  but  on  a  basis  which  will  encour- 
age inter-communication  and  the  development  of  like- 
mindedness  throughout  the  world.  Moreover,  the  choice 
of  national  representatives  for  the  peace  negotiations 
should  include  men  capable  of  taking  the  world-view 
rather  than  the  exclusively  nationalistic  view.  Repre- 
sentatives of  the  neutral  nations  should  be  admitted  to 
the  proceedings.  A  popular  demand  that  these  repre- 
sentatives be  of  the  world-mind  type  should  be  created 
immediately  by  publicity  methods.  So  far  as  possible, 
practical  projects  for  the  creation  of  the  world-mind 
and  world-organization  should  be  provided  for  in  the 
treaty  of  peace,  and  as  a  guarantee  of  good  faith  no  in- 
demnity other  than  a  pro-rata  contribution  for  the  main- 
tenance of  these  projects  should  be  exacted.  Provision 
should  be  made  also  for  permanently  meeting  the  cost 
of  such  projects,  by  agreement  that  a  definite  precentage 
of  national  taxes  be  set  aside  for  the  use  of  the  world 
organizations  created  by  the  treaty.  In  short,  an  au- 
thoritative and  intelligent  beginning  toward  world-or- 

198 


ganization  should  be  made  at  the  close  of  the  present 


war. 


A.  A.  Tenney,  "Theories  of  Social  Organization,  and 
the  Problems  of  International  Peace,"  Political  Sci- 
ence Quarterly,  March,  1915. 


199 


PART  III 
TOWARDS  THE  FUTURE 


THE  NEW  OUTLOOK 
No  one  dare  predict  just  what  the  end  of  this  world  Th«WBr-' » 

.,,  T      .  .      Katharsis   for 

war  will  be,  or  when  that  end  will  come.  It  is  possi-  humanity, 
ble,  of  course,  that  this  cataclysm  marks  the  end  of  cen- 
turies of  progress,  and  it  is  possible  that  man  in  1914 
crossed  over  the  watershed  of  civilization  and  is  now 
to  descend  on  the  other  side  towards  steadily  growing 
barbarism  and  the  steadily  extending  rule  of  force. 
That  I  say  is  possible;  but  I  for  one  am  an  unconquer- 
able optimist.  I  prefer  to  read  history  differently  and 
to  see  in  this  appalling  catastrophe  what  the  Greek  called 
a  katharsis,  a  cleansing  of  the  spirit.  I  prefer  to  think 
of  it  as  history's  way  of  teaching  beyond  peradventure 
or  dispute  the  fallacy  and  the  folly  of  the  old  ways 
and  the  old  policies.  Surely  that  struggle  for  the  bal- 
ance of  power  which  the  historian  Stubbs  described  as 
the  principle  which  gives  unity  to  the  plot  of  modern 
history, — surely  that  struggle  has  proved  its  futility. 
Surely  we  can  see  the  vanity  of  Ententes  and  Alliances 
and  of  a  division  of  the  world  into  heavily  armed  camps 
each  waiting  for  an  opportunity  or  for  an  excuse  to 
pounce  upon  the  other.  Surely  the  international  poli- 
tics of  a  Palmerston,  or  a  Disraeli,  or  a  Bismarck,  strik- 
ing and  splendid  as  they  were  in  their  own  way, — surely 
those  policies  are  put  behind  us  and  are  outgrown  for- 
ever. 

A  democratic  federated  people  can  teach  the  world 
democracy  and  the  use  of  the  federative  principle.    A 

203 


thfniu^ter.       people  devoted  to  civil  liberty  and  to  international  honor, 

nationally!        no  less  lightly  held  than  the  honor  of  an  individual — 

that  people  can  teach  the  world  the  foundations  upon 

which  to  rebuild  the  shattered  fabric  of  international  law 

and  of  broken  treaties. 

The  outlook  before  the  people  of  the  United  States 
has  changed.  When  Joseph  Chamberlain  returned 
from  South  Africa  his  message  to  the  people  of  Great 
Britain  was:  "You  must  learn  to  think  imperially." 
The  message  which  any  American  alive  to  the  world's 
situation  to-day  must  bring  to  his  fellow  citizens  is,  you 
must  learn  to  think  internationally!  Domestic  policies 
and  problems  are  perhaps  no  less  important  than  they 
have  been  in  the  past,  but  by  their  side  and  for  the  im- 
mediate future  surpassing  them  in  interest  and  in  im- 
portance are  the  international  problems  and  the  inter- 
national policies  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
For  those  problems  and  for  those  policies  we  must  pre- 
pare— prepare  thoughtfully,  seriously,  speedily;  for 
when  the  war  shall  be  ended,  we  may  truly  say,  as  Gam- 
betta  said  to  the  French  people  forty-five  years  ago, 
"Now  that  the  danger  is  past,  the  difficulties  begin." 

Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  Address  at  147th  Annual 
Banquet  of  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  Nov.  18, 1915. 


204 


ABOVE  THE  BATTLE 

0  young  men  that  shed  your  blood  with  so  generous  ™|  ££11* 
a  joy  for  the  starving  earth!  0  heroism  of  the  world!  °iflci*lf"*ac~ 
"What  a  harvest  for  destruction  to  reap  under  this  splen-  youth  i 
did  summer  sun!  Young  men  of  all  nations,  brought 
into  conflict  by  a  common  ideal,  making  enemies  of  those 
who  should  be  brothers;  all  of  you,  marching  to  your 
death,  are  dear  to  me.  Slavs,  hastening  to  the  aid  of 
your  race;  Englishmen  fighting  for  honor  and  right; 
intrepid  Belgians  who  dared  to  oppose  the  Teutonic 
colossus,  and  defend  against  him  the  Thermopylae  of 
the  West;  Germans  fighting  to  defend  the  philosophy 
and  the  birthplace  of  Kant  against  the  Cossack  ava- 
lanche; and  you,  above  all,  my  young  compatriots,  in 
whom  the  generation  of  heroes  of  the  Revolution  lives 
again ;  you,  who  for  years  have  confided  your  dreams  to 
me,  and  now,  on  the  verge  of  battle,  bid  me  a  sublime 
farewell.  .  .  . 

0  my  friends,  may  nothing  mar  your  joy !  Whatever 
fate  has  in  store,  you  have  risen  to  the  pinnacle  of 
earthly  life,  and  borne  your  country  with  you.  And 
you  will  be  victorious.  Your  self-sacrifice,  your  courage, 
your  whole-hearted  faith  in  your  sacred  cause,  and  the 
unshaken  certainty  that,  in  defending  your  invaded 
country,  you  are  defending  the  liberty  of  the  world — 
all  this  assures  me  of  your  victory,  young  armies  of  the 
Marne  and  Meuse,  whose  names  are  graven  henceforth 
in  history  by  the  side  of  your  elders  of  the  Great  Be- 

205 


But  have         Dublic.     Yet   even    had   misfortune    decreed   that    you 

the  leaders  ,  ,    ,  •  -,      -,  i         •.-,  -n  •*.     in 

done  their  should  be  vanquished,  and  with  you  France  itselt,  no 
people  could  have  aspired  to  a  more  noble  death.  It 
would  have  crowned  the  life  of  that  great  people  of  the 
Crusades — it  would  have  been  their  supreme  victory. 
Conquerors  or  conquered,  living  or  dead,  rejoice!  As 
one  of  you  said  to  me,  embracing  me  on  the  terrible 
threshold:  "A  splendid  thing  it  is  to  fight  with  clean 
hands  and  a  pure  heart,  and  to  dispense  divine  justice 
with  one's  life." 

You  are  doing  your  duty,  but  have  others  done 
theirs?  Let  us  be  bold  and  proclaim  the  truth  to  the 
elders  of  these  young  men,  to  their  moral  guides,  to  their 
religious  and  secular  leaders,  to  the  Churches,  the  great 
thinkers,  the  leaders  of  socialism;  these  living  riches, 
these  treasures  of  heroism  you  held  in  your  hands; 
for  what  are  you  squandering  them?  What  ideal  have 
you  held  up  to  the  devotion  of  these  youths  so  eager 
to  sacrifice  themselves?  Their  mutual  slaughter!  A 
European  war!  A  sacrilegious  conflict  which  shows  a 
maddened  Europe  ascending  its  funeral  pyre,  and,  like 
Hercules,  destroying  itself  with  its  own  hands! 

And  thus  the  three  greatest  nations  of  the  West,  the 
guardians  of  civilization,  rush  headlong  to  their  ruin, 
calling  in  to  their  aid  Cossacks,  Turks,  Japanese,  Cinga- 
lese, Soudanese,  Senegalese,  Moroccans,  Egyptians, 
Sikhs  and  Sepoys — barbarians  from  the  poles  and  those 
from  the  equator,  souls  and  bodies  of  all  colors.  It 
is  as  if  the  four  quarters  of  the  Roman  Empire  at  the 
time  of  the  Tetrarchy  had  called  upon  the  barbarians 
of  the  whole  universe  to  devour  each  other. 

Is  our  civilization  so  solid  that  you  do  not  fear  to 
shake  the  pillars  on  which  it  rests?  Can  you  not  see 
that  all  falls  in  upon  you  if  one  column  be  shattered? 
Could  you  not  have  learned  if  not  to  love  one  another, 

206 


at  least  to  tolerate  the  great  virtues  and  the  great  vices  of  JJe0f°7aard" 
each  other?  Was  it  not  your  duty  to  attempt — you  t»i>8mi 
have  never  attempted  it  in  sincerity — to  settle  amicably 
the  questions  which  divided  you,  the  problem  of  peoples 
annexed  against  their  will,  the  equitable  division  of  pro- 
ductive labor  and  the  riches  of  the  world?  Must  the 
stronger  forever  darken  the  others  with  the  shadow  of 
his  pride,  and  the  others  forever  unite  to  dissipate  it? 
Is  there  no  end  to  this  bloody  and  puerile  sport,  in  which 
the  partners  change  about  from  century  to  century — no 
end,  until  the  whole  of  humanity  is  exhausted  thereby? 

The  rulers  who  are  the  criminal  authors  of  these  wars 
dare  not  accept  the  responsibility  for  them.  Each  one 
by  underhand  means  seeks  to  lay  the  blame  at  the  door 
of  his  adversary.  The  peoples  who  obey  them  submis- 
sively resign  themselves  with  the  thought  that  a  power 
higher  than  mankind  has  ordered  it  thus.  Again  the 
venerable  refrain  is  heard:  "The  fatality  of  war  is 
stronger  than  our  wills."  The  old  refrain  of  the  herd 
that  makes  a  god  of  its  feebleness  and  bows  down  before 
him.  Man  has  invented  fate,  that  he  may  make  it  re- 
sponsible for  the  disorders  of  the  universe,  those  disor- 
ders which  it  was  his  duty  to  regulate.  There  is  no  fatal- 
ity! The  only  fatality  is  what  we  desire;  and  more 
often,  too,  what  we  do  not  desire  enough.  Let  each  now 
repeat  his  mea  culpa.  The  leaders  of  thought,  the 
Church,  the  Labor  Parties  did  not  desire  war  .  .  .  That 
may  be  ...  What  then  did  they  do  to  prevent  it? 
What  are  they  doing  to  put  an  end  to  it?  They  are 
stirring  up  the  bonfire,  each  one  bringing  his  fagot. 

The  most  striking  feature  in  this  monstrous  epic,  the 
fact  without  precedent,  is  the  unanimity  for  war  in  each 
of  the  nations  engaged.  An  epidemic  of  homicidal  fury, 
which  started  in  Tokio  ten  years  ago,  has  spread  like  a 
wave  and  overflowed  the  whole  world.  None  has  re- 

207 


Comei  Let  sisted  it;  no  high  thought  has  succeeded  in  keeping  out 
»*  etandi  of  the  reach  of  this  scourge.  A  sort  of  demoniacal 
irony  broods  over  this  conflict  of  the  nations,  from  which, 
whatever  its  result,  only  a  mutilated  Europe  can  emerge. 
For  it  is  not  racial  passion  alone  which  is  hurling  mil- 
lions of  men  blindly  one  against  another,  so  that  not  even 
neutral  countries  remain  free  of  the  dangerous  thrill, 
but  all  the  forces  of  the  spirit,  of  reason,  of  faith,  of 
poetry,  and  of  science,  all  have  placed  themselves  at  the 
disposal  of  the  armies  in  every  State.  There  is  not  one 
amongst  the  leaders  of  thought  in  each  country  who 
does  not  proclaim  with  conviction  that  the  cause  of  his 
people  is  the  cause  of  God,  the  cause  of  liberty  and  of 
human  progress.  And  I,  too,  proclaim  it. 

Strange  combats  are  being  waged  between  metaphy- 
sicians, poets,  historians — Eucken  against  Bergson; 
Hauptmann  against  Maeterlinck;  Holland  against 
Hauptmann;  Wells  against  Bernard  Shaw.  Kipling 
and  D'Annunzio,  Dehmel  and  de  Regnier  sing  war 
hymns,  Barres  and  Maeterlinck  chant  pseans  of  hatred. 
Between  a  fugue  of  Bach  and  the  organ  which  thunders 
Deutschland  uber  Alles,  Wundt,  the  aged  philosopher  of 
eighty-two,  calls  with  his  quavering  voice  the  students 
of  Leipzig  to  the  holy  war.  And  each  nation  hurls  at 
the  other  the  name  "  Barbarians.  ..." 

Come,  friends!  Let  us  make  a  stand!  Can  we  not 
resist  this  contagion,  whatever  its  nature  and  virulence 
be — whether  moral  epidemic  or  cosmic  force?  Do  we 
not  fight  against  the  plague,  and  strive  even  to  repair 
the  disaster  caused  by  an  earthquake  ?  Or  must  we  bow 
ourselves  before  it,  agreeing  with  Luzzatti  in  his  famous 
article  that  "In  the  universal  disaster,  the  nations 
triumph"?  Shall  we  say  with  him  that  it  is  good  and 
reasonable  that  "the  demon  of  international  war,  which 
mows  down  thousands  of  beings,  should  be  let  loose," 

208 


so  that  the  great  and  simple  truth,  "love  of  our  coun-  W1®r*r*11at 
try,"  be  understood?  It  would  seem,  then,  that  love  brothers! 
of  our  country  can  flourish  only  through  the  hatred  of 
other  countries  and  the  massacre  of  those  who  sacrifice 
themselves  in  the  defense  of  them.  There  is  in  this 
theory  a  ferocious  absurdity,  a  Neronian  dilettantism 
which  repels  me  to  the  very  depths  of  my  being.  No! 
Love  of  my  country  does  not  demand  that  I  shall  hate 
and  slay  those  noble  and  faithful  souls  who  also  love 
theirs,  but  rather  that  I  should  honor  them  and  seek 
to  unite  with  them  for  our  common  good.  .  .  . 

There  was  no  reason  for  war  between  the  "Western 
nations ;  French,  English,  and  German,  we  are  all  broth- 
ers and  do  not  hate  one  another.  The  war-preaching 
press  is  envenomed  by  a  minority,  a  minority  vitally  in- 
terested in  maintaining  these  hatreds;  but  our  peoples, 
I  know,  ask  for  peace  and  liberty  and  that  alone.  The 
real  tragedy,  to  one  situated  in  the  midst  of  the  conflict 
and  able  to  look  down  from  the  high  plateaus  of  Swit- 
zerland into  all  the  hostile  camps,  is  the  patent  fact  that 
actually  each  of  the  nations  is  being  menaced  in  its 
dearest  possessions — in  its  honor,  its  independence,  its 
life.  Who  has  brought  these  plagues  upon  them? 
-  Brought  them  to  the  desperate  alternative  of  overwhelm- 
ing their  adversary  or  dying?  None  other  than  their 
governments,  and  above  all,  in  my  opinion,  the  three 
great  culprits,  the  three  rapacious  eagles,  the  three  em- 
pires, the  tortuous  policy  of  the  house  of  Austria,  the 
ravenous  greed  of  Czarism,  the  brutality  of  Prussia. 
The  worst  enemy  of  each  nation  is  not  without,  but 
within  its  frontiers,  and  none  has  the  courage  to  fight 
against  it.  It  is  the  monster  of  a  hundred  heads,  the 
monster  named  Imperialism,  the  will  to  pride  and  dom- 
ination, which  seeks  to  absorb  all,  or  subdue  all,  or  break 
all,  and  will  suffer  no  greatness  except  itself.  For  the 

209 


Not  revenge.     Western  nations  Prussian  imperialism  is  the  most  dan- 
out  the  re-  .  . 

establishment     gerous.     Its  hand  uplifted  in  menace  against  Europe 

of  justice !  .    .       .  , ,  .  £ 

has  forced  us  to  join  in  arms  against  this  outcome  of  a 
military  and  feudal  caste,  which  is  the  curse  not  only 
of  the  rest  of  the  world  but  also  of  Germany  itself, 
whose  thought  it  has  subtly  poisoned.  We  must  destroy 
this  first:  but  not  this  alone;  the  Russian  autocracy  too 
will  have  its  turn.  Every  nation  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  has  an  imperialism  of  its  own,  and  whether  it  be 
military,  financial,  feudal,  republican,  social,  or  intel- 
lectual, it  is  always  the  octopus  sucking  the  best  blood 
of  Europe.  Let  the  free  men  of  all  the  countries  of 
Europe  when  this  war  is  over  take  up  again  the  motto 
of  Voltaire:  "Ecrasons  I'infdme!" 

When  the  war  is  over !  The  evil  is  done  now,  the  tor- 
rent let  loose  and  we  cannot  force  it  back  into  its  chan- 
nel unaided.  Moreover  crimes  have  been  committed 
against  right,  attacks  on  the  liberties  of  peoples  and  on 
the  sacred  treasuries  of  thought,  which  must  and  will 
be  expiated.  Europe  cannot  pass  over  unheeded  the  vio- 
lence done  to  the  noble  Belgian  people,  the  devastation 
of  Malines  and  Louvain,  sacked  by  modern  Tillys.  .  .  . 
But  in  the  name  of  heaven  let  not  these  crimes  be  ex- 
piated by  similar  crimes!  Let  not  the  hideous  words 
"vengeance"  and  "retaliation"  be  heard;  for  a  great 
nation  does  not  revenge  itself,  it  re-establishes  justice. 
But  let  those  in  whose  hands  lies  the  execution  of  justice 
show  themselves  worthy  of  her  to  the  end. 

It  is  our  duty  to  keep  this  before  them;  nor  will  we 
be  passive  and  wait  for  the  fury  of  this  conflict  to  spend 
itself.  Such  conduct  would  be  unworthy  of  us  who 
have  such  a  task  before  us.  ... 

The  neutral  countries  are  too  much  effaced.  Con- 
fronted by  unbridled  force  they  are  inclined  to  believe 
that  opinion  is  defeated  in  advance,  and  the  majority 

210 


of  thinkers  in  all  countries  share  their  pessimism.  There 
is  a  lack  of  courage  here  as  well  as  of  clear  thinking,  humanity  i 
For  just  at  this  time  the  power  of  opinion  is  immense. 
The  most  despotic  of  governments,  even  though  marching 
to  victory,  trembles  before  public  opinion  and  seeks  to 
court  it.  Nothing  shows  this  more  clearly  than  the  ef- 
forts of  both  parties  engaged  in  war,  of  their  ministers, 
chancellors,  sovereigns,  of  the  Kaiser  himself  turned 
journalist,  to  justify  their  own  crimes,  and  denounce  the 
crimes  of  their  adversary  at  the  invisible  tribunal  of  hu- 
manity. Let  this  invisible  tribunal  be  seen  at  last,  let 
us  venture  to  constitute  it.  Ye  know  not  your  moral 
power,  0  ye  of  little  faith !  If  there  be  a  risk,  will  you 
not  take  it  for  the  honor  of  humanity?  What  is  the 
value  of  life  when  you  have  saved  it  at  the  price  of  all 
that  is  worth  living  for?  .  .  . 

Et  propter  vitam,  vivendi  perdere  causas.  .  .  . 

But  for  us,  the  artists  and  poets,  priests  and  thinkers 
of  all  countries,  remains  another  task.  Even  in  time  of 
war  it  remains  a  crime  for  finer  spirits  to  compromise 
the  integrity  of  their  thought;  it  is  shameful  to  see  it 
serving  the  passion  of  a  puerile,  monstrous  policy  of  race, 
a  policy  scientifically  absurd — since  no  country  possesses 
a  race  wholly  pure.  Such  a  policy,  as  Renan  points  out 
in  his  beautiful  letter  to  Strauss,  "can  only  lead  to  zoo- 
logical wars,  wars  of  extermination,  similar  to  those  in 
which  various  species  of  rodents  and  carnivorous  beasts 
fight  for  their  existence.  This  would  ~be  the  end  of  that 
fertile  admixture  called  humanity,  composed  as  it  is  of 
such  various  necessary  elements."  Humanity  is  a 
symphony  of  great  collective  souls;  and  he  who  under- 
stands and  loves  it  only  by  destroying  a  part  of  those 
elements,  proves  himself  a  barbarian  and  shows  his  idea 
of  harmony  to  be  no  better  than  the  idea  of  order  an- 
other held  in  Warsaw. 

211 


m  o/ theuc?ty  •^or  *^e  ^ner  spirit-8  °^  Europe  there  are  two  dwelling- 
of  Godi  places:  our  earthly  fatherland,  and  that  other  City  of 

God.  Of  the  one  we  are  the  guests,  of  the  other  the 
builders.  To  the  one  let  us  give  our  lives  and  our  faith- 
ful hearts;  but  neither  family,  friend,  nor  fatherland, 
nor  aught  that  we  love  has  power  over  the  spirit.  The 
spirit  is  the  light.  It  is  our  duty  to  lift  it  above  tem- 
pests, and  thrust  aside  the  clouds  which  threaten  to  ob- 
scure it;  to  build  higher  and  stronger,  dominating  the 
injustice  and  hatred  of  nations,  the  walls  of  that  city 
wherein  the  souls  of  the  whole  world  may  assemble. 

I  feel  here  how  the  generous  heart  of  Switzerland 
is  thrilled,  divided  between  sympathies  for  the  various 
nations,  and  lamenting  that  it  cannot  choose  freely  be- 
tween them,  nor  even  express  them.  I  understand  its 
torment ;  but  I  know  that  this  is  salutary.  I  hope  it  will 
rise  thence  to  that  superior  joy  of  a  harmony  of  races, 
which  may  be  a  noble  example  for  the  rest  of  Europe. 
It  is  the  duty  of  Switzerland  now  to  stand  in  the  midst 
of  the  tempest,  like  an  island  of  justice  and  of  peace, 
where,  as  in  the  great  monasteries  of  the  early  Middle 
Ages,  the  spirit  may  find  a  refuge  from  unbridled  force ; 
where  the  fainting  swimmers  of  all  nations,  those  who 
are  weary  of  hatred,  may  persist,  in  spite  of  all  the 
wrongs  they  have  seen  and  suffered,  in  loving  all  men 
as  their  brothers. 

I  know  that  such  thoughts  have  little  chance  of  being 
heard  to-day.  Young  Europe,  burning  with  the  fever  of 
battle,  will  smile  with  disdain  and  show  its  fangs  like  a 
young  wolf.  But  when  the  access  of  fever  has  spent  it- 
self, wounded  and  less  proud  of  its  voracious  heroism, 
it  will  come  to  itself  again. 

Moreover  I  do  not  speak  to  convince  it.  I  speak  but 
to  solace  my  conscience  .  .  .  and  I  know  that  at  the 

212 


same  time  I  shall  solace  the  hearts  of  thousands  of  others 
who,  in  all  countries,  cannot  or  dare  not  speak  them- 
selves. 

Romain  Rolland,  in  Journal  de  Geneve,  September  15, 
1914. 


213 


THE  NEW  IDEALISM 

Germany  What  wishes  may  we  have  for  the  future?     What 

lasting  tasks  and  what  prospects  does  the  New  Year  unroll  be- 


peace.  jore  Ug9    Naturally,  our  first  wish  is  for  a  decisive  vic- 

tory, —  a  victory  which  will  bring  us  an  honorable  peace. 
A  discussion  of  how  the  conditions  of  peace  should  be 
drawn  up  seems  to  us  premature,  in  fact  it  runs  coun- 
ter to  our  feeling;  for  we  are  still  too  much  under  the 
tension  and  excitement  of  the  fight  to  pursue  such 
thoughts.  However,  it  may  be  said  that  the  German 
people  unanimously  desire  a  settlement  which  will  guar- 
antee a  lasting  peace  and  which  will  prevent  further 
wars.  Moreover,  the  wish  is  general  that,  when  it  is 
time  for  peace  negotiations,  not  only  professional  diplo- 
mats, but  also  representatives  of  the  various  professions 
and  industries  shall  be  consulted.  Just  as  war  is  an 
affair  of  the  whole  people,  so,  in  its  conclusion,  the  voice 
of  the  whole  people  should  have  due  weight. 

Closely  bound  up  with  the  desire  for  an  honorable 
peace  is  the  hope  that  the  mighty  spiritual  movement, 
which  the  war  has  called  forth,  may  continue  to  influ- 
ence German  life  after  the  war.  This  war  must  be  the 
starting-point  of  a  new  epoch.  The  tremendous  sacri- 
fices which  it  entails  will  be  justified  only  in  case  new 
life  comes  forth  out  of  loss  and  death  and  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  moment  are  transformed  into  permanent 
gain.  In  this  connection  we  think,  first  of  all,  of  the 
wonderful  consciousness  of  unity  which  the  war  has 

214 


awakened.  The  long  history  of  the  German  people  fur-  £*£.£"**. 
nishes  no  counterpart  of  such  a  unity  of  sentiment  as  orated  after 
we  enjoy  to-day.  We  must  now  see  to  it  that  this 
unanimity  of  purpose  is  deeply  implanted  in  German 
life.  Since,  through  common  effort,  so  much  has  been 
accomplished  during  the  war,  when  peace  has  been  re- 
established, no  one  should  be  prevented  from  cooperat- 
ing in  the  solution  of  our  common  tasks.  In  the  fu- 
ture there  should  be  no  discrimination  on  account  of 
political  partisanship,  whether  in  the  pursuit  of  a  pro- 
fession or  in  the  holding  of  a  public  office. 

But  especially  must  we  hope  that  the  sense  of  belong- 
ing together,  the  sense  of  being  dependent  on  each 
other,  the  sense  of  being  under  obligation  to  each  other 
will  persist  beyond  the  war  into  peace.  It  is,  however, 
not  only  for  the  feelings  of  the  individuals,  but  also  for 
our  national  life,  that  we  should  seek  to  win  lasting 
gain  from  the  storms  of  the  present.  All  the  earnest- 
ness and  all  the  mighty  force,  which  we  have  now  ex- 
erted, must  be  used  in  an  energetic  fight  against  all  that 
has  threatened  to  lower  our  standards  of  life. 

Such  a  reinvigoration  of  German  idealism  parallels 
a  similar  movement  which  has  spread  throughout  the 
whole  of  humanity.  Old  forms  of  life  have  often  been 
found  too  narrow;  they  have,  moreover,  frequently  lost 
their  basis  in  our  minds.  Therefore,  the  position  of  man 
in  the  universe  has  seemed  obscure  and  the  purpose  of 
his  life  has  become!  very  uncertain.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  now  awakens  a  deep  longing  for  the  restrengthen- 
ing,  deepening  and  inner  renewal  of  life. 

As  Germans,  we  must  consider  our  attitude  towards 
the  world  of  as  much  importance  as  our  attitude  to- 
wards ourselves.  We  must  not  allow  ourselves  to  in- 
dulge in  a  narrow  national  life.  We  must  not,  and  shall 
not,  have  a  false  racial  pride.  On  the  contrary,  we  must 

215 


ceaselessly  broaden  our  lives,  steadily  preserving  our 
narrowly  inter-relations  with  all  mankind.  Our  great  nation  can- 
not attain  its  proper  level  without  keeping  the  whole  of 
humanity  in  mind.  We  wish  to  think  highly  enough  of 
ourselves  to  believe  that  we  are  capable  of  drawing  to 
ourselves  everything  great  and  good,  that  has  arisen  or 
shall  arise  anywhere,  so  that  we  may  use  it  in  building 
up  the  ethical  civilization  (Wesenkultur)  which  our 
nature  demands. 

Rudolf  Eucken,  "German  Thoughts  and  Wishes  for 
the  New  Year,  1915." 


216 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM 

There  is  another  way  of  looking  at  this  matter  which  f  Ve't 
will  appeal  to  those  who  are  speculating  upon  the  fu-  what  seems 

£  ,  .      ,          .  .  .     ,1  •    i          v  .1  •      secure  and 

ture  oi  mankind.    Any  one  who  thinks  about  the  possi-  protecting, 
bility  of  a  world  state  is  stopped  to-day  by  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  world  patriotism  to  support  it.     How  are 
we  to  transfer  allegiance  from  the  national  to  the  inter- 
national State? 

The  answer  depends  upon  an  analysis  of  nationality. 
I  have  described  it  as  a  retreat  to  the  authority  and 
flavor  of  our  earliest  associations,  as  a  defensive-offen- 
sive reaction  to  what  seems  to  us  secure.  Our  loyalty 
turns  to  what  we  associate  with  our  protection  and  our 
ambitions.  The  reason  we  are  not  loyal  to  mankind  in 
general  or  to  The  Hague  or  to  internationalism  is  that 
these  conceptions  are  cold  and  abstract  beside  the 
warmth  of  the  country  and  place  where  we  were  born. 
Impressed  by  the  fear  of  Russian  invasion,  the  interna- 
tionalism of  German  socialists  vanished.  International- 
ism offered  no  protection.  The  German  army  did.  To 
be  a  German  was  to  be  part  of  a  tangible  group  with 
power;  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  world  was  to  be  homeless 
everywhere. 

And  yet  we  find  Canadians  and  Australians  and  New 
Zealanders  fighting  and  dying  for  a  thing  called  the 
British  Empire,  a  vague,  formless  organization  of  one- 
quarter  of  the  human  race.  What  is  it  that  has  pro- 
duced this  super-national  patriotism?  Nothing  less,  it 

217 


Patriotism        seems  to  me.  than  a  realization  that  the  protection  and 

cries  to-day  »  T-*        •     •  .  T  .  , 

for  ex-  growth  or  the  Dominions  is  bound  up  with  the  strength 

of  the  Empire.  Home  is  the  place  where  you  are  safe ; 
loyalty  reaches  back  to  the  source  of  your  security.  That 
is  why  danger  has  welded  the  British  Empire  instead  of 
disintegrating  it. 

Imagine  the  Empire  shattered,  its  navy  gone,  and 
the  Dominions  left  to  fetch  for  themselves.  What  would 
Canada  and  Australia  do  ?  They  would,  it  seems  to  me, 
develop  a  great  loypHy  to  the  United  States.  They 
would  not  face  the  world  alone.  They  would  have  to 
find  some  larger  political  organization  in  which  they 
could  feel  secure. 

In  other  words,  loyalty  overflows  the  national  State 
because  in  the  world  to-day  the  national  State  is  no 
longer  a  sufficient  protection.  People  have  got  to  a 
point  in  their  development  where  isolation  terrifies 
them.  They  want  to  be  members  of  a  stronger  group. 
In  Europe  they  turned  to  a  system  of  alliances  because 
no  nation  dared  to  stand  alone.  We  have  turned  in 
this  country  in  part  to  an  understanding  with  Great 
Britain,  in  part  to  the  Latin-American  States.  All  of 
which  proves  that  patriotism  is  not  a  fixed  quantity,  that 
it  is  not  attached  to  the  map  as  it  was  drawn  when  we 
were  at  school,  and  that  it  is  not  only  capable  of  expan- 
sion, but  is  crying  for  it. 

Fear  has  almost  always  played  a  large  part  in  weld- 
ing States  together.  The  fear  of  England  was  a  great 
argument  for  federal  union  under  our  Constitution ;  the 
sense  of  weakness  in  the  presence  of  unfriendly  neigh- 
bors undoubtedly  helped  to  break  down  the  separatism 
of  the  little  German  principalities.  Just  as  the  ap- 
pearance of  an  enemy  tends  to  blot  out  political  differ- 
ences within  a  nation,  so  it  will  often  unite  a  number 
of  nations.  The  rise  of  Germany  had  that  effect  on 

218 


the  Great  Powers  of  Europe;  the  fear  of  her  created  a 

league  almost  coextensive  with  western  civilization.     It  the  basis  of 

loyalty. 

covered  up  the  feud  between  France  and  England  which 
comes  down  through  the  centuries;  it  jolted  together  an 
understanding  with  Russia,  the  great  bogy  of  liberals. 

It  is  not  pleasant  to  think  of  fear  as  one  of  the  most 
powerful  forces  that  unify  mankind.  It  would  be  more 
gratifying  to  think  that  cooperation  was  always  spon- 
taneous and  free.  But  the  facts  will  not  justify  this 
belief.  The  inner  impulse  to  compose  differences  seems 
often  to  work  most  actively  when  there  is  pressure  from 
without.  Forced  by  danger  to  cooperate,  men  seem  to 
discover  the  advantages  of  cooperation.  The  Germans 
are  daily  discovering  good  qualities  in  the  Turks;  the 
British  are  seeing  deeper  into  the  souls  of  Russians.  .  .  . 

The  only  way  in  which,  world  organization  can  com- 
mand a  world  patriotism  is  by  proving  its  usefulness. 
If  it  affords  a  protection  and  produces  a  prosperity  such 
as  the  national  State  cannot  produce,  it  will  begin  to 
draw  upon  the  emotions  of  men.  If  they  are  capable 
of  loving  anything  so  abstract  and  complicated  as  the 
British  Empire,  or  even  the  United  States,  they  are  not 
incapable  of  attaching  themselves  to  a  still  larger  State. 
For  the  moment  it  was  evident  that  patriotism  could 
embrace  something  more  extensive  and  abstract  than  a 
village  which  a  man  might  know  personally,  world  or- 
ganization ceased  to  be  an  idle  dream.  If  men  could  be 
citizens  of  an  empire  scattered  over  all  the  seas,  there 
was  no  longer  anything  inconceivable  about  their  be- 
coming citizens  of  a  State  which  covered  modern  civili- 
zation. The  idea  has  ceased  to  be  a  psychological  im- 
possibility. 

Our  problem  is  to  broaden  the  basis  of  loyalty.  And 
for  that  task  we  have  considerable  experience  to  guide 
us.  Within  a  hundred  and  twenty-five  years  we  have 

219 


win  not  seen  *ke  welding  together  of  the  United  States,  Germany, 

stop  at  Italy,  and  Austria-Hungary.    We  have  seen  small  rival 

frontiers.  States  converted  into  members  of  federal  unions.  We 
have  watched  patriotism  expand  from  the  local  unit  to 
the  larger  one.  We  have  seen  Massachusetts  patriots 
converted  into  American  patriots,  Bavarians  into  Ger- 
mans, Venetians  into  Italians.  In  the  last  few  years  we 
have  been  witnessing  the  growth  of  an  imperial  patriot- 
ism within  the  British  Empire. 

There  is,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  not  the  least  ground 
for  supposing  that  the  broadening  of  loyalty  must  stop 
at  the  existing  frontiers.  The  task  of  the  great  unifi- 
ers, like  Hamilton,  Cavour,  and  Bismarck,  looked  just 
as  difficult  in  their  day  as  ours  does  now.  They  had 
States'  rights,  sovereignty,  traditional  jealousy,  and 
economic  conflicts  to  overcome.  They  conquered  them. 
Who  dares  to  say  that  we  must  fail  ?  .  .  . 

Loyalty  is  a  fluctuating  force,  not  attached  by  any 
necessity  to  some  one  spot  on  the  map  or  contained 
within  some  precise  frontier.  Loyalty  seeks  an  author- 
ity to  which  it  can  be  loyal,  and  when  it  finds  an  au- 
thority which  gives  security  and  progress  and  opportu- 
nity it  fastens  itself  there.  The  problem  of  world  or- 
ganization is  to  attach  enough  loyalty  to  the  immature 
World  State  to  enable  it  to  weather  the  inevitable  at- 
tacks. 

Walter  Lippmann,  "The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,"  pp. 
172-188. 


220 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CIVILIZATION 

What  hopes  dare  we  cherish,  in  this  hour  of  conflict, 
for  the  future  of  civilization  ?  the  sphere 

The  great,  the  supreme  task  of  human  politics  and 
statesmanship  is  to  extend  the  sphere  of  Law.  Let 
others  labor  to  make  men  cultured  or  virtuous  or  happy. 
These  are  the  tasks  of  the  teacher,  the  priest,  and  the 
common  man.  The  statesman 's  task  is  simpler.  It  is  to 
enfold  them  in  a  jurisdiction  which  will  enable  them  to 
live  the  life  of  their  soul's  choice.  The  State,  said  the 
Greek  philosophers,  is  the  foundation  of  the  good  life; 
but  its  crown  rises  far  above  mere  citizenship.  "There 
where  the  State  ends, ' '  cries  Nietzsche,  echoing  Aristotle 
and  the  great  tradition  of  civilized  political  thought, 
"there  men  begin.  There,  where  the  State  ends,  look 
thither,  my  brothers!  Do  you  not  see  the  rainbow  and 
the  bridge  to  the  Overman?"  Ever  since  organized  so- 
ciety began,  the  standards  of  the  individual,  the  ideals 
of  priest  and  teacher,  the  doctrines  of  religion  and  moral- 
ity, have  outstripped  the  practise  of  statesmanship.  For 
the  polestar  of  the  statesman  has  not  been  love,  but  law. 
His  not  the  task  of  exhorting  men  to  love  one  another, 
but  the  simpler  duty  of  enforcing  the  law,  ' '  Thou  shalt 
not  kill. ' '  And  in  that  simple,  strenuous,  necessary  task 
statesmen  and  political  thinkers  have  watched  the  slow 
extension  of  the  power  of  Law,  from  the  family  to  the 
tribe,  from  the  tribe  to  the  city,  from  the  city  to  the 
nation,  from  the  nation  to  the  Commonwealth.  When 

221 


The  World        w{\\  Law  take  its  next  extension?     When  will  warfare, 

u  already 

one  great  which  is  murder  between  individuals  and  "rebellion" 
between  groups  of  citizens,  be  equally  preventable  be- 
tween nations  by  the  common  law  of  the  world  ? 

The  answer  is  simple.  When  the  world  has  a  common 
will,  and  has  created  a  common  government  to  express 
and  enforce  that  will. 

In  the  sphere  of  science  and  invention,  of  industry 
and  economics,  as  Norman  Angell  and  others  have  taught 
us,  the  world  is  already  one  Great  Society.  For  the 
merchant,  the  banker,  and  the  stockbroker  political  fron- 
tiers have  been  broken  down.  Trade  and  industry  re- 
spond to  the  reactions  of  a  single,  world-wide,  nervous 
system.  Shocks  and  panics  pass  as  freely  as  airmen  over 
borders  and  custom-houses.  And  not  "big  business" 
only,  but  the  humblest  citizen,  in  his  search  for  a  liveli- 
hood, finds  himself  caught  in  the  meshes  of  the  same 
world-wide  network.  "The  widow  who  takes  in  wash- 
ing," says  Graham  Wallas,  in  his  deep  and  searching 
analysis  of  our  contemporary  life,  "fails  or  succeeds  ac- 
cording to  her  skill  in  choosing  starch  or  soda  or  a  wring- 
ing machine  under  the  influence  of  half  a  dozen  compet- 
ing world-schemes  of  advertisement.  .  .  .  The  English 
factory  girl  who  is  urged  to  join  her  Union,  the  tired 
old  Scotch  gatekeeper  with  a  few  pounds  to  invest,  the 
Galieian  peasant  when  the  emigration  agent  calls,  the 
artisan  in  a  French  provincial  town  whose  industry  is 
threatened  by  a  new  invention,  all  know  that  unless  they 
find  their  way  among  world-wide  facts,  which  only  reach 
them  through  misleading  words,  they  will  be  crushed." 
The  Industrial  Revolution  of  the  past  century,  steam- 
power  and  electricity,  the  railway  and  the  telegraph, 
have  knit  mankind  together,  and  made  the  world  one 
place. 

But  this  new  Great  Society  is  as  yet  formless  and  in- 
222 


articulate.  It  is  not  only  devoid  of  common  leadership 
and  a  common  government ;  it  lacks  even  the  beginnings  ^™°|} 
of  a  common  will,  a  common  emotion,  and  a  common  emotion, 
consciousness.  Of  the  Great  Society,  consciously  or  un- 
consciously, we  must  all  perforce  be  members ;  but  of  the 
Great  State,  the  great  World-Commonwealth,  we  do  not 
yet  discern  the  rudiments.  The  economic  organization 
of  the  world  has  outstripped  the  development  of  its  citi- 
zenship and  government — the  economic  man,  with  his 
far-sighted  vision  and  scientific  control  of  the  resources 
of  the  world,  must  sit  by  and  see  the  work  of  his  hands 
laid  in  ashes  by  contending  governments  and  peoples. 
No  man  can  say  how  many  generations  must  pass  before 
the  platitudes  of  the  market  and  the  exchange  pass  into 
the  current  language  of  politics. 

In  the  great  work  which  lies  before  the  statesmen  and 
peoples  of  the  world  for  the  extension  of  law  and  com- 
mon citizenship  and  prevention  of  war  there  are  two 
parallel  lines  of  advance. 

One  road  lies  through  the  development  of  what  is 
known  as  International,  but  should  more  properly  be 
called  Inter-State  Law,  through  the  revival,  on  a  firmer 
and  broader  foundation,  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  con- 
ceived by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  just  a  hundred  years 
ago — itself  a  revival,  on  a  secular  basis,  of  the  great 
medieval  ideal  of  an  international  Christendom,  held  to- 
gether by  Christian  Law  and  Christian  ideals.  That 
ideal  faded  away  forever  at  the  Reformation,  which 
grouped  Europe  into  independent  sovereign  States  ruled 
by  men  responsible  to  no  one  outside  their  own  borders. 
It  will  never  be  revived  on  an  ecclesiastical  basis.  Can 
we  hope  for  its  revival  on  a  basis  of  modern  democracy, 
modern  nationality,  and  modern  educated  public  opin- 
ion? Can  Inter-State  Law,  hitherto  a  mere  shadow  of 
the  majestic  name  it  bears,  almost  a  matter  of  conven- 

223 


The  ideal 
of  Inter- 
State  Law 
must    be 
revived. 


tion  and  etiquette,  with  no  permanent  tribunal  to  inter- 
pret it,  and  no  government  to  enforce  it,  be  enthroned 
with  the  necessary  powers  to  maintain  justice  between 
the  peoples  and  governments  of  the  world? 

Such  a  Law  the  statesmen  of  Great  Britain  and  Rus- 
sia sought  to  impose  on  Europe  in  1815,  to  maintain  a 
state  of  affairs  which  history  has  shown  to  have  been  in- 
tolerable to  the  European  peoples.  There  are  those  who 
hope  that  the  task  can  be  resumed,  on  a  better  basis,  at 
the  next  Congress.  ' '  Shall  we  try  again, ' '  writes  Profes- 
sor Gilbert  Murray,  "to  achieve  Castlereagh 's  and  Alex- 
ander's ideal  of  a  permanent  Concert,  pledged  to  make 
collective  war  upon  the  peace-breaker?  Surely  we  must. 
We  must,  at  all  cost  and  in  spite  of  all  difficulties,  because 
the  alternative  means  such  unspeakable  failure.  We 
must  learn  to  agree,  we  civilized  nations  of  Europe,  or 
else  we  must  perish.  I  believe  that  the  chief  counsel  of 
wisdom  here  is  to  be  sure  to  go  far  enough.  We  need  a 
permanent  Concert,  perhaps  a  permanent  Common  Coun- 
cil, in  which  every  awkward  problem  can  be  dealt  with 
before  it  has  time  to  grow  dangerous,  and  in  which  out- 
voted minorities  must  accustom  themselves  to  giving 
way." 

Other  utterances  by  public  men,  such  as  Mr.  Roose- 
velt and  our  own  Prime  Minister,  might  be  cited  in  the 
same  sense ;  but  Professor  Murray 's  has  been  chosen  be- 
cause he  has  the  courage  to  grasp  the  nettle.  In  his 
words  the  true  position  is  quite  clearly  set  forth.  If  In- 
ter-State Law  is  to  become  a  reality  we  must  "be  sure  to 
go  far  enough."  There  is  no  half-way  house  between 
Law  and  no  Law,  between  Government  and  no  Govern- 
ment, between  Responsibility  and  no  Responsibility. 
If  the  new  Concert  is  to  be  effective  it  must  be  able  to 
compel  the  submission  of  all  "awkward  problems"  and 
causes  of  quarrel  to  its  permanent  Tribunal  at  The  Hague 

224 


or  elsewhere ;  and  it  must  be  able  to  enforce  the  decision 
of  its  tribunal,  employing  for  the  purpose,  if  necessary,  on  Law- 
the  armed  forces  of  the  signatory  Powers  as  an  inter- 
national police.  "Outvoted  minorities  must  accustom 
themselves  to  giving  way."  It  is  a  bland  and  easy 
phrase ;  but  it  involves  the  whole  question  of  world-gov- 
ernment. "Men  must  accustom  themselves  not  to  de- 
mand an  eye  for  an  eye  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,"  the 
earliest  law-givers  might  have  said,  when  the  State  first 
intervened  between  individuals  to  make  itself  responsible 
for  public  order.  Peace  between  the  Powers,  as  between 
individuals,  is,  no  doubt,  a  habit  to  which  cantankerous 
Powers  "must  accustom  themselves."  But  they  will  be 
sure  to  do  so  if  there  is  a  Law,  armed  with  the  force  to 
be  their  schoolmaster  towards  peaceable  habits.  In  other 
words,  they  will  do  so  because  they  have  surrendered  one 
of  the  most  vital  elements  in  the  independent  life  of  a 
State — the  right  of  conducting  its  own  policy — to  the 
jurisdiction  of  a  higher  Power.  An  Inter-State  Concert, 
with  a  Judiciary  of  its  own  and  an  army  and  navy  under 
its  own  orders,  is,  in  fact,  not  an  Inter-State  Concert  at 
all;  it  is  a  new  State:  it  is,  in  fact,  the  World-State. 
There  is  no  middle  course  between  Law  and  no  Law :  and 
the  essence  of  Statehood,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  Common 
Law.  .  .  . 

In  discussing  proposals  for  a  European  Council,  then, 
we  must  be  quite  sure  to  face  all  that  it  means.  But  let 
us  not  reject  Professor  Murray's  suggestion  off-hand  be- 
cause of  its  inherent  difficulties :  for  that  men  should  be 
discussing  such  schemes  at  all  marks  a  significant  ad- 
vance in  our  political  thought.  Only  let  us  be  quite 
clear  as  to  what  they  presuppose.  They  presuppose  the 
supremacy,  in  the  collective  mind  of  civilized  mankind, 
of  Law  over  Force,  a  definite  supremacy  of  what  may  be 
called  the  civilian  as  against  the  military  ideal,  not  in  a 

225 


W0erkmf  **  majority  of  States,  but  in  every  State  powerful  enough 
"The  Prin-  to  defy  coercion.  They  presuppose  a  world  map  defi- 
common-  nitcly  settled  on  lines  satisfactory  to  the  national  aspira- 
tions of  the  peoples.  They  presuppose  a  status  quo 
which  is  not  simply  maintained,  like  that  after  1815, 
because  it  is  a  legal  fact  and  its  disturbance  would  be 
inconvenient  to  the  existing  rulers,  but  because  it  is  in- 
herently equitable.  They  presuppose  a  similar  demo- 
cratic basis  of  citizenship  and  representation  among  the 
component  States.  They  presuppose,  lastly,  an  educated 
public  opinion  incomparably  less  selfish,  less  ignorant, 
less  unsteady,  less  materialistic,  and  less  narrowly  na- 
tional than  has  been  prevalent  hitherto.  Let  us  work 
and  hope  for  these  things:  let  us  use  our  best  efforts  to 
remove  misunderstandings  and  promote  a  sense  of  com- 
mon responsibilities  and  common  trusteeship  for  civiliza- 
tion between  the  peoples  of  all  the  various  sovereign 
States ;  but  meanwhile  let  us  work  also,  with  better  hopes 
of  immediate  if  less  ambitious  successes,  along  the  other 
parallel  road  of  advance. 

The  other  road  may  seem,  in  this  hour  of  dreams  and 
disaster,  of  extremes  of  hope  and  disillusionment,  a  long 
and  tedious  track :  it  is  the  old  slow  high  road  of  civiliza- 
tion, not  the  short  cut  across  thejields.  It  looks  forward 
to  abiding  results,  not  through  the  mechanical  coopera- 
tion of  governments,  but  through  the  growth  of  an  or- 
ganic citizenship,  through  the  education  of  the  nations 
themselves  to  a  sense  of  common  duty  and  a  common 
life.  It  looks  forward,  not  to  the  definite  establishment, 
in  our  day,  of  the  World-State,  but  only  to  the  definite 
refutation  of  the  wicked  theory  of  the  mutual  incom- 
patibility of  nations.  It  looks  forward  to  the  expression 
in  the  outward  order  of  the  world's  government  of  what 
we  may  call  "the  Principle  of  the  Commonwealth,"  of 
Lord  Acton's  great  principle  of  the  State  composed  of 

226 


free  nations,  of  the  State  as  a  living  body  which  lives  ™*rlfd. 
through  the  organic  union  and  free  activity  of  its  several  principle, 
national  members.     And  it  finds  its  immediate  field  of 
action  in  the  deepening  and  extension  of  the  obligations 
of  citizenship  among  the  peoples  of  the  great,  free,  just, 
peace-loving,  supra-national  Commonwealths  whose  pa- 
triotism has  been  built  up,  not  by  precept  and  doctrine, 
but  on  a  firm  foundation  of  older  loyalties. 

The  principle  of  the  Commonwealth  is  not  a  European 
principle:  it  is  a  world-principle.  It  does  not  proceed 
upon  the  expectation  of  a  United  States  of  Europe ;  for 
all  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  except  Austria-Hungary 
(and  some  of  the  smaller,  such  as  Holland,  Belgium,  and 
Portugal)  are  extra-European  Powers  also.  Indeed  if 
we  contract  our  view,  with  Gladstone  and  Bismarck  and 
the  statesmen  of  the  last  generation,  to  European  issues 
alone,  we  shall  be  ignoring  the  chief  political  problem  of 
our  age — the  contact  of  races  and  nations  with  wide  va- 
rieties of  social  experience  and  at  different  levels  of  civ- 
ilization. It  is  this  great  and  insistent  problem  (call  it 
the  problem  of  East  and  "West,  or  the  problem  of  the 
color-line)  in  all  its  difficult  ramifications,  political,  so- 
cial, and,  above  all,  economic,  which  makes  the  develop- 
ment of  the  principle  of  the  Commonwealth  the  most 
pressing  political  need  of  our  age.  For  the  problems 
arising  out  of  the  contact  of  races  and  nations  can  never 
be  adjusted  either  by  the  wise  action  of  individuals  or 
by  conflict  and  warfare ;  they  can  only  be  solved  by  fair 
and  deliberate  statesmanship  within  the  bosom  of  a  single 
State,  through  the  recognition  by  both  parties  of  a 
higher  claim  than  their  own  sectional  interest — the  claim 
of  a  common  citizenship  and  the  interest  of  civilization. 
It  is  here,  in  the  union  and  collaboration  of  diverse  races 
and  peoples,  that  the  principle  of  the  Commonwealth 
finds  its  peculiar  field  of  operation.  Without  this  prin- 

227 


ciple>  an^  without  its  expression,  however  imperfect,  in 


British  com-      the  British  Empire,  the  world  would  be  in  chaos  to-day. 
to°hoid'  the  We  cannot  predict  the  political  development  of  the 

pceaace.  and  various  Great  Powers  who  between  them  control  the  des- 
tinies of  civilization.  We  cannot  estimate  the  degree  or 
the  manner  in  which  France,  freed  at  last  from  nearer 
preoccupations,  will  seek  to  embody  in  her  vast  dominion 
the  great  civilizing  principles  for  which  her  republic 
stands.  We  cannot  foretell  the  issue  of  the  conflict  of 
ideas  which  has  swayed  to  and  fro  in  Russia  between  the 
British  and  the  Prussian  method  of  dealing  with  the 
problem  of  nationality.  Germany,  Italy,  Japan  —  here, 
too,  we  are  faced  by  enigmas.  One  other  great  Common- 
wealth remains  besides  the  British.  Upon  the  United 
States  already  lies  the  responsibility,  voluntarily  as- 
sumed and,  except  during  a  time  of  internal  crisis,  suc- 
cessfully discharged,  of  securing  peace  from  external 
foes  for  scores  of  millions  of  inhabitants  of  the  American 
continent.  Yet  with  the  progress  of  events  her  responsi- 
bilities must  yearly  enlarge  :  for  both  the  immigrant  na- 
tionalities within  and  the  world-problems  without  her 
borders  seem  to  summon  her  to  a  deeper  education  and  to 
wider  obligations. 

But  upon  the  vast,  ramifying,  and  inchoate  Common- 
wealth of  Great  Britain  lies  the  heaviest  responsibility. 
It  is  a  task  unequally  shared  between  those  of  her  citi- 
zens who  are  capable  of  discharging  it.  Her  task  within 
the  Commonwealth  is  to  maintain  the  common  character 
and  ideals  and  to  adjust  the  mutual  relations  of  one 
quarter  of  the  human  race.  Her  task  without  is  to 
throw  her  weight  into  the  scales  of  peace,  and  to  uphold 
and  develop  the  standard  and  validity  of  inter-State 
agreements.  It  is  a  task  which  requires,  even  at  this 
time  of  crisis,  when,  by  the  common  sentiment  of  her 
citizens,  the  real  nature  and  purpose  of  the  Common 

228 


wealth  have  become  clear  to  us,  the  active  thoughts  of  all  *£ 
political  students.  For  to  bring  home  to  all  within  her  *»«  of  Law 
borders  who  bear  rule  and  responsibility,  from  the  vil- 
lage headman  in  India  and  Nigeria,  the  Basutu  chief  and 
the  South  Sea  potentate,  to  the  public  opinion  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  self-governing  Dominions,  the  nature 
of  the  British  Commonwealth,  and  the  character  of  its 
citizenship  and  ideals,  and  to  study  how  those  ideals  may 
be  better  expressed  in  its  working  institutions  and  execu- 
tive government — that  is  a  task  to  which  the  present 
crisis  beckons  the  minds  of  British  citizens,  a  task  which 
Britain  owes  not  only  to  herself  but  to  mankind. 

Alfred  E.  Zimmern,  "The  War  and  Democracy,"  pp. 
371-382. 


229 


TOWARDS  THE  PEACE  THAT  SHALL  LAST 

War  must  At  every  stage  of  warfare  in  the  past,  men  and  women 

iikeShuman  in  all  nations  have  endeavored  to  abate  and  lessen  it. 
Their  repeated  endeavors  have  been  answered  by  re- 
peated wars,  until  the  present  war  in  Europe  completes 
the  works  of  death,  desolation,  and  tyranny. 

In  spite  of  this,  these  protests  against  war  are  des- 
tined to  succeed;  as  once  before  in  the  history  of  the 
race,  the  sentiment  of  pity,  of  respect  for  human  life, 
called  a  halt  to  senseless  slaughter. 

There  came  a  time  in  the  history  of  the  Greek  and 
Jewish  people  when  a  few  set  their  faces  against  human 
sacrifice  as  a  religious  rite  of  their  highest  faith, — bound 
up,  like  our  wars,  with  old  fealties  and  solemn  customs 
and  with  their  most  desperate  fears.  Humble  men  and 
women,  out  of  sheer  affection  for  their  kind,  revolted. 
In  face  of  persecution  and  ridicule,  they  warned  their 
countrymen  that  in  pouring  human  blood  upon  altars 
to  the  gods,  they  wrought  upon  their  kind  more  irre- 
parable wrong  than  any  evil  against  which  they  sought 
to  forefend.  Finally,  there  came  to  be  enough  people 
with  courage  and  pity  sufficient  to  carry  a  generation 
with  them;  and  human  sacrifice  became  a  thing  of  the 
past. 

It  took  the  human  race  many  centuries  to  rid  itself  of 
human  sacrifice ;  during  many  centuries  more  it  relapsed 
again  and  again  in  periods  of  national  despair.  So  have 

230 


we  fallen  back  into  warfare,  and  perhaps  will  fall  back  JjJJ *™p»o. 
again  and  again,  until  in  self-pity,  in  self-defense,  in  test  against 
self-assertion  of  the  right  of  life,  not  as  hitherto,  a  few, 
but  the  whole  people  of  the  world,  will  brook  this  thing 
no  longer. 

OUR  RIGHT   TO   PROTEST 

By  that  opportunity,  now  ours  as  never  before,  to 
weigh  the  case  against  war  and  to  draw  the  counts  from 
burning  words  spoken  by  those  who  protest  and  who  are 
of  all  peoples — we  make  single  judgment  and  complete 
indictment. 

By  that  good  fortune  which  has  placed  us  outside  the 
conflict ;  by  that  ill  fortune  by  which  the  belligerent  and 
his  rights  have  heretofore  bestrode  the  world ;  by  mine- 
strewn  channels,  and  by  international  codes  which  offer 
scant  redress — we  speak  as  people  of  a  neutral  nation. 

By  the  unemployed  of  our  water-fronts,  and  the  aug- 
mented misery  of  our  cities;  by  the  financial  depression 
which  has  curtailed  our  school  building  and  crippled  our 
works  of  good-will;  by  the  sluicing  of  human  impulse 
among  us  from  channels  of  social  development  to  the 
back-eddies  of  salvage  and  relief — we  have  a  right  to 
speak. 

By  the  hot  anger  and  civil  strife  that  we  have  known ; 
by  our  pride,  vain-glory,  and  covetousness ;  by  the  strug- 
gles we  have  made  for  national  integrity  and  defense  of 
our  hearthstones;  by  our  consciousness  that  every  in- 
stinct and  motive  and  ideal  at  work  in  this  war,  how- 
ever lofty  or  however  base,  has  had  some  counterpart  in 
our  national  history  and  our  current  life — we  can  speak 
a  common  language. 

By  that  comradeship  among  nations  which  has  made 
for  mutual  understanding;  by  those  inventions  which 
have  bound  us  in  communication  and  put  the  horrors  of 

231 


war  has  war  at  our  doors;  by  the  mechanical  contrivances  which 

blighted 

Life.  multiply  and  intensify  those  horrors;  by  the  quickening 

human  sympathies  which  have  made  us  sensitive  to  the 
hurts  of  others — we  can  speak  as  fellow-victims  of  this 
great  oppression. 

By  our  heritage  from  each  embattled  nation;  by  our 
debt  to  them  for  languages  and  faiths  and  social  institu- 
tions; for  science,  scholarship  and  invention;  by  the 
broken  and  desolated  hearts  that  will  come  to  us  when 
the  war  ends ;  by  our  kinships  and  our  unfeigned  friend- 
ships— we  can  speak  as  brothers, 

By  all  these  things,  we  hold  the  present  opportunity 
for  conscience-searching  and  constructive  action  to  be 
an,  especial  charge  upon  us;  upon  the  newcomers  among 
us  from  the  fatherlands;  and  upon  the  joint  youth  of 
all  the  peoples  of  the  two  Americas. 

WHAT    WAR    HAS    DONE    AND    IS    DOING 

Its  Blights 

War  has  brought  low  our  conception  of  the  precious- 
ness  of  human  life  as  slavery  brought  low  our  concep- 
tion of  human  liberty. 

It  has  benumbed  our  growing  sense  of  the  nurture  of 
life;  and  at  a  time  when  we  were  challenging  Reich- 
stag, Parliament,  and  Congress  with  the  needlessness  of 
infant  mortality  and  child  labor,  it  entrenches  a  million 
youths  with  cold  and  fever  and  impending  death. 

It  has  thwarted  the  chance  of  our  times  toward  the 
fulfilment  of  life,  and  scattered  like  burst  shrapnel  the 
hands  of  the  sculptors  and  the  violinists,  the  limbs  of 
the  hurdlers  and  swimmers,  the  sensitive  muscles  of  the 
mechanics  and  the  weavers,  the  throats  of  the  singers 
and  the  interpreters,  the  eyes  of  the  astronomers  and 
the  melters — every  skilled  and  prescient  part  of  the  hu- 

232 


man  body,  every  type  of  craft  and  competence  of  the  *j0£"d 
human  mind.  humanity. 

It  has  set  back  our  promptings  toward  the  conserva- 
tion of  life;  and  in  a  decade  when  England  and  France 
and  Russia,  Germany  and  Austria  and  Belgium,  have 
been  working  out  social  insurance  against  the  hazards 
of  peace,  it  throws  back  upon  the  world  an  unnumbered 
company  of  the  widowed  and  the  fatherless,  and  of  aged 
parents  left  bereft  and  destitute.  ' 

It  has  blocked  our  way  toward  the  ascent  of  life,  and 
in  a  century  wLich  has  seen  the  beginnings  of  effort  to 
upbuild  the  common  stock,  has  cut  off  from  parenthood 
the  strong,  the  courageous  and  the  high-spirited. 

Its  Injuries 

It  has  in  its  development  of  armaments,  pitted  human 
flesh  against  machinery. 

It  has  wrested  the  power  of  self-defense  from  the  hands 
of  free-men  who  wielded  lance  and  sword  and  scythe, 
and  has  set  them  as  machine-tenders  to  do  the  bidding 
of  their  masters. 

It  has  brought  strange  men  to  the  door-silk  of  peace- 
ful people ;  men  like  their  own  men,  bearing  no  grudges 
one  against  another ;  men  snatched  away  from  their  fields 
and  villages  where  their  fathers  lie  buried,  to  kill  and 
burn  and  destroy  till  this  other  people  are  driven  from 
their  homes  of  a  thousand  years  or  sit  abject  and  broken. 

It  has  stripped  farms  and  ruined  self-sustaining  com- 
munities, and  poured  into  a  bewildered  march  for  suc- 
cor, the  crippled  and  aged  and  bedridden,  the  little  chil- 
dren and  the  women  great  with  child  unborn. 

It  has  razed  the  flowing  lines  in  which  the  art  and 
aspiration  of  earlier  generations  expressed  themselves, 
and  has  thus  waged  war  upon  the  dead. 

233 


it  has  turned         ft  j^  tortured  and  twisted  the  whole  social  fabric 

effort  into  de- 
struction, of  the  living. 

It  has  burdened  our  children  and  our  children's  chil- 
dren with  a  staggering  load  of  debt. 

It  has  inundated  the  lowlands  of  the  world's  economy 
with  penury  and  suffering  unreckonable,  hopelessly  de- 
pressing standards  of  living  already  much  too  low. 

It  has  rent  and  trampled  upon  the  net-work  of  world 
cooperation  in  trade  and  craftsmanship  which  had  made 
all  men  fellow-workers. 

It  has  whetted  a  lust  among  neutral  nations  to  profit 
by  furnishing  the  means  to  prolong  its  struggles. 

It  has  blasted  our  new  internationalism  in  the  pro- 
tection of  working  women  and  children. 

It  has  distracted  our  minds  with  the  business  of  de- 
struction and  stayed  the  forward  reach  of  the  builders 
among  men. 

It  has  conscripted  physician  and  surgeon,  summoning 
them  from  research  and  the  prolongation  of  life  to  the 
patchwork  of  its  wreckage. 

It  has  sucked  into  its  blood  and  mire  our  most  recent 
conquests  over  the  elements — over  electricity,  and  air 
and  the  depths  of  ocean ;  and  has  prostituted  our  prowess 
in  engineering,  chemistry  and  technology,  to  the  service 
of  terror  and  injury. 

It  has  bent  our  achievements  in  transportation  into 
runways,  so  that  neither  volcanoes  nor  earthquakes,  nor 
the  rat-holes  of  famine,  but  only  the  plagues  can  match 
war  in  unbounded  disaster. 

Its  Wrongs 

It  has  in  its  compulsory  service  made  patriotism  a 
shell,  empty  of  liberty. 

It  has  set  up  the  military  independent  of  and  superior 
to  the  civil  power. 

234 


It  has  substituted  arbitrary  authority  and  the  morals 
of  foot-loose  men  who  escape  identity  in  the  common  uni-  intelligence, 
form,  for  the  play  of  individual  conscience,  and  that  so- 
cial pressure  which  in  household  and  village,  in  neigh- 
borhood and  State,  makes  for  individual  responsibility, 
for  decency,  and  fair  play. 

It  has  battened  on  apathy,  unintelligence  and  help- 
lessness such  as  surrender  the  judgment  and  volition  of 
nations  into  a  few  hands;  and  has  nullified  rights  and 
securities,  such  as  are  of  inestimable  value  to  the  people 
and  formidable  to  tyrants  only. 

It  has  threatened  the  results  of  a  hundred  martyr- 
doms and  revolutions,  and  put  in  jeopardy  those  free  gov- 
ernments which  make  possible  still  newer  social  con- 
quests. 

It  has  crushed  under  iron  heels  the  uprisings  of  civil- 
ization itself. 

Its  Evils 

It  has  turned  the  towers  of  art  and  science  into  new 
Babels,  so  that  our  philosophers,  and  men  of  letters, 
our  physicists  and  geographers,  our  economists  and  biolo- 
gists and  dramatists,  speak  in  strange  tongues,  and  to 
hate  each  other  has  become  a  holy  thing  among  them. 

It  has  made  were-wolves  of  neighboring  peoples,  in 
the  imaginations  of  each  other. 

It  has  put  its  stamp  upon  growing  boys  and  girls,  and 
taught  them  to  hate  other  children  who  have  chanced  to 
be  born  on  the  other  side  of  some  man-made  boundary. 

It  has  massed  and  exploded  the  causes  of  strife,  fos- 
tering religious  antagonisms  and  racial  hates,  inbreeding 
with  the  ugliest  strains  of  commercialism,  perverting  to 
its  purposes  the  increase  of  over-dense  populations  and 
their  natural  yearning  for  new  opportunities  for  enter- 
prise and  livelihood. 

235 


we  must  join         ft  fc^  not  Only  shattered  men's  breasts,  but  loosened 

m  throwing  "  ' 

off  this  the  black  fury  of  their  hearts;  so  that  in  rape,  and 

cruelty,  and  rage,  we  have  ancient  brutishness  trailing 
at  the  heels  of  all  armies. 

It  has  found  a  world  of  friends  and  neighbors,  and 
substituted  a  world  of  outlanders  and  aliens  and  enemies. 

It  has  lessened  the  number  of  those  who  feel  the  joys 
and  sorrows  of  all  peoples  as  of  their  own. 

It  has  strangled  truth  and  paralyzed  the  power  and 
wish  to  face  it,  and  has  set  up  monstrous  and  irreconcil- 
able myths  of  self -justification. 

It  has  mutilated  the  human  spirit. 

It  has  become  a  thing  which  passeth  all  understanding. 

STRIKING   HANDS 

We  have  heard  the  call  from  overseas  of  those  who 
have  appealed  to  men  and  women  of  good-will  in  all 
nations  to  join  with  them  in  throwing  off  this  tyranny 
upon  life. 

We  must  go  further;  we  must  throw  open  a  peace 
which  shall  be  other  than  a  shadow  of  old  wars  and  a 
prelude  to  new.  We  do  more  than  plead  with  men  to 
stay  their  hands  from  killing.  We  hail  living  men.  As 
peace-lovers,  we  are  charged,  with  the  sanctity  of  human 
life;  as  democrats  and  freemen  we  are  charged  with  its 
sovereignty. 

By  the  eight  million  natives  of  the  warring  States  liv- 
ing among  us  without  malice  or  assault  one  upon  an- 
other, let  us  leave  the  occasions  of  fighting  no  longer  for 
idle  war  boards  to  decide. 

By  the  blow  our  forebears  struck  at  barbarism  when 
they  took  vengeance  out  of  private  hands,  let  us  wrest 
the  manufacture  of  armaments  and  deadly  weapons  from 
the  gun-mongers  and  powder-makers  who  gain  by  it. 

By  those  electric  currents  that  have  cut  the  ground 
236 


from  under  the  old  service  of  diplomacy,  and  spread  the 

new  intelligence,  let  us  put  the  ban  upon  intrigue  and  the  nations. 

secret  treaties. 

For  we  hold  that  not  soldiers,  nor  profit-takers,  nor 
diplomats,  but  the  people  who  suffer  and  bear  the  brunt 
of  war  should  determine  whether  war  must  be ;  that  with 
ample  time  for  investigation  and  publicity  of  its  every 
cause  and  meaning,  with  recourse  to  every  avenue  for 
mediation  and  settlement  abroad,  war  should  come  only 
by  the  slow  process  of  self -willing  among  men  and  women 
who  solemnly  publish  and  declare  it  to  be  a  last  and  sole 
resort. 

With  our  treated  borderland,  3000  miles  in  length 
without  fort  or  trench  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pa- 
cific, which  has  helped  weld  us  for  a  century  of  unbroken 
peace  with  our  neighbors  to  the  north,  we  would  spread 
faith  not  in  entrenched  camps  but  in  open  boundaries. 

With  the  pacts  of  our  written  constitutions  before  us 
which  bind  our  own  sovereign  States  in  amity,  we  are 
convinced  that  treaty-making  may  be  lifted  to  a  new  and 
inviolable  estate,  and  lay  the  foundations  for  that  world 
organization  which  for  all  time  shall  make  for  peace  upon 
earth  and  good-will  among  men. 

With  our  experience  in  lesser  conflicts  in  industrial 
life,  which  have  none  the  less  embraced  groups  as  large 
as  armies,  have  torn  passions  and  rasped  endurance  to 
the  uttermost,  we  can  bear  testimony  that  at  the  end  of 
such  strife  as  cleaves  to  the  heart  of  things,  men  are 
disposed  to  lay  the  framework  of  their  relations  in  larger 
molds  than  those  which  broke  beneath  them. 

With  our  ninety  million  people  drawn  from  Alpine 
and  Mediterranean,  Danubean,  Baltic,  and  Slavic  stocks ; 
with  a  culture  blended  from  these  different  affluents, 
we  hold  that  progress  lies  in  the  predominance  of  none ; 
and  that  the  civilization  of  each  nation  needs  to  be  re- 

237 


Waed  throu  h      freshed  by  that  cross-breeding  with  the  genius  and  the 

type  of  other  human  groups,  that  blending  which  began 

th^war1          on  the  coast  lands  and  islands  of  the  JEgean  Sea  where 

European  civilization  first  drew  its  sources  from  the 

Euphrates  and  the  Nile. 

With  memories  of  the  tyranny  which  provoked  our 
Revolution,  with  the  travail  still  upon  us  by  which  we  in 
our  turn  have  paid  for  the  enslavement  of  a  people,  with 
the  bitterness  only  now  assuaged  which  marked  our  pe- 
riod of  mistrust  and  reconstruction,  we  bear  witness  that 
boundaries  should  be  set  where  not  force,  but  justice  and 
consanguinity  direct;  and  that,  however  boundaries  fall, 
liberty  and  the  flowering-out  of  native  cultures  should 
be  secure. 

With  our  fair  challenge  to  the  spirit  of  the  East  and 
to  the  chivalry  of  the  West  in  standing  for  the  open  door 
in  China  when  that  Empire,  now  turned  Republic,  was 
threatened  by  dismemberment,  we  call  for  the  freeing  of 
the  ports  of  every  ocean  from  special  privilege  based  on 
territorial  claims,  throwing  them  open  with  equal  chance 
to  all  who  by  their  ability  and  energy  can  serve  new 
regions  to  their  mutual  benefit. 

With  the  faith  we  have  kept  with  Cuba,  the  regard 
we  have  shown  for  the  integrity  of  Mexico  and  our 
preparations  for  the  independence  of  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands, we  urge  the  framing  of  a  common  colonial  policy 
which  shall  put  down  that  predatory  exploitation  which 
has  embroiled  the  West  and  oppressed  the  East  and  shall 
stand  for  an  opportunity  for  each  latent  and  backward 
race  to  build  up  according  to  its  own  genius. 

By  our  full  century  of  ruthless  waste  of  forest,  ore 
and  fuel;  by  the  vision  which  has  come  to  us  in  these 
latter  days  of  conserving  to  the  permanent  uses  of  the 
people,  the  water  power  and  natural  wealth  of  our  public 

238 


domain,   we  propose  the  laying  down  of  a  planetary 
policy  of  conservation. 

By  that  tedium  and  monotony  of  life  and  labor  for 
vast  companies  of  people,  which  when  war  drums  sound, 
goads  the  field  worker  to  forsake  his  harvest  and  the 
wage-earner  to  leap  from  his  bench,  we  hold  that  the 
ways  of  peace  should  be  so  cast  as  to  make  stirring  ap- 
peal to  the  heroic  qualities  in  men,  and  give  common  ut- 
terance to  the  rhythm  and  beauty  of  national  feeling. 

By  the  joy  of  our  people  in  the  conquest  of  a  conti- 
nent ;  by  the  rousing  of  all  Europe,  when  the  great  navi- 
gators threw  open  the  new  Indies  and  the  New  World, 
we  stand  for  such  a  scheming-out  of  our  joint  existence 
that  the  achieving  instincts  among  men,  not  as  one  na- 
tion against  another,  nor  as  one  class  against  another, 
but  as  one  generation  after  another,  shall  have  freedom 
to  come  into  their  own. 

Jane  Addams, 
Lillian  Wald, 
Paul  U.  Kellogg. 


239 


APPENDIX 
PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 

1.  INTERNATIONAL 

NEUTRAL  CONFERENCE  FOR  CONTINUOUS  MEDIATION, 
STOCKHOLM 

To  the  Governments,  Parliaments  and  Peoples  of  the 
Warring  Nations: 

A  conference  composed  of  delegates  from  six  neutral  Ford  Neutral 

"  Conference  at 

countries — Denmark,  Holland,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzer-  Stockholm, 
land  and  the  United  States — has  been  convened  at  Stock- 
holm upon  the  initiative  of  Henry  Ford  to  work  for  the 
achievement  of  an  early  and  lasting  peace,  based  upon 
principles  of  justice  and  humanity.  This  conference 
represents  no  government.  It  has  no  official  sanction. 
It  represents  the  good  will  of  millions  throughout  the 
civilized  world  who  cannot  stand  idly  by  while  the  deadly 
combat  rages  unchecked.  It  does  not  attempt  to  im- 
pose its  judgment  upon  the  belligerents,  but  its  mem- 
bers, as  private  individuals,  unhampered  by  considera- 
tions which  restrain  governments,  have  resolved  to  do 
everything  within  their  power  to  promote  such  discus- 
sion as  may  tend  to  bring  the  belligerents  together  on 
just  and  reasonable  terms. 

Through  a  thousand  channels  utterances  have  already 
reached  the  conference  pleading  that  a  long  continuance 
of  the  struggle  will  mean  ruin  for  all,  but  as  both  sides 
believe  that  only  complete  victory  can  decide  the  issue, 

243 


ever  new  sacrifices  of  blood  and  treasure  are  made,  ex- 
hausting the  present  and  impoverishing  the  future. 
Still,  we  are  convinced  that  an  agreement  between  the 
warring  nations  might  even  now  be  reached  were  cer- 
tain universal  principles  to  be  accepted  as  a  basis  of 
discussion ;  principles  which  cannot  be  violated  with  im- 
punity, whatever  the  military  results  of  the  war. 

The  first  duty  of  a  neutral  conference,  then,  is  to  call 
attention  to  those  universal  principles  and  concrete  pro- 
posals upon  which  agreement  seems  possible,  and  upon 
which  there  may  be  founded  a  peace  that  will  not  only 
satisfy  the  legitimate  demands  of  the  warring  nations 
themselves,  but  also  advance  the  welfare  of  humanity 
at  large.  The  neutral  conference  does  not  propose  to 
discuss  all  the  issues  at  stake.  Nor  does  it  desire  to  set 
forth  a  plan  for  the  construction  of  a  perfect  world. 
But  it  emphasizes  the  universal  demand  that  peace,  when 
it  comes,  shall  be  real,  insuring  mankind  against  the  re- 
currence of  a  world  war.  Humanity  demands  a  lasting 
peace. 

In  presenting  this  appeal  to  governments,  parliaments 
and  peoples  for  discussion  and  comment  the  neutral  con- 
ference hopes  that  no  formal  objection  may  prevent  its 
sympathetic  consideration  both  by  those  in  authority 
and  by  the  people  whom  they  represent. 

(A)  Right  of  Nations  to  Decide  Their  Own  Fate. — 
History  demonstrates  that  dispositions  contrary  to  the 
wishes  of  the  peoples  concerned  bring  with  them  the  dan- 
ger of  future  wars  of  liberation.  Hence  the  acceptance 
of  these  principles  appears  generally  to  be  regarded  as 
an  essential  prerequisite  to  the  satisfactory  settlement  of 
this  war;  namely,  that  no  transfer  of  territory  should 
take  place  without  the  consent  of  the  population  in- 
volved, and  that  nations  should  have  the  right  to  decide 
their  own  fate. 

244 


It  follows  that  the  restoration  of  Belgium  must  first 
be  agreed  upon  before  there  can  be  an  understanding 
between  the  belligerent  powers.  Furthermore,  the  oc- 
cupied French  territory  should  be  returned.  A  recon- 
sideration of  the  difficult  Alsace-Lorraine  question  is  also 
an  absolute  necessity.  The  independence  of  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  should  be  assured. 

In  its  wider  interpretation,  the  principle  of  the  right 
of  nations  to  decide  their  own  fate  postulates  the  solu- 
tion of  a  problem  like  the  Polish  question  by  guarantee- 
ing the  union  of  the  Polish  nation  as  an  independent 
people.  Further  applications  would  be  the  adjustment 
of  the  frontiers  between  Austria  and  Italy,  as  far  as 
possible,  according  to  the  principle  of  nationality;  au- 
tonomy for  Armenia  under  international  guarantee,  and 
the  solution  of  various  national  questions  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  in  Asiatic  Turkey  by  international  agreement. 

(B)  Economic    Guarantees. — Economic    competition 
is  generally  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  causes  of  the 
present   war.     Hence  the   demand   becomes   more   and 
more  insistent  that  the  economic  activity  of  all  peoples 
should  be  afforded  development  on  equal  terms.     The 
recognition  of  the  principle  of  the  open  door  in  the  col- 
onies, protectorates,  and  spheres  of  influence  would  be 
an  important  step  in  this  direction,  as  would  also  the 
internationalization    of    certain   waterways,    e.    g.,    the 
Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus.     The  German  colonies 
ought  to  be  returned,  the  exchange  of  colonies  made  pos- 
sible by  satisfactory  compensation,  and  Germany 's  access 
to  the  Near  East  guaranteed. 

(C)  Freedom  of  the  Seas. — The  principle  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  should  be  recognized. 

(D)  Parliamentary  Control  of  Foreign  Policy. — Ef- 
fective parliamentary  control  of  foreign  policy  should 
be  established,  so  that  secret  treaties  and  secret  diplo- 

245 


macy  may  no  longer  endanger  the  most  vital  interests  of 
the  nation. 

(E)  International   Organization. — Far   more   impor- 
tant, however,  for  the  welfare  of  humanity  than  the 
solutions  thus  far  suggested  is  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national organization,  founded,  upon  law  and  justice, 
which  would  include  an  agreement  to  submit  all  disputes 
between  States  for  peaceful  settlement.     Hence  the  al- 
most universal  opinion  that  in  the  coming  treaty  of 
peace  the  principle  of  such  an  international  order  of 
justice  must  be  accepted. 

(F)  Disarmament. — Equally  important  with  the  in- 
sistence upon  an  international  organization  is  the  de- 
mand that  disarmament  be  brought  about  by  interna- 
tional agreement. 

(G)  A    World  Congress. — In  order  to   bring  about 
the  creation  of  an  international  order  of  justice  it  will 
be  necessary  to  secure  the  adherence  thereto  of  both 
belligerents  and  neutrals.     The   difficulties  that  result 
from  the  present  catastrophe  do  not  affect  the  warring 
nations  alone.     They  affect  the  whole  world.     In  their 
settlement  the  whole  world  should  participate.     A  world 
congress  should  therefore  be  called  together.     Such  a 
congress  should  concern  itself  with  more  than  the  im- 
mediate questions  arising  out  of  this  war.     Problems 
like  that  of  guaranteeing  political  and  spiritual  freedom 
to  special  nationalities  united  with  other  peoples,  though 
not  direct  issues  of  this  war,  are  nevertheless  of  vital  im- 
portance to  the  future  maintenance  of  peace. 

In  the  foregoing  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  sug- 
gest a  possible  approach  to  the  task  of  uniting  again 
the  international  bonds  that  have  been  torn  asunder  in 
this  fratricide  war.  Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  so- 
lution, there  is  abundant  evidence  of  the  growing  con- 
viction among  belligerents  and  neutrals  alike  that  the 

246 


hope  of  the  world  lies  in  the  substitution  of  law  and 
order  for  international  anarchy.  The  neutral  confer- 
ence, therefore,  feels  justified  in  hoping  that  the  end  of 
this  war  will  witness  the  institution  of  an  international 
order  of  justice  which  shall  make  possible  an  enduring 
peace  for  all  mankind. 
Easter,  1916. 


CENTRAL  ORGANIZATION  FOR  A  DURABLE  PEACE 
The  Hague. 

An  important  international  gathering  was  held  at  The  qrganiz 
Hague  from  the  seventh  to  the  tenth  of  April,  1915.  £°unr*£jre 
The  meeting,  for  which  arrangements  had  been  made  Peace. 
by  the  "Dutch  Anti-War  Council/'  who  sent  invita- 
tions to  a  limited  number  of  persons,  was  composed  of 
more  than  thirty  people,  belonging  to  the  following  coun- 
tries:    United   States   of   America,   Austria,    Belgium, 
Germany,   Great  Britain,   Holland,   Hungary,  Norway, 
Sweden   and   Switzerland.    Letters   of  sympathy  were 
also  received  from  Denmark,  France,  Italy,  Russia  and 
.Spain. 

The  object  of  the  meeting  was  not  to  suggest  steps  to 
bring  the  war  to  an  end,  but  to  consider  by  what  prin- 
ciples the  future  peace  of  the  world  could  be  best  guar- 
anteed. After  full  discussion  a  minimum  program  was 
unanimously  adopted. 

MINIMUM-PROGRAM 

1.  No  annexation  or  transfer  of  territory  shall  be 
made  contrary  to  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the  popula- 
tion concerned.  Where  possible  their  consent  shall  be 
obtained  by  plebiscite  or  otherwise. 

The  States  shall  guarantee  to  the  various  nationalities, 
247 


included  in  their  boundaries,  equality  before  the  law, 
religious  liberty  and  the  free  use  of  their  native  lan- 
guages. 

2.  The  States  shall  agree  to  introduce  in  their  col- 
onies, protectorates  and  spheres  of  influence,  liberty  of 
commerce,  or  at  least  equal  treatment  for  all  nations. 

3.  The  work  of  the  Hague  Conferences  with  a  view  to 
the  peaceful  organization  of  the  Society  of  Nations  shall 
be  developed. 

The  Hague  Conference  shall  be  given  a  permanent  or- 
ganization and  meet  at  regular  intervals. 

The  States  shall  agree  to  submit  all  their  disputes  to 
peaceful  settlement.  For  this  purpose  there  shall  be 
created,  in  addition  to  the  existent  Hague  Court  of  Arbi- 
tration (a)  a  permanent  Court  of  International  Justice; 
(b)  a  permanent  international  Council  of  Investigation 
and  Conciliation.  The  States  shall  bind  themselves  to 
take  concerted  action,  diplomatic,  economic  or  military, 
in  case  any  State  should  resort  to  military  measures  in- 
stead of  submitting  the  dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  tb 
the  mediation  of  the  Council  of  Investigation  and  Con- 
ciliation. 

4.  The  States  shall  agree  to  reduce  their  armaments. 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  reduction  of  naval  armaments, 
the  right  of  capture  shall  be  abolished  and  the  freedom 
of  the  seas  assured. 

5.  Foreign  policy  shall  be  under  the  effective  control 
of  the  Parliaments  of  the  respective  nations. 

Secret  treaties  shall  be  void. 


Union  of 
Interna- 
tional  Ag- 
tociationa. 


UNION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS:  BRUSSELS 
Secretary-General:  Paul  Otlet. 

Project  of  World-Charter  ("Charte  Mondiale"),  by 
M.  Paul  Otlet. 

248 


1.  Court  of  arbitration  and  court  of  justice. 

2.  Council  of  inquiry  and  conciliation. 

3.  Council   of   States,   taking  in  concert   diplomatic, 
economic  and  military  measures.     International  armed 
force  consisting  of  national  contingents  under  an  inter- 
national general  staff. 

4.  International    Parliament    with    two    houses — the 
lower  composed  of  delegates  from  the  various  Parlia- 
ments; upper,  of  delegates  from  the  international  asso- 
ciations representing  the  fundamental  social  forces. 

5.  No  annexation  and  no  right  of  conquest.     Guaran- 
tee of  rights  of  minorities.     Freedom  of  nationalities. 

6.  Democratic    control   of   foreign   policy.     Suppres- 
sion of  alliances  and  of  secret  treaties. 

7.  Considerable  reduction  of  armies,  and  application 
of  war  budgets  to  education,  etc. 

8.  Freedom  of  commerce,  at  least  in  colonies. 

9.  Woman  suffrage.    Reform  of  education  and  of  the 
press. 


INTERNATIONAL  BUREAU  OF  PEACE  (BUREAU  INTER- 
NATIONAL DE  LA  PAIX) 

President:  H.  La  Fontaine. 

1.  Neutral  States  should  be  called  to  participate  in 

.  ,        tional    Bu- 

the  peace  negotiations,  because  a  permanent  peace  ought  reau  of 
to  be  guaranteed  by  the  signature  of  all  the  powers  of 
the  world. 

2.  No  annexations  must  take  place  without  the  consent 
of  the  populations  concerned.     In  all  the  States  of  di- 
verse nationalities  the  rights  of  minorities  must  be  guar- 
anteed. 

3.  There  should  be  established  an  international  or- 
ganization of  States,  with  permanent  bodies  and  espe- 

249 


cially  an  international  tribunal  before  which  will  be 
brought  international  disputes. 

4.  Armaments  must  be  reduced  according  to  general 
agreement  and  placed  under  an  international  control. 
All  industrial  establishments  occupied  with  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions  must  be  expropriated. 

5.  Diplomacy  in  all  the  nations  must  be  put  under 
the  control  of  parliaments  and  public  opinion.     All  trea- 
ties and  agreements  which   are  not  made  public  and 
have  the  ratification  of  the  representative  bodies  of  the 
nation  are  to  be  considered  null  and  void. 

6.  All  alliances,  offensive  or  defensive,  are  to  be  pro- 
hibited. 

7.  To  all  colonies  without  distinction  must  be  applied 
the  principle  of  the  "open  door."     No  State  shall  be 
able  to  impose  a  tariff  system  on  another.     The  develop- 
ment of   free  trade  through  international   agreements 
must  be  furthered. 

8.  The  public  institutions  and  the  honor  of  each  na- 
tion are  to  be  protected  against  foreign  insult  by  penal 
regulations  internationally  devised  and  guaranteed  by  an 
international  judicial  body. 

9.  A  new  peace  conference  is  to  be  called  with  the  ob- 
ject of  establishing  the  permanent  character  of  the  in- 
stitution and  ensuring  its  automatic  reunion. 


INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  OF  WOMEN 
The  Hague,  Holland,  April  28th,  29th,  30th,  1915 

tiouiM6on-          In  a  preparatory  meeting  of  English,  German,  Belgian 
w^menf  and  Dutch  women,  held  at  Amsterdam  (February,  1915), 

the  following  resolutions  were  drawn  up  to  be  put  before 

the  International  Congress: 

250 


I.  Plea  for  definition  of  terms  of  peace. 
Considering  that  the  people  in  each  of  the  countries 

now  at  war  believe  themselves  to  be  fighting,  not  as  ag- 
gressors but  in  self-defense  and  for  their  national  ex- 
istence, this  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  the 
Governments  of  the  belligerent  countries,  publicly  to 
define  the  terms  on  which  they  are  willing  to  make  peace 
and  for  this  purpose  immediately  to  call  a  truce. 

II.  Arbitration  and  conciliation. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women,  believing  that 
war  is  the  negation  of  all  progress  and  civilization,  de- 
clares its  conviction  that  future  international  disputes 
should  be  referred  to  arbitration  or  conciliation;  and 
demands  that  in  future  these  methods  shall  be  adopted 
by  the  governments  of  all  nations. 

III.  International  pressure. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  the  Pow- 
ers to  come  to  an  agreement  to  unite  in  bringing  pressure 
to  bear  upon  any  country  which  resorts  to  arms  without 
having  referred  its  case  to  arbitration  or  conciliation. 

IV.  Democratic  control  of  foreign  policy. 

War  is  brought  about  not  by  the  peoples  of  the  world, 
who  do  not  desire  it,  but  by  groups  of  individuals  rep- 
resenting particular  interests.  This  International  Con- 
gress of  Women  demands  therefore  that  Foreign  Poli- 
tics shall  be  subject  to  Democratic  Control;  and  at  the 
same  time  declares  that  it  can  only  recognize  as  demo- 
cratic a  system  which  includes  the  equal  representation 
of  men  and  women. 

V.  Transference  of  territory. 

This  International   Congress  of  women  affirms  that 
251 


there  should  be  no  transference  of  territory  without  the 
consent  of  the  men  and  women  in  it. 

VI.  Women's  responsibility. 

This  International  "Women's  Congress  is  convinced 
that  one  of  the  strongest  forces  for  the  prevention  of 
war  will  be  the  combined  influence  of  the  women  of  all 
countries  and  that  therefore  upon  women  as  well  as 
men  rests  the  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of  future 
wars.  But  as  women  can  only  make  their  influence  ef- 
fective if  they  have  equal  political  rights  with  men,  this 
Congress  declares  that  it  is  the  duty  of  all  women  to 
work  with  all  their  force  for  their  political  enfranchise- 
ment. 

VII.  Women  delegates  in  the  conference  of  the  powers. 
Believing  that  it  is  essential  for  the  future  peace  of 

the  world  that  representatives  of  the  people  should  take 
part  in  the  Conference  of  the  Powers  after  the  war,  this 
International  Women's  Congress  urges,  that  among  the 
representatives  women  delegates  should  be  included. 

VIII.  Woman  suffrage  resolution. 

This  International  Women's  Congress  urges,  that  in 
the  interests  of  civilization  the  Conference  of  the  Pow- 
ers after  the  war  should  pass  a  resolution  affirming  the 
need  in  all  countries  of  extending  the  parliamentary 
franchise  to  women. 

IX.  Promotion  of  good  feeling  between  nations. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women,  which  in  it- 
self is  evidence  of  the  serious  desire  of  women  to  bring 
together  mankind  in  the  work  of  building  up  our  com- 
mon civilization,  considers  that  every  means  should  be 
used  for  promoting  mutual  understanding  and  good 

252 


will  between  the  nations  and  for  resisting  any  tendency 
to  hatred  and  revenge. 


RESOLUTIONS  OF  WOMEN'S  INTERNATIONAL  PEACE 
CONGRESS  AT  THE  HAGUE 

I. — WOMEN  AND  WAR 

1.  Protest. 

We  women,  in  International  Congress  assembled,  pro- 
test against  the  madness  and  the  horror  of  war,  involv- 
ing as  it  does  a  reckless  sacrifice  of  human  life  and  the 
destruction  of  so  much  that  humanity  has  labored 
through  centuries  to  build  up. 

2.  Women's  Sufferings  in  War. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  opposes  the 
assumption  that  women  can  be  protected  under  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  warfare.  It  protests  vehemently 
against  the  odious  wrongs  of  which  women  are  the  vic- 
tims in  time  of  war,  and  especially  against  the  horrible 
violation  of  women  which  attends  all  war. 

H. — ACTION   TOWARD   PEACE 

The  Peace  Settlement. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  of  different 
nations,  classes,  creeds  and  parties  is  united  in  express- 
ing sympathy  with  the  suffering  of  all,  whatever  their 
nationality,  who  are  fighting  for  their  country  or  labor- 
ing under  the  burden  of  war. 

Since  the  mass  of  the  people  in  each  of  the  countries 
now  at  war  believe  themselves  to  be  fighting,  not  as  ag- 
gressors but  in  self-defense  and  for  their  national  ex- 
istence, there  can  be  no  irreconcilable  difference  between 
them,  and  their  common  ideals  afford  a  basis  upon  which 
a  magnanimous  and  honorable  peace  might  be  estab- 

253 


lished.  The  congress  therefore  urges  the  governments 
of  the  world  to  put  an  end  to  this  bloodshed  and  to  be- 
gin peace  negotiations.  It  demands  that  the  peace  which 
follows  shall  be  permanent,  and  therefore  based  on  prin- 
ciples of  justice,  including  those  laid  down  in  the  resolu- 
tions adopted  by  this  congress — namely: 

That  no  territory  should  be  transferred  without  the 
consent  of  the  men  and  women  in  it,  and  that  the  right 
of  conquest  should  not  be  recognized. 

That  autonomy  and  a  democratic  parliament  should 
not  be  refused  to  any  people. 

That  the  governments  of  all  nations  should  come  to 
an  agreement  to  refer  future  international  disputes  to 
arbitration  or  conciliation,  and  to  bring  social,  moral  and 
economic  pressure  to  bear  upon  any  country  which  re- 
sorts to  arms. 

That  foreign  politics  should  be  subject  to  democratic 
control. 

That  women  should  be  granted  equal  political  rights 
with  men. 

4.  Continuous  Mediation. 

This  International  Congress  of  "Women  resolves  to 
ask  the  neutral  countries  to  take  immediate  steps  to  cre- 
ate a  conference  of  neutral  nations  which  shall  without 
delay  offer  continuous  mediation.  The  congress  shall  in- 
vite suggestions  for  settlement  from  each  of  the  bellig- 
erent nations,  and  in  any  case  shall  submit  to  all  of 
them,  simultaneously,  reasonable  proposals  as  a  basis  of 
peace. 

m. PRINCIPLES   OF   A   PERMANENT   PEACE 

5.  Respect  for  Nationality. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women,  recognizing 
the  right  of  the  people  to  self-government,  affirms  that 

254 


there  should  be  no  transference  of  territory  without 
the  consent  of  the  men  and  women  residing  therein,  and 
urges  that  autonomy  and  a  democratic  parliament  should 
not  be  refused  to  any  people. 

6.  Arbitration  and  Conciliation. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women,  believing  that 
war  is  the  negation  of  progress  and  civilization,  urges 
the  governments  of  all  nations  to  come  to  an  agreement 
to  refer  future  international  disputes  to  arbitration  and 
conciliation. 

7.  International  Pressure. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  the  gov- 
ernments of  all  nations  to  come  to  an  agreement  to  unite 
in  bringing  social,  moral  and  economic  pressure  to  bear 
upon  any  country  which  resorts  to  arms  instead  of  re- 
ferring its  case  to  arbitration  or  conciliation. 

8.  Democratic  Control  of  Foreign  Policy. 

Since  war  is  commonly  brought  about  not  by  the 
mass  of  the  people,  who  do  not  desire  it,  but  by  groups 
representing  particular  interests,  this  International  Con- 
gress of  Women  urges  that  foreign  politics  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  democratic  control,  and  declares  that  it  can  only 
recognize  as  democratic  a  system  which  includes  the  equal 
representation  of  men  and  women. 

9.  The  Enfranchisement  of  Women. 

Since  the  combined  influence  of  the  women  of  all  coun- 
tries is  one  of  the  strongest  forces  for  the  prevention  of 
war,  and  since  women  can  only  have  full  responsibility 
and  effective  influence  when  they  have  equal  political 
rights  with  men,  this  International  Congress  of  Women 
demands  their  political  enfranchisement. 


255 


IV. — INTERNATIONAL.  COOPERATION 

10.  Third  Hague  Conference. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  that  a 
third  Hague  Conference  be  convened  immediately  after 
the  war. 

11.  International  Organization. 

This  International  "Women's  Congress  urges  that  the 
organization  of  the  Society  of  Nations  should  be  further 
developed  on  the  basis  of  a  constructive  peace,  and  that 
it  should  include: 

(a)  As  a  development  of  The  Hague  Court  of  Arbi- 
tration, a  permanent  International  Court  of  Justice  to 
settle  questions  or  differences  of  a  justiciable  character, 
such  as  arise  on  the  interpretation  of  treaty  rights  or  of 
the  law  of  nations. 

(b)  As  a  development  of  the  constructive  work  of 
The  Hague  Conference,  a  permanent  international  con- 
ference holding  regular  meetings,  in  which  women  should 
take  part,  to  deal  not  with  the  rules  of  warfare  but 
with  practical  proposals  for  further  international  co- 
operation among  the  States.    This  conference  should  be 
so  constituted  that  it  could  formulate  and  enforce  those 
principles  of  justice,  equity  and  good-will  in  accord- 
ance with  which  the  struggles  of  subject  communities 
could  be  more  fully  recognized  and  the  interests  and 
rights  not  only  of  the  great  Powers  and  small  nations, 
but  also  those  of  weaker  countries  and  primitive  peo- 
ples, gradually  adjusted  under  an  enlightened  interna- 
tional public  opinion. 

The  International  Conference  shall  appoint:  A  per- 
manent council  of  conciliation  and  investigation  for 
the  settlement  of  international  differences  arising  from 
economic  competition,  expanding  commerce,  increasing 

256 


population  and  changes  in  social  and  political  stand- 
ards. 

12.  General  Disarmament. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women,  advocating 
universal  disarmament  and  realizing  that  it  can  only 
be  secured  by  international  agreement,  urges  as  a  step 
to  this  end  that  all  countries  should,  by  such  an  inter- 
national agreement,  take  over  the  manufacture  of  arms 
and  munitions  of  war  and  should  control  all  interna- 
tional traffic  in  the  same.  It  sees  in  the  private  profits 
accruing  from  the  great  armament  factories  a  powerful 
hindrance  to  the  abolition  of  war. 

13.  Commerce  and  Investments. 

The  Congress  urges  that  in  all  countries  there  shall 
be  liberty  of  commerce,  that  the  seas  shall  be  free  and 
the  trade  routes  open  on  equal  terms  to  the  shipping  of 
all  nations. 

Inasmuch  as  the  investment  by  capitalists  of  one  coun- 
try in  the  resources  of  another  and  the  claims  arising 
therefrom  are  a  fertile  source  of  international  compli- 
cations, this  congress  urges  the  widest  possible  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  that  such  investments  shall  be  made 
at  the  risk  of  the  investor,  without  claim  to  the  official 
protection  of  his  government. 

14.  National  Foreign  Policy. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  demands  that 
all  secret  treaties  shall  be  void,  and  that  for  the  ratifi- 
cation of  future  treaties  the  participation  of  at  least 
the  legislature  of  every  government  shall  be  necessary. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  recommends 
that  national  commissions  be  created  and  international 
conferences  convened  for  the  scientific  study  and  elabora- 
tion of  the  principles  and  conditions  of  permanent  peace 

257 


which  might  contribute  to  the  development  of  an  inter- 
national federation.  These  commissions  and  conferences 
should  be  recognized  by  the  governments  and  should  in- 
clude women  in  their  deliberations. 

15.  Women  in  National  and  International  Politics. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  declares  it  to 
be  essential,  both  nationally  and  internationally,  to  put 
into  practise  the  principle  that  women  should  share  all 
civil  and  political  rights  and  responsibilities  on  the  same 
terms  as  men. 

V. THE   EDUCATION   OF   CHILDREN 

16.  This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  the 
necessity  of  so  directing  the  education  of  children  that 
their  thoughts  and  desires  may  be  directed  toward  the 
ideal  of  constructive  peace. 

VI. WOMEN   AND   THE  PEACE   SETTLEMENT   CONFERENCE 

17.  This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  that 
in  the  interests  of  lasting  peace  and  civilization  the  con- 
ference which  shall  frame  the  peace  settlement  after  the 
war  should  pass  a  resolution  affirming  the  need  in  all 
countries  of  extending  the  parliamentary  franchise  to 
women. 

18.  This  International  Congress  of  Women  urges  that 
representatives  of  the  people  should  take  part  in  the 
conference  that  shall  frame  the  peace  settlement  after 
the  war,  and  claims  that  among  them  women  should  be  in- 
cluded. 

VII. — ACTION   TO   BE  TAKEN 

19.  Envoys  to  the  Governments. 

In  order  to  urge  the  governments  of  the  world  to  put 
an  end  to  this  bloodshed  and  to  establish,  a  just  and  last- 

258 


ing  peace,  this  International  Congress  of  Women  dele- 
gates envoys  to  carry  the  message  expressed  in  the  con- 
gress resolutions  to  the  rulers  of  the  belligerent  and  neu- 
tral nations  of  Europe  and  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 

These  envoys  shall  be  women  of  both  neutral  and 
belligerent  nations,  appointed  by  the  international  com- 
mittee of  this  congress.  They  shall  report  the  result  of 
their  missions  to  the  International  Women's  Committee 
for  Constructive  Peace  as  a  basis  for  further  action. 

20.  Women's  Voice  in  the  Peace  Settlement. 

This  International  Congress  of  Women  resolves  that 
an  international  meeting  of  women  shall  be  held  in  the 
same  place  and  at  the  same  time  as  the  conference  of 
the  Powers  which  shall  frame  the  terms  of  the  peace  set- 
tlement after  the  war,  for  the  purpose  of  presenting 
practical  proposals  to  that  conference. 


CONFERENCE  OF  SOCIALISTS  OF  THE  ALLIED  NATIONS 
London,  Feb.  14,  1915. 


This  conference  cannot  ignore  the  profound  general  sfocAi11 
causes  of  the  European  conflict,  itself  a  monstrous  prod-  Nations, 
uct  of  the  antagonisms  which  tear  asunder  capitalist  so- 
ciety and  of  the  policy  of  colonial  dependencies  and 
aggressive  imperialism,  against  which  international  So- 
cialism has  never  ceased  to  fight,  and  in  which  every 
government  has  its  share  of  responsibility. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  and  France  by  the  German 
armies  threatens  the  very  existence  of  independent  na- 
tionalities, and  strikes  a  blow  at  all  faith  in  treaties.  In 
these  circumstances  a  victory  for  German  imperialism 

259 


would  be  the  defeat  and  the  destruction  of  democracy 
and  liberty  in  Europe.  The  Socialists  of  Great  Britain, 
Belgium,  France,  and  Russia  do  not  pursue  the  political 
and  economic  crushing  of  Germany ;  they  are  not  at  war 
with  the  people  of  Germany  and  Austria,  but  only  with 
the  governments  of  those  countries  by  which  they  are 
oppressed.  They  demand  that  Belgium  shall  be  liber- 
ated and  compensated.  They  desire  that  the  question  of 
Poland  shall  be  settled  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of 
the  Polish  people,  either  in  the  sense  of  autonomy  in  the 
midst  of  another  State,  or  in  that  of  complete  inde- 
pendence. They  wish  that  throughout  all  Europe,  from 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  Balkans,  those  populations  that 
have  been  annexed  by  force  shall  receive  the  right  freely 
to  dispose  of  themselves. 

While  inflexibly  resolved  to  fight  until  victory  is 
achieved  to  accomplish  this  task  of  liberation,  the  So- 
cialists are  none  the  less  resolved  to  resist  any  attempt 
to  transform  this  defensive  war  into  a  war  of  conquest, 
which  would  only  prepare  fresh  conflicts,  create  new 
grievances,  and  subject  various  peoples  more  than  ever 
to  the  double  plague  of  armaments  and  war. 

Satisfied  that  they  are  remaining  true  to  the  principles 
of  the  International,  the  members  of  the  Conference 
express  the  hope  that  the  working  class  of  all  the  dif- 
ferent countries  will  before  long  find  themselves  united 
again  in  their  struggle  against  militarism  and  capitalist 
imperialism.  The  victory  of  the  Allied  Powers  must  be 
a  victory  for  popular  liberty,  for  unity,  independence, 
and  autonomy  of  the  nations  in  the  peaceful  federation 
of  the  United  States  of  Europe  and  the  world. 

II 

On  the  conclusion  of  the  war  the  working  classes  of 
all  the  industrial  countries  must  unite  in  the  Interna- 

260 


tional  in  order  to  suppress  secret  diplomacy,  put  an  end 
to  the  interests  of  militarism,  and  those  of  the  armament 
makers  and  establish  some  international  authority  to  set- 
tle points  of  difference  among  the  nations  by  compulsory 
conciliation  and  arbitration,  and  to  compel  all  nations 
to  maintain  peace. 

m 

The  Conference  protests  against  the  arrest  of  the  dep- 
uties of  the  Duma,  against  the  suppression  of  Russian 
Socialist  papers  and  the  condemnation  of  their  editors, 
as  well  as  against  the  oppression  of  Finns,  Jews,  and 
Russian  and  German  Poles. 


CONFERENCE  OP  SOCIALISTS  FROM  SWEDEN,  NORWAY,  DEN- 
MARK AND  HOLLAND,  HELD  AT  COPENHAGEN 

The  Conference  states  that  Capitalism,  in  its  imperial-  socialists 

.      .       „  .  .  °f    Neutral 

istic  form,  expressed  by  the  constantly  increasing  arma-  Nations. 
ments,  and  by  arrogant  politics  of  aggrandizement,  sup- 
ported by  the  secret  and  irresponsible  diplomacy  of  the 
Great  Powers,  have  now  led  the  world  to  the  catastrophe 
.predicted  and  always  warned  against  by  the  Social 
Democracy. 

In  this  moment,  when  the  world  is  struck  with  terror 
at  the  horrible  devastation  this  war  has  caused,  the  Con- 
ference desires  to  give  expression  to  the  firm  and  strong 
will  to  peace,  existing  within  the  nations  represented  at 
the  Conference. 

The  delegates  are  of  opinion  that  the  chief  aim  of  the 
conference  is  to  be  the  strengthening  and  uniting  of  that 
public  will  which,  undoubtedly,  in  all  countries,  demands 
the  end  of  the  war  in  such  a  way  that  a  permanent  peace 
may  be  secured.  To  realize  this  aim,  the  conference 
addresses  itself  to  the  democratic  workmen,  particularly 

261 


to  those  of  the  belligerent  countries,  pointing  at  the  same 
time  to  those  principles  of  international  solidarity  and 
proletarian  conception  of  justice  which  have  been  sanc- 
tioned at  all  our  international  congresses.  These  prin- 
ciples were  expressed  by  the  Congress  of  Copenhagen, 
1910,  in  the  following  way : 

The  parliamentary  representatives  of  the  Social  De- 
mocracy are  bound  to  work  in  order  to  realize  the  follow- 
ing aims: 

1.  International  compulsory  arbitration. 

2.  Restriction  of  the  preparations  for  war  ending  in 
final  disarmament. 

3.  Abolition  of  secret  diplomacy  with  full  parliamen- 
tary responsibility  as  to  foreign  politics. 

4.  Recognition  of  the  right  of  self-determination  of 
nations,  of  resistance  to  oppression  and  war-intrigues. 

The  Conference  considers  it  the  duty  of  all  socialistic 
parties  to  be  active  in  order  to  render  possible  an  early 
conclusion  of  peace,  and  to  work  energetically  in  favor 
of  such  conditions  of  peace  as  may  form  a  basis  of  inter- 
national disarmament  and  of  the  democratization  of  for- 
eign politics. 

The  Conference  protests  against  the  infringement  of 
international  right  in  the  case  of  Belgium  and  expresses 
a  hope  that  the  Social  Democracy  in  all  belligerent  coun- 
tries will  in  the  strongest  way  possible  oppose  every  vio- 
lent annexation  at  variance  with  the  right  of  self-deter- 
mination of  the  peoples. 

The  Conference,  thus,  reiterates  the  principles  of  peace 
of  the  International,  and  summons  the  International 
Bureau  to  convoke  the  social  democratic  parties  to  joint 
deliberation,  if  not  earlier,  at  least  at  the  beginning  of 
the  negotiations  of  peace,  in  order  to  examine  the  con- 
ditions of  peace,  because  the  Conference  considers  it  ab- 
solutely necessary  that  the  conditions  of  peace  be  not 

262 


stipulated  without  the  collaboration  of  the  working  men 
and  women,  or  against  their  will,  and  summons  the  work- 
ing class  in  all  countries  to  concentrate  their  efforts  in 
order  to  realize  a  permanent  peace  throughout  the 
world.  This  war,  with  all  its  horrors,  has  only  been 
possible,  because  the  Capitalist  class  of  the  different 
countries  still  holds  the  power  in  its  hands.  The  Con- 
ference hence  summons  the  Socialists  to  work  with  the 
greatest  energy  in  order  to  conquer  the  political  power, 
so  that  Imperialism  may  be  ruined,  and  that  the  Inter- 
national Social  Democracy  may  fulfil  its  great  mission 
of  emancipating  the  people. 

Copenhagen,  Jan.  17-18,  1915. 


263 


PEACE  PEOPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 
2.  UNITED  STATES 

LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE 

OBJECTS 
League  to  l.  An  International  Court  to  try  all  justiciable  ques- 

enforce 
Peace. 


2.  A  Council  of  Conciliation  for  consideration  of  non- 
justiciable  questions. 

3.  Use  of  joint  economic  pressure  and  military  force 
against  signatory  beginning  hostilities  contrary  to  terms 
of  alliance. 

4.  Formulation  and  adoption  of  a  code  of  interna- 
tional law. 

The  League's  proposal  is  that  economic  pressure  and 
military  force  shall  be  used  to  compel  signatory  Powers 
to  take  their  international  differences  to  the  court  for 
adjudication  rather  than  to  the  battlefield.  It  frankly 
hopes  to  promote  peace  and  aid  its  establishment  by  us- 
ing economic  and  military  force. 


NATIONAL  PEACE  CONVENTION, 

HELD  UNDER  THE  AUSPICES  OF  THE  EMERGENCY  PEACE 
FEDERATION,  CHICAGO, 

February  27  and  28,  1915. 

National  1.  Foreign  policies  of  nations  should  not  be  aimed 

Oonven-  at  creating  alliances  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the 

tion.  264 


"balance  of  power,"  but  should  be  directed  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  "  Concert  of  Nations, ' '  with 

(a)  An  international  court  for  the  settlement  of  all 
disputes  between  nations; 

(&)  An  international  congress,  with  legislative  and 
administrative  powers  over  international  af- 
fairs, and  with  permanent  committees  in  place 
of  present  secret  diplomacy; 

(c)  An  international  police  force; 

(d)  The  embodiment  in  international  law  of  the  prin- 

ciple of  non-intercourse,  as  the  sanction  and  en- 
forcement of  international  obligations. 

2.  The  gradual  reduction  and  final  abolition  of  na- 
tional   armaments    should    be    accomplished    upon    the 
adoption  of  this  peace  program  by  a  sufficient  number 
of  nations,  or  by  nations  of  sufficient  power  to  ensure 
protection  to  those  disarmed;  such  reduction  should  be 
graduated  in  each  nation  according  to  the  degree  of  dis- 
armament   elected    in    other    nations,    and    should    be 
progressive    until    complete    abolition    is    finally    at- 
tained. 

3.  The  manufacture  of  armaments  for  private  profit 
should  be  prohibited,  and  the  export  of  munitions  of  war 
from  one  country  to  another  should  be  directly  under 
governmental  control. 

4.  The  protection  of  private  property  at  sea,  of  neu- 
tral commerce  and  of  communications  should  be  secured 
by  the  neutralization  of  the  seas,  and  of  such  maritime 
trade  routes  as  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Panama  and  Suez 
Canals. 

5.  National  and  international  action  should  be  aimed 
at  the  removal  of  inequitable  trade  barriers  and  other 
more  fundamental  economic  causes  of  war. 

6.  The  democracies  of  the  world  should  be  extended 

265 


and  reinforced  by  general  application  of  the  principles 
of  self-government  and  of  universal  adult  suffrage. 

7.  No  province  should  be  transferred  from  one  gov- 
ernment to  another  without  the  consent  of  the  population 
of  such  province. 

8.  No  treaty,  alliance,  or  other  arrangement  should  be 
entered  upon  by  any  nation,  unless  ratified  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people;  treaties  for  securing  delay 
before  commencing  hostilities,  and  adequate  machinery 
for  insuring  democratic  control  of  foreign  politics  should 
be  created. 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

Boston,  Mass. 
World  1.  No  territory  should  be  transferred  from  one  nation 

HfilCB 

Founda-  to  another  in  disregard  of  the  inhabitants,  nor  any  re- 

adjustment be  made  of  which  the  effect  would  neces- 
sarily be  to  sow  the  seeds  of  future  war. 

2.  As   the    alliances    and    ententes    of    Europe    have 
proved  their  incapacity  to  safeguard  the  welfare  of  the 
people,  the  nations  of  that  continent  should  establish 
and  maintain  a  representative  council  in  order  to  insure 
mutual  conference  and  concerted  action. 

3.  Competition  in  armaments  should  end.     The  na- 
tions should  agree  to  abandon  compulsory  military  serv- 
ice and  to  limit  military  force  to  purposes  of  police  and 
international  defense. 

4.  All  manufactures  of  arms,  armaments  and  muni- 
tions for  use  in  war  should  hereafter  be  national  prop- 
erty.    No  private  citizen  or  corporation  should  be  per- 
mitted to  engage  in  such  manufacture.     The  export  of 
such  goods  for  use  in  armies  and  fleets  should  be  pro- 
hibited. 

266 


5.  No  neutral  nation  should  permit  its  citizens  to  make 
loans  to  belligerents  for  war  purposes.  As  our  own 
State  Department  has  said :  ' '  Loans  by  American  bank- 
ers to  any  foreign  nation  which  is  at  war  are  incon- 
sistent with  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality." 


AMERICAN  SCHOOL,  PEACE  LEAGUE 

1.  A  Concert  of  Europe.    The  surest  method  of  estab-  American 
lishing  permanent  peace  is  to  bring  about  a  Concert  of 
Europe,  based  upon  the  knowledge  that,  with  nations  as 

with  individuals,  cooperation  and  not  conflict  is  the  law 
of  progress.  In  order  to  insure  mutual  conference  and 
concerted  action,  there  should  be  organized  a  representa- 
tive Council  whose  deliberations  and  decisions  would  be 
public.  This  would  mark  the  end  of  offensive  alliances 
and  ententes  which  have  proved  their  inability  to  safe- 
guard the  real  and  permanent  interests  of  the  people. 

2.  Nationality    Must     be    Respected.    No    territory 
should  be  transferred  from  one  nation  to  another  against 
the  will  of  the  inhabitants,  nor  should  any  readjustments 
be  made  which  might  breed  fresh  wars.     National  bound- 
aries should  coincide  as  far  as  possible  with  national  sen- 
timent.    No  terms  of  settlement  should  be  regarded  as 
satisfactory  if  they  impose  upon  any  nation  such  harsh 
and  humiliating  terms  of  peace  as  would  be  inconsistent 
with  its  independence,  self-respect,  or  well-being.     All 
idea  of  revenge  should,  of  course,  be  rooted  out. 

3.  Limitation   of   Armaments.     Since   the   policy    of 
huge  national  armaments  has  lamentably  failed  to  pre- 
serve peace,  competition  in  armaments  should  end.     The 
nations  should  agree  to  have  no  military  forces  other 
than   those  maintained  for  international   police   duty. 
Militarism  should  be  abandoned  by  all  nations,  because 

267 


they  recognize  the  absolute  futility  of  force  as  a  means 
of  advancing  the  moral  or  material  well-being  of  any 
country.  To  facilitate  the  elimination  of  militarism, 
the  conditions  of  peace  should  stipulate  that  all  manu- 
factories of  arms,  armaments,  and  munitions  for  use  in 
war  shall  hereafter  be  national  property.  No  private 
citizen  or  corporation  should  be  permitted  to  engage  in 
such  manufacture. 


PROGRAM  OF  WOMEN'S  PEACE  PARTY 
Organized  in  Washington,  January  10,  1915. 

women's  1.  The  immediate  calling  of  a  convention  of  neutral 

Party.  nations  in  the  interest  of  early  peace. 

2.  Limitation  of  armaments,  and  the  nationalization 
of  their  manufacture. 

3.  Organized   opposition   to   militarism   in   our   own 
country. 

4.  Democratic  control  of  foreign  policies. 

5.  The  further  humanizing  of  governments  by  the  ex- 
tension of  the  franchise  to  women. 

6.  "Concert    of    Nations"    to    supersede    balance    of 
power. 

7.  Action   toward   the   gradual    organization    of   the 
world  to  substitute  law  for  war. 

8.  The  substitution  of  an  international  police  for  rival 
armies  and  navies. 

9.  Removal  of  the  economic  causes  of  war. 

10.  The  appointment  of  our  Government  of  a  commis- 
sion of  men  and  women,  with  an  adequate  appropriation, 
to  promote  international  peace. 


268 


PROGRAM  OP  WOMEN'S  PEACE  PARTY 
Washington,  January,  1916. 

1.  That  no   increased   appropriations  for  war  prep- 
arations be  voted  during  the  present  session. 

2.  That  a  joint  committee  be  appointed  to  conduct 
a  thorough  investigation  with  public  hearings,  and  report 
within  the  next  six  months  upon  the  following  matters: 

a.  The  condition  of  our  military  and  naval  de- 

fenses with  special  reference  to  the  ex- 
penditures of  past  appropriations; 

b.  The   probability   of   aggressive    action   by 

other  nations  against  the  United  States 
by  reason  of  antagonism  with  respect  to 
race,  trade,  national  expansion,  property 
holding  in  foreign  lands  and  other  causes 
of  war; 

c.  The  possibility  of  lessening  by  legislative 

or  diplomatic  action  the  sources  of  fric- 
tion between  this  country  and  other  na- 
tions. 

3.  That  action  be  taken  to  secure  by  our  Government 
the  immediate  calling  of  a  conference  of  neutral  nations 
in  the  interest  of  a  just  and  early  peace.     (To  that  end 
we  endorse  the  principles  embodied  in  House  Joint  Reso- 
lution 38.) 

4.  That  action  be  taken  to  provide  for  the  elimina- 
tion of  all  private  profit  from  the  manufacture  of  arma- 
ments. 

5.  That  action  be  taken  which  shall  provide  Federal 
control  over  unnaturalized  residents. 

6.  That  action  be  taken  to  bring  about  the  creation 
of  a  joint  commission  of  experts  representing  Japan, 
China,  and  the  United  States  to  study  the  complex  and 

269 


important  question  at  issue  between  the  Orient  and  the 
United  States  and  make  recommendations  to  the  various 
governments  involved. 

7.  That  action  be  taken  to  convene  the  Third  Hague 
Conference  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  and  that  all 
voting  American  delegates  shall  be  civilians  who  repre- 
sent various  important  elements  in  the  country,  includ- 
ing if  possible  the  business,  educational  and  labor  in- 
terests and  women,  and  that  the  delegates  from  the 
United  States  be  instructed  to  advocate  world  organiza- 
tion and  a  peaceful  settlement  of  all  international  diffi- 
culties. 

One  change  was  made  in  the  platform  adopted  by  the 
party  a  year  ago.  Economic  pressure,  instead  of  an  in- 
ternational police,  was  urged  as  a  substitute  for  rival 
armies  and  navies. 


NEW  YORK  PEACE  SOCIETY 

New  In  the  platform  of  the  New  York  Peace  Society  appear 

Pe£ce  these  five  "conditions  of  a  permanent  peace": 

1.  A  union  of  a  sufficient  number  of  Powers  to  guar- 
antee permanent  peace  by  the  maintenance  of  military 
force  which  can  be  used  at  need  as  a  police  against  any 
Power  which  threatens  hostilities. 

2.  A  treaty  which  shall  not  only  arrange  the  bound- 
aries of  the  States  and  their  colonies,  but  also  guarantee 
the  territories  so  established  against  attack  either  from 
within  or  without  the  league. 

3.  The  removal  of  enmities,  (a)  By  making  peace  in 
a  generous  spirit  at  the  close  of  the  present  war,  and 
before  the  forces  on  either  side  shall  have  been  com- 
pletely crushed,     (b)  By  respecting  racial  affiliations  in 
the  adjustments  of  territory  made  in  the  treaty  of  peace. 

4.  A  renewal  of  the  conferences  at  The  Hague,  the 

270 


meetings  to  be  held  so  frequently  as  to  constitute  a  Stand- 
ing Committee  of  the  nations  for  promoting  measures  of 
common  interest,  and  for  removing  in  their  incipient 
stages  causes  of  contention. 

5.  A  treaty  agreement  to  refer  all  differences  within 
the  league  for  adjudication  either  to  arbitration  or  to  a 
permanent  court. 

"The  present  war,"  says  the  platform  in  part,  "  has 
made  it  clear  that  the  arming  of  all  nations  menaces  the 
peace  of  all.  A  common  reduction  of  armaments  under 
an  international  agreement  seems  to  present  itself  as 
the  sole  condition  of  tolerable  security  and  welfare  of 
all.  Such  a  consummation  would  give  to  humanity  its 
own  possible  compensation  for  the  unparalleled  tragedy 
of  the  war." 


SOCIALIST  PARTY  OP  AMERICA 

I.  Terms  of  peace  at  close  of  present  war  must  be 

such  as  to  protect  the  nations  from  future  wars  America, 
and  conserve  the  identity  of  the  smaller  nations. 

1.  No  indemnities. 

2.  No  transfer  of  territory,  except  upon  consent  and 
by  vote  of  the  people  within  the  territory. 

II.  International    Federation — United    States    of    the 

World. 

1.  Court  or  courts  for  the  settlement  of  all  disputes 
between  nations. 

2.  International  congress,  with  legislative  and  admin- 
istrative powers  over  international  affairs,  and  with  per- 
manent committees  in  place  of  present  secret  diplomacy. 

3.  International  police  force. 

III.  National  disarmament. 

1.  National  disarmament  shall  be  effected  immediately 
271 


upon  the  adoption  of  the  peace  program  by  a  sufficient 
number  of  nations,  or  by  nations  of  sufficient  power  so 
that  the  international  police  force  developed  by  the 
terms  of  the  program  shall  be  adequate  to  insure  the  pro- 
tection of  the  disarmed. 

2.  No  increase  in  existing  armaments  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. 

3.  Pending  complete  disarmament  the  abolition  of  the 
manufacture  of  armaments  and  munitions  of  war  for 
private  profit. 

4.  International  ownership   and  control  of  strategic 
waterways,  such  as  the  Dardanelles,  Straits  of  Gibraltar, 
and  the  Suez,  Panama  and  Kiel  Canals. 

5.  Neutralization  of  the  seas. 

IV.     Extension  of  democracy. 

1.  Political  democracy. 

(a)  The  declaration  of  offensive  war  to  be  made 
only  by  direct  vote  of  the  people. 

(&)  Abolition  of  secret  diplomacy  and  the  demo- 
cratic control  of  foreign  policies. 

(c)  Universal  suffrage,  including  woman  suf- 
frage. 

2.  Industrial  democracy. 

Radical  social  changes  in  all  countries  to  eliminate  the 
economic  causes  of  war,  such  as, 

(a)  Federation  of   the  working  classes   of  the 

world  in  a  league  of  peace. 
(6)   Socialization  of  the  national  resources,  pub- 
lic utilities  and  fundamental  equipment 
of  industry  of  the  nations. 

(c)  Elimination  of  all  unearned  income. 

(d)  Immediate  and  progressive  amelioration  of 

the  conditions  of  labor. 
272 


V.    Immediate  action. 

1.  Efforts  to  be  made  in  every  nation  to  secure  the  of- 
ficial adoption  of  the  above  program,  by  the  governing 
bodies  at  the  earliest  possible  date.     The  adoption  of 
the  program  (contingent  upon  its  acceptance  by  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  the  nations  to  ensure  its  success)  to  be 
immediately  announced  to  the  world  as  a  standing  offer 
of  federation. 

2.  The  federation  of  all  tha  possible  peace  forces  that 
can  be  united  in  behalf  of  the  above  program  for  active 
propaganda  among  all  nations. 

3.  Efforts  through  the  international  and  the  national 
organizations  of  the  Socialist  party  of  all  nations  to 
secure  universal  cooperation  of  all  socialist  and  labor 
organizations  in  the  above  program. 


DAVID   STARR  JORDAN'S  RESOLUTIONS  AS  TO  RATIONAL 
TERMS  OF  PEACE 

WHEREAS,  The  Great  War  in  Europe  is  working  havoc  David 
without  parallel  among  the  best  racial  elements  in  all  Jordan, 
nations  concerned,  thereby  exhausting  the  near  future 
and  bringing  subsequent  impoverishment  to  the  race ; 

WHEREAS,  An  intolerable  burden  of  sorrow  and  misery 
is  thrown  on  the  women  and  children  of  Europe,  those 
who  had  no  part  in  bringing  on  the  war  and  no  possible 
interests  to  be  served  by  it; 

WHEREAS,  No  possible  gain,  economic  or  political  (the 
restoration  of  Belgium  being  secured),  can  compensate 
any  nation  for  the  loss,  distress  and  misery  involved  in 
this  war  and  aggravated  by  each  day  of  its  continuance ; 

WHEREAS,  No  probability  appears  that  military  opera- 
tions in  any  quarter  can  of  themselves  bring  the  war  to 
its  end; 

273 


WHEREAS,  A  sweeping  victory  tends  to  leave  an  in- 
creasing legacy  of  hate,  with  seeds  of  future  wars; 

RESOLVED,  That  the  rational  interests  of  the  civilized 
world  demand  that  the  war  be  brought  to  a  speedy  close ; 
and 

RESOLVED,  That  a  way  to  honorable  and  lasting  peace 
may  be  possible  along  the  following  lines : 

1.  Recognition  of  the  fact  that  no  nation  can  estab- 
lish rule  or  dominion  over  any  other  civilized  nation, 
large  or  small,  that  peace  cannot  be  maintained  by  the 
overruling  power  of  any  one  nation,  but  rather  by  inter- 
national agreements  of  those  nations  which  reject  ag- 
gressive war. 

2.  Guaranteed  security  to  the  small  States  of  Europe, 
with  relief  of  peoples  held  in  unnatural  allegiance. 

3.  The  freedom,   under  international   guarantees,   of 
the  High  Seas  and  of  the  channels  of  trade,  with  im- 
munity of  commerce  from  belligerent  attack. 

4.  The  removal  of  hampering  tariff  restrictions. 

5.  Compensation  to  Belgium,   as  determined  by  im- 
partial arbitration. 

6.  The   neutralization   of   Constantinople,    with    ade- 
quate safeguarding  of  the  rights  of  Christian  and  Jew- 
ish peoples  within  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

7.  An   international   conference   to   secure  terms   of 
peace;  with  reduction  of  national  armament,  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  supreme  international  tribunal,  the  main- 
tenance of  an  international  police  force,  accompanied  by 
recognition  of  the  stability  of  International  Law. 

May  13,  1915. 


274 


SIX  LESSONS  OF  THE  WAR 

First. — That    the    various    Hague    Conventions,    sol- 
emnly  entered  into  in  1899  and  in  1907,  have  been  vio-  sutler, 
lated  frequently  since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and 
that,  obviously,  some  greater  and  more  secure  sanction 
for  such  Conventions  must  be  provided  in  the  future. 

Second. — That  in  not  a  few  instances  the  rules  and 
usages  of  international  law  have  been  thrown  to  the 
winds,  to  the  discredit  of  the  belligerents  themselves 
and  to  the  grave  distress,  physically  and  commercially, 
of  neutral  powers. 

Of  course  every  one  understands  that  international 
law  is  merely  a  series  of  conventions  without  other  than 
moral  sanction.  If,  however,  the  world  has  gone  back 
to  the  point  where  a  nation 's  plighted  faith  is  not  moral 
sanction  enough,  then  that  fact  and  its  implications 
ought  to  be  clearly  understood  and  appropriate  punitive 
action  provided  for. 

Third. — That  any  attempt  to  submerge  nationalities 
in  nations  other  than  their  own  is  certain  to  result  in 
friction  and  conflict  in  the  not  distant  future.  Any  at- 
tempt to  create  new  nations,  or  to  enlarge  or  diminish 
the  area  of  nations,  without  having  regard  to  nationality, 
is  simply  to  organize  a  future  war. 

Fourth. — That  the  transfer  of  sovereignty  over  any 
given  district  or  people  without  their  consent,  is  certainly 
an  unwise,  and  probably  an  unjust,  action  for  any  gov- 

275 


eminent  to  take,  having  regard  for  the  peace  and  happi- 
ness of  the  world. 

Fifth. — That  the  international  organizations  which 
had  been  carried  so  far  in  such  fields  as  maritime  law, 
postal  service,  railway  service,  and  international  arbitra- 
tion, should  be  taken  up  anew  and  pursued  more  vigor- 
ously, but  upon  a  sounder  and  a  broader  foundation,  and 
made  a  certain  means  of  protecting  the  smaller  and  the 
weaker  nations. 

Sixth. — That  competitive  armaments,  instead  of  be- 
ing an  assurance  against  war,  are  a  sure  cause  of  war  and 
an  equally  certain  preventive  of  those  policies  of  social 
reform  and  advance  that  enlightened  peoples  everywhere 
are  eager  to  pursue. 

Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  quoted  in  N.  Y.  Times,  May 
16,  1915, 


CHAMBER  OP  COMMERCE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

ofhBcomr  1-  A.  more  comprehensive  and  better-defined  sea-law, 

the'u. °s.  2-  ^n  international  court. 

3.  A  council  of  Conciliation. 

4.  International  conferences  for  the  better  establish- 
ment and  progressive  amendment  of  international  law. 

5.  Power  to  enforce  agreement:     The  organization  of 
a  system  of  commercial  and  financial  non-intercourse, 
to  be  followed  by  military  force  if  necessary,  to  be  ap- 
plied to  those  nations  entering  into  the  foregoing  ar- 
rangements and  then  going  to  war  without  first  submit- 
ting their  differences  to  an  agreed-upon  tribunal. 


276 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 
3.  GREAT  BRITAIN 

UNION  OF  DEMOCRATIC  CONTROL 

1.  No  Province  shall  be  transferred  from  one  Govern-  £nion  of 

Uemo- 

ment  to  another  without  the  consent  by  plebiscite  or  cratic 
otherwise  of  the  population  of  such  Province. 

2.  No  Treaty,  Arrangement,  or  Undertaking  shall  be 
entered  upon  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  without  the 
sanction  of  Parliament.     Adequate  machinery  for  en- 
suring  democratic   control  of  foreign   policy   shall  be 
created. 

3.  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  shall  not  be 
aimed  at  creating  Alliances  for  the  purpose  of  maintain- 
ing the  Balance  of  Power;  but  shall  be  directed  to  con- 
certed action  between  the  Powers,  and  the  setting  up  of 
an  International  Council,  whose  deliberations  and  deci- 
sions shall  be  public,  with  such  machinery  for  securing 
international  agreement  as  shall  be  the  guarantee  of  an 
abiding  peace. 

4.  Great  Britain  shall  propose  as  part  of  the  Peace  set- 
tlement a  plan  for  the  drastic  reduction  by  consent  of  the 
armaments  of  all  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  to  facilitate 
that  policy,  shall  attempt  to  secure  the  general  national- 
ization of  the  manufacture  of  armaments,  and  the  con- 
trol of  the  export  of  armaments  by  one  country  to  an- 
other. 

• 

277 


Fabian 
Society. 


FABIAN  SOCIETY 

London,  July  17,  1915. 

PROPOSED  ARTICLES  OF  SETTLEMENT 

The  signatory  States,  desirous  of  preventing  any  fu- 
ture outbreak  of  war,  improving  international  relations, 
arriving  by  agreement  at  an  authoritative  codification 
of  international  law  and  facilitating  the  development  of 
such  joint  action  as  is  exemplified  by  the  International 
Postal  Union,  hereby  agree  and  consent  to  the  following 
Articles : 


THE   ESTABLISHMENT   OF   A   SUPERNATIONAL   AUTHORITY 

1.  There  shall  be  established  as  soon  as  possible  within 
the  period  of  one  year  from  the  date  hereof  (a)  an  Inter- 
national High  Court  for  the  decision  of  justiciable  is- 
sues between  independent  Sovereign  States;  (6)  an 
International  Council  with  the  double  function  of  secur- 
ing, by  common  agreement,  such  international  legislation 
as  may  be  practicable,  and  of  promoting  the  settlement 
of  non-justiciable  issues  between  independent  Sovereign 
States;  and  (c)  an  International  Secretariat. 


The  Constituent  States 

2.  The  independent  Sovereign  States  to  be  admitted  as 
Constituent  States,  and  hereinafter  so  described,  shall 
be: 

(a)  The  belligerents  in  the  present  war; 

(&)  The  United  States  of  America; 

(c)  Such  other  independent  Sovereign  States  as  have 
been  represented  at  either  of  the  Peace  Coferences  at 
The  Hague,  and  as  shall  apply  for  admission  within  six 
months  from  the  date  of  these  Articles ;  and 

278 


(d)  Such  other  independent  Sovereign  States  as  may 
hereafter  be  admitted  by  the  International  Council. 

Covenant  Against  Aggression 

3.  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  these  Articles  that 
the  Constituent  States  severally  disclaim  all  desire  or 
intention  of  aggression  on  any  other  independent  Sov- 
ereign State  or  States,  and  that  they  agree  and  bind 
themselves,  under  all  circumstances,  and  without  any 
evasion  or  qualification  whatever,  never  to  pursue,  be- 
yond the  stage  of  courteous  representation,  any  claim 
or  complaint  that  any  of  them  may  have  against  any 
other  Constituent  State,  without  first  submitting  such 
claim  or  complaint,   either  to  the  International  High 
Court  for  adjudication  and  decision,  or  to  the  Inter- 
national Council  for  examination  and  report,  with  a 
view   to   arriving   at   a  settlement   acceptable   to   both 
parties. 

Covenant  Against  War  Except  as  a  Final  Resource 

4.  The  Constituent  States  expressly  bind  themselves 
severally  under  no  circumstances  to  address  to  any  Con- 
stituent State  an  ultimatum,  or  a  threat  of  military  or 
naval  operations  in  the  nature  of  war,  or  of  any  act 
of  aggression;  and  under  no  circumstances  to  declare 
war,  or  begin  military  or  naval  operations  of  the  nature 
of  war,  or  violate  the  territory  or  attack  the  ships  of 
another  State,  otherwise  than  by  way  of  repelling  and 
defeating  a  forcible  attack  actually  made  by  military  or 
naval  force,  until  the  matter  in  dispute  has  been  sub- 
mitted as  aforesaid  to  the  International  High  Court  or 
to  the  International  Council,  and  until  after  the  expira- 
tion of  one  year  from  the  date  of  such  submission. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  Constituent  State  shall,  after 
279 


submission  of  the  matter  at  issue  to  the  International 
Council  and  after  the  expiration  of  the  specified  time, 
be  precluded  from  taking  any  action,  even  to  the  point 
of  going  to  war,  in  defense  of  its  own  honor  or  interests, 
as  regards  any  issues  which  are  not  justiciable  within 
the  definition  laid  down  by  these  Articles,  and  which 
affect  either  its  independent  sovereignty  or  its  terri- 
torial integrity,  or  require  any  change  in  its  internal 
laws,  and  with  regard  to  which  no  settlement  acceptable 
to  itself  has  been  arrived  at. 

THE   INTERNATIONAL    COUNCIL 

5.  The  International  Council  shall  be  a  continuously 
existing  deliberative  and  legislative  body  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  Constituent  States,  to  be  appointed 
in  such  manner,  for  such  periods  and  under  such  condi- 
tions as  may  in  each  case  from  time  to  time  be  deter- 
mined by  the  several  States. 

Each  of  the  eight  Great  Powers — viz.,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, the  British  Empire,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Ja- 
pan, Russia  and  the  United  States  of  America — may  ap- 
point five  representatives.  Each  of  the  other  Constitu- 
ent States  may  appoint  two  representatives. 

Different  Sittings  of  the  Council 

6.  The   International   Council   shall   sit   either  as   a 
Council  of  all  the  Constituent  States,  hereinafter  called 
the  Council  sitting  as  a  whole,  or  as  the  Council  of  the 
eight  Great  Powers,  or  as  the  Council  of  the  States  other 
than  the  eight  Great  Powers,  or  as  the  Council  for  Amer- 
ica, or  as  the  Council  for  Europe,  each  such  sitting  be- 
ing restricted  to  the  representatives  of  the  States  thus 
indicated. 

There  shall  stand  referred  to  the  Council  of  the  eight 
Great  Powers  any  question  arising  between  any  two  or 

280 


more  of  such  Powers,  and  also  any  other  question  in 
which  any  of  such  Powers  formally  claims  to  be  con- 
cerned, and  requests  to  have  so  referred. 

There  shall  also  stand  referred  to  the  Council  of  the 
eight  Great  Powers,  for  consideration  and  ratification, 
or  for  reference  back  in  order  that  they  may  be  recon- 
sidered, the  proceedings  of  the  Council  for  America,  the 
Council  for  Europe,  and  the  Council  of  the  States  other 
than  the  eight  Great  Powers. 

There  shall  stand  referred  to  the  Council  for  Europe 
any  question  arising  between  two  or  more  independent 
Sovereign  States  of  Europe,  and  not  directly  affecting 
any  independent  Sovereign  States  not  represented  in 
that  Council,  provided  that  none  of  the  Independent 
Sovereign  States  not  so  represented  formally  claims  to 
be  concerned  in  such  question,  and  provided  that  none 
of  the  eight  Great  Powers  formally  claims  to  have  it  re- 
ferred to  the  Council  of  the  eight  great  Powers  or  to 
the  Council  sitting  as  a  whole. 

There  shall  stand  referred  to  the  Council  for  America 
any  question  arising  between  two  or  more  independent 
Sovereign  States  of  America,  not  directly  affecting  any 
independent  Sovereign  State  not  represented  in  that 
Council,  provided  that  none  of  the  independent  Sov- 
ereign States  not  so  represented  formally  claims  to  be 
concerned  in  such  question,  and  provided  that  none  of 
the  eight  Great  Powers  formally  claims  to  have  it  re- 
ferred to  the  Council  of  the  eight  Great  Powers  or  to  the 
Council  sitting  as  a  whole. 

There  shall  stand  referred  to  the  Council  for  the 
States  other  than  the  eight  Great  Powers  any  question 
between  two  or  more  of  such  States,  not  directly  affect- 
ing any  of  the  eight  Great  Powers  and  which  none  of 
the  eight  Great  Powers  formally  claims  to  have  referred 
to  the  Council  sitting  as  a  whole. 

281 


The  Council  shall  sit  as  a  whole  for — 

(a)  General  legislation  and  any  question  not  standing 
referred  to  the  Council  of  the  eight  Great  Powers,  the 
Council  of  the  States  other  than  the  eight  Great  Powers, 
the  Council  for  Europe  or  the  Council  for  America  re- 
spectively ; 

(6)  The  appointment  and  all  questions  relating  to 
the  conditions  of  office,  functions  and  powers  of  the  Inter- 
national Secretariat,  and  of  the  President  and  other  offi- 
cers of  the  International  Council ; 

(c)  The  settlement  of  Standing  Orders,  and  all  ques- 
tions relating  to  procedure  and  verification  of  powers ; 

(d)  The  financial  affairs  of  the  International  Council 
and  International  High  Court,  the  allocation  of  the  cost 
among  the  Constituent  States,  and  the  issue  of  precepts 
upon  the  several  Constituent  States  for  the  shares  due 
from  them; 

(e)  The  admission  of  independent  Sovereign  States 
as  Constituent  States;  and 

(/)  Any  proposal  to  alter  any  of  these  Articles,  and 
the  making  of  such  an  alteration. 

Membership  of  the  Council  and  Voting 

7.  All  the  Constituent  States  shall  have  equal  rights 
to  participation  in  the  deliberations  of  the  International 
Council.  Any  Constituent  State  may  submit  to  the 
International  Council  sitting  as  a  whole  any  proposal  for 
any  alteration  of  International  Law,  or  for  making  an 
enactment  of  new  law;  and  also  (subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  these  Articles  with  regard  to  the  submission 
of  justiciable  issues  to  the  International  High  Court) 
may  bring  before  the  Council  any  question,  dispute  or 
difference  arising  between  it  and  any  other  Constituent 
State. 

When  the  International  Council  is  sitting  as  the  Coun- 
282 


cil  of  the  eight  Great  Powers  or  as  the  Council  of  the 
States  other  than  the  eight  Great  Powers  each  of  the 
States  represented  therein  shall  have  one  vote  only. 

When  the  International  Council  is  sitting  as  a  whole 
or  as  the  Council  for  Europe  or  as  the  Council  for 
America,  the  number  of  votes  to  be  given  on  behalf  of 
each  State  shall  be  as  follows : 

As  agreed  to  by  the  Hague  Conference,  the  relative 
position  of  the  States  works  out  into  the  following  scale 
of  votes: 

Austria-Hungary,    the    British    Empire,    France, 
Germany,    Italy,    Japan,    Russia,    the    United 

States  of  America  20  votes  each 

Spain      12 

The    Netherlands     9 

Belgium,    Denmark,    Greece,    Norway,    Portugal, 

Sweden,  China,  Roumania,  Turkey 6 

Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico    4 

Switzerland,    Bulgaria,    Persia    3 

Colombia,  Peru,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Serbia,  Siam       2 

The  other   Constitutent   States    1  vote 

Legislation  Subject  to  Ratification 

8.  It  shall  be  within  the  competence  of  the  Inter- 
national Council  to  codify  and  declare  the  International 
Law  existing  between  the  several  independent  Sovereign 
States  of  the  world;  and  any  such  codifying  enactment, 
when  and  in  so  far  as  ratified  by  the  Constituent  States, 
shall  be  applied  and  enforced  by  the  International  High 
Court. 

It  shall  also  be  within  the  competence  of  the  Inter- 
national Council  from  time  to  time,  by  specific  enact- 
ment, to  amend  International  Law,  whether  or  not  this 
has  been  codified;  and  any  such  enactment  when  and  in 
so  far  as  ratified  by  the  several  Constituent  States  shall 

283 


be  applied  and  enforced  by  the  International  High 
Court. 

Whenever  any  Constituent  State  notifies  its  refusal  to 
ratify  as  a  whole  any  enactment  made  by  the  Interna- 
tional Council,  it  shall  at  the  same  time  notify  its  rati- 
fication of  such  part  or  parts  of  such  enactment  as  it 
will  consent  to  be  bound  by :  and  the  International  Coun- 
cil shall  thereupon  reenact  the  parts  so  ratified  by  all 
the  Constituent  States,  and  declare  such  enactment  to 
have  been  so  ratified,  and  such  enactment  shall  there- 
upon be  applied  and  enforced  by  the  International  High 
Court. 

When  any  enactment  of  the  International  Council 
making  any  new  general  rule  of  law  has  been  ratified 
wholly  or  in  part  by  any  two  or  more  Constituent 
States,  but  not  by  all  the  Constituent  States,  it  shall,  so 
far  as  ratified,  be  deemed  to  be  binding  on  the  ratifying 
State  or  States,  but  only  in  respect  of  the  relations  of 
such  State  or  States  with  any  other  ratifying  State  or 
States ;  and  it  shall  be  applied  and  enforced  accordingly 
by  the  International  High  Court. 

N on- Justiciable  Issues 

9.  When  any  question,  difference  or  dispute  arising 
between  two  or  more  Constituent  States  is  not  justiciable 
as  defined  in  these  Articles,  and  is  not  promptly  brought 
to  an  amicable  settlement,  and  is  of  such  a  character  that 
it  might  ultimately  endanger  friendly  relations  between 
such  States,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  each  party  to  the 
matter  at  issue,  irrespective  of  any  action  taken  or  not 
taken  by  any  other  party,  to  submit  the  question,  dif- 
ference or  dispute  to  the  International  Council  with  a 
view  to  a  satisfactory  settlement  being  arrived  at.  The 
Council  may  itself  invite  the  parties  to  lay  any  such 
question,  difference  or  dispute  before  the  Council,  or 

284 


the  Council  may  itself  take  any  such  matter  at  issue  into 
its  own  consideration. 

The  Constituent  States  hereby  severally  agree  and 
bind  themselves  under  no  circumstances  to  address  to 
any  other  Constituent  State  an  ultimatum  or  anything 
in  the  nature  of  a  threat  of  forcible  reprisals  or  naval 
or  military  operations,  or  actually  to  commence  hostil- 
ities against  such  State,  or  to  violate  its  territory,  or 
to  attack  its  ships,  otherwise  than  by  way  of  repelling 
and  defeating  a  forcible  attack  actually  made  by  naval 
or  military  force,  before  a  matter  in  dispute,  if  not  of 
a  justiciable  character  as  defined  in  these  Articles,  has 
been  submitted  to  or  taken  into  consideration  by  the 
International  Council  as  aforesaid  for  investigation, 
modification  and  report,  and  during  a  period  of  one  year 
from  the  date  of  such  submission  or  consideration. 

The  International  Council  may  appoint  a  Permanent 
Board  of  Conciliators  for  dealing  with  all  such  ques- 
tions, differences  or  disputes  as  they  arise,  and  may  con- 
stitute the  Board  either  on  the  nomination  of  the  sev- 
eral Constituent  States  or  otherwise,  in  such  manner, 
upon  such  conditions  and  for  such  term  or  terms  as  the 
Council  may  decide. 

When  any  question,  difference  or  dispute,  not  of  a 
justiciable  character  as  defined  in  these  Articles,  is  sub- 
mitted to  or  taken  into  consideration  by  the  Interna- 
tional Council  as  aforesaid,  the  Council  shall,  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  take  action,  either  (1)  by  referring 
the  matter  at  issue  to  the  Permanent  Board  of  Concilia- 
tors, or  (2)  by  appointing  a  Special  Committee,  whether 
exclusively  of  the  Council  or  otherwise,  to  enquire  into 
the  matter  and  report,  or  (3)  by  appointing  a  Commis- 
sion of  Enquiry  to  investigate  the  matter  and  report, 
or  (4)  by  itself  taking  the  matter  into  consideration. 

The  Constituent  States  hereby  agree  and  bind  them- 
285 


selves,  whether  or  not  they  are  parties  to  any  such  mat- 
ter at  issue,  to  give  all  possible  facilities  to  the  Inter- 
national Council,  to  the  Permanent  Board  of  Concili- 
ators, to  any  Committee  or  Commission  of  Enquiry  ap- 
pointed by  either  of  them,  and  to  any  duly  accredited 
officer  of  any  of  these  bodies,  for  the  successful  discharge 
of  their  duties. 

When  any  matter  at  issue  is  referred  to  the  Board  of 
Conciliation,  or  to  a  Special  Committee,  or  to  a  Com- 
mission of  Enquiry,  such  Board,  Committee  or  Commis- 
sion shall,  if  at  any  time  during  its  proceedings  it  suc- 
ceeds in  bringing  about  an  agreement  between  the  par- 
ties upon  the  matter  at  issue,  immediately  report  such 
agreement  to  the  International  Council;  but,  if  no  such 
agreement  be  reached,  such  Board,  Committee  or  Com- 
mission shall,  so  soon  as  it  has  finished  its  enquiries,  and 
in  any  case  within  six  months,  make  a  report  to  the 
International  Council,  stating  the  facts  of  the  case  and 
making  any  recommendations  for  a  decision  that  are 
deemed  expedient.  , 

When  a  report  is  made  to  the  International  Council 
by  any  such  Board,  Committee  or  Commission  that  an 
agreement  has  been  arrived  at  between  the  parties,  the 
Council  shall  embody  such  agreement,  with  a  recital  of 
its  terms,  in  a  resolution  of  the  Council. 

When  any  other  report  is  made  to  the  Council  by  any 
such  Board,  Committee  or  Commission,  or  when  the 
Council  itself  has  taken  the  matter  at  issue  into  consid- 
eration, the  Council  shall,  after  taking  all  the  facts  into 
consideration,  and  within  a  period  of  three  months,  come 
to  a  decision  on  the  subject,  and  shall  embody  such  de- 
cision in  a  resolution  of  the  Council.  Such  resolution 
shall,  if  necessary,  be  arrived  at  by  voting,  and  shall  be 
published,  together  with  any  report  on  the  subject,  in  the 
Official  Gazette. 

286 


A  resolution  of  the  Council  embodying  a  decision  set- 
tling a  matter  at  issue  between  Constituent  States  shall 
be  obligatory  and  binding  on  all  the  Constituent  States, 
including  all  the  parties  to  the  matter  at  issue,  if  either 
it  is  passed  unanimously  by  all  the  members  of  the  Coun- 
cil present  and  voting ;  or  where  the  proposed  enactment 
does  not  affect  the  independent  sovereignty  or  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity,  nor  require  any  change  in  the  internal 
laws  of  any  State,  and  where  such  enactment  shall  have 
been  assented  to  by  a  three-fourths  majority  of  the 
votes  given  by  the  representatives  present  and  voting. 

The  International  Secretariat 

10.  There  shall  be  an  International  Secretariat,  with 
an  office  permanently  open  for  business,  with  such  a  staff 
as  the  International  Council  may  from  time  to  time  de- 
termine. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  International  Secretariat  to 
make  all  necessary  communications  on  behalf  of  the 
International  Council  to  States  or  individuals;  to  place 
before  the  President  to  bring  before  the  Council  any 
matter  of  which  it  should  have  cognizance;  to  organize 
and  conduct  any  enquiries  or  investigations  ordered  by 
the  Council;  to  maintain  an  accurate  record  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Council;  to  make  authentic  translations 
of  the  resolutions  and  enactments  of  the  Council,  the 
report  of  the  proceedings,  and  other  documents,  and  to 
communicate  them  officially  to  all  the  Constituent  States ; 
and  to  publish  for  sale  an  Official  Gazette  and  such  other 
works  as  the  Council  may  from  time  to  time  direct. 

Subject  to  any  regulations  that  may  be  made  by  the 
International  Council,  the  International  Secretariat  shall 
take  charge  of  and  be  responsible  for  (a)  the  funds  be- 
longing to  or  in  the  custody  of  the  International  Coun- 
cil and  the  International  High  Court;  (6)  the  collec- 

287 


tion  of  all  receipts  due  to  either  of  them;  and  (c)  the 
making  of  all  authorized  payments. 

THE   INTERNATIONAL   HIGH    COURT 

11.  The  International  High  Court  shall  be  a  perma- 
nent judicial  tribunal,  consisting  of  fifteen  Judges,  to 
be  appointed  as  hereinafter  provided.     Subject  to  these 
Articles  it  shall,  by  a  majority  of  Judges  sitting  and 
voting,  control  its  own  proceedings,  determine  its  ses- 
sions and  place  of  meeting,  settle  its  own  procedure,  and 
appoint  its  own  officers.     It  may,  if  thought  fit,  elect 
one  of  its  members  to  be  President  of  the  Court  for  such 
term  and  with  such  functions  as  it  may  decide.     Its 

members  shall   receive   an   annual  stipend   of   , 

whilst  if  a  President  is  elected  he  shall  receive  an  addi- 
tional sum  of  .     The  Court  shall  hear  and  de- 
cide with  absolute  independence  the  issues  brought  be- 
fore it  in  conformity  with  these  Articles;  and  shall  in 
each  case  pronounce,  by  a  majority  of  votes,  a  single 
judgment  of  the  Court  as  a  whole,  which  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  separate  reasoned  statements  by  each  of  the 
Judges  sitting  and  acting  in  the  case.     The  sessions  of 
the  Court  shall  be  held,  if  so  ordered,  notwithstanding 
the  existence  of  a  vacancy  or  of  vacancies  among  the 
Judges ;  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  shall  be  valid, 
and  the  decision  of  a  majority  of  the  Judges  sitting  and 
acting  shall  be  of  full  force,  notwithstanding  the  exist- 
ence of  any  vacancy  or  vacancies  or  of  the  absence  of  any 
Judge  or  Judges. 

The  Judges  of  the  Court 

12.  The  Judges  of  the  International  High  Court  shall 
be  appointed  for  a  term  of  five  years  by  the  International 
Council  sitting  as  a  whole,  in  accordance  with  the  fol- 

288 


lowing  scheme:  Each  of  the  Constituent  States  shall 
be  formally  invited  to  nominate  one  candidate,  who 
need  not  necessarily  be  a  citizen  or  a  resident  of  the 
State  by  which  he  is  nominated.  The  eight  candidates 
severally  nominated  by  the  eight  Great  Powers  shall 
thereupon  be  appointed  Judges  by  the  International 
Council  sitting  as  the  Council  of  the  eight  Great  Pow- 
ers. The  remaining  seven  Judges  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  International  Council  sitting  as  a  whole,  after 
selection  by  exhaustive  ballot  from  among  the  candidates 
nominated  by  the  Constituent  States  other  than  the 
eight  Great  Powers.  On  the  occurrence  of  a  vacancy 
among  the  Judges  nominated  by  the  eight  Great  Pow- 
ers, the  State  which  had  nominated  the  Judge  whose  seat 
has  become  vacant  shall  be  invited  to  nominate  his  suc- 
cessor, and  the  candidate  so  nominated  shall  thereupon 
be  appointed  by  the  International  Council  sitting  as  the 
Council  of  the  eight  Great  Powers.  On  the  occurrence 
of  a  vacancy  among  the  other  Judges,  each  of  the  Con- 
stituent States  other  than  the  eight  Great  Powers  shall 
be  invited  to  nominate  a  candidate  to  fill  the  vacancy; 
and  the  International  Council  sitting  as  a  whole  shall, 
by  exhaustive  ballot,  choose  from  among  the  candidates 
so  nominated  the  person  to  be  appointed. 

A  Judge  of  the  International  High  Court  shall  not  be 
liable  to  any  legal  proceedings  in  any  tribunal  in  any 
State,  and  shall  not  be  subjected  to  any  disciplinary  ac- 
tion by  any  Government,  in  respect  of  anything  said 
or  done  by  him  in  his  capacity  as  Judge ;  and  shall  not 
during  his  term  of  office  be  deprived  of  any  part  of  the 
emoluments  or  privileges  of  his  office.  A  Judge  of  the 
International  High  Court  may  be  removed  from  office 
by  a  resolution  of  the  International  Council  sitting  as 
a  whole,  carried  by  a  three-fourths  majority. 

289 


The  Court  Open  Only  to  State  Governments 

13.  The  International  High  Court  shall  deal  only  with 
justiciable   questions,   as   defined   in  these   Articles,   at 
issue  between  the  national  Governments  of  independent 
Sovereign  Sates,  and  shall  not  entertain  any  applica- 
tion from  or  on  behalf  of  an  individual  person,  or  any 
group  or  organization  of  persons,  or  any  company,  or 
any  subordinate  administration,  or  any  State  not  inde- 
pendent and  Sovereign.     The  International  High  Court 
may,  if  it  thinks  fit,  deal  with  a  suit  brought  by  a  Con- 
stituent State  against  an  independent  Sovereign  State 
which  is  not  a  Constituent  State ;  or  with  a  suit  between 
two  or  more  such  States. 

Justiciable  Issues 

14.  The  justiciable  questions  with  which  the  Inter- 
national High  Court  shall  be  competent  to  deal  shall  be 
exclusively  those  falling  within  one  or  other  of  the  fol- 
lowing classes,  viz. : 

(a)  Any  question  of  fact  which,  if  established,  would 
be  a  cause  of  action  within  the  competence  of  the  Court ; 

(&)  Any  question  as  to  the  interpretation  or  applica- 
tion of  any  international  treaty  or  agreement  duly  reg- 
istered as  provided  in  these  Articles,  or  of  International 
Law,  or  of  any  enactment  of  the  International  Coun- 
cil; together  with  any  alleged  breach  or  contravention 
thereof ; 

(c)  Any  question  as  to  the  responsibility  or  blame  at- 
taching to  any  independent  Sovereign  State  for  any  of 
the  acts,  negligences  or  defaults  of  its  national  or  local 
Government  officers,  agents  or  representatives,  occasion- 
ing loss  or  damage  to  a  State  other  than  their  own, 
whether  to  any  of  the  citizens,  companies  or  subordinate 
administrations  of  such  State,  or  to  its  national  Gov- 

290 


eminent;  and  as  to  the  reparation  to  be  made,  and  the 
compensation  to  be  paid,  for  such  loss  or  damage ; 

(d)  Any  question  as  to  the  title,  by  agreement,  pre- 
scription, or  occupation,  to  the  sovereignty  of  any  place 
or  district ; 

(e)  Any  question  as  to  the  demarcation  of  any  part  of 
any  national  boundary; 

(/)  Any  question  as  to  the  reparation  to  be  made,  or 
the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid,  in  cases  in  which 
the  principle  of  indemnity  has  been  recognized  or  ad- 
mitted by  all  the  parties ; 

(gr)  Any  question  as  to  the  recovery  of  contract  debts 
claimed  from  the  Government  of  an  independent  Sov- 
ereign State  by  the  Government  of  another  independent 
Sovereign  State,  as  being  due  to  any  of  its  citizens,  com- 
panies or  subordinate  administrations,  or  to  itself; 

(ft,)  Any  question  which  may  be  submitted  to  the 
Court  by  express  agreement  between  all  the  parties  to 
the  case. 

The  question  of  whether  or  not  an  issue  is  justiciable 
within  the  meaning  of  these  Articles  shall  be  determined 
solely  by  the  International  High  Court,  which  may  de- 
termine such  a  question  whether  or  not  formal  objection 
is  taken  by  any  of  the  litigants. 

If  any  State,  being  a  party  to  any  action  in  the  Inter- 
national High  Court,  objects  that  any  point  at  issue  is 
not  a  justiciable  question  as  herein  defined,  the  objec- 
tion shall  be  considered  by  the  Court;  and  the  Court 
shall,  whether  or  not  the  objecting  State  enters  an  ap- 
pearance, or  argues  the  matter,  pronounce  upon  the 
objection,  and  either  set  it  aside  or  declare  it  well 
founded. 

It  shall  be  within  the  competence  of  the  International 
High  Court,  with  regard  to  any  justiciable  question  in 
respect  of  which  it  may  be  invoked  by  one  or  more  of  the 

291 


parties,  summarily  to  enjoin  any  State,  whether  or  not 
a  party  to  the  case,  to  refrain  from  taking  any  specified 
positive  action  or  to  discontinue  any  specified  positive 
action  already  begun,  or  to  cause  to  be  discontinued  any 
specified  positive  action  begun  by  any  person,  company 
or  subordinate  administration  within  or  belonging  to 
such  State,  which  in  the  judgment  of  the  Court  is  de- 
signed or  intended,  or  may  reasonably  be  expected  to 
change  the  status  quo  with  regard  to  the  question  at  issue 
before  the  Court,  or  seriously  to  injure  any  of  the  par- 
ties to  the  case.  Any  such  injunction  of  the  Interna- 
tional High  Court  shall  be  binding,  and  shall  be  enforce- 
able, in  the  same  way  as  a  judgment  of  the  Court,  in  the 
manner  hereinafter  described. 

Immediate  Publicity  for  All  Treaties,  Existing  and 
Future 

15.  No  treaty  or  agreement  between  two  or  more  in- 
dependent Sovereign  States  shall  be  deemed  to  confer 
any  right  to  invoke  the  International  High  Court,  or 
shall  be  treated  as  valid,  or  be  in  any  way  recognized 
by  the  International  Council  or  the  International  High 
Court,  or  shall  be  held  to  confer  any  rights,  to  impose 
any  obligations,  or  to  change  the  status  or  legal  rights 
of  any  person,  company,  subordinate  administration, 
district  or  State,  unless  a  duly  authenticated  copy  of 
such  Treaty  or  Agreement  has  been  deposited  by  one  or 
all  of  the  States  that  are  parties  to  it,  in  the  Registry  of 
the  International  High  Court,  within  twelve  months 
from  the  date  of  these  Articles,  in  accordance  with  any 
rules  that  may  from  time  to  time  be  made  by  the  Court 
for  this  purpose ;  or  in  the  case  of  a  Treaty  or  Agreement 
hereafter  made,  within  three  months  from  the  date  of 
such  Treaty  or  Agreement. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  Reg- 
292 


istry  immediately  after  deposit  to  allow  the  duly  accred- 
ited representative  of  any  Constituent  State  to  inspect 
and  copy  any  Treaty  or  Agreement  so  deposited;  and 
promptly  to  communicate  a  copy  to  the  International 
Secretariat  for  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette, 

Undertaking  to  Submit  All  Justiciable  Questions  to  the 
International  High  Court 

16.  The  Constituent  States  severally  undertake  and 
agree  to  submit  to  the  International  High  Court  for  trial 
and  judgment  every  question,  difference  or  dispute  com- 
ing within  the  definition  of  a  justiciable  question  as  laid 
down  by  these  Articles  that  may  arise  between  them- 
selves and  any  other  independent  Sovereign  State  or 
States;  and  at  all  times  to  abstain,  in  respect  of  such 
questions,  from  anything  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum ; 
from  any  threat  to  take  unfriendly  or  aggressive  action 
of  any  kind  with  a  view  to  redressing  the  alleged  griev- 
ance or  punishing  the  alleged  wrongdoing ;  and  from  any 
violation  of  the  territory  of  any  other  State  or  attack  on 
the  ships  of  such  State  or  other  military  or  naval  opera- 
tions, or  other  action  leading  or  likely  to  lead  to  war. 

Enforcement  of  the  Decrees  of  the  Court 

17.  When  in  any  case  upon  which  judgment  is  given 
by  the  International  High  Court,  the  Court  finds  that 
any  of  the  parties  to  the  case  has,  by  act,  negligence,  or 
default,  committed  any  breach  of  international  obliga- 
tion, whether  arising  by  Treaty  or  Agreement,  or  by 
International  Law,  or  by  enactment  of  the  International 
Council  in  accordance  with  these  Articles,  the  Court  may 
simply  declare  that  one  or  other  litigant  State  is  in  de- 
fault, and  leave  such  State  voluntarily  to  make  repara- 
tion; or  the  Court  may,  in  the  alternative,  itself  direct 
reparation  to  be  made  or  compensation  to  be  paid  for 

293 


such  wrong,  and  may  assess  damages  or  compensation, 
and  may,  either  by  way  of  addition  to  damages  or  com- 
pensation, or  as  an  alternative,  impose  a  pecuniary  fine 
upon  the  State  declared  in  default,  hereinafter  called 
the  recalcitrant  State ;  and  may  require  compliance  with 
its  decree  within  a  specified  time  under  penalty  of  a 
pecuniary  fine,  and  may  prescribe  the  application  of  any 
such  damages,  compensation,  or  fine. 

In  the  event  of  non-compliance  with  any  decision  or 
decree  or  injunction  of  the  International  High  Court,  or 
of  non-payment  of  the  damages,  compensation,  or  fine 
within  the  time  specified  for  such  payment,  the  Court 
may  decree  execution,  and  may  call  upon  the  Constituent 
States,  or  upon  some  or  any  of  them,  to  put  in  opera- 
tion, after  duly  published  notice,  for  such  period  and 
under  such  conditions  as  may  be  arranged,  any  or  all  of 
the  following  sanctions — viz. : 

(a)  To  lay  an  embargo  on  any  or  all  ships  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  such  Constituent  State  or  States  regis- 
tered as  belonging  to  the  recalcitrant  State; 

(6)  To  prohibit  any  lending  of  capital  or  other 
moneys  to  the  citizens,  companies,  or  subordinate  admin- 
istrations of  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  to  its  national 
Government ; 

(c)  To  prohibit  the  issue  or  dealing  in  or  quotation 
on  the  Stock  Exchange  or  in  the  press  of  any  new  loans, 
debentures,  shares,  notes  or  securities  of  any  kind  by 
any  of  the  citizens,  companies  or  subordinate  adminis- 
trations of  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  of  its  national  Gov- 
ernment ; 

(d)  To  prohibit  all  postal,  telegraphic,  telephonic  and 
wireless  communication  with  the  recalcitrant  State ; 

(e)  To  prohibit  the  payment  of  any  debts  due  to  the 
citizens,  companies  or  subordinate  administrations  of  the 
recalcitrant  State,  or  to  its  national  Government;  and, 

294 


if  thought  fit,  to  direct  that  payment  of  such  debts  shall 
be  made  only  to  one  or  other  of  the  Constituent  Govern- 
ments, which  shall  give  a  good  and  legally  valid  dis- 
charge for  the  same,  and  shall  account  for  the  net  pro- 
ceeds thereof  to  the  International  High  Court; 

(/)  To  prohibit  all  imports,  or  certain  specified  im- 
ports, coming  from  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  originating 
within  it; 

(g)  To  prohibit  all  exports,  or  certain  specified  ex- 
ports consigned  directly  to  the  recalcitrant  State,  or  des- 
tined for  it; 

(h)  To  prohibit  all  passenger  traffic  (other  than  the 
exit  of  foreigners),  whether  by  ship,  railway,  canal  or 
road,  to  or  from  the  recalcitrant  State ; 

(i)  To  prohibit  the  entrance  into  any  port  of  the  Con- 
stituent States  of  any  of  the  ships  registered  as  belong- 
ing to  the  recalcitrant  State,  except  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  for  any  of  them  to  seek  safety,  in  which  case 
such  ship  or  ships  shall  be  interned; 

(j)  To  declare  and  enforce  a  decree  of  complete  non- 
intercourse  with  the  recalcitrant  State,  including  all  the 
above-mentioned  measures  of  partial  non-intercourse ; 

(fc)  To  levy  a  special  export  duty  on  all  goods  destined 
for  the  recalcitrant  State,  accounting  for  the  net  pro- 
ceeds to  the  International  High  Court ; 

(I)  To  furnish  a  contingent  of  war-ships  to  maintain 
a  combined  blockade  of  one  or  more  of  the  ports,  or  of 
the  whole  coastline  of  the  recalcitrant  State. 

The  International  High  Court  shall  arrange  for  all  the 
expenses  incurred  in  putting  in  force  the  above  sanc- 
tions, including  any  compensation  for  loss  thereby  in- 
curred by  any  citizens,  companies,  subordinate  ad- 
ministrations or  national  Governments  of  any  of  the 
Constituent  States  other  than  the  recalcitrant  State,  to 
be  raised  by  a  levy  on  all  the  Constituent  States  in  such 

295 


proportions  as  may  be  decided  by  the  International  Coun- 
cil; and  for  the  eventual  recovery  of  the  total  sum  by 
way  of  additional  penalty  from  the  recalcitrant  State. 

When  on  any  decree  or  decision  or  injunction  of  the 
International  High  Court  execution  is  ordered,  or  when 
any  sanction  or  other  measure  ordered  by  the  Court  is 
directed  to  be  put  in  operation  against  any  Constituent 
State,  it  shall  be  an  offense  against  the  comity  of  na- 
tions for  the  State  against  which  such  decree,  decision, 
injunction  or  execution  has  been  pronounced  or  ordered, 
or  against  which  any  sanction  or  other  measure  is  di- 
rected to  be  enforced,  to  declare  war,  or  to  take  any  naval 
or  military  action,  or  to  violate  the  territory  or  attack 
the  ships  of  any  other  State  or  to  commit  any  other  act 
of  aggression  against  any  or  all  of  the  States  so  acting 
under  the  order  of  the  Court;  and  all  the  other  Con- 
stituent States  shall  be  bound,  and  do  hereby  pledge 
themselves,  to  make  common  cause  with  the  State  or 
States  so  attacked,  and  to  use  naval  and  military  force 
to  protect  such  State  or  States,  and  to  enforce  the  or- 
ders of  the  International  High  Court,  by  any  warlike 
operations  that  may  for  the  purpose  be  deemed  neces- 
sary. 

[See  New  Statesman,  special  supplement,  July  17, 
1915,  for  program,  with  notes  and  queries,  here  omitted.] 


INDEPENDENT  LABOR  PARTY 

Annual  Conference,  Norwich,  April  5  and  6,  1915. 
Drafted  Resolutions: 

independent  This  Conference  calls  upon  the  workers  to  guard 
against  allowing  elements  to  enter  the  peace  settlement 
which  would  be  a  pretext  and  excuse  for  future  devastat- 

296 


ing  wars ;  in  order  that  the  peace  may  be  just  and  lasting, 
the  Conference  demands: 

1.  That  the  people  concerned  shall  give  consent  before 
there  is  transfer  of  territory : 

2.  No  future  treaty,  agreement  or  understanding  be 
entered  into  without  the  knowledge  of  the  people  and 
the  consent  of  Parliament,  and  machinery  to  be  created 
for  the  democratic  control  of  foreign  policy : 

3.  Drastic  all-round  reduction  of  armaments,  by  inter- 
national  agreement,   together  with  the   nationalization 
of  the  manufacture  of  armaments,  and  the  national  con- 
trol of  the  export  of  armaments,  by  one  country  to  an- 
other : 

4.  British  foreign  policy  to  be  directed  in  future  to- 
ward establishing  a  federation  of  the  nations,  and  the  set- 
ting up  of  an  International  Council,  whose  decisions 
shall  be  public,  together  with  the  establishment  of  courts 
for  the  interpretation  and  enforcement  of  treaties  and 
International  Law. 

5.  This  Conference  is  of  opinion  that  an  International 
Arbitration  Court  should  be  established,  with  power,  as 
an  alternative  to  war,  to  enforce  its  decisions  by  declar- 
ing a  postal,  commercial,  transport  and  financial  boy- 
cott against  any  dissenting  nation. 

6.  This  Conference  is  of  opinion  that  no  war  should 
be  declared  without  the  consent  of  Parliament. 

7.  Recognizing  that  a  permanent  peace  must  be  based 
upon  mutual  confidence  and  goodwill  between  the  na- 
tions, which  can  only  be  shown  effectively  by  the  aban- 
donment of  all  material  preparations  for  war,  this  Con- 
ference urges  the  abolition  of  armaments,  the  disband- 
ing of  military  and  naval  forces,  and  the  prohibition  of 
the  manufacture  and  import  or  export  of  munitions  of 
war. 


297 


NATIONAL  PEACE  COUNCIL:  FEDERATION  OF  BRITISH 
PEACE  SOCIETIES 

National  1.  Establishment  of  an  international  peace  commission 

Council.  such  as  those  already  established  between  the  United 

States  and  certain  other  Powers. 

2.  Peace  commission  to  extend  its  functions  to  include 
both  those  of  a  commission  of  inquiry  and  of  a  per- 
manent Hague  court  of  arbitration. 

3.  Formation   of   a  permanent   Congress  of   Nations 
composed   of   delegates  appointed  by  the  Parliaments, 
to   settle   important  international   affairs  which  might 
give  rise  to  war;  further  elaboration  by  the  Congress 
of  the  Hague  Conventions  regulating  the  conduct  and 
methods  of  warfare. 

4.  No  territorial  change  without  consent  of  the  popu- 
lation involved. 

5.  Foreign  policies  and  treaties  subject  to  parliament- 
ary control. 

6.  Armament  question  to  be  put  before  Congress  of 
Nations. 

7.  Congress  to  seek  to  remove  obstacles  to  freedom  of 
trade. 


WOMEN'S  MOVEMENT  FOR  CONSTRUCTIVE  PEACE 
London 

Object:  to  organize  public  union  and  to  bring  its  pres- 
sure to  bear  upon  the  Governments  of  the  world  to  the 
furtherance  of  the  following  ends: 

PROPOSITIONS 

1.  The  reinforcement  of  the  Democracies  of  the  world 
by  the  inclusion  of  the  mother-half  of  the  human  race 
into  the  ranks  of  articulate  citizenship. 

298 


2.  The    creation    of    some    constitutional    machinery, 
where  none  at  present  exists,  by  which  the  Democracies 
may  exercise  some  control  over  foreign  policy. 

3.  That  all  treaties  and  alliances  on  the  part  of  any 
Democratic  nation  shall  be  ratified  by  the  representatives 
of  the  people. 

4.  That  the  manufacture  of  armaments  shall  be  nation- 
alized and  that  the  export  of  ammunition  from  one  coun- 
try to  another  shall  be  vetoed. 

5.  That  the  allies  shall  be  held  to  their  slogan  that 
this  is  a  war  to  end  war. 

6.  That  at  the  conclusion  of  peace  no  province  shall 
be  transferred  from  one  Government  to  another  without 
the  consent  of  the  population  concerned;  that  this  con- 
sent shall  be  obtained  by  plebiscite  and  that  women,  who 
have  suffered  equally  with  men,  shall  be  included  in  the 
plebiscite. 

7.  That  women  as  well  as  men  should  be  sent  as  rep- 
resentatives of  their  nation  to  the  Hague  Conference. 

8.  That  the  Democracies  shall  press  for  some  kind  of 
international  agreement  by  which  all  the  nations  shall 
put  themselves  at  the  back  of  any  one  lawabiding  nation 
that  is  aggressively  attacked,  or  of  any  small  country 
that  is  menaced  by  a  stronger  Power. 

9.  That  the  idea  be  brought  to  the  front  and  the  pos- 
sibility discussed  of  the  formation  of  an  European  Sen- 
ate composed  of  representatives  of  every  European  na- 
tion.    That  this  Senate  exist  for  the  discussion  of  inter- 
national concerns  and  in  this  way  a  means  may  be  con- 
structed whereby  nations  can  seek  to  obtain  what  is 
necessary  to  the  development  of  their  national  life  by 
bargain  and  by  exchange,  instead  of  by  secret  treachery 
or  open  slaughter  and  loot. 


299 


SUGGESTED  ADDENDA 


That  the  Hague  Conference  which  regulates  the  rules 
of  war  is  based  upon  a  pernicious  principle  in  that  it 
treats  as  natural  the  existence  of  war,  and  only  aims  to 
prune  off  some  features  regarded  as  objectionable,  in- 
stead of  trying  to  render  war  impossible. 


AUSTRALIAN  PEACE  ALLIANCE 

Australian  1.  The  establishment  of  an  effective  and  permanent 

Hance.  international  arbitration  court  elected  on  a  democratic 

basis,  including  women  delegates. 

2.  The  setting  up  of  adequate  machinery  for  ensuring 
democratic  control  of  foreign  policy. 

3.  The  general  reduction  of  armaments  and  the  na- 
tionalization of  their  manufacture. 

4.  The  organization  of  the  trades  unions  and  workers' 
associations,  with  a  definite  view  of  ending  war. 

5.  The  termination  of  the  present  war  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment,  and  the  following  principles  to  govern 
the  terms  of  peace: 

(  i.)  No  Province  or  Territory  in  any  part  of 
the  world  shall  be  transferred  from  one 
Government  to  another  without  the  con- 
sent by  plebiscite  of  the  population  of 
such  Province. 

(  11.)  No  treaty,  arrangement  or  undertaking 
shall  be  entered  upon  in  the  name  of 
Great  Britain  without  the  sanction  of 
Parliament.  Adequate  machinery  for 
ensuring  democratic  control  of  foreign 
policy  shall  be  created. 

(in.)  The  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  shall 
not  be  aimed  at  creating  Alliances  for 
300 


the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  "Bal- 
ance of  Power,"  but  shall  be  directed  to 
the  establishment  of  a  concert  of  Europe 
and  the  setting  up  of  an  international 
council,  whose  deliberations  and  deci- 
sions shall  be  public. 

(iv.)  Great  Britain  shall  propose  as  part  of  the 
peace  settlement  a  plan  for  the  drastic 
reduction  of  armaments  by  the  consent 
of  all  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  to  fa- 
cilitate that  policy  shall  attempt  to  se- 
cure the  general  nationalization  of  the 
manufacture  of  armaments  and  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  export  of  armaments  by 
one  country  to  another. 

(  v.)  The  universal  abolition  of  conscription  or 
compulsory  military  training. 


MR.  CHARLES  RODEN  BUXTON  ON  PEACE 
TERMS 

1.  Total  evacuation  by  Germany  of  Belgium,  France, 
Poland  and  Baltic  provinces,  and  by  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria  of  Serbia. 

2.  No  indemnity,  of  course,  from  Great  Britain,  but 
compensation  to  Belgium  by  Germany  for  damage  done. 

3.  The  special  demands  of  France  against  Germany,  of 
Italy  and  Serbia  against  Austria,  and  of  Russia  against 
Turkey  to  be  agreed  upon  with  Great  Britain  by  the 
States  concerned.    This  country  to  use  its  influence  to 
secure   that  such   demands  are   in  harmony  with  the 
principle  of  nationality. 

4.  Germany's  right  to  a  colonial  empire  to  be  recog- 
nized, though  not  necessarily  to  exactly  the  same  terri- 
tories as  those  previously  possessed. 

301 


POINTS  FOB  A  CONFERENCE 

The  following  points  might  be  referred  to  a  conference 
representing  neutral  and  belligerent  States: 

a.  The  repartition  of  Africa,  with  a  view  to  more  con- 
venient frontiers  and  to  the  interests  of  the  native  popu- 
lation. 

6.  The  question  of  equal  economic  opportunities,  in- 
cluding the  open  door,  in  all  colonial  possessions. 

c.  The  discussion  and  definition  of  immunity  from 
capture  of  goods  other  than  contraband  and  the  modifi- 
cation of  commercial  blockade,  whether  by  submarine 
warfare  or  otherwise. 

d.  As  a  condition  of  the  preceding  point  the  question 
of  equal,  comprehensive,  and  effective  guarantees  against 
future  war  on  land  as  well  as  on  sea;  binding  Germany 
as  well  as  other  nations,  including  ourselves. 


BRAILSFORD  ON  A  PEACE  BY 
SATISFACTION 

BrauL'.  A  peace  in  which  neither  side  could  dicate  the  settle- 

ford,  ment  might  aim  either  at  general  frustration  or  general 

satisfaction.  A  sullen  peace,  in  which  each  side  used  up 
the  remnants  of  its  military  strength  to  veto  the  claims 
of  the  adversary,  would  be  of  all  peaces  the  worst,  for 
it  would  leave  standing  all  the  old  causes  of  unrest.  This 
war  came  about  because  Europe  had  evolved  in  peace  no 
machinery  by  which  demands  for  large  and  necessary 
changes  could  be  met  without  war.  Each  people  post- 
poned its  larger  ambitions  until  war  should  come,  and 
the  knowledge  of  each  that  only  war  offered  a  chance 
of  satisfaction  made  our  universal  strife.  The  claims  of 

302 


the  Entente  Powers  for  certain  satisfactions  for  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality,  are  to  us  familiar  and  sympathetic. 
It  must  be  realized  that  the  German  demand  for  eco- 
nomic expansion  is  deeply  rooted,  and  in  the  modern 
world  inevitable.  For  Manchuria,  Morocco,  Egypt  and 
Tripoli,  the  Entente  Powers  made,  or  were  ready  to 
make  war.  The  German  craving  for  "a  place  in  the 
sun"  may  be  condemned  by  those  of  us  who  have  op- 
posed Imperialism  at  home,  but  the  ruling  classes  can- 
not consistently  censure  it.  For  twenty  years  past,  the 
unsolved  problem  for  European  statecraft  was  to  find 
an  outlet  for  these  tremendous  German  energies,  to  cut 
a  canal  in  which  the  broad  river  could  flow  without 
floods.  The  peace  of  Europe  will  never  be  secure  until 
this  passion  for  Imperial  work  overseas,  which  is  to-day 
the  strongest  ambition  in  Germany,  finds  its  useful  satis- 
faction. The  forges  are  there.  If  they  cannot  make 
rails,  they  will  make  cannon. 

The  formula  of  an  enduring  peace  must  be  to  remove 
all  the  causes  of  strife  in  Europe,  and  we  shall  succeed 
only  if  we  can  satisfy  the  enemy 's  legitimate  claims  while 
we  secure  justice  for  our  friends.  The  general  idea  must 
be,  win  from  him  the  largest  recognition  of  the  idea  of 
nationality,  while  conceding  to  him  the  economic  oppor- 
tunities which  he  requires.  The  more,  by  the  ordinary 
working  of  barter  that  we  concede,  the  more  shall  we  ob- 
tain. Let  us  attempt  to  sketch  what  the  main  lines  of 
such  an  exchange  might  be. 

(A) — ACTS  OF   RESTORATION 

1. — Belgium  must  be  restored,  Serbia  re-instated,  and 

French  territory  evacuated. 
2. — The  German  colonies  must  either  be  restored,  or 

equivalent  territories  provided. 
303 


(B) — CLAIMS  OP   NATIONALITY 

3. — The  ideal  solution  for  Poland,  in  a  political  sense, 
would  be  independence.  But  could  a  land-locked 
State,  between  three  great  military  empires,  ever 
be  secure?  The  Poles,  themselves,  are  not  averse 
to  the  idea  of  their  re-union  as  a  State  within  the 
Austrian  Empire.  If  they  had  the  same  status  as 
Hungary,  they  would  be  internally  independent. 
But  if  Europe  consented  to  allow  this  accession  of 
territory  to  Austria,  conditions  might  be  laic 
down.  It  might  be  stipulated  that  a  like  status 
should  be  given  to  Bohemia,  and  to  the  Serbo-Croats 
of  Croatia,  Bosnia  and  Dalmatia.  Thus  Austria 
would  become  a  quintuple  Federal  Empire  (Aus- 
tria, Hungary,  Bohemia,  Poland,  Jugoslavia),  and 
one  of  the  main  problems  of  the  war,  the  libera- 
tion of  the  Western  Slavs,  would  be  satisfactorily 
solved. 

In  return  for  this  extension  of  territory  Austrit 
might  be  required  to  cede  the  Eastern  (Ruthenian) 
part  of  Galicia  to  Russia,  and  the  Trentino  to  Italy. 

4. — The  chief  difficulty  lies  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  Let  us 
make  the  bold  claim  that  it  must  be  restored  to 
France  (or  such  parts  of  it  as  desire  this  change). 
What  can  we  offer  as  a  quid  pro  quo?  The  follow- 
ing economic  concessions  suggest  themselves  (5,  6, 
and?). 

(C) — ECONOMIC   CLAIMS 

5. — That  Germany  be  allowed  to  complete  that  closer 
economic  union  with  her  Allies,  and  especially  Aus- 
tria, which  seems  to  be  her  chief  objective.  We 
cannot  prevent  the  creation  of  "Mid-Europe"  as  an 
economic  unity,  but  we  might  reply  to  it  by  a  boy- 
304 


cott.  An  amiable  regulation  of  tariff  questions  is  a 
necessity  for  peace. 

6. — We  might  further  agree  not  to  oppose  such  eco- 
nomic expansion  (railway  and  irrigation  schemes) 
in  Turkey  as  Germany  can  arrange.  Turkey  would 
become  a  German  economic  sphere,  but  there  must 
be  guarantees  for  the  fair  treatment  of  the  trade 
in  goods  of  other  Powers. 

7. — A  general  measure  by  which  all  Powers  renounced 
differential  tariffs  in  their  tropical  colonies  would 
ease  the  struggle  for  territory.  France  would  be 
reluctant  to  agree  to  this,  but  the  condition  is  that 
she  secures  Alsace. 

(D) — OTHER  ISSUES 

8. — The  greater  part  of  Macedonia,  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  of  nationality,  must  go  to  Bulgaria. 

9. — Russia  might  acquire  the  Armenian  provinces  of 
Turkey.  It  lies  with  us  to  accord  her  an  ice-free 
port  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  A  Russian  protectorate 
over  Persia  might  in  the  end  be  less  fatal  to  Per- 
sian nationalism  than  the  present  partition  and  con- 
dominium. 

10. — Finally,  the  whole  bargain  must  rest  upon  Ger- 
many's assent  to  some  scheme  of  permanent  con- 
ciliation and  the  reduction  of  armaments,  and  upon 
our  consent  to  consider  a  revision  of  certain  usages 
of  sea-warfare. 

H.  N.  Brailsford. 


305 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PEOGEAMS 

4.  GERMANY 

GERMAN  AND  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  SOCIALISTS 
Vienna,  April  12-13,  1915. 

fsteiadf  1-  Development  of  the  international  arbitration  courts. 

Powers  ^'  Recognition  of  the  right  of  every  people  to  deter- 

mine its  own  destiny. 

3.  All  treaties  to  be  under  democratic  parliamentary 
control. 

4.  International   agreement  to  limit   armament  with 
general  disarmament  as  the  ultimate  goal. 


BUND  NEUES  VATERLAND 

Bund  1.  Development  of  international  organization, 

vateriand.  2.  Further  development  of  international  law  by  future 

Hague  conferences. 

3.  No  annexation. 

4.  No  secret  treaties. 

5.  Open  door.     Freedom  of  the  seas. 


MANIFESTO    OF    THE        DEUTSCHE   FRIEDENSGESELLSCHAFT ' 

German  Notwithstanding  the  prohibition  of  the  Government, 

Society.  demands  for  annexation  are  being  more  or  less  publicly 

advocated.     Six  large  agricultural  associations  go  espe- 
cially far  in  these  ideas;  indeed  for  one  petition  signa- 

306 


tures  are  collected  among  those  who  because  of  "their 
rank  and  education  consider  themselves  the  spiritual 
leaders  of  public  opinion."  This  movement  has  evi- 
dently the  support  of  important  circles.  The  worst  of 
this  is  that  those  demands  are  known  to  the  neutrals  and 
to  hostile  countries,  who  make  them  the  foundation  of 
their  accusations  of  German  desires  of  conquest.  Be- 
sides they  kindle  ill-feeling  against  Germany,  as  the 
Government  and  the  whole  German  nation  are  held  re- 
sponsible for  all  this. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Imperial  Government  is 
unjustly  accused  in  this  respect,  whatever  may  be  her 
attitude  towards  other  questions.  Should  such  ten- 
dencies be  publicly  criticized,  then  the  world  would  soon 
see  that  the  greater  part  of  the  German  nation  is  strongly 
opposed  to  them. 

The  prohibition  to  discuss  the  aims  of  the  war,  which  is 
strictly  maintained  with  respect  to  ourselves,  prevents  us 
from  criticizing  this  question  thoroughly;  and  from  or- 
ganizing our  opposition  to  such  tendencies. 

So  far  we  have  gladly  obeyed  the  order  not  to  discuss 
these  questions.  After  our  experience,  however,  of  the 
way  in  which  this  prohibition  and  the  above-mentioned 
agitation  are  exploited  abroad  to  the  detriment  of  Ger- 
man interests,  we  think  it  our  duty  to  appeal  to  the 
Government  to  grant  "free  speech  to  a  free  nation." 

Until  this  has  been  granted,  the  German  Peace  Asso- 
ciation can  do  no  more  than  utter  a  general  protest 
against  the  danger  of  such  annexation  ideas.  When 
such  ideas  are  considered  the  aim  of  war,  the  war  will  be 
prolonged  indefinitely,  for  months,  perhaps  for  years. 
Their  realization  would  not  strengthen,  but  weaken  Ger- 
many, abroad  as  well  as  at  home,  in  peace  and  in  future 
wars.  A  new  war  would  be  inevitable  shortly  after  such 
a  peace. 

307 


The  German  Peace  Association  and  all  friends  of  the 
people  desire  that  the  military  supremacy  of  the  Central 
Powers,  which  we  hope  will  decide  the  peace,  shall  be 
turned  towards  the  consolidation  of  Germany's  position 
in  the  world,  towards  the  development  of  the  economical 
and  national  forces  of  the  German  nation.  But  they 
hope  also,  that  the  coming  peace  may  contain  the  ele- 
ments of  a  durable  peace  and  lay  the  foundation  for  a 
lasting  community  of  justice  and  culture  between  the 
nations,  which  must  be  restored  after  the  peace,  howso- 
ever bitter  their  hostility  may  be  at  present.  The  asso- 
ciation is  convinced  that  a  sensible  consideration  of  the 
vital  interests  of  the  German  nation  will  prevail  over 
empty  phrases  and  private  interests,  when  the  conditions 
of  peace  shall  be  drawn  up. 

L.  QUIDDE, 
0.  UMFRID, 

Stuttgart. 


MANIFESTO    BY    88    GERMAN    PROFESSORS    AND    STATESMEN 

Mani-  Germany  has  not  entered  upon  this  war  with  the  idea 

Professors        of  conquering  foreign  territory,  but  in  order  to  defend 
state*-  her  existence,  her  internal  unity,  and  her  culture,  which 

were  threatened  by  a  hostile  coalition. 

When  peace  shall  be  discussed,  those  objects  alone 
should  be  Germany's  care.  Some  petitions  laid  before 
Your  Excellency  go  against  them :  so  we  consider  it  our 
duty  energetically  to  resist  such  endeavors  and  to 
declare  publicly  that  we  think  their  realization  a  polit- 
ical error,  which  may  produce  dangerous  consequences, 
and  not  a  strengthening  but  an  ominous  weakening  of 
the  German  Empire. 

Practically  we  lay  down  the  principle  that  annexation 
or  conquest  of  nations,  which  so  far  have  been  politi- 

308 


catty  independent,  is  not  advisable.  The  German  Em- 
pire is  the  result  of  the  idea  of  national  unity,  of  na- 
tional kinship.  Foreign  elements  have  been  amalga- 
mated only  slowly  and  incompletely;  so  we  object  to 
events,  persons  or  tendencies  which  may  be  easily  influ- 
enced one  way  or  another,  disturbing  the  leading  prin- 
ciples of  the  creation  of  our  Empire,  and  destroying  the 
character  of  our  national  State. 

Of  course  we  cannot  allow  a  territory  which  we  should 
evacuate  according  to  our  conditions  of  the  peace  to  be- 
come a  stronghold  for  our  enemies,  we  cannot  allow  the 
adversaries  of  Germany  to  settle  there.  There  should 
not  be  any  possibility  of  the  hostile  feelings  of  the  in- 
habitants revealing  themselves  in  hostile  actions,  which 
might  threaten  the  peace  and  security  of  our  border- 
provinces.  Such  dangers  can  be  averted  and  we  trust 
that  suitable  and  effective  measures  will  be  chosen  and 
applied  to  accomplish  this.  But  those  measures  should 
not  after  all  lead  to  annexation  in  any  form. 

With  our  whole  nation  we  share  the  conviction  that 
this  war  will  end  in  a  complete  victory  of  Germany. 
All  those  heroic  deeds,  those  endless  sacrifices  and  labors, 
all  this  military  glory  and  all  the  sorrow  borne  in  mute 
heroism,  entitle  Germany  to  a  price  of  victory  corre- 
sponding— as  far  as  that  is  possible — to  what  she  has  sac- 
rificed. 

The  highest  price  will  be  the  proudly  acquired  knowl- 
edge that  Germany  need  not  fear  a  world  full  of  ene- 
mies, and  the  unprecedented!  display  of  strength  she 
has  shown  before  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  and  the 
generations  yet  to  come. 

The  German  nation  can  only  conclude  a  peace  which 
assures  the  foundations  of  the  strategical  wants,  of  the 
political  and  economic  interests  of  the  country  and  the 
unimpeded  development  of  its  strength  and  its  energy 

309 


at  home  and  on  the  free  seas.  We  trust  that  with  the 
help  of  the  bodies  indicated  by  the  Constitution  Your 
Excellency  may  succeed  in  obtaining  such  a  peace  reso- 
lutely, while  we  are  in  the  zenith  of  our  military  suc- 
cesses. 


PROPOSALS  OF  SOUTH  GERMAN  SOCIAL  DEMOCRATS 

South  1  a.  Restitution  of  status  quo  ante,  or 

social  1  b.  Plebiscite    in    disputed    territories    (Alsace-Lor- 

crttsT  raine,    Schleswig,    Poland,    Baltic    Provinces,    Finland, 

Trentino).     International  possession  of  Bosphorus,  Dar- 
danelles, Suez  Canal,  Gibraltar,  and  Kiel  Canal. 

2.  No  indemnifications. 

3.  Confederacy  of  all  European  States. 

4.  Limitations  of  armies  and  navies.     People's  army 
for  defense  only. 

5.  Alliance  of  all  against  aggression. 

6.  International  Parliaments  and  permanent  interna- 
tional committees  in  place  of  diplomacy. 

7.  International  police.     International  law-courts  for 
minor  international  offenses. 

8.  Guarantees  of  democratic  government:  equality  of 
electoral  district,   ten-year  redistribution,   proportional 
representation,  payment  of  members. 


PEACE  AIMS  OF  GERMAN  SOCIALISTS:  CONFERENCE  OF 
PARTY'S  MEMBERS  IN  REICHSTAG  WITH  MEMBERS  OF 
PARTY  COMMITTEE. 

(Reported  in  New  York  Times,  August  26,  1915.) 

socialist  j    Peace  must  be  a  permanent  one,  leading  the  nations 

Commit-  to  closer  relations. 

•M 

2.  Germany's  opponents  must  not  be  permitted  to  ac- 
quire any  German  territory. 

310 


3.  "Most   favored   nation"   clauses  should  be   intro- 
duced into  peace  terms  with  all  belligerents. 

4.  Tariff  walls  should  be  removed. 

5.  So  far  as  possible,  freedom  of  the  seas  should  be 
established,   the   right   of   capture   abolished,    and   the 
straits,  important  for  the  world's  commerce,  should  be 
internationalized. 

6.  Austria  and  Turkey  should  not  be  weakened. 

7.  Annexations  of  foreign  territories  violate  the  rights 
of  peoples  to  self-rule,  and  weaken  internal  strength  and 
harmony  in  the  German  nation.     Therefore,  all  plans 
of  short-sighted  politicians  favoring  conquest  are   op- 
posed. 

8.  Finally,  the  party  demands  the  establishment  of 
an  international  court  to  which  all  future  conflicts  of 
nations  shall  be  submitted. 


THE  GERMAN  SOCIALISTS'  PEACE  MANIFESTO 

The  manifesto  was  published  June  26,  1915,  in  the 
form  of  a  full  page  advertisement  in  the  Berlin  Vor- 
waerts.  The  paper  was  promptly  suspended  but  not 
until  its  message  had  crossed  the  German  frontier. 
The  New  York  Times  publishes  a  translation  in  full  as 
follows : 

"For  nearly  a  year  the  world  has  been  devastated  by 
the  fury  of  war.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  human  lives 
have  been  cut  off  in  their  prime,  works  of  incalculable 
value  to  civilization  have  been  destroyed,  and  there  has 
been  an  appalling  weakening  of  human  forces.  Millions 
of  mothers,  wives,  and  children  are  weeping  for  their 
lost  sons,  husbands  and  fathers.  Want  and  harship 
heighten  the  misery  now  oppressing  the  nations.  Must 
this  terrible  drama,  which  has  no  precedent  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world,  go  on  indefinitely  ? 

311 


"The  Socialist  Party  foresaw  this  world  catastrophe 
and  predicted  it.  It  has  consistently  fought,  therefore, 
against  the  policies  of  imperial  expansion  and  against 
the  fatal  competition  in  armaments,  which  in  the  last  in- 
stance is  the  cause  of  this  war.  It  has  worked  unceas- 
ingly for  a  good  understanding  among  the  nations,  for 
the  cause  of  our  common  civilization,  and  for  the  welfare 
of  mankind.  When  last  year  threatening  war  clouds 
were  gathering  on  the  horizon  the  German  Socialists 
up  to  the  very  last  moment  bent  all  their  energies  to  pre- 
serving peace.  But,  to  the  misfortune  of  mankind,  they 
were  unable  to  avert  the  catastrophe. 

"Then  when  the  Czar's  Cossacks  came  across  the  bor- 
der, pillaging  and  burning,  the  Socialists  made  good  the 
promise  that  had  been  given  by  their  leaders — they  put 
themselves  at  the  service  of  the  Fatherland  and  voted  the 
means  for  its  defense.  They  not  only  did  their  duty  in 
defending  Germany's  national  independence,  but  they 
worked  with  all  their  might  to  safeguard  its  internal  in- 
terests in  the  matter  of  food  supplies,  in  relieving  the 
needy,  and  in  protecting  the  working  classes  against 
avaricious  tradesmen  and  narrow-minded  bureaucrats. 

"Faithfully  observing  the  obligations  which  all  So- 
cialist parties  are  bound  to  respect,  the  German  Socialist 
Party,  from  the  very  first  days  of  this  awful  tragedy, 
has  striven  to  further  the  cause  of  a  speedy  peace. 
When  the  first  war  loan  was  voted,  in  August,  1914,  the 
Socialist  group  in  the  Reichstag,  through  its  spokesman, 
Herr  Haase,  said:  'We  demand  that  as  soon  as  guar- 
antees of  national  safety  are  secured  and  the  enemy 
shows  an  inclination  to  make  peace,  the  war  be  brought 
to  an  end  on  conditions  admitting  of  friendly  relations 
with  neighboring  nations.' 

"This  demand,  which  was  accompanied  by  an  expres- 
sion disapproving  any  policy  of  conquest,  was  repeated 

312 


when  the  new  war  loan  was  voted  on  December  2.  On 
May  29,  after  Italy  had  intervened,  the  statement  was 
made  in  the  Reichstag  in  behalf  of  the  Socialist  Party 
that  the  desire  for  peace  was  increasing  and  that  the  So- 
cialists wanted  no  policy  of  conquest.  At  a  meeting  in 
Vienna  on  April  12  and  13  representatives  of  the  Ger- 
man and  Austro-Hungarian  Socialist  Parties  again 
adopted  a  resolution  in  favor  of  peace.  But  the  German 
Socialists  have  not  been  content  with  such  measures.  In 
spite  of  opposition  and  suspicion,  they  have  striven  for  a 
renewal  of  international  relations  with  the  Social-Dem- 
ocrats of  all  countries,  and  when  the  executive  committee 
of  the  international  Socialist  organization  made  a  pro- 
posal to  hold  a  meeting  at  The  Hague  to  discuss  the  pos- 
sibility of  peace  negotiations,  the  German  Socialist  lead- 
ers agreed,  under  condition  that  the  French  Socialist 
Party  participate.  All  efforts  at  an  international  agree- 
ment, however,  were  thwarted  by  the  attitude  of  the 
French  Socialists. 

"We  recognize  with  satisfaction  that  in  England,  as 
well  as  in  France,  there  are  Socialists  who  are  working 
for  peace.  That  cannot  blind  us  to  the  deplorable  fact 
that  the  majority  of  the  Socialists,  both  in  England  and 
France,  favor  continuing  the  war  until  Germany  is  com- 
pletely conquered. 

"The  Socialists  in  the  Reichstag  and  the  official  lead- 
ers of  the  Socialist  Party  have  constantly  and  unitedly 
fought  against  a  policy  of  conquests  and  annexation. 
We  protest  again  with  all  possible  emphasis  against  all 
efforts  looking  to  the  annexation  of  foreign  territory 
and  the  oppression  of  other  peoples — measures  now  de- 
manded by  the  great  business  organizations  and  influ- 
ential political  leaders.  The  mere  fact  that  such  efforts 
are  being  made  tends  to  postpone  the  day  of  peace,  which 
the  whole  public  is  now  so  earnestly  awaiting. 

313 


"The  people  want  no  conquest  of  land,  they  want 
peace.  If  the  war  is  not  to  go  on  indefinitely  until  all 
the  nations  are  completely  exhausted,  some  one  of  the 
Powers  involved  must  stretch  out  the  hand  of  peace. 
Upon  Germany,  which  has  successfully  defended  itself 
against  superior  forces,  and  which  has  frustrated  the 
plan  to  bring  it  to  starvation,  rests  the  duty  of  taking 
the  first  steps  toward  peace.  In  the  name  of  humanity 
and  civilization,  and  recognizing  the  favorable  military 
position  which  our  brave  troops  have  won,  we  urge  the 
Government  to  try  to  end  the  struggle.  We  expect  of 
our  fellow  Socialists  in  other  belligerent  countries  that 
they  will  make  the  same  demand  upon  their  own  gov- 
ernments. ' ' 


GERMAN  PROPOSALS  FOR  PEACE 

Letter  of  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg  to  American  News- 
papers, April  18,  1915. 

Dr.  1.  The  peace  must  be  of  a  permanent  nature. 

Dernburg.  g.  The  world  is  one  interlocking  family  of  nations. 

World  dominion  is  possible  only  with  dominion  on  high 
seas.  All  the  seas  and  narrows  must  be  neutralized 
permanently  by  common  and  effective  agreement  guar- 
anteed by  all  the  Powers. 

3.  The  free  sea  is  useless  without  free  cables.     Cables 
must  be  jointly  owned  by  the  interested  nations,  with  a 
world  mail-system.     Customs  duties  must  be  equal  foi 
all  exports  and  imports,  for  whatever  destination  am 
from   whatever   source.     Preferential   tariffs   with    col- 
onies are  the  basis  of  world-empire,  and  must  not  be 
permitted. 

4.  International  law  should  be  codified,  with  guaran- 
tees to  save  all  neutrals  from  implication  in  wars  in 
which  they  do  not  wish  to  take  part. 

314 


5.  A  natural   commercial   relationship   between   Ger- 
many and  Belgium  must  be  established  in  workable  form. 

6.  Germany  should  be  permitted  industrial  expansion 
in  such  foreign  parts  as  need  or  wish  for  development. 

Dr.  Dernburg's  Speech  at   City   Club,   Cleveland, 
May  8,  1915. 

1.  Asks  recognition  of  the  truth  that  strong  nations 
showing  great  vitality  and  large  increase  are  entitled 
to  enough  soil,  air  and  water  to  maintain  and  advance 
their  growing  population.     The  lack  of  such  proper  ad- 
justment of  the  conditions  of  the  European  Powers  dur- 
ing the  last  fifty  years  has  been  one  of  the  primary 
causes  for  unrest  in  Europe,  and  one  of  the  principal 
dangers  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 

2.  Since  no  readjustment  of  the  kind  can  take  place  in 
Europe  on  national  lines,  it  is  necessary  to  seek  the  solu- 
tion, first,  by  the  apportioning  of  all  uncivilized  parts 
of  the  globe,  that  is,  by  a  readjustment  of  colonial  pos- 
sessions, then  by  the  creation  of  spheres  of  influence  and 
non-interference  with  nations  who  are  willing  to  take 
and  to  concede  such  spheres;  further,  by  an  open  door 
and  equal  opportunity  policy  all  over  the  globe;  and 
finally,  by  the  neutralization  of  all  the  seas  and  narrows, 
cables  and  overseas  mails  of  the  world.     This  readjust- 
ment must  be  sanctioned  by  a  simple  and  codified  in- 
ternational law,  safeguarded  so  that  it  cannot  be  broken 
without  putting  the  infractor  outside  the  pale  of  inter- 
national relationships,  not  only  with  the  party  attacked, 
but  also  with  all  the  parties  remaining  neutral.    Eng- 
land must  give  up  her  rule  of  the  seas,  which  must  be 
placed  definitely  in  the  hands  of  all  the  Powers  of  the 
world.    World  trade  must  be  free  and  all  colonies  neu- 
tralized.    The  decision  whether  there  is  to  be  a  free  and 

315 


neutralized  sea  or  a  Chinese  wall  will  also  be  decisive 
regarding  the  fate  of  Belgium.  If  the  sea  remains  forti- 
fied, there  can  be  no  choice  for  Germany  except  to  have 
her  own  sea  fortresses  as  well,  and  since  the  only  way  of 
getting  out  into  the  high  sea  would  be  by  way  of  Bel- 
gium, there  would  be  no  possibility  of  Germany's  con- 
sidering the  return  of  Belgium  to  its  former  status. 


PROF.  DR.  L.  QUIDDE  ON  REAL  GUARANTEES 
FOR  A  DURABLE  PEACE 

Prof.  I.     The   annexation  of  Belgium  would   prolong   the 

indefinitely. 


II.  The  strength  of  the  German  Empire  ivould  de- 
crease instead  of  increase   by  the  annexation  of  Bel- 
gium, in  times  of  peace  as  well  as  during  the  war. 

The  annexation  of  Belgium  would  destroy  every  out- 
look of  a  better  understanding  between  Germany  and  her 
present  enemies,  after  the  war.  It  ivould  make  almost 
the  whole  rest  of  the  world  remain  our  enemies  and 
would  call  forth  a  coalition  of  all  against  one.  Germany 
need  not  foster  illusions  in  this  respect,  if  she  only  con- 
siders the  effect  of  the  invasion  into  Belgium  upon  public 
opinion  throughout  the  world,  especially  in  those  neu- 
tral countries  who  were  originally  Germany's  friends. 

He  who  wishes  to  annex  Belgium  must  have  the  cour- 
age to  face  the  fact  that  annexation  will  make  the  whole 
world  our  enemy  for  an  indefinite  space  of  time  and 
will  completely  isolate  Germany  politically,  so  far  as 
the  feelings  of  the  nations  are  to  bring  about  such  isola- 
tion. 

III.  The  annexation  of  Belgium  is  bound  to  bring 
about  a  new  war. 

It  is  evident  that  neither  England  nor  France  can 
allow  Belgium  to  be  annexed  by  Germany  as  long  as 

316 


they  do  not  wish  to  be  annihilated  themselves.  Espe- 
cially England  would  have  to  prepare  retaliation  with 
all  the  force  that  she  can  display,  and  it  would  be  easy 
enough  for  her  to  find  allies  to  support  her.  One  may 
differ  vastly  on  the  subject  of  annexation,  its  advan- 
tages and  drawbacks,  but  one  cannot  deny  that  durable 
peace  and  annexation  of  Belgium  are  two  things  abso- 
lutely incompatible. 

Finally  Prof.  Quidde  asks  how  it  will  be  possible 
to  make  a  durable  peace  which  at  the  same  time  guar- 
antees the  welfare  of  Germany.  This  will  be  first  of 
all  a  general  removal  of  the  causes  that  have  led  to  the 
war,  followed  by  a  thorough  reorganization  of  Europe 
on  lines  offering  a  better  security  for  peace. 

The  first  essentials  for  that  reorganization  are  the 
"open-door"  and  the  "free  sea,"  which  will  have  to  be 
guaranteed  by  international  treaties. 

One  of  the  best  grounded  charges  against  Interna- 
tional Law  is,  that  International  Law  is  in  many  cases 
so  hopelessly  rudimentary  that  the  lack  of  precision 
forms  a  temptation  to  violate  it.  It  is  necessary  that 
a  strong  agitation  for  the  development,  perfection  and 
sanction  of  International  Law  should  result  from  the 
experiences,  the  causes  and  the  course  of  this  war. 


ED.  BERNSTEIN  ON  PEACE  TERMS 
i 

It  is  the  vital  interest  of  the  majority  of  the  German  |^n. 
nation,  that  the  present  war  should  end  by  a  peace  treaty  8tein- 
which,  as  to  the  rights  and  the  relations  of  the  nations,  is 
in  conformity  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  pro- 
gram of  the  German  Social-Democrat  Party  and  in  the 
resolutions  adopted  by  their  party-meetings  and  by  the 
International  Social-Democratic  Congresses. 

317 


Only  a  peace  based  on  these  principles  will  result  in 
renewing  the  friendly  relations  between  Germany  and 
the  nations  she  is  now  at  war  with,  as  soon  and  as  thor- 
oughly as  possible. 

ii 

The  supreme  principle,  insisted  upon  in  the  program 
and  the  resolutions  of  the  Social-Democratic  Party  is  the 
right  of  peoples  to  decide  their  own  fate,  within  the  lim- 
its of  international  law. 

The  German  Socialists  consider  it  their  duty  to  defend 
this  principle  by  all  available  means  against  any  attack 
from  any  side  whatsoever.  No  nation  or  part  of  a  na- 
tion having  so  far  enjoyed  national  independence,  may 
be  deprived  of  this  right  or  see  it  impaired ;  no  territory 
may  be  annexed,  when  the  annexation  would  deprive 
the  inhabitants  of  that  right. 

The  Social-Democratic  Party  do  not  admit  the  right 
of  conquest  of  one  nation  over  any  other. 

ra 

In  the  case  of  countries  of  European  civilization, 
which  have  lived  under  foreign  rule,  no  territorial 
changes  shall  take  place  without  a  referendum  being 
taken  of  the  inhabitants.  This  referendum  should  be 
arranged  and  supervised  by  representatives  of  neutral 
States,  so  as  to  insure  perfect  freedom  in  voting.  Any 
inhabitant,  who  is  of  age  and  has  lived  in  the  country 
for  at  least  a  year  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  shall 
have  the  right  to  vote. 

In  the  interests  of  peace,  all  peoples  of  European  civil- 
ization living  under  foreign  rule  in  sufficient  numbers 
to  form  a  community  in  the  international  Concert,  shall 
obtain  political  independence. 

When  a  sufficient  number  out  of  subject  peoples  in- 
318 


corporated  by  force  in  one  State,  desire  to  belong  to  an- 
other, they  shall  be  given  the  right  to  decide  by  vote  as 
to  which  State  they  will  belong. 

rv 

Transfer  of  territory  outside  of  Europe  shall  only  take 
place  under  such  conditions,  as  guarantee  that  the  legal 
and  material  conditions  of  such  native  population  shall 
not  be  injured. 

v 

Nations  can  only  be  safeguarded  against  a  renewal  of 
war  or  wars  of  retaliation  by  developing  and  strengthen- 
ing international  law. 

In  this  respect  the  following  means  should  be  empha- 
sized : 

a.  Development  of  the  Hague  Conference  into  a  Per- 
manent International  Conference  for  the  Codification 
of  International  Law  and  for  International  Arbitration. 
Concentration  of  the  various  Hague  institutions  into  a 
permanent  international  court,  suitably  divided  into 
branch  courts. 

6.  All  States  to  bring  those  differences  they  cannot 
themselves  peaceably  solve,  before  the  Court  of  Justice 
to  be  instituted  by  the  Hague  Conference,  where  they 
will  be  settled  either  by  mutual  agreement,  conciliation 
or  abitration. 

c.  All  signatory  States  to  refrain  from  war  or  war- 
like measures  till  the  Court  of  Justice  has  examined  the 
cause  of  war  and  till  all  attempts  to  settle  the  difference 
in  a  peaceful  manner,  have  proved  useless.    Any  State 
or  Union  resorting  to  hostilities  contrary  to  these  rules 
to  be  treated  as  an  enemy  by  all  the  others. 

d.  The  Parliaments  to  decide  about  war  and  peace. 
Secret  treaties  to  be  abolished. 

319 


e.  Development  of  International  Law  relating  to  the 
conduct  of  war  and  the  protection  of  the  civil  popula- 
tion. Abolition  of  the  right  of  capture  at  sea  and  of 
the  right  to  levy  war-contributions.  No  hostages  to  be 
taken.  Abolition  of  the  system  of  reprisals  against  in- 
habitants of  an  invaded  country  for  acts  of  self-defense 
or  defense  of  other  non-combatants.  Permanent  com- 
mittees to  watch  the  actions  of  belligerents  in  occupied 
territories  and  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  and  of 
civil  prisoners  interned  in  the  enemy's  country. 

/.  Internationalization  of  transcontinental  railways 
and  of  all  waterways  connecting  seas  or  lakes  sur- 
rounded by  different  countries,  with  the  ocean. 

g.  Adoption  of  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  for 
all  Colonies,  Protectorates  and  for  every  territory  which 
lies  in  the  sphere  of  influence  of  an  European  State. 

h.  These  principles  to  be  inserted  into  the  constitu- 
tions of  the  Powers. 

BELGIUM 

Whereas,  Art.  2  already  excludes  any  forcible  annex- 
ation of  Belgian  territory  or  any  attack  on  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium  by  another  State,  Germany  has 
moreover  invaded  Belgium,  overpowered  its  army  and 
occupied  its  territory  without  any  provocation  from 
the  side  of  Belgium  and  as  the  Chancellor  has  himself 
admitted  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in  defi- 
ance of  the  law  of  nations.  Germany  having  thus  made 
her  way  into  Belgium  to  satisfy  her  own  designs,  beat 
down  the  resistance  of  the  army  and  occupied  the  coun- 
try by  force,  Germany  is  therefore  bound  in  honor  to 
evacuate  Belgium  immediately  on  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  in  accordance  with  the  solemn  delaration,  made 
on  August  4,  1914,  by  the  German  Ambassador,  Prince 

320 


Lichnowsky,  to  the  English  Secretary  of  State,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  and  to  pay  a  full  and  ample  indemnity  to 

he  people  of  Belgium  for  the  material  and  moral  in- 

ury  which  they  have  suffered. 


321 


C.   G.  T. 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 
5.  FRANCE 

FRENCH  GENERAL,  CONFEDERATION  OF  LABOR 

1.  Federation  of  nations. 

2.  Compulsory  arbitration  of  international  disputes. 

3.  Independence  of  nationalities.     Bight  of  all  peo- 
ples to  dispose  of  themselves  to  be  safeguarded. 

4.  Suppression  of  secret  diplomacy. 

5.  End  of  competitive  armament. 

6.  Conference  of  organized  labor  forces  of  the  work 
at  same  time  as  conference  of  diplomats. 


322 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 
6.  SWITZERLAND 

RESOLUTIONS  OF  Swiss  PEACE  SOCIETY 
At  Annual  Meeting,  May  17,  1915. 

1.  The   avoidance   of   any   annexation    or   territorial 
changes  which  are  in  opposition  to  the  interests  and  Socie*y- 
wishes  of  a  population ;  a  guarantee  of  religious  liberty, 

free  speech  and  equality  before  the  law,  for  the  minority. 

2.  The  creation  of  a  permanent  organization  in  which 
all  European  States  shall  be  equally  represented,  for  the 
purpose  of  safeguarding  the  order,  peace  and  safety  of 
our  portion  of  the  earth. 

3.  The  development  of  an  international  law  organiza- 
tion by  continual  Hague  Conferences. 


Swiss  COMMITTEE  FOR  THE  STUDY  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
A  DURABLE  TREATY  OF  PEACE 

President:  Prof.  Otto  Nippold,  Bern. 

1.  Participation  of  neutral  nations  in  the  settlement,  commit- 

2.  Prohibition  of  secret  treaties  and  agreements  be-  steudfyr 
tween  nations.  of  Peace- 

3.  Participation  of  popular  representative  bodies  in 
control  of  foreign  policy. 

4.  No  annexation  except  after  plebiscite  of  popula- 
tions concerned. 

5.  Limitation  of  armaments  to  point  of  mere  protec- 
:ion. 

323 


6.  Manufacture  of  armaments  to  become  State  mo- 
nopoly. 

7.  The  States  which  participate  in  the  settlement  are 
to  mutually  guarantee  each  other's  territories. 

8.  Since  the  best  guarantee  for  the  preservation  of 
world  peace  lies  in  the  creation  of  international  law  and 
custom,  arbitration  must  be  substituted  for  war. 

9.  Disputed  regions  of  the  earth  should  be  neutralized. 

10.  Free  trade  in  all  colonies. 


324 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  PROGRAMS 
7.  HOLLAND 

NEDERLANDSCHE  ANTI-OORLOG  EAAD 

The  Hague 
Founded  on  the  8th  of  October,  1914 

The  Council  is  of  opinion  that  the  following  principles  Dutch 
are  indispensable  to  attain  a  lasting  peace:  war" 

1.  Concert  of  the  Powers  instead  of  mutually  opposed  CounciL 
Alliances ; 

2.  Limitation  of  armaments  by  international  regula- 
tions; 

3.  Influence  of  the  different  Parliaments  on  the  peace- 
treaty  ; 

4.  Avoidance  of  the  dangers  engendered  by  annexa- 
tion or  by  transfer  of  territory  against  the  will  of  the 
population ; 

5.  Removal  of  the  obstructions  to  commerce  or  at  least 
of   difference  in  treatment  of  the  various  nations  in 
colonies  and  settlements,  according  to  international  reg- 
ulations. 

6.  New  endeavors  to  promote  compulsory  arbitration 
and  compulsory  inquiry  of  international  differences. 


325 


One  vrould  prefer  to  think  otherwise,  but  the  truth  probably 
is  that  the  future  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  nature  of  inter- 
national organization  depends  a  good  deal  less  upon  definitely 
conceived  plans  like  that  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  (how- 
ever admirable  and  desirable  it  may  be  to  promote  definite 
projects  of  that  kind)  than  upon  the  nature  of  the  foreign 
policy  which  each  nation  individually  pursues.  Disagreements 
between  nations  arise  generally  in  situations  in  which  both  sides 
honestly  believe  themselves  to  be  in  the  right.  Most  nations 
are  honestly  in  favor  of  peace  in  general,  and  would  go  to  The 
Hague  and  assist  in  drawing  up  plans  to  maintain  it;  yet  each 
may  be  persisting  in  a  line  of  conduct  which,  in  its  own  view 
entirely  defensive  and  defensible,  appears  to  another  unwar- 
rantably aggressive.  And  when  that  is  the  case  paper  arrange- 
ments for  avoiding  conflict  are  apt  to  break  down. 

So  the  most  practical  question  for  each  of  us  for  some  time  is 
likely  to  be  this:  what  will  be  the  effect  of  our  own  country's 
conduct  in  its  relations  with  other  countries,  upon  the  future 
peace  and  international  condition  of  the  world?  Or,  to  put  the 
question  in  another  form :  What  can  our  country  do,  irrespec- 
tive of  what  others  may  do,  to  contribute  to  a  more  orderly 
international  condition,  saner  world  politics? 

America  is  of  course  concerned  in  the  present  war  whether 
she  will  or  no.  She  may,  by  her  material  resources  in  supplies, 
ammunition,  credit,  be  largely  influencing  its  decision.  As  part 
of  the  problem  of  protecting  her  own  rights,  incidentally 
menaced  by  the  operations  of  the  war,  she  has  taken  very 
solemnly  a  certain  position  in  international  affairs.  She  has 
declared,  for  instance,  that  she  stands  irrevocably  for  the  pro- 
tection of  innocent  non-combatant  life  at  sea  in  war  time.  She 
would  undoubtedly  stand  as  decisively  for  certain  lesser  rights 

326 


of  trade  and  free  communication  on  the  seas  as  well  (in  the 
past  she  has  gone  to  war  in  their  defense)  but  for  the  fact  that 
doing  so  against  one  belligerent  would  aid  the  cause  of  the  other 
guilty  of  still  greater  offenses. 

And  if  we  look  beneath  diplomatically  expressed  claims  into 
unofficial,  but  unmistakably  expressed  public  opinion,  we  find 
America  standing  strongly  for  certain  other  rules  of  life  be- 
tween nations — the  right  of  each  nation  to  national  existence 
for  instance — like  those  violated  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium. 

Is  America  really  serious  in  the  stand  thus  made  ?  Or  is  she 
going  to  avow  by  her  future  policy,  if  not  in  words,  that  she 
will  take  no  real  risk  nor  assume  any  real  obligation  in  support 
of  the  principles  she  has  been  maintaining  diplomatically  and 
by  her  clearly  expressed  public  opinion.  Is  she  going  to  sub- 
mit lamely,  to  the  indignities  and  violation  of  right  involved  in 
the  massacre  of  her  innocent  non-combatant  citizens  at  sea  ? 

I  put  the  question  in  that  form  because  it  is  generally  a 
rhetorical  prelude  to  the  demand  for  warlike  action.  And  yet 
the  American  who  is  moved  by  his  country's  dignity  and  right 
to  have  thought  this  thing  out,  as  well  as  to  have  become  angry 
about  it,  knows  that  warlike  action  is  perhaps  the  very  last 
thing — though  it  may  be  the  last  thing — which  the  situation 
calls  for;  and  that  warlike  action  alone  would  be  a  betrayal  of 
his  country's  highest  interests  in  the  matter.  If  America  is 
really  serious  she  must  prepare  herself — in  public  opinion,  in 
-political  education — for  action  of  a  different  kind:  for  the 
abandonment  of  certain  traditions  about  freedom  from  en- 
tangling alliances,  for  the  assumption  of  risks  and  obligations 
which  to  most  Americans  is  to  ask  a  great  deal  more  than  the 
mere  act  of  going  to  war. 

Why  will  war  of  itself  not  suffice? 

Suppose  this  country  goes  to  war,  over,  for  instance,  the  sub- 
marine issue;  and  is  finally  entirely  successful,  so  far  as  de- 
feating Germany  is  concerned.  How  do  we  then  know  that 
America  has  got  what  she  has  been  fighting  for?  Our  de- 
mands at  the  end  of  the  war  will  be  that  American  rights  at  sea 
shall  be  respected;  that,  most  particularly,  non-combatants 
shall  not  be  drowned  by  attacks  on  merchantmen.  Very  good. 
Germany  gives  us  her  promise.  She  has  given  it  before.  How 
do  we  know  that  it  will  be  kept — either  by  her  or  any  other 
nation  that  in  a  future  war  may  find  a  ruthless  use  of  the  sub- 
marine the  only  weapon  left  to  it  against  a  power  commanding 

327 


the  sea?  Can  we  hope  that  if  we  show  now  that  we  are  ready 
to  fight  "at  the  drop  of  the  hat,"  in  future  a  hard-pressed 
belligerent  will  be  overawed  by  the  great  American  navy? 
Then  why  is  not  the  belligerent  we  now  propose  to  deal  with 
held  in  check  by  the  combined  navies  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  Italy,  Japan  and  Portugal?  Again,  when  we  have  that 
promise  at  the  end  of  our  victorious  war  how  do  we  know  that 
it  will  be  kept,  that  we  shall  have  got  what  we  have  been 
fighting  for? 

And  what  of  the  American  case  against  the  Allies  ?  Is  Amer- 
ica now  to  surrender  rights  upon  which  she  has  insisted  ever 
since  she  became  an  independent  State  and  which  she  once 
fought  a  war  and  twice  very  nearly  came  to  war  to  defend  ?  Is 
America,  in  fighting  Germany  to  make  the  British  Order  in 
Council  the  basis  of  future  sea  law,  so  that  when  say  Japan 
goes  to  war  with  some  other  nation  America  will  have  to  submit 
to  Japanese  control  of  her  trade  and  communication  with  neu- 
tral States — even  to  mail  and  banking  correspondence — as  she 
now  submits  to  British  control? 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  American  claims  have  this  difference 
from  those  of  the  Allies :  they,  in  so  far  as  they  are  territorial 
can  at  the  peace  be  satisfied  on  the  spot.  America's  cannot. 
Hers  depend  absolutely  upon  the  establishment,  after  the  war, 
of  a  different  and  better  international  order;  upon  agreement 
as  to  what  shall  constitute  international  law  and  some  method 
of  ensuring  its  observance. 

Now  has  it  not  become  evident  that  the  present  German- 
American  situation  contains  the  elements  of  a  great  opportunity 
for  America :  not  only  of  putting  an  end  to  a  situation  humiliat- 
ing for  herself  but  of  creating  a  new  state  of  world  affairs  out 
of  which  might  grow — would  almost  inevitably  grow — the  res- 
toration of  general  peace  on  conditions  that  civilization  could 
accept? 

But  that  result  is  certainly  conditional  on  one  thing:  that 
American  diplomacy  is  great  enough  to  make  precedent,  to  be 
dangerously  honest  to  the  point  of  dropping  diplomatic  make- 
believe  and  breaking  with  diplomatic  usage. 

Germany  says  in  effect  that  she  will  make  military  sacrifices 
for  the  purpose  of  respecting  American  neutral  right,  if  Amer- 
ica on  her  side  will  reciprocally  fulfil  neutral  obligation  by 
insisting  on  the  military  sacrifice  from  both  belligerents;  so 
that  American  rights  are  not  made  a  means  of  handicapping 

328 


one  party  as  against  the  other;  are  not  invoked  in  what  Ger- 
many regards  as  so  one-sided  a  fashion  as  to  become  an  arm 
for  the  use  of  one  belligerent  against  the  other. 

Now  it  is  quite  within  precedent,  right  and  usage,  to  reply, 
as  in  the  past,  to  such  a  demand  by  diplomatic  punctilio: 
"America  cannot  discuss  the  behavior  of  one  belligerent  with 
the  other,"  and  so  forth  and  so  forth.  The  American  govern- 
ment could  make  excellent  debating  points  and  be  diplomati- 
cally entirely  correct. 

But  suppose,  instead,  it  were  undiplomatically  honest  and 
unprecedentedly  bold  and  said  bluntly  what  every  one  knows  to 
be  the  truth :  that  because  of  the  slowly  acquired  American  con- 
viction of  the  badness  of  the  German  cause — the  danger  to 
civilization  and  ourselves  which  this  country  has  come  to  believe 
inherent  in  that  cause — it  is  impossible  for  America  to  enforce 
the  law — or  what  America  holds  to  be  the  law — sharply  against 
England,  to  take  any  action  which  would  seriously  add  to  the 
chances  of  German  victory ;  to  be,  in  other  words,  really  neutral. 
Suppose  America  bold  and  honest  enough  to  avow  the  quite 
simple  obvious  truth  that  we  are  not  indifferent  as  to  the  out- 
come of  the  war  and  that  in  the  long  run  our  conduct  won't  be 
guided  as  though  we  were;  that  so  long  as  we  have  reason  to 
believe  German  policy  a  menace  it  will  encounter  in  one  form 
or  another  (not  excluding  necessarily  even  the  military  form) 
our  active  or  latent  opposition. 

And  then,  suppose  that  on  top  of  that  impossibly  bold  and 
honest  stand  this  country  were  further  to  announce  that  it  can 
only  act  effectively  for  the  sea  law  Germany  desires,  and  other- 
wise withdraw  its  opposition,  if  Germany  is  prepared  to  reas- 
sure us  as  to  her  cause  by  stating  definitely  that  the  terms  upon 
which  she  is  prepared  to  discuss  peace  include  such  things  as 
the  evacuation  of  Belgium  and  France  and  indemnification  for 
damage  done ;  the  acceptance  of  the  international  principles  in- 
volved in  the  American  claims ;  recognition  of  the  absolute  right 
to  existence  of  all  States  great  and  small ;  readiness  to  enter,  at 
least  to  the  extent  that  others  are  ready,  into  European  or 
world  arrangements  for  the  guarantee  of  that  right  and  the 
mutual  discussion  and  limitation  of  armaments;  together  with 
such  minor  details  as  agreement  to  the  appointment  of  an  inter- 
national commission  to  enquire  into  the  violation  of  the  laws  of 
war  on  land  and  sea  and  the  punishment  of  the  individuals  con- 
victed by  that  commission. 

329 


Once  convinced  that  Germany  stands  for  a  policy  such  as 
peace  on  those  terms  would  imply,  America  could  on  her  side 
(so  this  impossibly  honest  diplomacy  might  make  plain)  stand 
effectively  for  the  freedom  of  the  sea  as  against  England  if 
needs  be  at  least  to  the  extent  of  upholding  the  Declaration  of 
London;  could  assure  Germany  that  this  country  would  never 
be  reckoned  among  her  enemies,  but  on  the  contrary  would  co- 
operate with  her  in  defense  of  that  equality  of  commercial 
opportunity  in  the  world  of  which  Germany  accuses  her  enemies 
of  trying  to  deprive  her. 

Such  a  "Declaration  of  America's  International  Position"  as 
that  which  I  am  here  imagining  would,  in  more  precise  terms, 
be  about  as  follows: 

1.  Though  America  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  has  done 
^everything  possible  to  observe  the  form  of  neutrality  which  in- 
ternational practise  had  heretofore  imposed  upon  States  not 
actively  participating  in  a  war,  the  circumstances  of  the  present 
conflict  have  shown  that  the  future  protection  of  her  own  par- 
ticular interests  are  so  identified  with  the  maintenance  of  certain 
general  rules  of  international  intercourse  that  in  all  future 
wars  she  will  differentiate  in  her  treatment  of  the  combatants. 
Thus  in  no  case  will  American  resources  be  available  for  the 
military  purposes  of  a  belligerent  who  had  entered  upon  a  war 
refusing  to  submit  his  case  to  enquiry  and  the  necessary  delay, 
and  to  adhere  to  certain  rules  necessary  for  the  safeguarding 
of  innocent  non-combatant  life. 

The  United  States  could  not  in  consequence  feel  that  her  re- 
lations with  Germany  could  be  placed  upon  a  really  sound 
foundation  of  friendly  cooperation  until  that  country  had 

(a)  accepted  the  international  principles    (as  for  instance  the 
sanctity  of  non-combatant  life)   involved  in  the  American  claims 
and  the  further  principle  that  their  violation  is  an  unfriendly 
act  towards  America  whether   American   life   and   property   are 
concerned  or  not; 

(b)  undertaken  to  evacuate  Belgium,  France  and  Serbia  and 
indemnify  Belgium  for  damage  done; 

(c)  agreed  to  the  appointment  of  an  international  commission  of 
inquiry  into  the  violation   of  the  rights   of  non-combatants  on 
land  and  sea,  with  authority  to  assess  damages,  and  to  payment 
of  any  damages  in  which  Germany  may  be  cast,  and  to  punish- 
ment  of   individuals  convicted   of   offenses   against   the   laws   of 
war. 

On  the  acceptance  of  these  terms  by  Germany,  America  would 
undertake : 

330 


A.  Not  to  furnish  military  or  naval  aid  to  Germany's  enemies 
in  this  war. 

B.  To  become  one  of  the  guarantors  of  the  integrity  of  Belgium. 

C.  In  the  event  of  the  creation  of  new  buffer  States,  to  assist 
in  the  maintenance  of  their  inviolability  by  refusing  to   allow 
American  citizens  to  furnish  their  invader  with  supplies  of  any 
nature:  by  the  application,  that  is,  of  the  principle  of  differential 
neutrality  above  indicated. 

D.  To  accord   to  German   citizens  in   protectorates   subject  to 
American  control,  commercial  access  on  equal  terms  with  Ameri- 
can citizens  and  to  support  by  the  differential  neutrality  already 
indicated  the  policy  of  the  open  door   in  all  protectorates  and 
non-self-governing    territories.     That    is    to    say    America    would 
undertake   not  to  furnish   military   or   naval   aid   to   any   power 
or  group  of  powers  that  refused  to  apply  the  principle   of  the 
open  door  in  their  protectorates,  and  to   prohibit  the  export  of 
supplies  or  munitions  to   such   powers   in  their   military   opera- 
tions. 

E.  To  join,  pari  passu,  with  other  powers  in  any  arrangement 
for  enforcing  the  submission  of  international  disputes  to  enquiry. 

Now  whatever  followed  that  announcement  America  and  the 
world  would  gain.  If  Germany  refused  she  would  by  that 
prove  that  she  was  still  unchastened,  not  ready  to  surrender  or 
modify  her  policy  of  world  hegemony.  America  then  knows 
that  her  fears  are  justified.  She  is  definitely  warned  of  a  fact 
which  sooner  or  later  she  will  have  to  face  if  it  is  really  a  fact. 
And  it  is  obviously  far  better  that  it  should  become  patent  to 
America  (and  the  world)  now,  than  later  (after  a  possibly 
patched  up  peace).  Indeed,  on  grounds  simply  of  sheer  na- 
tional security  America  should  attempt  by  some  such  means  to 
establish  now,  when  Germany  is  relatively  helpless  so  far  as 
damaging  us  is  concerned,  where  she  stands,  what  America 
faces.  It  would  enable  her  to  make  her  future  policy  definite 
and  objective. 

But  suppose  Germany,  realizing  at  last  that  it  is  impossible 
to  maintain  a  national  policy  which  during  the  next  generation 
or  two  will  have  to  meet  not  only  the  opposition  of  the  Western 
democracies  of  Europe  and  the  potential  forces  of  Russia,  but 
all  that  North  America  might  during  the  next  generation  de- 
velop into,  accepts?  What  if  the  German  government  were 
pushed  by  the  best  elements  of  the  German  people  to  take  the 
opportunity  thus  so  publicly  offered  for  putting  themselves 
right  with  the  world  and  starting  afresh  on  a  more  workable 
basis? 

331 


If  that  happened — which  after  all  is  the  most  probable  thing 
of  all — America,  without  striking  a  blow,  would  have  secured 
from  Germany  the  main  thing  for  which  the  Western  democ- 
racies are  now  fighting.  Not  only  would  she  have  laid  the 
foundation  for  the  future  protection  of  her  own  sea  rights  in  the 
only  way  in  which  finally  they  can  be  protected — by  an  inter- 
national law  that  is  a  reality  because  rooted  in  a  real  interna- 
tional order — but  she  would  have  helped  win  the  battle  of 
democracy  by  bringing  about  a  discussion  of  terms  before  the 
democratic  nations  have  bled  themselves  white. 

Never  in  history  had  a  nation  such  an  opportunity.  But  to 
take  it  means  breaking  with  routine,  employing  a  new  method, 
a  new  manner;  great  governmental  boldness,  great  political 
honesty.  And  all  that  is,  perhaps,  too  much  to  ask. 

But  that  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  face  the  fact  that  on 
those  conditions  the  opportunity  is  there.  Nor  why  those  most 
responsible  for  the  direction  of  American  public  opinion  should 
not  help  the  nation  to  realize  it. 

NORMAN  ANGELL. 


332 


INDEX 


Algeciras,  30. 

Alliances,     135     ff,     144,     166; 

prohibited,   94,   250,   266. 
Alsace-Lorraine,    autonomy    of, 

245,  260. 
American  School  Peace  League, 

program  of,  267. 
Angell,    Norman,    33,    34,    82, 

326. 
Annexation,  76,  249,  306,  308, 

311,   316,   322,   325. 


demnity,  321;  and  Germany, 
58,  316,  320. 

Berlin  Conference  of  1885,  29. 

Bernstein,    Ed.,    317. 

Bosphorus,  neutralization  of, 
245. 

Boycott,  economic,  155,  174  ff, 
186. 

Brailsford,   H.  N.,   302. 

Bund  Neues  Vaterland,  pro- 
gram of,  306. 


Arbitration,  249,  251,  254,  262,      Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  275. 
271,    306,    324;    compulsory,      Buxton,  Charles  Roden,  301. 


262,  322,  325. 
Armaments,  export  of,  266; 
limitation  of,  99,  124,  246, 
248,  249,  250,  256,  262,  265, 
266,  267,  271,  276,  277,  297, 

300,  301,  306,  310,  322,  323, 
325;     national    manufacture 
of,  102  ff,  250,  265,  266,  267, 
268,  269,  271,  277,  299,  300, 

301,  324. 

Armed  Peace,  121. 

Australian  Peace  Alliance,  pro- 
gram of,  300. 

Autonomy,  249,  254,  262,  275, 
306,  318,  322. 

Backward  peoples,  22. 
Balance   of    Power,    94  ff,    124, 

265,  277,  301. 
Bauer,  Otto,  35. 
Belgium,  restoration  of,  245, 

260,  262,  274,  301,  320;   in- 


333 


Capital,  export  of,  14,  21,  256. 
Causes  of  war,   3,  5,   109,  265, 

268. 
Central      "human      betterment 

bureau,"  196. 
Central     Organization     for     a 

Durable   Peace,   program   of, 

247. 
Chamber    of    Commerce   of    U. 

S.,  program  of,  276. 
Charte  Mondiale,  248. 
Citizen  Army,  310. 
Coercion,     international,      130, 

133,  134,   155,  160,   174,   184, 

251,  255,  264,  270,  276,  293. 
Concert    of    nations,    98,    106, 

267,  268,  322,  325. 
Commercial  privilege  as  cause 

of  war,  5. 
Commission    on    International 

Migration,  World,  196. 


Concessions,  24. 

Conference  of  organized  labor, 

322. 
Conservation  Commission, 

World,  195. 
Constantinople,     neutralization 

of,  274. 

Consular  Service,  World,  194. 
Council    of    Investigation    and 

Conciliation,    128,    248,    249, 

264,  276,  285,  298. 
Council  of  States,  225,  249. 
Court  of  International  Justice, 

248,  249,  264,  265,  271,  276, 

297,  300,  311,  319. 

Dardanelles,  neutralization  of, 
245. 

David  Starr  Jordan,  program 
of,  273. 

Democracy,  political,  310;  in- 
dustrial, 272,  300. 

Democratic  Control  of  foreign 
policy,  89  ff,  109,  245,  248, 

249,  250,  251,  254,  255,  257, 
262,  266,  268,  271,  277,  297, 

298,  299,  300,  306,  319,  323, 
325. 

Dernburg,  Dr.  Bernhard,  314. 

Deutsche  Friedensgesellschaft, 
program  of,  306. 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  82. 

Diplomacy,  22,  67  ff ;  secret,  90, 
245,  261,  262,  322. 

Drago  Doctrine,  19. 

Dutch  Anti-War  Council,  pro- 
gram of,  325. 

Economic  Imperialism,  7,  15  ff, 

23  ff,  35. 
Education,  reform  of,  249,  257. 

Fabian    Society,     program    of, 

186,  278. 
Far  East,  commission  to  study 

problems  of,  269. 
Federation  of  nations,  106,  114, 


172,  203,  265,  267,  268,  271, 
310,  322,  323,  325. 

Ford,  Henry,  243. 

Foreign  policy,  democratic  con- 
trol of,  245,  248,  249,  250, 
251,  254,  255,  257,  262,  266, 
268,  271,  277,  297,  298,  299, 
300,  306,  319,  323,  325. 

Freedom  of  nationalities,  50, 
249,  254,  262,  275,  306,  318, 
322. 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  7,  10,  245, 
248,  256,  274,  306. 

Freedom  of  trade,  6,  11,  250, 
265,  274,  298,  311,  314,  315, 
324,  325. 

General  Confederation  of  La- 
bor, program  of,  322. 

German  policy,  111  ff. 

Great  Britain,  as  example  of 
federalism,  114,  228. 

Great  Society,  the,  222. 

Guarantees,  57,  60,  245,  270, 
324. 

Hague    Conference,     150,     248, 

256,  270,  323. 
Haase,  312. 

Imperialism,  7,  15,  23,  35,  110. 

Indemnities,  271,  310,  321. 

Industrial  democracy,  272,  300. 

International  Congress  of 
Women,  program  of,  250. 

International  Bureau  of  Peace, 
program  of,  249. 

International  Council,  277,  278, 
280. 

International  Government,  18, 
31,  64,  120,  179  ff,  246,  249, 
256,  265,  271,  274,  278,  299, 
310. 

International  High  Court,  186, 
278,  288. 

Independent  Labor  Party,  pro- 
gram of,  33,  296. 

International   law,   221  ff,   264, 


334 


265,  268,  276,  306,  314,  319, 

320,  323. 
International  Parliament,    161, 

249. 

International     Peace     Commis- 
sion, 298. 
International  organization,  29, 

194,   276,    306. 
International  police  force,  152, 

181,  249,  264,  265,  268,  271, 

310. 
International   Secretariat,  278, 

287. 

Justiciable  issues,  290. 
Kautsky,  Karl,  40. 

Language,  guarantee  of,  248. 
League    of    Peace,    78,    79,    85, 

120,    131,    135  ff,    143  ff,    165, 

169,  270. 
League  to  Enforce  Peace,   148, 

160,  264. 

Like-mindedness,  193. 
Loans  for  war,  prohibition  of, 

186,  267. 

Mediation,  continuous,  243,  254. 
'Militarism,  123. 
Military  service,  109,  152,  266, 

301. 
Minorities,   rights   of,   61,   249, 

275. 

Monetary  System,  World,   197. 
"Most  favored  nation,"  311. 

Nationality,  47,  192,  217;  free- 
dom of,  249,  254,  262,  275, 
306,  318,  322;  respect  for, 
254,  267. 

National  Peace  Convention, 
program  of,  264. 

National  Peace  Council,  pro- 
gram of,  298. 

Naturalization,  269. 

Neutral    Conference    for    Con- 


tinuous Mediation,  program 
of,  243. 

Neutralization  of  straits  and 
canals,  10,  265,  271,  310,  311, 
314,  315,  320;  of  disputed 
regions,  324;  of  Constanti- 
nople, 274;  of  colonies,  315. 

'Neutral  States  in  peace  nego- 
tiations, 249,  268,  269,  323. 

Non-intercourse,  265. 

"Open  Door,"  the,  4,  250,  306, 
320  (see  Freedom  of  trade). 

Patriotism,   217  ff. 

Pacifism,   164. 

Peaceful  penetration,  23. 

Permanent  Credit  Bureau,  20. 

Persia,  guarantees  for,  60. 

Philadelphia  Conference  of 
League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
170. 

Plebiscite  in  transferred  terri- 
tory, 76,  87,  244,  247,  249, 
251,  254,  266,  267,  271,  277, 
297,  298,  299,  300,  310,  318, 
323. 

Preparedness,  269. 

Poland,  autonomy  of,  245,  260. 

Press,  reform  of,  74,  249. 

"Principle  of  the  Common- 
wealth," 227. 

Private  property  at  sea,  265. 

Publicity  organization,  World, 
197. 

Quidde,  Dr.  L.,  316. 

Eeform    Club    of    New    York, 

memorandum,  4,  10. 
Religious  liberty,   248. 
Rights-of-way,  economic,  60. 

Scandinavia,     guarantees     for, 

60. 

Serbia,  autonomy  of,  245. 
Slovene    Unit,    guarantees    for, 

60. 


335 


Small  States,  security  of,  77, 
143,  274,  275. 

Socialism,   35,   272. 

Socialists,  allied  nations,  pro- 
gram, 259;  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian,  program, 
306 ;  South-German,  program, 
310;  German  party,  pro- 
gram, 310,  311;  neutral  na- 
tions, program,  261;  Ameri- 
can party,  program,  271; 
and  imperialism,  33,  38. 

Social  organization,  forms  of, 
189. 

"Spheres  of  influence,"  15,  83. 

State,  theory  of  the,  70. 

Status  quo  ante,  310. 

Straits,  neutralization  of,  245, 
265. 

Suffrage,  universal  adult,  266; 
woman,  249,  251,  254,  255, 
257,  268,  271,  298. 

Swiss  Committee  for  Study  of 
a  Durable  Peace,  program, 
323. 

Swiss  Peace  Society,  program, 
323. 

Switzerland,  example  of  fed- 
eralism, 114. 

Tariff  restrictions,  6,  82. 
Trade  as  cause  of  war,  9. 


Trades        unions,        organized 

against  war,  300. 
Transfer    of   territory,    76,    87, 

244,  247,  249,  251,  254,  266, 

267,  271,  275,  277,  297,  298, 

299,   300. 
Treaties,  secret,  245,  248,  249, 

250,  257,  306,  323. 

Union  of  Democratic  Control, 
program,  33,  86  ff,  277. 

Union  of  International  Asso- 
ciations, program  of,  248. 

United  States,  example  of  fed- 
eralism, 114,  228. 

Vorwaerts,  36. 

Walling,  Wm.  English,  39. 

West  African  Conference,  29. 

Women,  as  delegates  to  peace 
conference,  251,  258,  259; 
Committee  for  Constructive 
Peace,  program,  259;  In- 
ternational Congress  of,  250; 
suffrage,  249,  251,  254,  255, 
257,  268,  271,  298. 

Women's  Peace  Party,  program 
of,  33,  268. 

World  Congress,  246,  298. 

World  Peace  Foundation,  pro- 
gram of,  266. 


336 


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